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do-Pakistani wars and conflicts 



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Contents 

Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 1 

Background 8 

Indian independence movement 8 

Pakistan Movement 26 

Wars 33 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 34 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1 947 34 

Partition of India 42 

Kashmir conflict 42 

Stages of the war 66 

Military operations in Ladakh (1948) 66 

Military operations in Poonch (1948) 68 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 72 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1 965 72 

Aerial warfare 90 

Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1 965 90 

Indian Air Force 96 

Pakistan Air Force 110 

Naval hostilities 128 

Operation Dwarka 128 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 132 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1 97 1 132 

Background 149 

Bangladesh Liberation War 149 

1971 Bangladesh atrocities 166 

Naval hostilities 177 

Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 177 



Air operations 183 

East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 183 

Surrender 193 

Instrument of Surrender (1971) 193 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1999 195 

Kargil War 195 

War progress 212 

Kargil order of battle 212 

Nuclear conflict 216 

Smiling Buddha 216 

Kirana Hills 220 

Pokhran-II 224 

Chagai-I 232 

Kharan Desert 240 

Other armed engagements 243 

Indian integration of Junagadh 243 

Siachen conflict 246 

Operation Brasstacks 25 1 

Sir Creek 253 

Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 255 

2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoff 262 

India— Pakistan maritime trespassing 265 

Incidents 267 

Atlantique Incident 267 

2008 Mumbai attacks 273 

201 1 India-Pakistan border shooting 291 

In popular culture 293 

Films (Indian) 294 

Hindustan Ki Kasam 294 

Aakraman 296 

Vijeta 297 



Param Vir Chakra (film) 299 

Border (1997 film) 301 

LOC Kargil 305 

Deewaar (2004 film) 309 

Lakshya (film) 310 

1971 (film) 315 

Kurukshetra (2008 film) 324 

Miniseries/Dramas (Pakistani) 32 g 

Angar Wadi 326 

Laag (TV series) 327 

Alpha Bravo Charlie 328 

Sipahi Maqbool Hussain 33 1 

Battles of Indo-Pakistani wars 333 

Operation Barisal 333 

Operation Python 334 

Operation Trident ( 1 97 1 ) 336 

Battle of AsalUttar 339 

Battle of Atgram 341 

Battle of Basantar 346 

Battle of Boyra 351 

Battle of Chamb 354 

Battle of Dhalai 354 

Battle of Kushtia 354 

Capture of Kishangarh Fort 354 

Battle of Garibpur 356 

Battle of Gazipur 357 

Battle of Hilli 360 

Defence of KamalPur 362 

Khemkaran 364 

Lahore Front 366 

Battle of Longewala 369 

Meghna Heli Bridge 374 

Mitro Bahini Order of Battle December 197 1 375 

Operation Chengiz Khan 38 1 

Operation Gibraltar 387 

Operation Meghdoot 391 



Operation Safed Sagar 394 

Battle of Phillora 397 

Tangail Airdrop 398 

Battle of Tololing 399 

References 

Article Sources and Contributors 400 

Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 408 

Article Licenses 

License 412 



Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 



Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 



Since the partition of British India in 1947 and creation of India and 
Pakistan, the two South Asian countries have been involved in four 
wars, including one undeclared war, as well as many border skirmishes 
and military stand-offs. Additionally, India has accused Pakistan of 
engaging in proxy wars by providing military and financial assistance 
to violent non-state actors. 

The dispute for Kashmir has been the cause, whether direct or indirect 
of all major conflicts between the two countries with the exception of 
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, where conflict originated due to 
turmoil in erstwhile East Pakistan. 




The F-86 Sabre was a front-line fighter of the 
PAF during the 1 965 and 1 97 1 wars. 



Background 



Further information: Indian independence movement and Pakistan 
Movement 

The Partition of India came about in the aftermath of World War II, 
when both Great Britain and British India were dealing with the 
economic stresses caused by the war and its demobilisation. It was 
the intention of those who wished for a Muslim state to come from 
British India to have a clean partition between independent and equal 



"Pakistan" and "Hindustan" once independence came 



12] 




Refugees awaiting evacuation by IAF Dakota on 
Poonch Airstrip, December 1947. 



The partition itself, according to leading politicians such as 

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, leader of the All India Muslim League, and Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the Indian National 
Congress, should have resulted in peaceful relations. However, the partition of British India into India and Pakistan 
in 1947 did not divide the nations cleanly along religious lines. Nearly one third of the Muslim population of British 
India remained in India. Inter-communal violence between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims resulted in between 



500,000 to 1 million casualties 



[1]:6 



Princely-ruled territories, such as Kashmir and Hyderabad, were also involved in Partition. Rulers of these territories 
had the choice of joining India or Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan laid claim on Kashmir and thus it became the 
main point of conflict. The ruler of Kashmir, which had a Muslim majority population, joined India by signing 



the Instrument of Accession 



[4] 



Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 



Wars 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 

This is also called the First Kashmir War. The war started in October 

1947 when it was feared by the Kashmiris that Maharajah of the 
princely state of Kashmir and Jammu might accede to India as choice 
was given to him on the matter to accede to any of the newly 
independent nations. Tribal forces from Pakistan attacked and occupied 
the princely state, resulting in Maharajah signing the Agreement to the 
accession of the princely state to India. The United Nations was invited 
by India to mediate the quarrel resulting in the UN Security Council 
passing Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948. The war ended in December 

1948 with the Line of Control dividing Kashmir into territories 
administered by Pakistan (northern and western areas) and India 
(southern, central and northeastern areas). 




Sherman tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on 
the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 

This war started following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was 
designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an 
insurgency against rule by India. India retaliated by launching an attack 
on Pakistan. The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both 
sides and was witness to the largest tank battle in military history since 
World War II. The outcome of this war was a strategic stalemate with 
some small tactical victories for both sides. The war concluded after 
diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and USA and the 
subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration. 




Pakistan's PNS Ghazi, was a significant threat to 
Indian Navy in 1965 and 1971 wars. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 

The war was unique in that it did not involve the issue of Kashmir, but was rather precipitated by the crisis brewing 
in erstwhile East Pakistan. Following Operation Searchlight and the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities, about 10 million 
Bengalis in East Pakistan took refuge in neighbouring India. India intervened in the ongoing Bangladesh liberation 



movement 



[7] [8] 



After a large scale pre-emptive strike by Pakistan, full-scale hostilities between the two countries 
commenced. Within two weeks of intense fighting, Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to India following 
which the People's Republic of Bangladesh was created. This war saw the highest number of casualties in any of 
the India-Pakistan conflicts, as well as the largest number of prisoners of war since the Second World War after the 
surrender of more than 90,000 Pakistani military and civilians. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1999 (minor war) 

Commonly known as Kargil War, this conflict between the two countries was mostly limited. Pakistani troops along 
with Kashmiri insurgents infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC) and occupied Indian territory mostly in the 
Kargil district. The Pakistani government believed that its nuclear weapons would deter a full-scale escalation in 
conflict but India launched a major military campaign to flush out the infiltrators. Due to Indian military advances 
and increasing foreign diplomatic pressure, Pakistan was forced to withdraw its forces back across the LoC. 



Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 

Nuclear conflict 

The Nuclear conflict between both countries is of passive strategic nature with Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan stating a 
first strike policy, although the strike would only be initiated if and only if, the Pakistan Armed Forces are unable to 
halt an invasion (as for example in 1971 war) or a nuclear strike is launched against Pakistan while India has a 
declared policy of No first use. 

ri2i 

• Pokhran-I (Smiling Buddha): On 18 May 1974 India detonated an 8 Kiloton nuclear device at Pokhran Test 

Range becoming the first nation to become nuclear capable outside the five permanent members of United 

ri3i 

Nations Security Council as well as dragging Pakistan along with it into a nuclear arms race with the Pakistani 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto swearing to reciprocate India. The Pakistan Atomic Energy 

Commission Chairman Munir Ahmed Khan said that the test would force Pakistan to test its own nuclear 
bomb. [16] 

• Kirana-I: In 1980s a series of 24 different cold tests were conducted by Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission led 

ri7i 
by Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan under extreme secrecy. The tunnels at Kirana Hills, Sargodha, are reported 

to have been bored after the Chagai nuclear test sites, it is widely believed that the tunnels were constructed 

sometime between 1979 and 1983. As in Chagai, the tunnels at Kirana Hills had been bored and then sealed and 

ri7i 

this task was also undertaken by PAEC's DTD. Later due to excessive US intelligence and satellite focus on 
the Kirana Hills site, it was abandoned and the WTL-I was shifted to the Kala-Chitta Range. 

• Pokhran-II (Operation Shakti): On 1 1 May 1998 India detonated another 5 nuclear devices at Pokhran Test 
Range. With jublication and large scale approval from the Indian society came International sanctions as a 
reaction to this test. The most vehement reaction of all coming from Pakistan. Great ire was raised in Pakistan, 
which issued a severe statement claiming that India was instigating a nuclear arms race in the region. Pakistan 
vowed to match India's nuclear capability with statements like, "We are in a headlong arms race on the 
subcontinent." 

• Chagai-I: (Youm-e-Takbir) Within half a month of Pokhran-II, on 28 May 1998 Pakistan detonated 5 nuclear 
devices to reciprocate India in the nuclear arms race. Pakistani public, like the Indian, reacted with a celebration 
and heightened sense of nationalism for responding to India in kind and becoming the only Muslim nuclear 
power. The day was later given the title Youm-e-Takbir to further proclaim such. 

• Chagai-II: Two days later, on 30 May 1998, Pakistan detonated a 6th nuclear device completing its own series of 

[21] [221 

underground tests with this being the last test the two nations have carried out to date. 

Other armed engagements 

Apart from the aforementioned wars, there have been skirmishes between the two nations from time to time. Some 
have bordered on all-out war, while others were limited in scope. The countries were expected to fight each other in 
1955 after warlike posturing on both sides, but full-scale war did not break out. 

• Indian integration of Junagadh: The princely state of Junagadh, which had a Hindu majority and a Muslim 
ruler acceded to Pakistan on 15 September 1947, claiming a connection by sea. Pakistan's acceptance of the 
Instrument of Accession was seen as a strategy to get a plebiscite held in Kashmir which had a Muslim majority 
and a Hindu ruler. Following communal tensions Indian military entered the territory which was protested by 
Pakistan as a violation of International law. Later a plebiscite was held and the accession was reversed for the 

t t t ■ ■ j a- [23] [24] [25] [26] 

state to join India. 

• Kashmir conflict: Other than the three wars mentioned in above section, the conflict, since accession of the state 
on 26 October 1947, has been an on and off major cause for the tensions between the two nations. 

• Siachen conflict: In 1984, India launched Operation Meghdoot capturing most of the Siachen Glacier. Further 
clashes erupted in the glacial area in 1985, 1987 and 1995 as Pakistan sought, without success, to oust India from 
its stronghold. 



Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 

• Operation Brasstacks: (the largest of its kind in South Asia), conducted by India between November 1986 and 
March 1987, and Pakistani mobilisation in response, raised tensions and fears that it could lead to another war 
between the two neighbours. 

• Sir Creek: The dispute lies in the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. Before 

India's independence, the provincial region was a part of Bombay Presidency of British India. After India's 

independence in 1947, Sindh became a part of Pakistan while Kutch remained a part of India. Pakistan lays claim 

[291 
to the entire creek as per paras 9 and 10 of the Bombay Government Resolution of 1914 signed between the 

then Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch. 

• Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir: An insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir has been a cause for 
heightened tensions. 

• 2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoff: The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, which 

India blamed on the Pakistan-based terrorist organisations Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, prompted the 

T311 
2001—2002 India-Pakistan standoff and brought both sides close to war. 

• India— Pakistan maritime trespassing: frequent trespassing and violation of respective national territorial waters 
of India and Pakistan in peacetime occurs commonly by Pakistani and Indian fishermen operating along the 
coastline of the Indian state of Gujarat and the Pakistani province of Sindh. Most violations occur due to the 
absence of a physical boundary and lack of navigational tools for small fishermen. Hundreds of fishermen are 
arrested by the Coast Guards of both nations, but obtaining their release is difficult and long-winded owing to the 
hostile relations between the two nations. 

Incidents 

• Atlantique Incident: Pakistan Navy's Naval Air Arm Breguet Atlantique patrol plane, carrying 16 people on 
board, was shot down by the Indian Air Force for alleged violation of airspace. The episode took place in the 
Rann of Kutch on 10 August 1999, just a month after the Kargil War, creating a tense atmosphere between India 
and Pakistan. Foreign diplomats noted that the plane fell inside Pakistani territory, although it may have crossed 
the border. However, they also believe that India's reaction was unjustified. Pakistan later lodged a 
compensation claim at the International Court of Justice, accusing India for the incident, but the court dismissed 
the case in India's favour. 

• 2008 Mumbai attacks: Following 10 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai, India's largest 

r37ir38i 
city, tensions heightened between the two countries since India claimed interogation results alleging 

Pakistan's ISI supporting the attackers while Pakistan denied it. Pakistan placed its air force on alert and 

moved troops to the Indian border voicing concerns about proactive movements of Indian Army and Indian 

[43] 
government's possible plans to launch attacks on Pakistani soil. The tension diffused in short time and Pakistan 

moved its troops away from border. 

• 2011 India— Pakistan border shooting: incident took place between 30 August (Tuesday) and 1 September 201 1 
(Thursday) across the Line of Control in Kupwara District/Neelam Valley resulting in one Indian soldier and 
three Pakistani soldiers being killed. Both countries gave different accounts of the incident, each accusing the 
other of initiating the hostilities. 



Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 

Annual celebrations 

• 28 May (since 1998) as Youm-e-Takbir (The day of Greatness) in Pakistan. 

• 26 July (since 1999) as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. 

• 6 September (since 1965) as Defence Day (Youm-e-Difa) in Pakistan. 

• 7 September (since 1965) as Air Force Day (Youm-e-Fizaya) in Pakistan. 

• 8 September (since 1965) as Victory Day/Navy Day in Pakistan. 

• 4 December (since 1971) as Navy Day in India. 

• 16 December (since 1971) as Vijay Diwas (Victory Day) in India. 

In popular culture 

These wars have provided source material for both Indian and Pakistani film and television dramatists, who have 
adapted events of the war for the purposes of drama and to please target audiences in their nations. 

Films (Indian) 

• Hindustan Ki Kasam, a 1973 Hindi war film based on Operation Cactus Lilly of the 197 1 Indo-Pakistani War, 
directed by Chetan Anand. 

Aakraman, a 1975 Hindi war film based on the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, directed by J. Om Prakash. 
Vijeta, a 1982 Hindi film based on the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, produced by Shashi Kapoor and directed by 
Govind Nihalani. 

Param Vir Chakra, a 1995 Hindi film based on Indo-Pak War, directed by Ashok Kaul. 
Border, a 1997 Hindi war film based on the Battle of Longewala of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, directed by 
J.P.Dutta. 

LOC Kargil, a 2003 Hindi war film based on the Kargil War, directed by J.P.Dutta 

Deewaar, a 2004 Hindi film starring Amitabh Bachchan based on the POW of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, 
directed by Milan Luthria. 

Lakshya, a 2004 Hindi film partially based on the events of the Kargil War, directed by Farhan Akhtar. 
1971, 2007 Hindi war film based on a true story of prisoners of war after the Indo-Pak war of 1971, directed by 
Amrit Sagar 
Kurukshetra, a 2008 Malayalam film based on Kargil War, directed by Major Ravi. 

Miniseries/Dramas (Pakistani) 

Angaar Waadi, an Urdu drama serial based on Indian occupation of Kashmir, directed by Rauf Khalid 

Laag, an Urdu drama serial based on Indian occupation of Kashmir, directed by Rauf Khalid 

Operation Dwarka, 1965, an Urdu drama based on the naval Operation Dwarka of 1965, directed by Qasim Jalali 

PNS Ghazi (Shaheed), an Urdu drama based on sinking of PNS Ghazi, ISPR 

Alpha Bravo Charlie, an Urdu drama serial based on three different aspects of Pakistan Army's involvement in 

action, directed by Shoaib Mansoor 

Shahpar, an Urdu drama serial based on Pakistan Air Force, directed by Qaisar Farooq & Syed Shakir Uzair 

Sipahi Maqbool Hussain, an Urdu drama serial based on a 1965 war POW, directed by Haider Imam Rizvi 



Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts 

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December 2011. 
[48] Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965 — John Fricker — Google Boeken (http://books. google. com/books ?id=RPttAAAAMAAJ& 

source=gbs_navlinks_s). Google Books. 1 January 1979. . Retrieved 16 December 201 1. 
[49] "Param Vir Chakra (1995)" (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0940893/). IMDB. . Retrieved 26 November 201 1. 
[50] APP 25 November 2011 (25 November 2011). "Prominent writer, actor, Rauf Khalid dies in road accident I Entertainment" (http://www. 

dawn.com/2011/ll/25/prominent-writer-actor-rauf-khalid-dies-in-road-accident.html). Dawn. Com. . Retrieved 15 January 2012. 

External links 

• Nuclear Proliferation in India and Pakistani (http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552636) 
from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives (http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/ 
10822/552494) 



Background 



Indian independence movement 




Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi was the pre-eminent political and ideological 
leader of India during the Indian independence movement. 



Colonial India 



Imperial Entities of India 


Colonial India 


Dutch India 


1605-1825 


Danish India 


1620-1869 


French India 


1759-1954 


Portuguese India 1510-1961 


Casa da India 


1434-1833 


Portuguese East India Company 


1628-1633 


British India 1613-1947 


East India Company 


1612-1757 


Company rule in India 


1757-1857 


British Raj 


1858-1947 


British rule in Burma 


1824-1942 


1765-1947/48 


Partition of India 


1947 



The term Indian Independence Movement encompasses a wide area of political organisations, philosophies, and 
movements which had the common aim of ending first British East India Company rule, and then British imperial 
authority, in parts of South Asia. The independence movement saw various national and regional campaigns, 



Indian independence movement 



agitations and efforts, some nonviolent and others not so. 

During the first quarter of the 19th century, Rammohan Roy introduced modern education into India. Swami 
Vivekananda was the chief architect who profoundly projected the rich culture of India to the west at the end of 19th 
century. Many of the country's political leaders of the 19th and 20th century, including Mahatma Gandhi and Netaji 
Subhas Chandra Bose, were influenced by the teachings of Swami Vivekananda. 

The first organized militant movements were in Bengal, but they later took to the political stage in the form of a 
mainstream movement in the then newly formed Indian National Congress (INC), with prominent moderate leaders 
seeking only their basic right to appear for Indian Civil Service examinations, as well as more rights, economic in 
nature, for the people of the soil. The early part of the 20th century saw a more radical approach towards political 
independence proposed by leaders such as the Lai, Bal, Pal and Aurobindo Ghosh. 

The last stages of the freedom struggle from the 1920s onwards saw Congress adopt Mohandas Karamchand 
Gandhi's policy of nonviolence and civil resistance, Muhammad Ali Jinnah's constitutional struggle for the rights of 
minorities in India, and several other campaigns. Legendary figures such as Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose later came 
to adopt a militant approach to the movement, while others like Swami Sahajanand Saraswati wanted both political 
and economic freedom for India's peasants and toiling masses. Poets including Rabindranath Tagore used literature, 
poetry and speech as a tool for political awareness. The period of the Second World War saw the peak of the 
campaigns by the Quit India movement (led by "Mahatma" Gandhi) and the Indian National Army (INA) movement 
(led by "Netaji" Subhas Chandra Bose) and others, eventually resulting in the withdrawal of the British. 

The work of these various movements led ultimately to the Indian Independence Act 1947, which created the 
independent dominions of India and Pakistan. India remained a Dominion of the Crown until 26 January 1950, when 
the Constitution of India came into force, establishing the Republic of India; Pakistan was a dominion until 1956. 

The Indian independence movement was a mass-based movement that encompassed various sections of society. It 
also underwent a process of constant ideological evolution. Although the basic ideology of the movement was 
anti-colonial, it was supported by a vision of independent capitalist economic development coupled with a secular, 
democratic, republican, and civil-libertarian political structure. After the 1930s, the movement took on a strong 
socialist orientation, due to the increasing influence of left-wing elements in the INC as well as the rise and growth 
of the Communist Party of India. On the other hand, due to the INC's policies, the All-India Muslim League was 
formed in 1906 to protect the rights of Muslims in the Indian Sub-continent against the INC and to present a Muslim 
voice to the British government. 



Background (1757-1885) 



Early British colonialism in India 

European traders first reached Indian shores with the arrival of the 
Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1498 at the port of Calicut, in 
search of the lucrative spice trade. Just over a century later, the Dutch 
and English established trading outposts on the subcontinent, with the 
first English trading post set up at Surat in 1612. Over the course of 
the 17th and early 18th centuries, the British defeated the Portuguese 
and Dutch militarily, but remained in conflict with the French, who had 
by then sought to establish themselves in the subcontinent. The decline 
of the Mughal empire in the first half of the 18th century provided the 
British with the opportunity to seize a firm foothold in Indian 
politics. After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, during which the East 




Robert Clive, 1st Baron Clive with Mir Jafar after 
the Battle of Plassey 



Indian independence movement 



10 



India Company's Bengal army under Robert Clive defeated Siraj-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Bengal, the Company 
established itself as a major player in Indian affairs, and soon afterwards gained administrative rights over the 
regions of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, following the Battle of Buxar in 1765. After the defeat of Tipu Sultan, most 
of South India came either under the Company's direct rule, or under its indirect political control as part a princely 
state in a subsidiary alliance. The Company subsequently gained control of regions ruled by the Maratha Empire, 
after defeating them in a series of wars. Punjab was annexed in 1849, after the defeat of the Sikh armies in the First 
(1845-46) and Second (1848-49) Anglo-Sikh Wars. 

In 1835 English was made the medium of instruction in India's schools. Western-educated Hindu elites sought to rid 
Hinduism of controversial social practices, including the varna caste system, child marriage, and sati. Literary and 
debating societies established in Calcutta (Kolkata) and Bombay (Mumbai) became forums for open political 
discourse. 

Even while these modernising trends influenced Indian society, many 
Indians increasingly despised British rule. With the British now 
dominating most of the subcontinent, they grew increasingly abusive 
of local customs by, for example, staging parties in mosques, dancing 
to the music of regimental bands on the terrace of the Taj Mahal, using 
whips to force their way through crowded bazaars (as recounted by 
General Henry Blake), and mistreating Indians (including the sepoys). 
In the years after the annexation of Punjab in 1849, several mutinies 
broke out among the sepoys; these were put down by force. 

After the defeat of Tipu Sultan, most of South 

India was now either under the Company's direct 

rule, or under its indirect political control 




Indian States during 
Revolt of 1857 



The rebellion of 1857 and its consequences 

The Indian rebellion of 1857 was a large-scale rebellion in northern 
and central India against the British East India Company's rule. It was 
suppressed and the British government took control of the Company. 

The conditions of service in the Company's army and cantonments 

increasingly came into conflict with the religious beliefs and prejudices 

of the sepoys. Chandra 1989, p. 33 The predominance of members 

from the upper castes in the army, perceived loss of caste due to 

overseas travel, and rumours of secret designs of the Government to 

convert them to Christianity led to deep discontentment among the 

sepoys. Chandra 1989, p. 34 The sepoys were also disillusioned by their 

low salaries and the racial discrimination practised by British officers 

in matters of promotion and privileges. Chandra 1989, p. 34 The 

indifference of the British towards leading native Indian rulers such as 

the Mughals and ex-Peshwas and the annexation of Oudh were 

political factors triggering dissent amongst Indians. The Marquess of 

Dalhousie's policy of annexation, the doctrine of lapse (or escheat) applied by the British, and the projected removal 

of the descendants of the Great Mughal from their ancestral palace at Red Fort to the Qutb (near Delhi) also angered 

some people. 




States during the rebellion 



Indian independence movement 1 1 

The final spark was provided by the rumoured use of tallow (from cows) and lard (pig fat) in the newly introduced 
Pattern 1853 Enfield rifle cartridges. Soldiers had to bite the cartridges with their teeth before loading them into their 
rifles, and the reported presence of cow and pig fat was religiously offensive to both Hindu and Muslim 
soldiers. "The Uprising of 1857" . Library of Congress. Retrieved 2009-11-10. 

Mangal Pandey, a 29 year old sepoy, was believed to be responsible for inspiring the Indian sepoys to rise against 
the British. On the first week of May 1857, he killed a higher officer in his regiment at Barrackpore for the 
introduction of the offensive rule. He was captured and was sentenced to death when the British took back control 
over the regiment. On 10 May 1857, the sepoys at Meerut broke rank and turned on their commanding officers, 
killing some of them. They then reached Delhi on May 11, set the Company's toll house afire, and marched into the 
Red Fort, where they asked the Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah II, to become their leader and reclaim his throne. 
The emperor was reluctant at first, but eventually agreed and was proclaimed Shehenshah-e-Hindustan by the rebels. 
Chandra 1989, p. 31 The rebels also murdered much of the European, Eurasian, and Christian population of the city. 
David, S (202) The India Mutiny, Penguin P122 

Revolts broke out in other parts of Oudh and the North-Western Provinces as well, where civil rebellion followed the 
mutinies, leading to popular uprisings. Chandra 1989, p. 35 The British were initially caught off-guard and were thus 
slow to react, but eventually responded with force. The lack of effective organisation among the rebels, coupled with 
the military superiority of the British, brought a rapid end to the rebellion. Chandra 1989, pp. 38—39 The British 
fought the main army of the rebels near Delhi, and after prolonged fighting and a siege, defeated them and retook the 
city on 20 September 1857. Chandra 1989, p. 39 Subsequently, revolts in other centres were also crushed. The last 
significant battle was fought in Gwalior on 17 June 1858, during which Rani Lakshmi Bai was killed. Sporadic 
fighting and guerrilla warfare, led by Tatya Tope, continued until 1859, but most of the rebels were eventually 
subdued. 

The Indian Rebellion of 1857 was a major turning point in the history of modern India. While affirming the military 
and political power of the British,Heehs 1998, p. 32 it led to significant change in how India was to be controlled by 
them. Under the Government of India Act 1858, the Company was deprived of its involvement in ruling India, with 
its territory being transferred to the direct authority of the British government. At the apex of the new system was a 
Cabinet minister, the Secretary of State for India, who was to be formally advised by a statutory council;Heehs 1998, 
pp. 47—48 the Governor-General of India (Viceroy) was made responsible to him, while he in turn was responsible to 
the British Parliament for British rule. In a royal proclamation made to the people of India, Queen Victoria promised 
equal opportunity of public service under British law, and also pledged to respect the rights of the native 
princes. Heehs 1998, p. 48 The British stopped the policy of seizing land from the princes, decreed religious 
tolerance, and began to admit Indians into the civil service (albeit mainly as subordinates). However, they also 
increased the number of British soldiers in relation to native Indian ones, and only allowed British soldiers to handle 
artillery. Bahadur Shah was exiled to Rangoon (Yangon), Burma (Myanmar), where he died in 1862. 

In 1876, Queen Victoria took the additional title of Empress of India. 



Indian independence movement 



12 




at. coM'ir.ir^s. ] y8y 



Image of the delegates to the first meeting of the Indian National Congress in 
Bombay, 1885 



Rise of organized movements 

The decades following the Rebellion were a 
period of growing political awareness, 
manifestation of Indian public opinion, and 
emergence of Indian leadership at both 
national and provincial levels. Dadabhai 
Naoroji formed the East India Association in 
1867, and Surendranath Banerjee founded the 
Indian National Association in 1876. 

Inspired by a suggestion made by A. O. Hume, 

a retired British civil servant, seventy-three 

Indian delegates met in Bombay in 1885 and 

founded the Indian National Congress. They 

were mostly members of the upwardly mobile 

and successful western-educated provincial 

elites, engaged in professions such as law, 

teaching, and journalism. At its inception, the Congress had no well-defined ideology and commanded few of the 

resources essential to a political organization. Instead, it functioned more as a debating society that met annually to 

express its loyalty to the British Raj, and passed numerous resolutions on less controversial issues such as civil rights 

or opportunities in government (especially in the civil service). These resolutions were submitted to the Viceroy's 

government and occasionally to the British Parliament, but the Congress's early gains were meagre. Despite its claim 

to represent all India, the Congress voiced the interests of urban elites; the number of participants from other social 

and economic backgrounds remained negligible. 

The influence of socio-religious groups such as Arya Samaj (started by 
Swami Dayanand Saraswati) and Brahmo Samaj (founded by Raja Ram 
Mohan Roy and others) became evident in pioneering reforms of Indian 
society. The work of men like Swami Vivekananda, Ramakrishna 
Paramhansa, Sri Aurobindo, Subramanya Bharathy, Bankim Chandra 
Chatterjee, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Rabindranath Tagore, and Dadabhai 
Naoroji, as well as women such as the Scots— Irish Sister Nivedita, spread 
the passion for rejuvenation and freedom. The rediscovery of India's 
indigenous history by several European and Indian scholars also fed into 
the rise of nationalism among Indians. 




Swami Dayananda Saraswati was an important 
Hindu religious scholar, reformer, and founder 
of the Arya Samaj, a Hindu reform movement. 



Rise of Indian nationalism (1885-1905) 

By 2012, although the Congress had emerged as an all-India political 
organization, its achievement was undermined by its singular failure to 
attract Muslims, who felt that their representation in government service 
was inadequate. Attacks by Hindu reformers against religious conversion, 
cow slaughter, and the preservation of Urdu in Arabic script deepened their concerns of minority status and denial of 
rights if the Congress alone were to represent the people of India. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan launched a movement for 
Muslim regeneration that culminated in the founding in 1875 of the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College at 
Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh (renamed Aligarh Muslim University in 1920). Its objective was to educate wealthy students 
by emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with modern western knowledge. The diversity among India's Muslims, 
however, made it impossible to bring about uniform cultural and intellectual regeneration. 



Indian independence movement 13 

The nationalistic sentiments among Congress members led to the movement to be represented in the bodies of 
government, to have a say in the legislation and administration of India. Congressmen saw themselves as loyalists, 
but wanted an active role in governing their own country, albeit as part of the Empire. This trend was personified by 
Dadabhai Naoroji, who went as far as contesting, successfully, an election to the British House of Commons, 
becoming its first Indian member. 

Bal Gangadhar Tilak was the first Indian nationalist to embrace Swaraj as the destiny of the nation. Tilak deeply 
opposed the then British education system that ignored and defamed India's culture, history and values. He resented 
the denial of freedom of expression for nationalists, and the lack of any voice or role for ordinary Indians in the 
affairs of their nation. For these reasons, he considered Swaraj as the natural and only solution. His popular sentence 
"Swaraj is my birthright, and I shall have it" became the source of inspiration for Indians. 

In 1907, the Congress was split into two factions. The radicals led by Tilak advocated civil agitation and direct 
revolution to overthrow the British Empire and the abandonment of all things British. The moderates led by leaders 
like Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale on the other hand wanted reform within the framework of British 
rule. Tilak was backed by rising public leaders like Bipin Chandra Pal and Lala Lajpat Rai, who held the same point 
of view. Under them, India's three great states - Maharashtra, Bengal and Punjab shaped the demand of the people 
and India's nationalism. Gokhale criticized Tilak for encouraging acts of violence and disorder. But the Congress of 
1906 did not have public membership, and thus Tilak and his supporters were forced to leave the party. 

But with Tilak's arrest, all hopes for an Indian offensive were stalled. The Congress lost credit with the people. A 
Muslim deputation met with the Viceroy, Minto (1905—10), seeking concessions from the impending constitutional 
reforms, including special considerations in government service and electorates. The British recognized some of the 
Muslim League's petitions by increasing the number of elective offices reserved for Muslims in the Indian Councils 
Act 1909. The Muslim League insisted on its separateness from the Hindu-dominated Congress, as the voice of a 
"nation within a nation." 

Partition of Bengal, 1905 

In July 1905, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General (1899—1905), ordered the partition of the province of 

ro] 

Bengal supposedly for improvements in administrative efficiency in the huge and populous region. It also had 
justifications due to increasing conflicts between Muslims and dominant Hindu regimes in Bengal. However the 
Indians viewed the partition as an attempt by the British to disrupt the growing national movement in Bengal and 
divide the Hindus and Muslims of the region. The Bengali Hindu intelligentsia exerted considerable influence on 
local and national politics. The partition outraged Bengalis. Not only had the government failed to consult Indian 
public opinion, but the action appeared to reflect the British resolve to divide and rule. Widespread agitation ensued 
in the streets and in the press, and the Congress advocated boycotting British products under the banner of swadeshi. 
Hindus showed unity by tying Rakhi on each other's wrists and observing Arandhan (not cooking any food). During 
this time Bengali Hindu nationalists begin writing virulent newspaper articles and were charged with sedition. 
Brahmabhandav Upadhyay, a Hindu newspaper editor who helped Tagore establish his school at Shantiniketan, was 
imprisoned and the first martyr to die in British custody in the 20th century struggle for independence. In 1911 the 
decision was reversed and Bengal was united. 

All India Muslim League 

The All India Muslim League was founded by the All India Muhammadan Educational Conference at Dhaka (now 
Bangladesh), in 1906, in the context of the circumstances that were generated over the partition of Bengal in 1905. 
Being a political party to secure the interests of the Muslim diaspora in British India, the Muslim League played a 
decisive role during the 1940s in the Indian independence movement and developed into the driving force behind the 
creation of Pakistan in the Indian subcontinent. 



Indian independence movement 



14 



In 1906, Muhammad Ali Jinnah joined the Indian National Congress, which was the largest Indian political 
organization. Like most of the Congress at the time, Jinnah did not favour outright independence, considering British 
influences on education, law, culture and industry as beneficial to India. Jinnah became a member on the 
sixty-member Imperial Legislative Council. The council had no real power or authority, and included a large number 
of un-elected pro-Raj loyalists and Europeans. Nevertheless, Jinnah was instrumental in the passing of the Child 
Marriages Restraint Act, the legitimization of the Muslim waqf (religious endowments) and was appointed to the 
Sandhurst committee, which helped establish the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. During World War I, 
Jinnah joined other Indian moderates in supporting the British war effort, hoping that Indians would be rewarded 
with political freedoms. 



First World War 

World War I began with an unprecedented outpouring of love and 
goodwill towards the United Kingdom from within the mainstream 
political leadership, contrary to initial British fears of an Indian revolt. 
India contributed massively to the British war effort by providing men 
and resources. About 1.3 million Indian soldiers and labourers served 
in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, while both the Indian 
government and the princes sent large supplies of food, money, and 
ammunition. However, Bengal and Punjab remained hotbeds of anti 
colonial activities. Nationalism in Bengal, increasingly closely linked 
with the unrests in Punjab, was significant enough to nearly paralyse 



the regional administration 



[11][12] 



None of the overseas conspiracies had significant impact on Indians 
inside India, and there were no major mutinies or violent outbursts. 
However, they did lead to profound fears of insurrection among British 
officials, preparing them to use extreme force to frighten the Indians 



into submission 



[131 




This photograph shows an emaciated Indian 
Army soldier who survived the Siege of Kut 



Nationalist response to war 

In the aftermath of the World War I, high casualty rates, soaring inflation compounded by heavy taxation, a 
widespread influenza epidemic, and the disruption of trade during the war escalated human suffering in India. 

The pre-war nationalist movement revived as moderate and extremist groups within the Congress submerged their 
differences in order to stand as a unified front. They argued their enormous services to the British Empire during the 
war demanded a reward, and demonstrated the Indian capacity for self rule. In 1916, the Congress succeeded in 
forging the Lucknow Pact, a temporary alliance with the Muslim League over the issues of devolution of political 
power and the future of Islam in the region. 



British reforms 

The British themselves adopted a "carrot and stick" approach in recognition of India's support during the war and in 
response to renewed nationalist demands. In August 1917, Edwin Montagu, the secretary of state for India, made the 
historic announcement in Parliament that the British policy for India was "increasing association of Indians in every 
branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the 
progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire." The means of 
achieving the proposed measure were later enshrined in the Government of India Act 1919, which introduced the 
principle of a dual mode of administration, or diarchy, in which both elected Indian legislators and appointed British 



Indian independence movement 



15 



officials shared power. The act also expanded the central and provincial legislatures and widened the franchise 
considerably. Diarchy set in motion certain real changes at the provincial level: a number of non-controversial or 
"transferred" portfolios, such as agriculture, local government, health, education, and public works, were handed 
over to Indians, while more sensitive matters such as finance, taxation, and maintaining law and order were retained 
by the provincial British administrators 



[14] 




Gandhi arrives in India 

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi), had been a 
prominent leader of the Indian nationalist movement in South Africa, 
and had been a vocal opponent of basic discrimination and abusive 
labour treatment as well as suppressive police control such as the 
Rowlatt Acts. During these protests, Gandhi had perfected the concept 
of satyagraha, which had been inspired by the philosophy of Baba 
Ram Singh (famous for leading the Kuka Movement in the Punjab in 
1872). In January 1914 (well before the First World War began) 
Gandhi was successful. The hated legislation against Indians was 
repealed and all Indian political prisoners were released by General Jan 
Smuts. [15] 

Gandhi returned to India, on 6 January 1915 and initially entered the 
political fray not with calls for a nation-state, but in support of the 
unified commerce-oriented territory that the Congress Party had been 
asking for. Gandhi believed that the industrial development and 
educational development that the Europeans had brought with them 
were required to alleviate many of India's problems. Gopal Krishna 
Gokhale, a veteran Congressman and Indian leader, became Gandhi's 
mentor. Gandhi's ideas and strategies of non- violent civil disobedience 
initially appeared impractical to some Indians and Congressmen. In 
Gandhi's own words, "civil disobedience is civil breach of unmoral statutory enactments." It had to be carried out 
non-violently by withdrawing cooperation with the corrupt state. Gandhi's ability to inspire millions of common 
people became clear when he used satyagraha during the anti-Rowlatt Act protests in Punjab. Gandhi had great 
respect for Lokmanya Tilak. His programmes were all inspired by Tilak's "Chatusutri" programme. 

Gandhi's vision would soon bring millions of regular Indians into the movement, transforming it from an elitist 
struggle to a national one. The nationalist cause was expanded to include the interests and industries that formed the 
economy of common Indians. For example, in Champaran, Bihar, Gandhi championed the plight of desperately poor 
sharecroppers and landless farmers who were being forced to pay oppressive taxes and grow cash crops at the 
expense of the subsistence crops which formed their food supply. The profits from the crops they grew were 
insufficient to provide for their sustenance. 

The positive impact of reform was seriously undermined in 1919 by the Rowlatt Act, named after the 
recommendations made the previous year to the Imperial Legislative Council by the Rowlatt Commission. The 
Rowlatt Act vested the Viceroy's government with extraordinary powers to quell sedition by silencing the press, 
detaining the political activists without trial, and arresting any individuals suspected of sedition or treason without a 
warrant. In protest, a nationwide cessation of work {hartal) was called, marking the beginning of widespread, 
although not nationwide, popular discontent. 

The agitation unleashed by the acts led to British attacks on demonstrators, culminating on 13 April 1919, in the 
Jallianwala Bagh massacre (also known as the Amritsar Massacre) in Amritsar, Punjab. The British military 



Gandhi in 1918, at the time of the Kheda and 
Champaran satyagrahas 



Indian independence movement 16 

commander, Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, blocked the main entrance-cum-exit, and ordered his soldiers to fire 
into an unarmed and unsuspecting crowd of some 15,000 men, women and children. They had assembled at 
Jallianwala Bagh, a walled courtyard, but Dyer had banned all meetings and proposed to teach all Indians a 

lesson. A total of 1,651 rounds were fired, killing 379 people (as according to an official British commission; 

ri7i 
Indian estimates ranged as high as 1,499 and wounding 1,137 in the massacre. Dyer was forced to retire but was 

hailed as a hero in Britain, demonstrating to Indian nationalists that the Empire was beholden to public opinion in 

ri Q] 

Britain but not in India. The episode dissolved wartime hopes of home rule and goodwill and opened a rift that 

ri9i 

could not be bridged short of complete independence. 

The non-cooperation movements 

The independence movement as late as 1918 was an elitist movement far removed from the masses of India, 
focusing essentially on a unified commerce-oriented territory and hardly a call for a united nation. Gandhi changed 
all that and made it a mass movement. 

The first non-cooperation movement 

At the Calcutta session of the Congress in September 1920, Gandhi convinced other leaders of the need to start a 
non-cooperation movement in support of Khilafat as well as for swaraj (self rule). The first satyagraha movement 
urged the use of khadi and Indian material as alternatives to those shipped from Britain. It also urged people to 
boycott British educational institutions and law courts; resign from government employment; refuse to pay taxes; 
and forsake British titles and honours. Although this came too late to influence the framing of the new Government 
of India Act 1919, the movement enjoyed widespread popular support, and the resulting unparalleled magnitude of 
disorder presented a serious challenge to foreign rule. However, Gandhi called off the movement following the 
Chauri Chaura incident, which saw the death of twenty-three policemen at the hands of an angry mob. 

Membership in the party was opened to anyone prepared to pay a token fee, and a hierarchy of committees was 
established and made responsible for discipline and control over a hitherto amorphous and diffuse movement. The 
party was transformed from an elite organization to one of mass national appeal and participation. 

Gandhi was sentenced in 1922 to six years of prison, but was released after serving two. On his release from prison, 
he set up the Sabarmati Ashram in Ahmedabad, on the banks of river Sabarmati, established the newspaper Young 
India, and inaugurated a series of reforms aimed at the socially disadvantaged within Hindu society — the rural 
poor, and the untouchables. 

This era saw the emergence of new generation of Indians from within the Congress Party, including C. 
Rajagopalachari, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Subhash Chandra Bose and others- who would later on come 
to form the prominent voices of the Indian independence movement, whether keeping with Gandhian Values, or, as 
in the case of Bose's Indian National Army, diverging from it. 

The Indian political spectrum was further broadened in the mid- 1920s by the emergence of both moderate and 
militant parties, such as the Swaraj Party, Hindu Mahasabha, Communist Party of India and the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh. Regional political organizations also continued to represent the interests of non-Brahmins in 
Madras, Mahars in Maharashtra, and Sikhs in Punjab. However, people like Mahakavi Subramanya Bharathi, 
Vanchinathan and Neelakanda Brahmachari played a major role from Tamil Nadu in both freedom struggle and 
fighting for equality for all castes and communities. 



Indian independence movement 17 

Purna Swaraj 

Following the rejection of the recommendations of the Simon Commission by Indians, an all-party conference was 
held at Bombay in May 1928. This was meant to instill a sense of resistance among people. The conference 
appointed a drafting committee under Motilal Nehru to draw up a constitution for India. The Calcutta session of the 
Indian National Congress asked the British government to accord dominion status to India by December 1929, or a 
countrywide civil disobedience movement would be launched. By 1929, however, in the midst of rising political 
discontent and increasingly violent regional movements, the call for complete independence from Britain began to 
find increasing grounds within the Congress leadership. Under the presidency of Jawaharlal Nehru at its historic 
Lahore session in December 1929, the Indian National Congress adopted a resolution calling for complete 
independence from the British. It authorised the Working Committee to launch a civil disobedience movement 
throughout the country. It was decided that 26 January 1930 should be observed all over India as the Purna Swaraj 
(total independence) Day. Many Indian political parties and Indian revolutionaries of a wide spectrum united to 
observe the day with honour and pride. 

Karachi congress session- 1931 A special session was held to endorse the Gandhi-Irwin or Delhi Pact. The goal of 
Purna swaraj was reiterated. Two resolutions were adopted-one on Fundamental rights and other on National 
Economic programme, which made the session particularly memmorable. 

This was the first time the congress spelt out what swaraj would mean for the masses. 

Salt March and civil disobedience 

Gandhi emerged from his long seclusion by undertaking his most famous campaign, a march of about 400 kilometers 
[240 miles] from his commune in Ahmedabad to Dandi, on the coast of Gujarat between 1 1 March and 6 April 1930. 
The march is usually known as the Dandi March or the Salt Satyagraha. At Dandi, in protest against British taxes on 
salt, he and thousands of followers broke the law by making their own salt from seawater. It took 24 days for him to 
complete this march. Every day he covered 10 miles and gave many speeches. 

In April 1930 there were violent police-crowd clashes in Calcutta. Approximately 100,000 people were imprisoned 
in the course of the Civil disobedience movement (1930—31), while in Peshawar unarmed demonstrators were fired 
upon in the Qissa Khwani bazaar massacre. The latter event catapulted the then newly formed Khudai Khidmatgar 
movement (founder Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier Gandhi) onto the National scene. While Gandhi was in 
jail, the first Round Table Conference was held in London in November 1930, without representation from the 
Indian National Congress. The ban upon the Congress was removed because of economic hardships caused by the 
satyagraha. Gandhi, along with other members of the Congress Working Committee, was released from prison in 
January 1931. 

In March 1931, the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed, and the government agreed to set all political prisoners free 
(Although, some of the key revolutionaries were not set free and the death sentence for Bhagat Singh and his two 
comrades was not taken back which further intensified the agitation against Congress not only outside it but within 
the Congress itself). In return, Gandhi agreed to discontinue the civil disobedience movement and participate as the 
sole representative of the Congress in the second Round Table Conference, which was held in London in September 
1931. However, the conference ended in failure in December 1931. Gandhi returned to India and decided to resume 
the civil disobedience movement in January 1932. 

For the next few years, the Congress and the government were locked in conflict and negotiations until what became 
the Government of India Act 1935 could be hammered out. By then, the rift between the Congress and the Muslim 
League had become unbridgeable as each pointed the finger at the other acrimoniously. The Muslim League disputed 
the claim of the Congress to represent all people of India, while the Congress disputed the Muslim League's claim to 
voice the aspirations of all Muslims. 



Indian independence movement 18 

Elections and the Lahore resolution 

The Government of India Act 1935, the voluminous and final 
constitutional effort at governing British India, articulated three 
major goals: establishing a loose federal structure, achieving 
provincial autonomy, and safeguarding minority interests through 
separate electorates. The federal provisions, intended to unite 
princely states and British India at the centre, were not 
implemented because of ambiguities in safeguarding the existing 
privileges of princes. In February 1937, however, provincial 
autonomy became a reality when elections were held; the 
Congress emerged as the dominant party with a clear majority in 
five provinces and held an upper hand in two, while the Muslim 
League performed poorly. 




Jinnah with Gandhi, 1944. 



In 1939, the Viceroy Linlithgow declared India's entrance into World War II without consulting provincial 
governments. In protest, the Congress asked all of its elected representatives to resign from the government. Jinnah, 
the president of the Muslim League, persuaded participants at the annual Muslim League session at Lahore in 1940 
to adopt what later came to be known as the Lahore Resolution, demanding the division of India into two separate 
sovereign states, one Muslim, the other Hindu; sometimes referred to as Two Nation Theory. Although the idea of 
Pakistan had been introduced as early as 1930, very few had responded to it. However, the volatile political climate 
and hostilities between the Hindus and Muslims transformed the idea of Pakistan into a stronger demand. 

Revolutionary activities 

Apart from a few stray incidents, the armed rebellion against the British rulers was not organized before the 
beginning of the 20th century. The Indian revolutionary underground began gathering momentum through the first 
decade of 20th century, with groups arising in Bengal, Maharastra, Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, and the then 

Madras Presidency including what is now called South India. More groups were scattered around India. Particularly 

T221 
notable movements arose in Bengal, especially around the Partition of Bengal in 1905, and in Punjab. In the 

former case, it was the educated, intelligent and dedicated youth of the urban Middle Class Bhadralok community 

T221 
that came to form the "Classic" Indian revolutionary, while the latter had an immense support base in the rural 

and Military society of the Punjab. Organisations like Jugantar and Anushilan Samiti had emerged in the 1900s 

(decade). The revolutionary philosophies and movement made their presence felt during the 1905 Partition of 

Bengal. Arguably, the initial steps to organize the revolutionaries were taken by Aurobindo Ghosh, his brother Barin 

Ghosh, Bhupendranath Datta etc. when they formed the Jugantar party in April 1906. Jugantar was created as an 

inner circle of the Anushilan Samiti which was already present in Bengal mainly as a revolutionary society in the 

guise of a fitness club. 

The Anushilan Samiti and Jugantar opened several branches throughout Bengal and other parts of India and recruited 
young men and women to participate in the revolutionary activities. Several murders and looting were done, with 
many revolutionaries being captured and imprisoned. The Jugantar party leaders like Barin Ghosh and Bagha Jatin 
initiated making of explosives. Amongst a number of notable events of political terrorism were the Alipore bomb 
case, the Muzaffarpur killing tried several activists and many were sentenced to deportation for life, while Khudiram 
Bose was hanged. The founding of the India House and The Indian Sociologist under Shyamji Krishna Varma in 
London in 1905 took the radical movement to Britain itself. On 1 July 1909, Madan Lai Dhingra, an Indian student 
closely identified with India House in London shot dead William Hutt Curzon Wylie, a British M.P. in London. 1912 
saw the Delhi-Lahore Conspiracy planned under Rash Behari Bose, an erstwhile Jugantar member, to assassinate the 
then Viceroy of India Charles Hardinge. The conspiracy culminated in an attempt to Bomb the Viceregal procession 



Indian independence movement 19 

on 23 December 1912, on the occasion of transferring the Imperial Capital from Calcutta to Delhi. In the aftermath 
of this event, concentrated police and intelligence efforts were made by the British Indian police to destroy the 
Bengali and Punjabi revolutionary underground, which came under intense pressure for sometime. Rash Behari 
successfully evaded capture for nearly three years. However, by the time that World War I opened in Europe, the 
revolutionary movement in Bengal (and Punjab) had revived and was strong enough to nearly paralyse the local 
administration. in 1914, Indian revolutionaries made conspiracies against British rule but the plan was failed 

and many revolutionaries sacrificed their life and others were arrested and sent to the Cellular Jail (Kalapani) in 

Andaman and Nicobar Islands. During the First World War, the revolutionaries planned to import arms and 

T241 
ammunitions from Germany and stage an armed revolution against the British. 

The Ghadar Party operated from abroad and cooperated with the revolutionaries in India. This party was 
instrumental in helping revolutionaries inside India catch hold of foreign arms. 

After the First World War, the revolutionary activities began to slowly wane as it suffered major setbacks due to the 
arrest of prominent leaders. In the 1920s, some revolutionary activists began to reorganize. 

Kakori Conspiracy (9 August 1925) 

In order to overturn the British Rule through arms, the idea of the robbery was conceived by Ram Prasad Bismil and 
Ashfaqullah Khan who belonged to the Hindustan Republican Association (HRA, which became HSRA or 
Hindustan Socialist Republican Association in 1928) that was created to carry out revolutionary activities against the 
British Empire in India. The objective of the HRA was to conduct an armed revolution against the British 

government. The organization needed money for the supply of weaponry, and thus Bismil decided to loot a train on 

T251 
one of the Northern Railway lines. The robbery plan was executed by Ram Prasad Bismil, Ashfaqulla Khan, 

Rajendra Lahiri, Chandrasekhar Azad, Sachindra Bakshi, Keshab Chakravarthy, Manmathnath Gupta, Murari 

r26ir27ir2Ri 
Sharma (fake name of Murari Lai Gupta), Mukundi Lai (Mukundi Lai Gupta),. In this historical event 40 

persons belonging to HRA were arrested and a Conspiracy case was filed in which 4 were sentenced to death and 16 

others were given imprisonment varying from 2 years to life importation. 

Hindustan Socialist Republican Association was formed under the leadership of Chandrasekhar Azad. Bhagat Singh 

and Batukeshwar Dutt threw a bomb inside the Central Legislative Assembly on 8 April 1929 protesting against the 

passage of the Public Safety Bill and the Trade Disputes Bill while raising slogans of Inqulab Zindabad, though no 

one was killed or injured in the bomb incident. Bhagat Singh, Rajguru and Sukhdev immediately surrendered after 

the bombing incident and a trial was conducted. Following the trial (Central Assembly Bomb Case), Bhagat Singh, 

Sukhdev and Rajguru were hanged in 1931. Allama Mashriqi founded Khaksar Tehreek in order to direct 

[291 
particularly the Muslims towards the independence movement. 

Surya Sen, along with other activists, raided the Chittagong armoury on 18 April 1930 to capture arms and 
ammunition and to destroy government communication system to establish a local governance. Pritilata Waddedar 
led an attack on a European club in Chittagong in 1932, while Bina Das attempted to assassinate Stanley Jackson, the 
Governor of Bengal inside the convocation hall of Calcutta University. Following the Chittagong armoury raid case, 
Surya Sen was hanged and several others were deported for life to the Cellular Jail in Andaman. The Bengal 
Volunteers started operating in 1928. On 8 December 1930, the Benoy-Badal-Dinesh trio of the party entered the 
secretariat Writers' Building in Kolkata and murdered Col. N. S. Simpson, the Inspector General of Prisons. 

On 13 March 1940, Udham Singh shot Michael O'Dwyer, generally held responsible for the Amritsar Massacre, in 
London. However, as the political scenario changed in the late 1930s — with the mainstream leaders considering 
several options offered by the British and with religious politics coming into play — revolutionary activities 
gradually declined. Many past revolutionaries joined mainstream politics by joining Congress and other parties, 
especially communist ones, while many of the activists were kept under hold in different jails across the country. 



Indian independence movement 20 

The climax of Indian independence movement 

In 1937, provincial elections were held and the Congress came to power in eight of the eleven provinces. This was a 
strong indicator of the Indian people's support for complete Independence. 

When World war II started, Viceroy Linlithgow had unilaterally declared India a belligerent on the side of the 
Britain, without consulting the elected Indian representatives. In opposition to Linlithgow's action, the entire 
Congress leadership resigned from the local government councils. However, many wanted to support the British war 
effort, and indeed the British Indian Army was the largest volunteer forces, numbering 2,500,000 men during the 

[30] 

war. 

Especially during the Battle of Britain in 1940, Gandhi resisted calls for massive civil disobedience movements that 
came from within as well as outside his party, stating he did not seek India's freedom out of the ashes of a destroyed 
Britain. In 1942 the Congress launched the Quit India movement. There was some violence but the Raj cracked 
down and arrested tens of thousands of Congress leaders, including all the main national and provincial figures. They 
were not released until the end of the war was in sight in 1945. 

The independence movement saw the rise of three movements. The first of these, the Kakori conspiracy (9 August 
1925) was done by the Indian youth under the leadership of Pandit Ram Prasad Bismil, second was the Azad Hind 
movement led by Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, saw its inception early in the war and joined with Germany and 
Japan to fight Britain. . And the third one after 17 years of the first from the same date (9) saw its inception in 
August 1942 which was led by Lai Bahadur Shastri and the common man resulting the failure of the Cripps' 
mission to reach a consensus with the Indian political leadership over the transfer of power after the war. 

Quit India Movement 

The Quit India Movement (Bharat Chhodo Andolan) or the August Movement was a civil disobedience movement in 
India launched on 9 August 1942 in response to Gandhi's call for immediate independence of India and against 
sending Indians to World War II. He asked all the teachers to leave their school, and other Indians to leave away 
their respective jobs and take part in this movement. Due to Gandhi's political influence, request was followed on a 
massive proportion of the population. 

At the outbreak of war, the Congress Party had during the Wardha meeting of the working-committee in September 

T321 
1939, passed a resolution conditionally supporting the fight against fascism, but were rebuffed when they asked 

for independence in return. In March 1942, faced with an increasingly dissatisfied sub-continent only reluctantly 

participating in the war, and deteriorations in the war situation in Europe and South East Asia, and with growing 

dissatisfactions among Indian troops- especially in Europe- and among the civilian population in the sub-continent, 

the British government sent a delegation to India under Stafford Cripps, in what came to be known as the Cripps' 

Mission. The purpose of the mission was to negotiate with the Indian National Congress a deal to obtain total 

co-operation during the war, in return of progressive devolution and distribution of power from the crown and the 

Viceroy to elected Indian legislature. However, the talks failed, having failed to address the key demand of a 

timeframe towards self-government, and of definition of the powers to be relinquished, essentially portraying an 

[331 
offer of limited dominion-status that was wholly unacceptable to the Indian movement. To force the British Raj to 

meet its demands and to obtain definitive word on total independence, the Congress took the decision to launch the 

Quit India Movement. 

The aim of the movement was to bring the British Government to the negotiating table by holding the Allied War 
Effort hostage. The call for determined but passive resistance that signified the certitude that Gandhi foresaw for the 
movement is best described by his call to Do or Die, issued on 8 August at the Gowalia Tank Maidan in Bombay, 
since renamed August Kranti Maidan (August Revolution Ground). However, almost the entire Congress leadership, 
and not merely at the national level, was put into confinement less than twenty-four hours after Gandhi's speech, and 
the greater number of the Congress khiland were to spend the rest of the war in jail. 



Indian independence movement 21 

On 8 August 1942, the Quit India resolution was passed at the Bombay session of the All India Congress Committee 
(AICC). The draft proposed that if the British did not accede to the demands, a massive Civil Disobedience would be 
launched. However, it was an extremely controversial decision. At Gowalia Tank, Mumbai, Gandhi urged Indians to 
follow a non-violent civil disobedience. Gandhi told the masses to act as an independent nation and not to follow the 
orders of the British. The British, already alarmed by the advance of the Japanese army to the India— Burma border, 
responded the next day by imprisoning Gandhi at the Aga Khan Palace in Pune. The Congress Party's Working 
Committee, or national leadership was arrested all together and imprisoned at the Ahmednagar Fort. They also 
banned the party altogether. Large-scale protests and demonstrations were held all over the country. Workers 
remained absent en masse and strikes were called. The movement also saw widespread acts of sabotage, Indian 
under-ground organisation carried out bomb attacks on allied supply convoys, government buildings were set on fire, 
electricity lines were disconnected and transport and communication lines were severed. The disruptions were under 
control in a few weeks and had little impact on the war effort. The movement soon became a leaderless act of 
defiance, with a number of acts that deviated from Gandhi's principle of non-violence. In large parts of the country, 
the local underground organisations took over the movement. However, by 1943, Quit India had petered out. 

All the other major parties rejected the Quit India plan, and most cooperated closely with the British, as did the 
princely states, the civil service and the police. The Muslim League supported the Raj and grew rapidly in 
membership, and in influence with the British. 

Indian National Army 

The arbitrary entry of India into the war was strongly opposed by Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, who had been 
elected President of the Congress twice, in 1938 and 1939. After lobbying against participation in the war, he 
resigned from Congress in 1939 and started a new party, the All India Forward Bloc. In 1940, a year after war broke 
out, the British had put Bose under house arrest in Calcutta. However, he escaped and made his way through 
Afghanistan to Germany to seek Axis help to raise an army to fight the British. Here, he raised with Rommel's Indian 
POWs what came to be known as the Free India Legion. Bose made his way ultimately to Japanese South Asia, 
where he formed what came to be known as the Azad Hind Government, a Provisional Free Indian Government in 
exile, and organized the Indian National Army with Indian POWs and Indian expatriates in South-East Asia, with the 
help of the Japanese. Its aim was to reach India as a fighting force that would build on public resentment to inspire 
revolts among Indian soldiers to defeat the British raj. 

The INA was to see action against the allies, including the British Indian 
Army, in the forests of Arakan, Burma and in Assam, laying siege on Imphal 
and Kohima with the Japanese 15th Army. During the war, the Andaman and 
Nicobar islands were captured by the Japanese and handed over by them to 
the INA. Bose renamed them Shahid (Martyr) and Swaraj (Independence). 

The INA would ultimately fail, owing to disrupted logistics, poor arms and 

supplies from the Japanese, and lack of support and training. [35] The 

supposed death of Bose is seen as culmination of the entire Azad Hind 

Movement. Following the surrender of Japan, the troops of the INA were 

brought to India and a number of them charged with treason. However, Bose's 

actions had captured the public imagination and also turned the inclination of 

the native soldiers of the British Indian Forces from one of loyalty to the 

[341 [351 
crown to support for the soldiers that the Raj deemed as collaborators. 11/d^ 

Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. 

After the war, the stories of the Azad Hind movement and its army that came 
into public limelight during the trials of soldiers of the INA in 1945 were seen 

as so inflammatory that, fearing mass revolts and uprisings — not just in India, but across its empire — the British 
Government forbade the BBC from broadcasting their story. Newspapers reported the summary execution of INA 




Indian independence movement 22 

T371 
soldiers held at Red Fort. During and after the trial, mutinies broke out in the British Indian Armed forces, most 

notably in the Royal Indian Navy which found public support throughout India, from Karachi to Mumbai and from 

Vizag to Kolkata. Many historians have argued that the INA, and the mutinies it inspired, were strong 

driving forces behind the transfer of power in 1947. 

Christmas Island Mutiny 

After two Japanese attacks on Christmas Island in late February and early March 1942 relations between the British 
officers and their Indian troops broke down. On the night of 10 March the Indian troops led by a Sikh policemen 

mutinied killing the five British soldiers and the imprisoning of the remaining 21 Europeans on the island. Later on 

[441 
31 March, a Japanese fleet arrived at the island and the Indians surrendered. 

Independence and partition of India 

On 3 June 1947, Viscount Louis Mountbatten, the last British Governor-General of India, announced the partitioning 
of British India into India and Pakistan. With the speedy passage through the British Parliament of the Indian 
Independence Act 1947, at 11:57 on 14 August 1947 Pakistan was declared a separate nation, and at 12:02, just after 
midnight, on 15 August 1947, India also became an independent nation. Violent clashes between Hindus, Sikhs and 
Muslims followed. Prime Minister Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel invited Mountbatten 
to continue as Governor General of India. He was replaced in June 1948 by Chakravarti Rajagopalachari. Patel took 
on the responsibility of bringing into the Indian Union 565 princely states, steering efforts by his "iron fist in a velvet 
glove" policies, exemplified by the use of military force to integrate Junagadh and Hyderabad state (Operation Polo) 
into India. On the other hand Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru kept the issue of Kashmir in his hands. 

The Constituent Assembly completed the work of drafting the constitution on 26 November 1949; on 26 January 
1950 the Republic of India was officially proclaimed. The Constituent Assembly elected Dr. Rajendra Prasad as the 
first President of India, taking over from Governor General Rajgopalachari. Subsequently India invaded and annexed 
Goa and Portugal's other Indian enclaves in 1961), the French ceded Chandernagore in 1951, and Pondicherry and its 
remaining Indian colonies in 1956, and Sikkim voted to join the Indian Union in 1975. 

Following Independence in 1947, India remained in the Commonwealth of Nations, and relations between the UK 
and India have been friendly. There are many areas in which the two countries seek stronger ties for mutual benefit, 
and there are also strong cultural and social ties between the two nations. The UK has an ethnic Indian population of 
over 1.6 million. In 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron described Indian — British relations as the "New Special 
Relationship". 

Notes 

[I] Chandra 1989, p. 26 
[2] Chandra 1989, p. 521 
[3] Heehs 1998, p. 9 

[4] The English colonial empire, including the territories and trading posts in Asia, came under British control following the union of England 

and Scotland in 1707. 
[5] Heehs 1998, pp. 9-10 
[6] Heehs 1998, pp. 11-12 

[7] http://en.wikipedia.Org/wiki/Mangal_Pandey#Consequences 

[8] John R. McLane, "The Decision to Partition Bengal in 1905," Indian Economic and Social History Review, July 1965, 2#3, pp 221-237 
[9] Jalal, Ayesha (1994) The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 

978-0-521-45850-4 
[10] Official website, Government of Pakistan. "The Statesman: Jinnah's differences with the Congress" (http://web.archive.org/web/ 

20060127234847/http://www. pakistan. gov. pk/Quaid/politician7. htm). Archived from the original (http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/ 

Quaid/politician7.htm) on 2006-01-27. . Retrieved 2006-04-20. 

[II] Gupta 1997, p. 12 

[12] Popplewell 1995, p. 201 



Indian independence movement 



23 



[13 
[14 
[15 
[16 
[17 
[18 
[19 

[20 
[21 
[22 
[23 
[24 
[25 

[26 
[27 
[28 
[29 
[30 

[31 

[32 



[33 



[34 



Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (2000) pp 439-518 

James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India (2000) pp 459-60, 519-20 

Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience From 1765 To The Present (pp 226-4 11998) 

Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer (2006) 

Nick Lloyd, The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day (201 1) 

Derek Sayer, "British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920," Past & Present, May 1991, Issue 131, pp 130-164 

Dennis Judd, "The Amritsar Massacre of 1919: Gandhi, the Raj and the Growth of Indian Nationalism, 1915-39," in Judd, Empire: The 
British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (1996) pp 258- 72 

Sankar Ghose, Mahatma Gandhi (1991) p. 107 

Sanjay Paswan and Pramanshi Jaideva, Encyclopaedia of Dalits in India (2003) p. 43 

Fraser 1977, p. 257 

Banglapedia article (http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/J_0130.htm) by Mohammad Shah 

Rowlatt Report (§109-110); First Spark of Revolution by A.C. Guha, pp. 424-34. 

N.P. Shankaranarayana Rao "A shfaqulla Khan: The immortal revolutionary" (http://pib.nic.in/feature/feyr2000/fdec2000/fl51220001. 
html) pib.nic.in. Accessed 1 February 2007 

Dr. Mahaur Bhagwandas Kakori Shaheed Smriti 1977 Lucknow Kakori Shaheed Ardhshatabdi Samaroh Samiti page 30 

Sharma Vidyarnav Yug Ke Devta: Bismil Aur Ashfaq 2004 Delhi Praveen Prakashan page 1 18 ISBN 81-7783-078-3 

'Krant'M.L.Verma Sarfaroshi Ki Tamanna (Part-1) 1997 Delhi Praveen Prakashan page 35 

Khaksar Tehrik Ki Jiddo Juhad Volume 1. Author Khaksar Sher Zaman 

Roy, Kaushik, "Military Loyalty in the Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Indian Army during World War II," Journal of Military 
History (2009) 73#2 pp 144-172 

Dr.'Krant'M.L.Verma Swadhinta Sangram Ke Krantikari Sahitya Ka Itihas (Vol-2) p. 559 

"The Congress and The Freedom Movement" (http://web.archive.Org/web/20070811001411/http://www.aicc.org.in/ 
the_congress_and_the_freedom_movement.htm#the). Indian National Congress. Archived from the original (http://www.aicc.org.in/ 
the_congress_and_the_freedom_movement.htm#the) on 2007-08-11. . Retrieved 2007-09-24. 

Culture and Combat in the Colonies. The Indian Army in the Second World War. Tarak Barkawi. J Contemp History. 41(2), 
325-355.pp:332 

Edwardes, Michael, The Last Years of British India, Cleveland, World Pub. Co., 1964, p. 93. 



The Government of India had hoped, by prosecuting members of the INA, to reinforce the morale of the 
Indian army. It succeeded only in creating unease, in making the soldiers feel slightly ashamed that they 
themselves had supported the British. If Bose and his men had been on the right side — and all India 
now confirmed that they were — then Indians in the Indian army must have been on the wrong side. It 
slowly dawned upon the Government of India that the backbone of the British rule, the Indian army, 
might now no longer be trustworthy. The ghost of Subhas Bose, like Hamlet's father, walked the 
battlements of the Red Fort (where the INA soldiers were being tried), and his suddenly amplified figure 
overawed the conference that was to lead to independence. 

[35] Encyclopaedia Britannica. Indian National army (http://www.britannica.com/ebi/article-93 1 1795). After returning to India the veterans 
of the INA posed a difficult problem for the British government. The British feared that a public trial for treason on the part of the INA 
members might embolden anti-British sentiment and erupt into widespread protest and violence. Eminem came and danced. URL Accessed on 
19 August 06. 

[36] Mutinies (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/3684288.stm) (last section). 

[37] Many I.N. A. men already executed (http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/specials/Netaji/images/nov_2_45.gif), Lucknow. The 
Hindustan Times, 2 November 1945. URL Accessed ll-Aug-06. 

[38] Legacy and assessment of the effects of the mutiny. 

[39] Consequences of the I.N. A. Trials 

[40] Tribune India (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060212/spectrum/main2.htm), accessed on 17-Jul-2006 

[41] "RIN mutiny gave a jolt to the British" (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060212/spectrum/main2.htm) by Dhanjaya Bhat, The 
Tribune, 12 February 2006, retrieved 17 July 2006 

[42] Majumdar, R.C., Three Phases of India's Struggle for Freedom, Bombay, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967, pp. 58—59. 

[43] R.C. Majumdar. History of the Freedom Movement in India. ISBN 0-8364-2376-3, reprint. Calcutta, Firma KLM, 1997, vol. III. 

[44] http ://www. Christmas. net. au/history. html 

[45] Nelson, Dean (7 July 2010). "Ministers to build a new 'special relationship' with India" (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/ 
politics/conservative/7877719/Ministers-to-build-a-new-special-relationship-with-India.html). The Daily Telegraph. . 



Indian independence movement 24 

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Indian independence movement 25 

Further reading 

Brown, Judith M. Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922 (Cambridge South Asian Studies) (1974) 

Brown, Judith M., 'Gandhi and Civil Resistance in India, 1917-47', in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash 

(eds.), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present. 

Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-19-955201-6. 

Chandra, Bipan. India's Struggle for Independence 2012) 

Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge South 

Asian Studies) (1994) 

Majumdar, R.C.. History of the Freedom movement in India. ISBN 0-8364-2376-3. 

Gandhi, Mohandas (1993). An Autobiography : The Story of My Experiments With Truth. Boston: Beacon Press. 

ISBN 0-8070-5909-9. 

Sofri, Gianni (1995—1999). Gandhi and India: A Century in Focus. Janet Sethre Paxia (translator) (English 

edition translated from the Italian ed.). Gloucestershire: The Windrush Press. ISBN 1-900624-12-5. 

Gopal, Sarvepalli. Jawaharlal Nehru - Volume One: 1889 - 1947 - A Biography (1975), standard scholarly 

biography 

Seal, Anil (1968). Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth 

Century. London: Cambridge U.P.. ISBN 0-521-06274-8. 

Singh, Jaswant. Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence (2010) 

Wolpert, Stanley A. Jinnah of Pakistan (2005) 

Wolpert, Stanley A. Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi (2002) 

External links 

• Muslim freedom martyrs of India (http://twocircles.net/2009oct01/muslim_freedom_martyrs_india.html) - 
TCN News 

• Indian Freedom Fighters (http://www.peopleforever.org/community. aspx?communityid=64) Tribute on 
PeopleForever.org 

• Pakistani Freedom Fighters (http://www. peopleforever.org/community. aspx?communityid=70) Tribute on 
PeopleForever.org 

• Allama Mashriqi (http://allama-mashriqi.8m.com/) 

• Origin of Non- Violence (http://www.sikhism.com/articles/origin_non_violence.htm) 

• Independence movement (http://www.freeindia.org/dynamic/) 

• Mahatma Gandhi (http://web.mahatma.org.in/flash.html) 

• Indian Government (http://goidirectory.nic.in/) 

• Raja Mahendapratap (http://www.rajamahendrapratap.com) 

• Timeline of Indian independence movement (http://www.kamat.com/kalranga/freedom/timeline.htm) 



Pakistan Movement 



26 



Pakistan Movement 



The Pakistan Movement or Tehrik-e-Pakistan (Urdu: Sjj»s 
5I1— 51) refers to the successful historical movement against British 
Raj and Indian Congress to have an independent Muslim state 
named Pakistan created from the separation of the north-western 
region of the Indian subcontinent, partitioned within or outside the 
British Indian Empire. It had its origins in the United Provinces of 
Agra and Oudh (present day Uttar Pradesh). Muslims there were a 
minority, yet their elite had a disproportionate amount of 
representation in the civil service and a strong degree of cultural 
and literary influence. The idea of Pakistan spread from Northern 
India through the Muslim diaspora of this region, and spread 
outwards to the Muslim communities of the rest of India. This 
movement was led by lawyer Muhammad Ali Jinnah, along with 
other prominent founding fathers of Pakistan including Allama 
Iqbal, Liaqat Ali Khan, Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, Aga Khan 
III, Fatima Jinnah, Bahadur Yar Jung, Maulana Mohammad Ali 
Jauhar, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, A.K. Fazlul Huq, Sardar Abdur 
Rab Nishtar, Jogendra Nath Mandal, Victor Turner, Ra'ana 
Liaquat Ali Khan, and Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmed. 

The movement ultimately achieved success in 1947, when part of 
northwest India was partitioned, granted independence and 
renamed Pakistan. 




Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948) was an ideological 
and political leader of the Pakistan Movement. 



History of the movement 

[2] [3] 

Minority Muslims 

The 1882 Local Self-Government Act had 

already troubled Syed Ahmed Khan. When, 

in 1906, the British announced their 

intention to establish Legislative Councils, 

Muhsin al-Mulk, the secretary of both the 

All India Muhammadan Educational 

Conference and MAO College, hoped to 

win a separate Legislative Council for 

Muslims by making correspondence to 

several prominent Muslims in different 

regions of the sub-continent and organising 

a delegation led by Aga Khan III to meet 

with Viceroy Lord Minto, [4][5][6][7] a deal to 

which Minto agreed because it appeared to assist the British divide and rule strategy.. The delegation consisted of 35 

members, who each represented their respective region proportionately, mentioned hereunder. 




The Muslim League Governing Council at the Lahore session. The woman wearing 

the black cloak is Muhatarma Amjadi Banu Begum, the wife of Maulana 

Mohammad Ali Jauhar, a prominent Muslim League leader. Begum was a leading 

representative of the UP's Muslim women during the years of the Pakistan 

Movement. 



Pakistan Movement 



27 



1. Sir Aga Khan III. (Head of the delegation); 
(Bombay). 2. Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk. (Aligarh). 3. 
Nawab Waqar-ul-Mulk. (Muradabad). 4. Maulvi 
Hafiz Hakim Ajmal Khan. (Delhi). 5. Maulvi Syed 
Karamat Husain. (Allahabad). 6. Maulvi Sharifuddin 
(Patna). 7. Nawab Syed Sardar Ali Khan (Bombay). 
8. Syed Abdul Rauf. (Allahabad). 9. Maulvi 
Habiburrehman Khan. (Aligarh). 10. Sahibzada 
Aftab Ahmed Khan. (Aligarh). 11. Abdul Salam 
Khan. (Rampur). 12. Rais Muhammed Ahtasham Ali. 
(Lukhnow) 13. Khan Bahadur Muhammed 
Muzammilullah Khan. (Aligarh). 14. Haji 
Muhammed Ismail Khan. (Aligarh). 15. Shehzada 
Bakhtiar Shah. (Calcutta). 16. Malik Umar Hayat 
Khan Tiwana. (Shahpur). 17. Khan Bahadur 
Muhammed Shah Deen. (Lahore). 18. Khan Bahadur 
Syed Nawab Ali Chaudhary. (Memon Singh). 19. 
Nawab Bahadur Mirza Shuja'at Ali Baig. 
(Murshidabad). 20. Nawab Nasir Hussain Khan 
Bahadur. (Patna). 21. Khan Bahadur Syed Ameer 
Hassan Khan. (Calcutta). 22. Syed Muhammed 
Imam. (Patna). 23. Nawab Sarfaraz Hussain Khan 
Bahadur. (Patna). 24. Maulvi Rafeeuddin Ahmed. 
(Bombay). 25. Khan Bahadur Ahmed Muhaeeuddin. 
(Madras). 26. Ibraheem Bhai Adamjee Pirbhai. 
(Bombay). 27. Maulvi Abdul Raheem. (Calcutta). 28. 
Syed Allahdad Shah. (Khairpur). 29. Maulana H. M. 
Malik. (Nagpur). 30. Khan Bahadur Col. Abdul 
Majeed Khan. (Patiala). 31. Khan Bahadur Khawaja 
Yousuf Shah. (Amritsar). 32. Khan Bahadur Mian 
Muhammad Shafi. (Lahore). 33. Khan Bahadur 
Shaikh Ghulam Sadiq. (Amritsar). 34. Syed 
Nabiullah. (Allahabad). 35. Khalifa Syed 




H.H. THE ASA KHAN 

Aga Khan III in 1936. 




Muhammed Khan Bahadur. (Patna) 



[8] 



Nawab Mohsin ul Mulk.(left) who organized the Simla deputation, with 

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (Centre), Sir Syed's son Justice Syed Mahmood 

(extreme right). Syed Mahmood was the first Muslim to serve as a High 

Court judge in the British Raj. 



For Jinnah, Islam laid a cultural base for an ideology 

of ethnic nationalism whose objective was to gather the Muslim community in order to defend the Muslim 
minorities. Jinnah's representation of minority Muslims was quite apparent in 1928, when in the All-Party Muslim 
Conference, he was ready to swap the advantages of separate electorates for a quota of 33% of seats at the Centre. 
He maintained his views at the Round Table Conferences, while the Muslims of Punjab and Bengal were vying for a 
much more decentralized political setup. Many of their requests were met in the 1935 Government of India Act. 
Jinnah and the Muslim League played a peripheral role at the time and in 1937 could manage to gather only 5% of 
the Muslim vote. Jinnah refused to back down and went ahead with his plan. He presented the two-nation theory in 



the now famous Lahore Resolution in March 1940, seeking a separate Muslim state 



[9] 



The idea of a separate state had first been introduced by Allama Iqbal in his speech in December 1930 as the 
President of the Muslim League. The state that he visualized included only Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP), and Balochistan. Three years later, the name Pakistan was proposed in a declaration in 1933 by 



Pakistan Movement 28 

Choudhary Rahmat Ali, a University of Cambridge graduate. Again, Bengal was left out of the proposal. 

In his book Idea of Pakistan, Stephen P. Cohen writes on the influence of South Asian Muslim nationalism on the 
Pakistan movement: 

"It begins with a glorious precolonial state empire when the Muslims of South Asia were politically united and 
culturally, civilizationally, and strategically dominant. In that era, ethnolinguistic differences were subsumed 
under a common vision of an Islamic-inspired social and political order. However, the divisions among 
Muslims that did exist were exploited by the British, who practiced divide and rule politics, displacing the 
Mughals and circumscribing other Islamic rulers. Moreover, the Hindus were the allies of the British, who 
used them to strike a balance with the Muslims; many Hindus, a fundamentally insecure people, hated 
Muslims and would have oppressed them in a one-man, one-vote democratic India. The Pakistan freedom 
movement united these disparate pieces of the national puzzle, and Pakistan was the expression of the national 
will of India's liberated Muslims. " 

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 

Further information: Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 

In NWFP, the Muslim League faced its hardest challenge yet. It had intense competition from Khan Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan dubbed as the "Frontier Gandhi" due to his efforts in following in the footsteps of Gandhi. The popularity of 
the Congress, along with the strong Paktoon identity created by Ghaffar Khan in the cultural and the political arenas 
made life hard for the Muslim League. With the support of Ghaffar Khan, the Congress was able to contain the 
Muslim League to the non-Pakhtoon areas, particularly, the Hazara region. The Muslim League could only manage 
to win 17 seats, against the 30 won by Congress, in the 1946 elections. 

Conclusion 

Further information: Partition of India and Indian Independence Act 1947 

Muslim nationalism became evident in the provinces where the Muslim minorities resided as they faced social and 
political marginalization. The desire of the significant Muslim minorities to for self government and self 
determination, became obvious when a clause in the Lahore Resolution which stated that "constituent units (of the 
states to come) shall be autonomous and sovereign" was not respected. The Two-Nation Theory became more and 
more obvious during the congress rule. In 1946, the Muslim majorities agreed to the idea of Pakistan, as a response 
to Congress's one sided policies, which were also the result of leaders like Jinnah leaving the party in favour 

of Muslim League, winning in seven of the 1 1 provinces. Prior to 1938, Bengal with 33 million Muslims had only 
ten representatives, less than the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, which were home to only seven million 
Muslims. Thus the creation of Pakistan became inevitable and the British had no choice but to create two separate 
nations, Pakistan and India, in 1947. 

According to Pakistan Studies curriculum, Muhammad bin Qasim is often referred to as the first Pakistani. 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah also acclaimed the Pakistan movement to have started when the first Muslim put a foot in the 
Gateway of Islam. 

Non-Muslims contribution and efforts 

Jinnah's vision also benefited the Hindus, Sikhs, Parsis, Jews and Christians existed lived in the Muslim dominated 

[22] [231 

regions of undivided India. Most notable and extremely influential Hindu figure in Pakistan Movement was 

F241 
Jogendra Nath Mandal from Bengal, and Jagannath Azad from the Urdu-speaking belt. Mandal represented the 

T221 
Hindu representation calling for independent state of Pakistan, and was one of the Founding-fathers of Pakistan. 

After the independence, Mandal was given ministries of Law, Justice, and Work-Force by Jinnah in Liaquat Ali 

Khan's government. 



Pakistan Movement 



29 



[251 
The Christian composition also stand behind Jinnah's vision, playing a pivotal role in the movement. The notable 

Christians included Sir Victor Turner and Alvin Robert Cornelius. Turner was responsible for carrying the 

economic, financial planning of the country, after gaining the independence. Turner was among one of the 

founding fathers of Pakistan, and guided Jinnah and Ali Khan on economic affairs, taxation and to handle the 

administrative units. Alvin Robert Cornelius was elevated as Chief Justice of Lahore High Court bench by Jinnah 

and served as Law secretary in Liaquat Ali Khan's government. 



[26] 



also played their due role for the development of Pakistan soon after its creation 



The Hindu, Christian, and Parsi communities had 

[25] 



Timeline 



1849 Annexation of the Punjab 

1850 Introduction of Urdu in Punjab (almost all of west Pakistan 
excluding Sindh) 

1857 War of Independence 

1885 Formation of the Indian National Congress 

1901 Partition of Punjab 

1905 Partition of Bengal 

1906 Simla Deputation 

1906 Founding of the All-India Muslim League 

1909 Minto-Morley Reforms 

1911 Annulment of the Partition of Bengal 

1914-18 World War I 

1916 Lucknow Pact 

1919 Jallianwala Bagh Massacre 

1919 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms 

1919-23 Khilafat Movement 
1922-29 Hindu-Muslim Riots 

1927 Delhi Muslim Proposals 

1928 Nehru Report 

1929 Fourteen Points of Jinnah 

1930 Simon Commission Report 

1930 Separation of a strong Punjabi group from congress and formation 
of Majlis-e- Ahrar-ul-Islam 
1930 Allama Iqbal Address 



1931 Kashmir Resistance movement 
1930-32 Round Table Conferences 

1932 Communal Award (1932) 

1933 Pakistan National Movement 
1933 Now or Never Pamphlet 
1935 Government of India Act 
1937 Elections 

1937-39 Congress Rule in 7 out of 1 1 Provinces 

1937 Strong anti congress governments in Punjab and Bengal 

1938 A. K. Fazlul Huq of Bengal joined Muslim League 
1938 Jinah Sikandar pact 

1938 Pirpur Report 
1939-45 World WarH 

1939 Resignation of congress ministries and non congress power 
players got golden chance 

1940 Pakistan Resolution 

T27ir281 
1940 March 19 Khaksar Massacre in Lahore 

1942 Quit India Movement and non congress players further got 

space 

1942 Cripps' mission 

1944 Gandhi - Jinnah Talks 

1945 The Simla Conference 

1946 The Cabinet Mission the last British effort to united India 

1946 Direct Action Day in the aftermath of cabinet mission plan 
1946 Interim Government installed in office 

1946 Quit Kashmir Campaign as the formation of the interim 
government of Azad Kashmir 

1947 June 3 Partition Plan 
1947 Creation of Pakistan 



Pakistan Movement 30 

Notable quotations 

Allama Iqbal 



I would like to see the Punjab, North- West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within 

the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North- West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the 

[29] 
final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North- West India. 



Choudhary Rahmat Ali 



At this solemn hour in the history of India, when British and Indian statesmen are laying the foundations of a Federal Constitution for that 
land, we address this appeal to you, in the name of our common heritage, on behalf of our thirty million Muslim brethren who live in Pakistan 
- by which we mean the five Northern units of India, Viz: Punjab, North- West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sind and 
Baluchistan - for your sympathy and support in our grim and fateful struggle against political crucifixion and complete annihilation. 



Muhammad Ali Jinnah 



It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religious in 
the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve 
a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our 
notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry 
nor interdine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. 
Their aspect on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of 
history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their 
victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, 
must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state." 

[30] 

[31] 

Leaders and Founding Fathers 

Muhammad Ali Jinnah 
Allama Muhammad Iqbal 
Liaquat Ali Khan 
Aga Khan III 

Muhammad Zafarullah Khan 
Ghulam Bhik Nairang 
Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy 
Khwaja Nazimuddin 
Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk 
Chaudhry Naseer Ahmad Malhi 
Maulana Zafar Ali Khan 
Jogendra Nath Mandal 
Victor Turner 
Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan 
Alvin Robert Cornelius 



Pakistan Movement 3 1 

References 

[I] "Encyclopedia of Canada's peoples - Paul R. Magocsi, Multicultural History Society of Ontario - Google Books" (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=dbUuX0mnvQMC&pg=PA1028&lpg=PA1028&dq=pakistan+united+provinces&source=bl&ots=K6A5hGd_mM& 
sig=-91nwMarp7cPge6v8ERSn-Xdvak&hl=en&ei=Ee6jSv7UHsSfjAeV44iJCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result& 
resnum=9#v=onepage&q=&f=false). Books.google.com. . Retrieved 2012-01-31. 

[2] sherazkamran@hotmail.com, muhammad sheraz kamran, http://sherazkamran.com.   "NPT - History of Pakistan Movement" (http:// 

nazariapak.info/pak-history/). Nazariapak.info. . Retrieved 2012-01-31. 
[3] http://pakistanmovement.org/PakMovement.html 

[4] Pakistan was inevitable p. 51-52, Author Syed Hassan Riaz, published by University Karachi. ISBN 969-404-003-5 
[5] History of Pakistan Movement (1857-1947), p. 237-238, Author Prof. M. Azam Chaudhary, published by Abdullah Brothers, Urdu Bazar, 

Lahore 
[6] History of Pakistan and its background, p. 338. Author Syed Asghar Ali Shah Jafri, published by Evernew Book Palace, Circular road, Urdu 

Bazar, Lahore. 
[7] History of Pakistan, p. 58-59. Author Prof. Muhammed Khalilullah (Ex-Principal Federal Govt. Urdu College, Karachi; Former Dean Law 

Faculty, University of Karachi), published by Urdu Academy Sindh, Karachi. 
[8] History of Pakistan, p. 232 to 234. by Muhammed Ali Chiragh, published by Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore. ISBN 969-35-0413-5. 
[9] "Pakistan: nationalism without a nation? - Christophe Jaffrelot - Google Boeken" (http://books. google. com/books?id=I2avL3aZzSEC& 

pg=PPl&dq=Pakistan:+Nationalism+without+a+Nation?). Books.google.com. . Retrieved 2012-01-31. 
[10] Shafique Ali Khan (1987), Iqbal's Concept of Separate North-west Muslim State: A Critique of His Allahabad Address of 1930, 

Markaz-e-Shaoor-o-Adab, Karachi, OCLC 18970794 

[II] Choudhary Rahmat Ali, (1933), Now or Never; Are We to Live or Perish Forever?, pamphlet, published 28 January 
[12] The Idea of Pakistan. Stephen Philip Cohen. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 

[13] "South Asia I India state bans book on Jinnah" (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/821 1038.stm). BBC News. 2009-08-20. . 

Retrieved 2012-01-31. 
[14] Jaswant Singh. Jinnah: India-Partition-Independence. 
[15] Sarojini Naidu. Muhammad Jinnah: An Ambassador of Unity (http://www.amazon.com/Mahomed-Ali-Jinnah-ambassador-unity/dp/ 

B0040SYONC/ref=sr_l_fkmr0_l?ie=UTF8&qid=1287776194&sr=l-l-fkmr0). . 
[16] "Lahore Resolution [1940]" (http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A043). Storyofpakistan.com. . Retrieved 2012-01-31. 
[17] Muhammad Munawwar. Dimensions of Pakistan movement (http://books. google. com/books?id=IkFuAAAAMAAJ). . 
[18] Yusuf Ali Chowdhury, Muhammad Asad, Nawab Sir Ziauddin Ahmed, Amir Abdullah Khan Rokhri. Pakistan Movement Activists (http:// 

books. google.com/books ?id=qA-fSQAACAAJ). . 
[19] Sikandar Hayat. Aspects of the Pakistan movement (http://books. google. com/books ?id=iBBuAAAAMAAJ). . 

[20] "History books contain major distortions" (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-3-2004_pg7_16). Daily Times. . 
[21] "Pakistan Movement" (http://www.cybercity-online.net/pof/pakistan_movement.html). cybercity-online.net. . 
[22] Heyworth-Dunne, James (1952). Pakistan: the birth of a new Muslim state (http://books.google.com/ 

books ?ei=F24wT7irA6iusQLmuMGTDg&id=TS4BAAAAMAAJ&dq=Pakistan+movement+and+jogendra+nath+leader&q=jogendra-l- 

nath+leader#search_anchor). University of Michigan: Renaissance Bookshop, pp. 173. ISBN ASIN: B000N7G1MG. . 
[23] Tai Yong Tan, Gyanes Kugaisya (2000). The Aftermath of partition in South Asia:Pakistan (http://books.google.com/ 

books ?id=05zEtBxk72wC&pg=PR9&dq=Pakistan+movement+and+jogendra+nath+leader&hl=en&sa=X& 

ei=oW0wT7qWBs7CsQK6nOWXDg&ved=0CD8Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Pakistan movement and jogendra nath leader&f=false). 

London, UK: Routledge Publishing Co.. pp. ix-327. ISBN 0-203-45766-8. . 
[24] Sophia Ajaz. [criticalppp.com/archives/35305 "Hindus' contribution towards making of Pakistan"]. Sophia Ajaz. 

criticalppp.com/archives/35305. 
[25] Staff Report. "Home » Local » Christians played vital role in Pakistan Movement Christians played vital role in Pakistan Movement" (http:// 

www.daily.pk/christians-played-vital-role-in-pakistan-movement-5871/). Daily Pakistan. Pakistan Daily. . Retrieved 7 February 2012. 
[26] Aminullah Chaudry (1999). The founding fathers (http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/07/excerpt-the-founding-fathers.html). Karachi, 

Sindh Province: Oxford University Press, Karachi. ISBN 978-0-19-906171-6. . 
[27] Allama Mashraqi (http://www.allamamashraqi.com/grandsonsarticles.html) 

[28] http://www.allamamashraqi.com/images/The_Khaksar_Martyrs_of_March_19, _1940_by_Nasim_Yousaf.pdf 
[29] Sir Muhammad Iqbal's 1930 Presidential Address (http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_iqbal_1930.html), 

from Columbia University site 
[30] "VIEW: March towards independence" (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\03\23\story_23-3-2011_pg3_6). Daily 

Times. 2011-03-23. . Retrieved 2011-09-29. 
[31] Excerpt from the Presidential Address delivered by Quaid-e-Azam at Lahore, March 22-23, 1940 (http://www.nazariapak.info/data/ 

quaid/statements/two-nation.asp), Nazariapak.info 



Pakistan Movement 32 

External links 

• "Pakistan Movement Workers Trust -(Tehrik-i-Pakistan) jli~5\ tX,^j" (http://www.pakistanmovement.org). 
Pakistan Movement Workers Trust's official website. 

• "The Pakistan Movement" (http://www.storyofpakistan.com/timeline06.htm). Story of Pakistan website. 

• "Iqbal and the Pakistan Movement" (http://www.allamaiqbal.com/person/movement/move_main.htm). Iqbal 
Academy Pakistan. 

• "The Pakistan Movement (Picture Gallery)" (http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/movement_pic.htm). 
Pakistan.gov. 



33 



Wars 



34 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 



The India-Pakistan War of 1947-48, sometimes known as the First Kashmir War, was fought between India and 
Pakistan over the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu from 1947 to 1948. It was the first of four wars fought 
between the two newly independent nations. The result of the war still affects the geopolitics of both the countries. 

The war was initially fought by the forces of the princely state and tribal militias from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Facing the assault and a Muslim revolution in the Poonch and Mirpur 

area, the ruler of princely state of Kashmir and Jammu signed an Instrument of Accession to the Indian union. 

Indian and Pakistani armies entered the war subsequently. The fronts solidified gradually along what came to be 

[31-379 
known as the Line of Control. A formal cease-fire was declared at 2359 hours on the night of 1/2 January 1949. 

Background 

Prior to 1815 the area now known as "Jammu and Kashmir" comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and 6 
Muslim) carved out of territories controlled by the Afghanistan Amir (King) combined with those of local small 
rulers. These were collectively referred to as the "Punjab Hill States". These small states, ruled by Rajput kings, were 
variously independent, vassals of the Mughal Empire since the time of Emperor Akbar or sometimes controlled from 
Kangra state in the Himachal area. Following the decline of the Mughals, turbulence in Kangra and Gorkha 
invasions, the hill states fell one by one under the dominance of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh. 

The First Anglo-Sikh War (1845—46) was fought between the Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over 
Kashmir, and the East India Company. In the Treaty of Lahore in 1846, the Sikhs were made to surrender the 
valuable region (the Jullundur Doab) between the Beas River and Sutlej River and required to pay an indemnity of 
1.2 million rupees. Because they could not readily raise this sum, the East India Company allowed the Dogra ruler 
Gulab Singh to acquire Kashmir from the Sikh kingdom in exchange for making a payment of 750,000 rupees to the 
East India Company. Gulab Singh became the first Maharaja of the newly formed princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, founding a dynasty, that was to rule the state, the second-largest principality during the British Raj, until 
India gained its independence in 1947. 

Partition of India 

Before and after the withdrawal of the British from India in 1947, the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu came 
under pressure from both India and Pakistan to agree to become part of one of the newly independent countries. 
According to the instruments of accession relating to the Partition of India, the rulers of princely states were to be 
given the choice of either acceding to India or Pakistan. However, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh tried to 
avoid accession to either country. Following a Muslim revolution in the Poonch and Mirpur area and an allegedly 

[3]. 1 Q 

Pakistani backed Pashtun tribal intervention from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that aimed at supporting the 

r7irsi 
revolution, the Maharaja asked for Indian military assistance. India set a condition that Kashmir must accede to 

India for it to receive assistance. The Maharaja complied, and the Government of India recognized the accession of 

the erstwhile princely state to India. Indian troops were sent to the state to defend it. The Jammu & Kashmir National 

Conference volunteers aided the Indian Army in its campaign to drive out the Pathan invaders. 

Pakistan was of the view that the Maharaja of Kashmir had no right to call in the Indian Army, because it held that 
the Maharaja of Kashmir was not a heredity ruler, that he was merely a British appointee after the British defeated 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 



35 



Ranjit Singh who ruled the province before the British. There had been no such position as the "Maharaja of 
Kashmir" prior to British rule. Hence Pakistan decided to take action, but the Army Chief of Pakistan General 
Douglas Gracey did not send troops to the Kashmir front and refused to obey the order to do so given by Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah, Governor-General of Pakistan. Gracey justified his insubordination by arguing that Indian forces 
occupying Kashmir represented the British Crown and hence he could not engage in a military encounter with Indian 
forces. Pakistan finally did manage to send troops to Kashmir but by then the Indian forces had taken control of 
approximately two thirds of the former principality. The Gilgit and Baltistan territories were secured for Pakistan by 
the Gilgit Scouts and the forces of the state of Chitral, another princely state that had acceded to Pakistan. 



Stages of the war 



[10] 



Initial invasion 



The state forces stationed in the border 
regions around Muzaffarabad and Domel 
were quickly defeated by tribal forces (some 
state forces mutinied and joined them) and 
the way to the capital was open. Rather than 
advancing toward Srinagar before state 
forces could regroup or be reinforced, the 
invading forces remained in the captured 
cities in the border region engaging in 
looting and other crimes against their 
inhabitants. In the Poonch valley, the 
state forces retreated into towns where they 
were besieged. 



: Initial Invasion by 
Irregular Forces: 
Op GULMARG: 
22-26 Oct 1947 




Indian defence of the Kashmir Valley 27 October 1947 — 17 November 1947 



Indian operation in the Kashmir 
Valley 

After the accession, India airlifted troops 
and equipment to Srinagar, where they 
reinforced the princely state forces, 
established a defence perimeter and defeated 
the tribal forces on the outskirts of the city. 
The successful defence included an 
outflanking manoeuvre by Indian armoured 
cars. The defeated tribal forces were 
pursued as far as Baramulla and Uri and 
these towns were recaptured. 

In the Poonch valley, tribal forces continued 
to besiege state forces. 



2: Indian Defence of 

the Kashmir Valley: 

27 Oct 1947-17 Nov 

1947 




High Himalayas 



c i j ^Tithwa 
Muzzaferabad M 



J^JjEaramula ~^~ Zoji-La Pass 
<Lj^Sy?J%! Srinagai 
•~~Gulmarg 



Kashmir Valley 




Kotijjt. • Rajauri Punch Valley 



Mimur'vl. n 
MJhagner' 9 Akhnw 



Indian defence of the Kashmir Valley 27 October 1947 — 17 November 1947 



In Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces, called the Gilgit Scouts, joined the invading tribal forces, who thereby 
obtained control of this northern region of the state. The tribal forces were also joined by troops from Chitral, whose 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 



36 



ruler, the Mehtar of Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan. 



Attempted link-up at Poonch and 
fall of Mirpur 

Indian forces ceased pursuit of tribal forces 
after recapturing Uri and Baramula, and sent 
a relief column southwards, in an attempt to 
relieve Poonch. Although the relief column 
eventually reached Poonch, the siege could 
not be lifted. A second relief column 
reached Kotli, and evacuated the garrisons 
of that town and others but were forced to 
abandon it being too weak to defend it. 
Meanwhile, Mirpur was captured by the 
tribal forces on 25 November 1947. 



3: Attempted link-up 

at Punch 

18 Nov 1947- 

26 Nov 1947 



Muzzaferabad 

Domel • 





High Himalayas 



M Keran • Gurais 



-^ 



Dras 
9 Baramula f^~ Zoji-La Pass 

• Gulmarg 

Kashmir Valley 



Rajaun Punch Valley 




■Jhagner^ — ~ Akhnu 



Attempted link-up at Poonch 18 November 1947 — 26 November 1947 



Fall of Jhanger and attacks on 
Naoshera and Uri 

The tribal forces attacked and captured 
Jhanger. They then attacked Naoshera 
unsuccessfully, and made a series of 
unsuccessful attacks on Uri. In the south a 
minor Indian attack secured Chamb. By this 
stage of the war the front line began to 
stabilize as more Indian troops became 
available. 



4: Fall of Jhanger 
and attacks on 

Naoshera and Uri: 
25 Nov 1947 
- 6 Feb 1948 



■WSka 




High Himalayas 



;• Keran • Gurais 



J- 



• Kargil 



Baramula f Zoji-La Pass 

■ Srinagar 
Gulmarg 



Kashmir Valley 



/KorJi # # Rajaun Punch Valley 

Mirpur ^ ~ jNaoshera 



Fall of Jhanger and attacks on Naoshera and Uri 25 November 1 947 - 6 February 

1948 




Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 



37 



Operation Vijay: counterattack to 
Jhanger 

The Indian forces launched a counterattack 
in the south recapturing Jhanger and 
Rajauri. In the Kashmir Valley the tribal 
forces continued attacking the Uri garrison. 
In the north Skardu was brought under siege 
by the Gilgit scouts. 



5: Op Vijay: 

Counterattack to 

Jhanger 

7 Feb 1948 

-31 Mar 1948 





High Himalayas 



X-Tith»aii» K ='=" « <=ras * Kar » il 

Muzzaferabad r ~- 

Domel# ~ i • Dras 

I Baramula (^~ Zoji-La Pass 

I Srinagar 

1 Gulmarg 




Kashmir Valley 



/Kotli # « Rajauri Punch Valley 

Mitpur V Naoshera 

[_• •J* 

*— ]hagner?=r Akhnur 



Operation Vijay: counterattack to Jhanger 7 February 1948 - 1 May 1948 



Indian Spring Offensive 

The Indians held onto Jhanger against 
numerous counterattacks, who were 
increasingly supported by regular Pakistani 
Forces. In the Kashmir Valley the Indians 
attacked, recapturing Tithwail. The Gilgit 
scouts made good progress in the High 
Himalayas sector, infiltrating troops to bring 
Leh under siege, capturing Kargil and 
defeating a relief column heading for 
Skardu. 




Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 



38 



Operations Gulab and Eraze 

The Indians continued to attack in the 
Kashmir Valley sector driving north to 
capture Keran and Gurais (Operation 
Eraze) " . They also repelled a 

counterattack aimed at Tithwal. In the 
Jammu region, the forces besieged in 
Poonch broke out and temporarily linked up 
with the outside world again. The Kashmir 
State army was able to defend Skardu from 
the Gilgit Scouts impeding their advance 
down the Indus valley towards Leh. In 
August the Chitral Forces under 
Mata-ul-Mulk besieged Skardu and with the 
help of artillery were able to take Skardu. 
This freed the Gilgit Scouts to push further into Ladakh. 



7: Operation Gulab 

and Erase 

19 May 1948 

-14 Aug 1948 




High Himalayas 



• Ksrgil 22-May-48 
" Dras 6-Jun-4B • Khalatse19~Jul-48 




Indian Spring Offensive 1 May 1948 - 19 May 1948 



S: Operation Duck 

15 August 1948 

-31 October 194S 





High Himalayas 



•^Tithwail* Keran * Gurais 
Muzzaferabadf# j-^ 5-Sep-48 (Duck; 



• Ksrgil 



Baramula 
# uri ■ Srinagai 



i_# Dras 
-f^Zoji-Ls 



• Gulmarg 



-$ Li 



Kashmir Valley 



Operation Bison 

During this time the front began to settle 

down. The siege of Poonch continued. An 

unsuccessful attack was launched by 77 

Parachute Brigade (Brig Atal) to capture 

Zoji La pass. Operation Duck, the earlier 

epithet for this assault, was renamed as 

Operation Bison by Cariappa. M5 Stuart 

light tanks of 7 Cavalry were moved in 

dismantled conditions through Srinagar and 

winched across bridges while two field 

companies of the Madras Sappers converted 

the mule track across Zoji La into a jeep 

track. The surprise attack on 1 November by 

the brigade with armour supported by two 

regiments of 25 pounders and a regiment of 3.7 inch guns, forced the pass and pushed the tribal/Pakistani forces back 

to Matayan and later Dras. The brigade linked up on 24 November at Kargil with Indian troops advancing from Leh 

T121" 103-127 

while their opponents eventually withdrew northwards toward Skardu. 




Kotli # * Rajauri Punch Valley 

Mirpur Naoshera 

\» • • 

hagner Akhnur 

v •/ 

Chamb 



Operation Duck 15 August 1948 - 1 November 1948 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 



39 



Operation Easy; Poonch link-up 

The Indians now started to get the upper 
hand in all sectors. Poonch was finally 
relieved after a siege of over a year. The 
Gilgit forces in the High Himalayas, who 
had previously made good progress, were 
finally defeated. The Indians pursued as far 
as Kargil before being forced to halt due to 
supply problems. The Zoji La pass was 
forced by using tanks (which had not been 
thought possible at that altitude) and Dras 
was recaptured. 



9: Operation Easy: 

Punch Link-up 

1 November 1948 

-26 November 1948 




■fithwaiP Kelan * Gurals 15-Nov- 



m «. i. j^Tithwair Kelan * Gurals 15-NoMS 
Muzzaferabad |# _JS\_ 

Domel • ">Y< ,-^Dras 

\ Baramula ( Zoji-L^ Pass 



24-NOV-48 
• ^Kargil 



High Himalayas 



• Gulmarg 
> Kashmir Valley 

' v « Rajauri Punch Valley 




Naoshera 

{• • • 

^--Jhagner Akhnur 



Operation Easy. Poonch link-up 1 November 1948 - 26 November 1948 



10: Moves up to 

Cease Fire 

27 November 1948 

-31 December 1948 



Muzzaferabad 

Domel • 





High Himalayas 






• Kargil 



j • Dras 
Baramula f~ Zoji-La Pass 
I Srinagar 
• Gulmarg 

Kashmir Valley 
Punch Valley 



Moves up to cease-fire 

At this stage Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru decided to ask UN to 
intervene. A UN cease-fire was arranged for 
the 31 December 1948. A few days before 
the cease-fire the Pakistanis launched a 
counter attack, which cut the road between 
Uri and Poonch. After protracted 
negotiations a cease-fire was agreed to by 
both countries, which came into effect. The 
terms of the cease-fire as laid out in a 
United Nations resolution of August 13, 

1948, were adopted by the UN on January 5, 

1949. This required Pakistan to withdraw its 
forces, both regular and irregular, while 

allowing India to maintain minimum strength of its forces in the state to preserve law and order. On compliance of 
these conditions a plebiscite was to be held to determine the future of the territory. In all, 1,500 soldiers died on each 
side during the war and Pakistan was able to acquire roughly two-fifths of Kashmir, including five of the fourteen 
eight thousanders plus peaks of the world, while India maintained the remaining three fifths of Kashmir, including 
the most populous and fertile regions. 




Moves up to cease-fire. 27 November 1948 - 31 December 1948 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 40 

Military awards 
Battle honours 

After the war, a total of number of 1 1 battle honours and one theatre honour were awarded to units of the Indian 
Army, the notable amongst which are: 

• Jammu and Kashmir 1947-48 (theatre honour) • Naoshera • Srinagar 

• Gurais • Punch • Tithwal 

• Kargil • Rajouri • Zoji La 



Gallantry awards 

For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries. 
Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award Param Vir Chakra, and the Pakistani award Nishan-E-Haider: 

India 

• Major Som Nath Sharma (Posthumous) 

• Lance Naik Karam Singh 

• Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane 

• Jadu Nath Singh 

• Company Havildar Major Piru Singh Shekhawat 

Pakistan 

• Captain Muhammad Sarwar Shaheed 

Notes 

[I] Kashmir. (201 1). In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from http://www.britannica.eom/EBchecked/topic/3 12908/Kashmir (http:// 
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/312908/Kashmir/214223/The-Kashmir-problem#ref673547) 

[2] Lamb, Alastair (1997), Incomplete partition: the genesis of the Kashmir dispute 1947-1948, Roxford, ISBN=0-907 129-08-0 } } 

[3] Prasad, S.N.; Dharm Pal (1987). History of Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948. New Delhi: History Department, Ministry of 

Defence, Government of India, (printed at Thomson Press (India) Limited), pp. 418.. 
[4] Hutchison, J.; Vogel, Jean Philippe (1933). History of the Panjah Hill States (http://books. google.com/books ?id=5uXgQwAACAAJ). 

Superint., Gov. Print., Punjab. . Retrieved 23 October 2011. 
[5] Srinagar (http://www.bl.Uk/onlinegallery/onlineex/apac/photocoll/g/019pho000000394u00076000.html) www.collectbritain.co.uk. 
[6] Article 2.4 of the Indian Independence Act. 

[7] Kashmir-konflikten. (2011-10-18) I Store norske leksikon. Taken from (http://snl.no/Kashmir-konflikten) 
[8] Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation: Kashmir-konflikten (http://www.nrk.nO/nyheter/verden/l.461250) 
[9] My Life and Times (http://books.google.com/books?id=KNFJKap8YxwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=My+life+and+times+By+ 

Sayyid+MA«r+QADsim&source=bl&ots=QelHViveYB&sig=59zRr-XTYB8srl0zs3A_CyfCabI&hl=en& 

ei=OAnCTM3rKsT48Aa7rajhCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=l&ved=0CBMQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false). 

Allied Publishers Limited. . Retrieved 2010-07-01. 
[10] Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948. (1987). Thomson Press (India) Limited, New 

Delhi. This is the Indian Official History. 

[II] I Indo-Pakistani War, 1947-1949 By Tom Cooper (http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_321.shtml) Air Combat Information 
Group October 29, 2003 

[12] Sinha, Lt. Gen. S.K. (1977). Operation Rescue: Military! Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49 (http://books.google.co.in/ 

books?id=SMwBAAAAMAAJ). New Delhi: Vision Books, pp. 174. ISBN 81-7094-012-5. . Retrieved 4 August 2010. 
[13] Resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 (http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/ 

intrel/uncoml.htm) 
[14] Global security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1947.htm) 
[15] Singh, Sarbans (1993). Battle Honours of the Indian Army 1757 - 1971 (http://books.google.com/books/about/ 

Battle_honours_of_the_Indian_Army_1757_l.html?id=5ATfAAAAMAAJ). New Delhi: Vision Books, pp. 227-238. ISBN 81-7094-115-6. . 

Retrieved 3 November 201 1. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1 947 4 1 

Bibliography 

Major sources 

• Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948. (1987). Thomson 
Press (India) Limited, New Delhi. This is the Indian Official History. 

• Lamb, Alastair. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990. (1991). Roxford Books. ISBN 0-907129-06-4. 

• Praval, K.C. The Indian Army After Independence. (1993). Lancer International, ISBN 1-897829-45-0 

• Sen, Maj Gen L.P. Slender Was The Thread: The Kashmir confrontation 1947-1948. (1969). Orient Longmans 
Ltd, New Delhi. 

• Vas, Lt Gen. E. A. Without Baggage: A personal account of the Jammu and Kashmir Operations 1947-1949. 
(1987). Natraj Publishers Dehradun. ISBN 81-85019-09-6. 

Other sources 

• Cohen, Lt Col Maurice. Thunder over Kashmir. (1955). Orient Longman Ltd. Hyderabad 

• Hinds, Brig Gen SR. Battle ofZoji La. (1962). Military Digest, New Delhi. 

• Sandhu, Maj Gen Gurcharan. The Indian Armour: History Of The Indian Armoured Corps 1941-1971. (1987). 
Vision Books Private Limited, New Delhi, ISBN 81-7094-004-4. 

• Singh, Maj K Brahma. History of Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (1820—1956). (1990). Lancer International New 
Delhi, ISBN 81-7062-091-0. 

'The template Jammu and Kashmir freedom movement is being eon side red for deletion.' 



Partition of India 



Kashmir conflict 



42 



Admin, by Claimed by 

Jammu & Kashmir India Pakistan 
Azad Kashmir Pakistan India 

Northern Areas Pakistan India 

Siachen Glacier India Pakistan 
AksaJ Chin China India 

Shaksam Valley China India 




The disputed areas of the region of Kashmir. India claims the entire erstwhile 

princely state of Jammu and Kashmir based on an instrument of accession signed in 

1947. Pakistan claims all areas of the erstwhile state except for those claimed by 

China. China claims the Shaksam Valley and Aksai Chin. 



The Kashmir conflict (Hindi: +:>[4k ^R, 
Urdu: j~^iS D1a~~o) is a territorial dispute 
between India and Pakistan over the 
Kashmir region, the northwestern most 
region of South Asia. 

India claims the entire state of Jammu and 
Kashmir and as of 2010, administers 
approximately 43% of the region, including 
most of Jammu, the Kashmir Valley, 
Ladakh, and the Siachen Glacier. India's 
claims are contested by Pakistan, which 
controls approximately 37% of Kashmir, 
namely Azad Kashmir and the northern 
areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. 

India has officially stated that it believes 

that Kashmir is an integral part of India, 

though the Prime Minister of India, 

Manmohan Singh, stated after the 2010 

Kashmir Unrest that his government is 

willing to grant autonomy within the purview of Indian constitution to Kashmir if there is consensus on this issue 

Pakistan maintains that Kashmir is the "jugular vein of Pakistan" and a currently disputed territory whose final 

status must be determined by the people of Kashmir. China states that Aksai Chin is a part of China and does not 

recognize the addition of Aksai Chin to the Kashmir region. Certain Kashmiri independence groups believe that 

Kashmir should be independent of both India and Pakistan. 

India and Pakistan have fought at least three wars over Kashmir, including the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1947, 1965 
and 1999. India and Pakistan have also been involved in several skirmishes over the Siachen Glacier. 

Since 1987, a disputed State election has resulted in some of the state's legislative assembly forming militant 
wings, creating a catalyst for insurgency. The Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir has been the site of 

conflict between the Indian Armed Forces, militants, and separatists. India has furnished documentary evidence to 
the United Nations that these militants are supported by Pakistan, leading to a ban on some terrorist organisations, 
which Pakistan has yet to enforce. The turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir has resulted in thousands of deaths, but has 
become less deadly in recent years. There have been protest movements in Indian Administered Kashmir since 

1989. The movements were created to voice Kashmir's disputes and grievances with the Indian government, 
specifically the Indian Military. Elections held in 2008 were generally regarded as fair by the United Nations 

High Commissioner for Refugees, had a high voter turnout in spite of calls by militants for a boycott, and led to the 
pro-India Jammu & Kashmir National Conference forming the government in the state. According to Voice of 

America, many analysts have interpreted the high voter turnout in this election as a sign that the people of Kashmir 

1121 

have endorsed Indian rule in the state. However Sajjad Lone, a prominent separatist leader in Kashmir, claims 



[l] 



Kashmir conflict 43 

ri2i 
that "the high turnout should not be taken as a sign that Kashmiris no longer want independence. Altaf Ahmad, a 

separatist activist of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, said, "The whole of Kashmir nation is standing 

against these elections, because these elections are not as India claims in the United Nations, that people of Kashmir 

[131 
are representing themselves in these elections, that this is the self determination," In 2009 and 2010 unrest 

erupted again. 

Timeline 
Early history 

According to folk etymology, the name "Kashmir" means "desiccated land" (from the Sanskrit: Ka = water and 
shimeera = desiccate). In the Rajatarangini, a history of Kashmir written by Kalhana in the mid-12th century, it is 
stated that the valley of Kashmir was formerly a lake. According to Hindu mythology, the lake was drained by the 
saptarishi or sage, Kashyapa, son of Marichi, son of Brahma, by cutting the gap in the hills at Baramulla 
(Varaha-mula) . When Kashmir had been drained, Kashyapa asked Brahmans to settle there. This is still the local 
tradition, and in the existing physical condition of the country, we may see some ground for the story which has 
taken this form. The name of Kashyapa is by history and tradition connected with the draining of the lake, and the 
chief town or collection of dwellings in the valley was called Kashyapa-pura, which has been identified with 

ri4i 

Kaspapyros of Hecataeus (apud Stephanus of Byzantium) and Kaspatyros of Herodotus (3.102, 4.44). Kashmir is 
also believed to be the country meant by Ptolemy's Kaspeiria. 

However an earlier and well known recorded reference can be found in the writings of a Tibetan Buddhist monk in 
the 6th Century. Hsien Tsang referred to a state called 'Kash-mi-lo' that had existed in the 1st century. 

In the 18th century, Kashmir was ruled by the Pashtun Durrani Empire. In 1819, Kashmir was conquered by the Sikh 
ruler Ranjit Singh. Following the First Anglo-Sikh War in 1845 and 1846, Kashmir was first ceded by the Treaty of 
Lahore to the East India Company, and shortly after sold by the Treaty of Amritsar to Gulab Singh, Raja of Jammu, 
who thereafter was given the title Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. From then until the Partition of India in 1947, 
Kashmir was ruled by the Hindu Maharajas of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu, although the majority of the 
population were Muslim, except in the Jammu and Ladakh region. 

Partition and dispute 

In 1947, British rule in India ended with the creation of two new nations: the Union of India and the Dominion of 
Pakistan, while British suzerainty over the 562 Indian princely states ended. According to the Indian Independence 
Act 1947, "the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in 
force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States", so the states were 
left to choose whether to join India or Pakistan or to remain independent. Jammu and Kashmir, the largest of the 
princely states, had a predominantly Muslim population, while having a Hindu ruler (Maharaja Hari Singh.) On 
partition Pakistan expected Kashmir to be annexed to it. 

ri7i 

In October 1947, Muslim revolutionaries in western Kashmir and Pakistani tribals from Dir entered Kashmir, 
intending to liberate it from Dogra rule. Unable to withstand the invasion, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of 
Accession on 25 October 1947 that was accepted by the government of India on 27 October 1947. 

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 

After rumours that the Maharaja supported the annexation of Kashmir by India, militant Muslim revolutionaries 

ri7i 

from western Kashmir and Pakistani tribesmen made rapid advances into the Baramulla sector. Maharaja Hari 
Singh of Kashmir asked the government of India to intervene. However, India and Pakistan had signed an agreement 
of non-intervention. Although tribal fighters from Pakistan had entered Jammu and Kashmir, there was no iron-clad 
legal evidence to unequivocally prove that Pakistan was officially involved. It would have been illegal for India to 



Kashmir conflict 



44 



unilaterally intervene in an open, official capacity unless Jammu and Kashmir officially joined the Union of India, at 
which point it would be possible to send in its forces and occupy the remaining parts. 

The Maharaja desperately needed military assistance when the Pakistani tribals reached the outskirts of Srinagar. 
Before their arrival into Srinagar, India argued that the Maharaja must complete negotiations for ceding Jammu and 
Kashmir to India in exchange for receiving military aid. The agreement which ceded Jammu and Kashmir to India 

was signed by the Maharaja and Lord Mountbatten of Burma. In Jammu and Kashmir, National Conference 

r2ii 
volunteers worked with the Indian Army to drive out the Pakistanis. 

The resulting war over Kashmir, the First Kashmir War, lasted until 
1948, when India moved the issue to the UN Security Council. Sheikh 
Abdullah was not in favor of India seeking UN intervention because he 
was sure the Indian Army could free the entire State of invaders. 
The UN had previously passed resolutions for setting up monitoring of 
the conflict in Kashmir. Following the set-up of the United Nations 
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 47 on 21 April 1948. The 
resolution imposed an immediate cease-fire and called on Pakistan to 
withdraw all military presence. The resolution stated that Pakistan 
would have no say in Jammu and Kashmir politics. India would retain 
a minimum military presence and "the final disposition of the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the 
people expressed through the democratic method of a free and 
impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United 
Nations." The ceasefire was enacted on 31 December 1948. 




The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir to India 

was accepted by Viceroy Louis Mountbatten, 1 st 

Earl Mountbatten of Burma. 



The Indian and Pakistani governments agreed to hold the plebiscite, 

but Pakistan did not withdraw its troops from Kashmir, thus violating 

T221 
the conditions for holding the plebiscite. In addition, the Indian 

T221 
Government distanced itself from its commitment to hold a plebiscite. Over the next several years, the UN 

Security Council passed four new resolutions, revising the terms of Resolution 47 to include a synchronous 

withdrawal of both Indian and Pakistani troops from the region, per the recommendations of General Andrew 

McNaughton. To this end, UN arbitrators put forward 1 1 different proposals for the demilitarization of the region. 

All of these were accepted by Pakistan, but rejected by the Indian government. The resolutions were passed by 

T241 
United Nations Security Council under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. Resolutions passed under 

Chapter VI of the UN charter are considered non-binding and have no mandatory enforceability, as opposed to the 



resolutions passed under Chapter VII 



[25] 



Sino-Indian War 

In 1962, troops from the People's Republic of China and India clashed in territory claimed by both. China won a 
swift victory in the war, resulting in the Chinese annexation of the region called Aksai Chin, which has continued as 
of January 2012. Another smaller area, the Trans-Karakoram, was demarcated as the Line of Control (LOC) between 
China and Pakistan, although some of the territory on the Chinese side is claimed by India to be part of Kashmir. The 
line that separates India from China in this region is known as the "Line of Actual Control". 



Kashmir conflict 45 

1965 and 1971 wars 

In 1965 and 1971, heavy fighting broke out again between India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 
resulted in the defeat of Pakistan and the Pakistani military's surrender in East Pakistan, leading to the creation of 
Bangladesh. The Simla Agreement was signed in 1972 between India and Pakistan. By this treaty, both countries 
agreed to settle all issues by peaceful means using mutual discussion in the framework of the UN Charter. 

1989 popular insurgency and militancy 

In the years since 1990, the Kashmiri Muslims and the Indian government have conspired to abolish the complexities of Kashmiri civilization. 
The world it inhabited has vanished: the state government and the political class, the rule of law, almost all the Hindu inhabitants of the valley, 
alcohol, cinemas, cricket matches, picnics by moonlight in the saffron fields, schools, universities, an independent press, tourists and banks. In 
this reduction of civilian reality, the sights of Kashmir are redefined: not the lakes and Mogul gardens, or the storied triumphs of Kashmiri 
agriculture, handicrafts and cookery, but two entities that confront each other without intermediary: the mosque and the army camp. 

[27] 
— British journalist lames Buchan 

r2Rir?9i 
In 1989, a widespread popular and armed insurgency started in Kashmir. After the 1987 State legislative 

assembly election, some of the results were disputed. This resulted in the formation of militant wings after the 

election and was the beginning of the Mujahadeen insurgency, which continues to this day. India contends that 

the insurgency was largely started by Afghan mujahadeen who entered the Kashmir valley following the end of the 

Soviet- Afghan War. Pakistani and Kashmiri nationalists argue that Afghan mujahideen did not leave Afghanistan in 

T311 
large numbers until 1992, three years after the insurgency began. Yasin Malik, a leader of one faction of the 

Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, was one of the Kashmiris to organize militancy in Kashmir, along with Ashfaq 

Majid Wani and Farooq Ahmad Dar (alias Bitta Karatay). Since 1995, Malik has renounced the use of violence and 

calls for strictly peaceful methods to resolve the dispute. He developed differences with one of the senior leaders, 

Farooq Siddiqui (alias Farooq Papa), for shunning the demand for an independent Kashmir and trying to cut a deal 

with the Indian Prime Minister. This resulted in a spilt in which Bitta Karatay, Salim Nanhaji, and other senior 

[32] [331 

comrades joined Farooq Papa. Pakistan claims these insurgents are Jammu and Kashmir citizens, and are 

rising up against the Indian army in an independence movement. Pakistan accuses the Indian army of committing 
serious human rights violations in Kashmir. Pakistan denies that it has or currently is supplying weapons and 
ammunition to the insurgents. 

India claims these insurgents are Islamic terrorist groups from Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Afghanistan, 

[34] 
fighting to make Jammu and Kashmir, a part of Pakistan. They claim Pakistan is supplying munitions to the 

terrorists and training them in Pakistan. India states that the terrorists have been killing many citizens in Kashmir and 

committing human rights violations. They deny that their own armed forces are responsible for human rights abuses. 

On a visit to Pakistan in 2006 current Chief Minister of Kashmir Omar Abdullah remarked that foreign militants 

[35] 
were engaged in reckless killings and mayhem in the name of religion. Indian government has said militancy is 

[9] 
now on the decline. 

The Pakistani government calls these insurgents "Kashmiri freedom fighters", and claims that it gives only moral and 
diplomatic support to these insurgents, though India believes they are Pakistan-supported terrorists from Pakistan 

Administered Kashmir. In October 2008, President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan called the Kashmir separatists, 

T371 
terrorists in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. These comments by Zardari sparked outrage amongst 

[30] 
many Kashmiris, some of whom defied a curfew by the Indian army to burn him in effigy. 

In 2008, pro-separation leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq told the Washington Post that there has been a "purely 

rsi 
indigenous, purely Kashmiri" peaceful protest movement alongside the insurgency in Indian-administered 

Kashmir since 1989. The movement was created for the same reason as the insurgency; it began with the disputed 

election of 1987. The Kashmiris have grievances with the Indian government, specifically the Indian Military, which 

[g][9][39] 
has committed human rights violations, according to the United Nations. 



Kashmir conflict 



46 



Al-Qaeda involvement 

In a 'Letter to American People' written by Osama bin Laden in 2002, he stated that one of the reasons he was 
fighting America is because of its support of India on the Kashmir issue. While on a trip to Delhi in 2002, U.S. 

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that Al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir, though he did not have any 

[421 [43] 

hard evidence. An investigation in 2002 unearthed evidence that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in 

Pakistan-administered Kashmir with tacit approval of Pakistan's National Intelligence agency Inter-Services 

[441 

Intelligence. A team of Special Air Service and Delta Force was sent into Indian-administered Kashmir in 2002 

to hunt for Osama bin Laden after reports that he was being sheltered by the Kashmiri militant group 

T451 
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. U.S. officials believed that Al-Qaeda was helping organize a campaign of terror in 

Kashmir in order to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. Their strategy was to force Pakistan to move its 

troops to the border with India, thereby relieving pressure on Al-Qaeda elements hiding in northwestern Pakistan. 

U.S. intelligence analysts say Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives in Pakistan-administered Kashmir are helping 

terrorists they had trained in Afghanistan to infiltrate Indian-administered Kashmir. Fazlur Rehman Khalil, the 

leader of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, signed al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of holy war, which called on Muslims to 

[471 
attack all Americans and their allies. In 2006 Al-Qaeda claim they have established a wing in Kashmir; this 

worried the Indian government. Indian Army Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag, GOC-in-C Northern Command, said to 

reporters that the army has ruled out the presence of Al-Qaeda in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. He said 

that there no evidence that verifies reports from the media of an Al-Qaeda presence in the state. He stated that 

[491 
Al-Qaeda had strong ties with the Kashmir militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed in Pakistan. 

While on a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, U.S. Defense secretary Robert Gates stated that Al-Qaeda was seeking 

to destabilize the region and planning to provoke a nuclear war between India and Pakistan 



[50] 



In September 2009, a U.S. Drone strike reportedly killed Ilyas Kashmiri, who was the chief of Harkat-ul-Jihad 
al-Islami, a Kashmiri militant group associated with Al-Qaeda. Kashmiri was described by Bruce Riedel as a 

'prominent' Al-Qaeda member, while others described him as the head of military operations for Al-Qaeda. 
Waziristan had now become the new battlefield for Kashmiri militants, who were now fighting NATO in support of 
Al-Qaeda. Ilyas Kashmiri was charged by the U.S. in a plot against Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper which 
was at the center of Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy. 

Indian Army Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag, GOC-in-C Northern Command told reporters that the army has ruled out the 
presence of Al-Qaeda in Jammu and Kashmir, and that there is no evidence that confirms an Al Qaeda presence in 



the state 



[57] 



Conflict in Kargil 

In mid-1999, insurgents and Pakistani soldiers from Pakistani 
Kashmir infiltrated into Jammu and Kashmir. During the winter 
season, Indian forces regularly move down to lower altitudes, as 
severe climatic conditions makes it almost impossible for them to 
guard the high peaks near the Line of Control. The insurgents took 
advantage of this and occupied vacant mountain peaks of the 
Kargil range overlooking the highway in Indian Kashmir that 
connects Srinagar and Leh. By blocking the highway, they wanted 
to cut off the only link between the Kashmir Valley and Ladakh. 
This resulted in a high-scale conflict between the Indian Army and 
the Pakistan Army. 




Location of conflict. 



Kashmir conflict 



47 



Fears of the Kargil War turning into a nuclear war provoked the then-United States President Bill Clinton to pressure 
Pakistan to retreat. Faced with mounting losses of personnel and posts, the Pakistan Army withdrew their remaining 
troops from the area, ending the conflict. India reclaimed control of the peaks, which they now patrol and monitor all 
year long. 



Reasons behind the dispute 

The Kashmir Conflict arises from the Partition of British India in 1947 into modern India and Pakistan. Both the 
countries have made claims to Kashmir, based on historical developments and religious affiliations of the Kashmiri 
people. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which lies strategically in the north-west of the subcontinent, bordering 
Afghanistan and China, was a princely state ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh under the paramountcy of British India. In 
geographical and legal terms, the Maharaja could have joined either of the two new Dominions. Although urged by 
the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, to determine the future of his state before the transfer of power took place, 
Singh demurred. In October 1947, incursions by Pakistan took place leading to a war, as a result of which the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir remains divided between the two countries. 



Administered by 


Area 


Population 


% Muslim 


% Hindu 


% Buddhist 


% Other 


India 


Kashmir valley 


~4 million 


95% 


4% 


- 


- 




Jammu 


~3 million 


30% 


66% 


- 


4% 




Ladakh 


-0.25 million 


46% (Shia) 


- 


50% 


3% 


Pakistan 


Northern Areas 


~1 million 


99% 


- 


- 


- 




Azad Kashmir 


~2.6 million 


100% 


- 


- 


- 


China 


Aksai Chin 


- 


- 


- 


- 


- 


KOI 

• Statistics from the BBC report. In Depth "There are roughly 1.5 million refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir in Pakistan 

[59] 
administered Kashmir and Pakistan UNHCR 

• About 300,000 Hindus in Indian Administered Kashmir valley are internally displaced due to militancy in Kashmir CIA 

• Muslims are the majority in Poonch, Rajouri, Kishtwar, and Doda districts in Jammu region. Shia Muslims make up the majority in Kargil 
district in Ladakh region. 

• India does not accept the two-nation theory and considers that Kashmir, despite being a Muslim-majority state, is in many ways an "integral 
part" of secular India. 



Two-thirds of the former princely state (known as the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir), comprising Jammu, the 
Kashmir Valley, and the sparsely populated Buddhist area of Ladakh are controlled by India; one-third is 
administered by Pakistan. The latter includes a narrow strip of land called Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, 
compromising the Gilgit Agency, Baltistan, and the former kingdoms of Hunza and Nagar. Attempts to resolve the 
dispute through political discussions were unsuccessful. In September 1965, war broke out again between Pakistan 
and India. The United Nations called for another cease-fire, and peace was restored once again following the 
Tashkent Declaration in 1966, by which both nations returned to their original positions along the demarcated line. 
After the 1971 war and the creation of independent Bangladesh, under the terms of the 1972 Simla Agreement 
between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, it was agreed that neither 
country would seek to alter the cease-fire line in Kashmir, which was renamed as the Line of Control, "unilaterally, 
irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations". 

Numerous violations of the Line of Control have occurred, including the incursions by insurgents and Pakistani 
armed forces at Kargil leading to the Kargil war. There are also sporadic clashes on the Siachen Glacier, where the 
Line of Control is not demarcated and both countries maintain forces at altitudes rising to 20000 ft (unknown 
operator: u'strong 1 m), with the Indian forces serving at higher altitudes. 



Kashmir conflict 48 

Indian view 

The Indian viewpoint is succinctly summarized by Ministry of External 
affairs, Government of India — 

• India holds that the Instrument of Accession of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir to the Union of India, signed by Maharaja Hari Singh 
(erstwhile ruler of the State) on 25 October 1947 & executed 

on 27 October 1947 between the ruler of Kashmir and the 
Governor General of India was a legal act, was completely valid in 
terms of the Government of India Act (1935), Indian Independence 
Act (1947) and international law and was total and irrevocable. *"^»i ^-?_ 




There is no evidence of any deceit practiced by India on Kashmir. 



Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of 
Accession in October 1947 under which he 

The Government of India had no right to question the right of the acceded the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the 

Maharaja to sign the Instrument of Accession, as he alone had the Union of India. 

right and power to take a decision for his state. To have asked the 

ruler to establish his right to sign the Instrument of Accession would have meant that the Government of India 

was going to meddle with the internal policies of the state. Law does not permit any such intervention in the 

affairs of another state. 

• The Constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had unanimously ratified the Maharaja's Instrument of 
Accession to India and had adopted a constitution for the state that called for a perpetual merger of Jammu and 
Kashmir with the Union of India. India claims that the Constituent assembly was a representative one, and that its 
views were those of the Kashmiri people at the time. 

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 1 172 tacitly accepts India's stand regarding all outstanding issues 
between India and Pakistan and urges the need to resolve the dispute through mutual dialogue and does not call 
for a plebiscite. 

• United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 cannot be implemented since Pakistan failed to withdraw its 
forces from Kashmir, which was the first step in implementing the resolution. India is also of the view that 
Resolution 47 is obsolete, since the geography and demographics of the region have been permanently altered. 
The resolution was passed by United Nations Security Council under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. It 
is therefore non-binding and has no mandatory enforceability, as opposed to the resolutions passed under Chapter 

vn [24][25] 

• India does not accept the two-nation theory that forms the basis of Pakistan and considers that Kashmir, despite 
being a Muslim-majority state, is in many ways an "integral part" of secular India. 

• The state of Jammu and Kashmir was provided significant autonomy in Article 370 of the Constitution of 
India. [67] 

• All differences between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir, need to be settled through bilateral negotiations as 
agreed to by the two countries when they signed the Simla Agreement on 2 July 1972. 

Additional Indian viewpoints regarding the broader debate over the Kashmir conflict include — 

• In a diverse country like India, disaffection and discontent are not uncommon. Indian democracy has the 

necessary resilience to accommodate genuine grievances within the framework of India's sovereignty, unity, and 

integrity. The Government of India has expressed its willingness to accommodate the legitimate political demands 

[59] 
of the people of the state of Kashmir. 

• Insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir is deliberately being fueled by Pakistan to create instability in the region. 
The Government of India has repeatedly accused Pakistan of waging a proxy war in Kashmir by providing 
weapons and financial assistance to terrorist groups in the region. 

• Pakistan is trying to raise anti-India sentiment among the people of Kashmir by spreading false propaganda 

T741 
against India. According to the state government of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistani radio and television 



Kashmir conflict 49 

T751 
channels deliberately spread "hate and venom" against India to alter Kashmiri opinion. 

• India has asked the United Nations not to leave unchallenged or unaddressed the claims of moral, political, and 
diplomatic support for terrorism, which were clearly in contravention of United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1373. This is a Chapter VII resolution that makes it mandatory for member states to not provide active 
or passive support to terrorist organizations. Specifically, it has pointed out that the Pakistani government 
continues to support various terrorist organizations, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, in direct 

[781 

violation of this resolution. 

• India points out reports by human rights organizations condemning Pakistan for the lack of civic liberties in 

[741 [79] 

Pakistan-administered Kashmir. According to India, most regions of Pakistani Kashmir, especially 

Northern Areas, continue to suffer from lack of political recognition, economic development, and basic 
fundamental rights. 

• Dr Karan Singh, the state's first and last sadar-e-riyast and son of the last Dogra ruler of Jammu and Kashmir 
Maharaja Hari Singh said that the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh was the same as signed 
by other states; however the state had its own separate constitution. That is why the state has special status and 

[811 

Article 370. With the signing of Instrument of Accession, it became an integral part of India. 

Pakistani view 

Pakistan's claims to the disputed region are based on the rejection of Indian claims to Kashmir, namely the 
Instrument of Accession. Pakistan insists that the Maharaja was not a popular leader, and was regarded as a tyrant by 

[821 

most Kashmiris. Pakistan maintains that the Maharaja used brute force to suppress the population. Pakistan 
accuses India of hypocrisy, as it refused to recognize the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan and Hyderabad's 
independence, on the grounds that those two states had Hindu majorities (in fact, India had occupied and forcibly 

ro'}] 

integrated those two territories). Since he had fled Kashmir due to Pakistani invasion, Pakistan asserts that the 
Maharaja held no authority in determining Kashmir's future. Pakistan argues that even if the Maharaja had any 
authority in determining the plight of Kashmir, he signed the Instrument of Accession under duress, thus invalidating 
the legitimacy of his actions. 

Pakistan claims that Indian forces were in Kashmir before the Instrument of Accession was signed with India, and 
that therefore Indian troops were in Kashmir in violation of the Standstill Agreement, which was designed to 
maintain the status quo in Kashmir (although India was not signatory to the Agreement, which was signed between 
Pakistan and the Hindu ruler of Jammu and Kashmir). 

From 1990 to 1999, some organizations reported that the Indian Armed Forces, its paramilitary groups, and 
counter-insurgent militias were responsible for the deaths of 4,501 Kashmiri civilians. Also from 1990 to 1999, there 
were records of 4,242 women between the ages of 7—70 being raped. Similar allegations were also made by 

some human rights organizations. 

In short, Pakistan holds that: 

• The popular Kashmiri insurgency demonstrates that the Kashmiri people no longer wish to remain within India. 
Pakistan suggests that this means that Kashmir either wants to be with Pakistan or independent. 

• According to the two-nation theory, which is one of the theories that is cited for the partition that created India 
and Pakistan, Kashmir should have been with Pakistan, because it has a Muslim majority. 

• India has shown disregard to the resolutions of the UN Security Council and the United Nations Commission in 
India and Pakistan by failing to hold a plebiscite to determine the future allegiance of the state. 

• The Kashmiri people have now been forced by circumstances to uphold their right of self-determination through 
militancy. Pakistan claims to give the Kashmiri insurgents moral, ethical and military support (see 1999 Kargil 
Conflict). 

• Recent protests in Indian-administered Kashmir attracted a large number of people to massive rallies that took 

T911 
place to oppose Indian control of the state. 



Kashmir conflict 50 

[92] 

• Pakistan points to the violence that accompanies elections in Indian Kashmir and the anti Indian sentiments 

[931 
expressed by some people in the state. 

• Pakistan has noted the widespread use of extrajudicial killings in Indian-administered Kashmir carried out by 
Indian security forces while claiming they were caught up in encounters with militants. These encounters are 
commonplace in Indian-administered Kashmir. The encounters go largely uninvestigated by the authorities, and 
the perpetrators are spared criminal prosecution. 

• Pakistan points towards reports from the United Nations which condemn India for its human rights violations 

[39] 
against Kashmiri people. Human rights organizations have strongly condemned Indian troops for widespread 

rape and murder of innocent civilians while accusing these civilians of being militants. 

• The Chenab formula was a compromise proposed in the 1960s, in which the Kashmir valley and other 
Muslim-dominated areas north of the Chenab river would go to Pakistan, and Jammu and other Hindu-dominated 
regions would go to India. 

Chinese view 

• China did not accept the boundaries of the princely state of Kashmir and Jammu, north of the Aksai Chin and the 

ri7i 

Karakoram that were proposed by the British. 

• China settled its border disputes with Pakistan in the Trans Karakoram Tract in 1963 with the provision that the 
settlement was subject to the final solution of the Kashmir dispute. 

Cross-border troubles 

The border and the Line of Control separating Indian and Pakistani Kashmir passes through some exceptionally 
difficult terrain. The world's highest battleground, the Siachen Glacier, is a part of this difficult-to-man boundary. 
Even with 200,000 military personnel, India maintains that it is infeasible to place enough men to guard all 
sections of the border throughout the various seasons of the year. Pakistan has indirectly acquiesced its role in failing 
to prevent "cross border terrorism" when it agreed to curb such activities after intense pressure from the Bush 
administration in mid 2002. 

The Government of Pakistan has repeatedly claimed that by constructing a fence along the line of control, India is 
violating the Shimla Accord. India claims the construction of the fence has helped decrease armed infiltration into 
Indian-administered Kashmir. 

In 2002, Pakistani President and Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf promised to check infiltration into Jammu 
and Kashmir. 

Water dispute 

Another reason for the dispute over Kashmir is water. Kashmir is the origin point for many rivers and tributaries of 
the Indus River basin. The river basin is divided between Pakistan, which has about 60 per cent of the catchment 
area, India with about 20 per cent, Afghanistan with 5 per cent and around 15 per cent in Tibet. The river tributaries 
are the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, which primarily flow into Pakistan while other branches — the Ravi, Beas, and the 
Sutlej — irrigate northern India. 

The Indus is a river system that sustains communities in both countries India and Pakistan. They both have 
extensively dammed the Indus River for irrigation fo their crops and hydro-electricity systems. In arbitrating the 
conflict in 1947 Sir Cyril Radcliffe, decided to demarcate the territories as he was unable to give to one or the other 
the control over the river as it was a main economic resource forth both areas. . The Line of Control (LoC) was 
recognised as an international border establishing that India would have control over the upper riparian and Pakistan 
over the lower riparian of Indus and its tributaries. However they might seem separate issues, the Kashmir dispute 
and the dispute over the water control are somehow related and the fight over the water remains as one of the main 
problems when establishing good relationships between the two countries. 



Kashmir conflict 5 1 

In 1948, Eugene Black, then president of the World Bank, offered his services in order to solve the tension around 
the water control. In the early days of independence, the fact that India was able to shut off the Central Bari Doab 
Canals at the time of the sowing season, causing significant damage to Pakistan's crops. Nevertheless, military and 
political clashes over Kashmir in the early years of independence appear to be more about ideology and sovereignty, 
rather than sharing water resources. But the minister of Pakistan stated the oppossite. 

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed by both countries in September 1960, giving exclusive rights over the three 
western rivers of the Indus river system (Jhelum, Chenab and Indus) to Pakistan, and over the three eastern rivers 
(Sutlej, Ravi and Beas) to India, as long as it does not reduce or delay the supply to Pakistan. India therefore 
maintains that they are not willing to break the regulation established and they see no more problems with this issue. 

Human rights abuse 
Indian administered Kashmir 

Claims of human rights abuses have been made against the Indian Armed Forces and the armed insurgents operating 
in Jammu and Kashmir. . Since 1989, over 50,000 and by some reports nearly 100,000 Kashmiris have claimed 
to be died during the conflict. . Indian Security forces have allegedly killed hundreds of Kashmiris by 
indiscriminate use of force and torture, firing on demonstrations, custodial killings, fake encounters and unlawful 
detensions . Kashmiris in thousands have vanished in enforced disappearances by 

Indian security forces . State Human Rights Commission (SHRC) has found 2,730 bodies buried into 

unmarked graves scattered all over Kashmir believed to contain the remains of victims of unlawful killings and 
enforced disappearances by Indian security forces .According to the cables leaked by website WikiLeaks, 

US diplomats in 2005 were informed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) about the use of 
torture and sexual humiliation against hundreds of Kashmiri detainees by the security forces .The cable said 
Indian security forces relied on torture for confessions and the human right abuses are believed to be condoned by 
the Indian government 

During the eruption of armed rebellion the Islamic insurgency has claimed to have specifically targeted the Hindu 
Kashmiri Pandits minority and violated their human rights. 400,000 Kashmiri Hindus have either been murdered or 
displaced. The main organisation of Hindus in Kashmir, Kashmir Pandit Sangharsh Samiti claimed that 399 
Kashmiri Pandit were killed by Islamic insurgents. The violence was condemned and labeled as ethnic cleansing 

M221 

in a 2006 resolution passed by the United States Congress. The CIA has reported about 300,000 Pandit Hindus 
and over 100,000 Kashmiri Muslims from Indian Administered Kashmir are internally displaced due to the 
insurgency. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights reports that there are roughly 1.5 million 

refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and in Pakistan. 

A 2005 study conducted by Medecins Sans Frontieres found that Kashmiri women are among the worst sufferers of 
sexual violence in the world, with 11.6% of respondents reporting that they had been victims of sexual abuse. 
Some surveys have found that in the Kashmir region itself (where the bulk of separatist and Indian military activity 
is concentrated), popular perception holds that the Indian Armed Forces are more to blame for human rights 
violations than the separatist groups. Amnesty International has called on India to "unequivocally condemn enforced 
disappearances" and to ensure that impartial investigation is conducted on mass graves in its Kashmir region. The 

Indian state police confirms as many as 331 deaths while in custody and 111 enforced disappearances since 

ri27iri2sin29in30i 
1989. Amnesty International criticised the Indian Military regarding an incident on 22 April 1996, 

when several armed forces personnel forcibly entered the house of a 32-year-old woman in the village of Wawoosa 

in the Rangreth district of Jammu and Kashmir. They reportedly molested her 12-year-old daughter and raped her 

other three daughters, aged 14, 16, and 18. When another woman attempted to prevent the soldiers from attacking 

her two daughters, she was beaten. Soldiers reportedly told her 17-year-old daughter to remove her clothes so that 

they could check whether she was hiding a gun. They molested her before leaving the house. 



Kashmir conflict 52 

Several international agencies and the UN have reported human rights violations in Indian-administered Kashmir. In 

a recent press release the OHCHR spokesmen stated "The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is 

concerned about the recent violent protests in Indian-administered Kashmir that have reportedly led to civilian 

[391 
casualties as well as restrictions to the right to freedom of assembly and expression." A 1996 Human Rights 

Watch report accuses the Indian military and Indian-government backed paramilitaries of "committ[ing] serious and 

widespread human rights violations in Kashmir." " One such alleged massacre occurred on 6 January 1993 in the 

town of Sopore. TIME Magazine described the incident as such: "In retaliation for the killing of one soldier, 

paramilitary forces rampaged through Sopore's market, setting buildings ablaze and shooting bystanders. The Indian 

government pronounced the event 'unfortunate' and claimed that an ammunition dump had been hit by gunfire, 

setting off fires that killed most of the victims." " There have been claims of disappearances by the police or the 

army in Kashmir by several human rights organizations. Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 

1978: Human rights organizations have asked Indian government to repeal the Public Safety Act, since 

n 2si 
"a detainee may be held in administrative detention for a maximum of two years without a court order." 




Many human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and 
the Human Rights Watch (HRW) have condemned human rights 
abuses in Kashmir by Indians such as "extra-judicial executions", 
"disappearances", and torture. The "Armed Forces Special Powers 
Act" grants the military, wide powers of arrest, the right to shoot to 
kill, and to occupy or destroy property in counterinsurgency 
operations. Indian officials claim that troops need such powers because 
the army is only deployed when national security is at serious risk from 
A soldier guards the roadside checkpoint outside armed combatants . Such circumstances, they say, call for extraordinary 

Srinagar International Airport in January 2009. 

| measures. Human rights organizations have also asked Indian 

M371 

government to repeal the Public Safety Act, since "a detainee may 

n 28i 
be held in administrative detention for a maximum of two years without a court order." A 2008 report by the 

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees determined that Indian Administered Kashmir was only 'partly 

T1271 
free'. A recent report by Amnesty International stated that up to 20,000 people have been detained by draconian 

laws in Indian-administered Kashmir. 



Pakistan administered Kashmir 

Azad Kashmir 

Pakistan, an Islamic Republic, imposes multiple restrictions on peoples' religious freedom. Religious minorities 
also face unofficial economic and societal discrimination and have been targets of sectarian violence. 

The constitution of Azad Kashmir specifically prohibits activities that may be prejudicial to the state's accession to 
Pakistan, and as such regularly suppresses demonstrations against the government. A number of Islamist militant 
groups operate in this area including Al-Qaeda, with tacit permission from Pakistan's intelligence. As in Indian 
administered Kashmir, there have been allegations of human rights abuse. 

A report titled "Kashmir: Present Situation and Future Prospects", which was submitted to the European Parliament 

by Emma Nicholson, Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne, was critical of the lack of human rights, justice, 

T1421 
democracy, and Kashmiri representation in the Pakistan National Assembly. According to the Human Rights 

Commission of Pakistan, Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence operates in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and is 

involved in extensive surveillance, arbitrary arrests, torture, and murder. Generally this is done with impunity 

and perpetrators go unpunished. The 2008 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

determined that Pakistan-administered Kashmir was 'Not free'. According to Shaukat Ali, chairman of the 

International Kashmir Alliance, "On one hand Pakistan claims to be the champion of the right of self-determination 



Kashmir conflict 53 

of the Kashmiri people, but she has denied the same rights under its controlled parts of Kashmir and 

Gilgit-Baltistan". [143] 

Gilgit-Baltistan 

The main demand of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan is a constitutional status to the region as a fifth province of 

[1441 [1451 

Pakistan. However, Pakistan claims that Gilgit-Baltistan cannot be given constitutional status due to 

Pakistan's commitment to the 1948 UN resolution. In 2007, International Crisis Group stated that "Almost 

six decades after Pakistan's independence, the constitutional status of the Federally Administered Northern Areas 
(Gilgit and Baltistan), once part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir and now under Pakistani control, 
remains undetermined, with political autonomy a distant dream. The region's inhabitants are embittered by 
Islamabad's unwillingness to devolve powers in real terms to its elected representatives, and a nationalist movement, 
which seeks independence, is gaining ground. The rise of sectarian extremism is an alarming consequence of this 
denial of basic political rights". A two-day conference on Gilgit-Baltistan was held on 8—9 April 2008 at the 
European Parliament in Brussels under the auspices of the International Kashmir Alliance. Several members of 
the European Parliament expressed concern over the human rights violation in Gilgit-Baltistan and urged the 

[14g][149] 

government of Pakistan to establish democratic institutions and rule of law in the area. 

In 2009, the Pakistan government implemented an autonomy package for Gilgit-Baltistan which entails rights similar 

1 [1441 

to those of Pakistan s other provinces. Gilgit-Baltistan thus gains province-like status without actually being 

[144] [146] 

conferred such a status constitutionally. The direct rule by Islamabad is replaced by an elected legislative 

assembly and its chief minister. 

There has been criticism and opposition to this move in Pakistan, India, and Pakistan administrated Kashmir. 
The move has been dubbed as an eyewash to hide the real mechanics of power, which allegedly are under the direct 
control of the Pakistani federal government. The package was opposed by Pakistani Kashmiri politicians who 
claimed that the integration of Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan would undermine their case for the independence of 
Kashmir from India. 300 activists from Kashmiri groups protested during the first Gilgit-Baltistan legislative 
assembly elections, with some carrying banners reading "Pakistan's expansionist designs in Gilgit-Baltistan are 
unacceptable" 

In December 2009, activists of nationalist Kashmiri groups staged a protest in Muzaffarabad to condemn the alleged 
rigging of elections and killing of a 18-year old student. 



Kashmir conflict 



54 



Map issues 

As with other disputed territories, each government issues maps 
depicting their claims in Kashmir territory, regardless of actual control. 
Due to India's Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961, it is illegal in 
India to exclude all or part of Kashmir in a map (or to publish any map 
that differs from those of the Survey of India). It is illegal in 

Pakistan not to include the state of Jammu and Kashmir as disputed 
territory, as permitted by the United Nations. Non-participants often 
use the Line of Control and the Line of Actual Control as the depicted 
boundaries, as is done in the CIA World Factbook, and the region is 
often marked out in hashmarks, although the Indian government 
strictly opposes such practices. When Microsoft released a map in 
Windows 95 and MapPoint 2002, a controversy was raised because it 
did not show all of Kashmir as part of India as per the Indian claim. All 
the neutral and Pakistani companies claim to follow the UN's map and 
over 90% of all maps containing the territory of Kashmir show it as 
disputed territory 



AFGHANISTAN 



Jammu and 
Kashmir Area 




United Nations' map of Jammu and Kashmir 



[154] 



The boundaries, names, and designations used on the map prepared by the United Nations do not imply official 
endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations, the Commonwealth Secretariat, or the publishers concerning the 
legal status of any country, territory or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or 
boundaries. There is no intention to define the status of Jammu and/or Kashmir, which has not yet been agreed upon 
by the parties. A dotted line represents the Line of Control agreed upon by the Republic of India and the Government 
of Pakistan since 1972. Both parties have not yet agreed upon the final status of the region, and nothing significant 
has been implemented since the peace process began in 2004. 

The Government of Pakistan maintains unprovisionally and unconditionally that the informal accession of Jammu 
and Kashmir to Pakistan or to the Republic of India remains to be decided by UN plebiscite. It accepts the UN's map 
of the territory. 

The Government of India states that "the external artificial boundaries of India, especially concerning the Kashmir 
region under its jurisdiction created by a foreign body are neither correct nor authenticated". 



Recent developments 

India continues to assert their sovereignty or rights over the entire region of Kashmir, while Pakistan maintains that it 
is a disputed territory. Pakistan argues that the status quo cannot be considered as a solution. Pakistan insists on a 
UN-sponsored plebiscite. Unofficially, the Pakistani leadership has indicated that they would be willing to accept 
alternatives such as a demilitarized Kashmir, if sovereignty of Azad Kashmir was to be extended over the Kashmir 
valley, or the "Chenab" formula, by which India would retain parts of Kashmir on its side of the Chenab river, and 
Pakistan the other side — effectively re-partitioning Kashmir on communal lines. The problem is that the population 
of the Pakistan-administered portion of Kashmir is for the most part ethnically, linguistically, and culturally different 
from the Valley of Kashmir, a part of Indian-administered Kashmir. A partition on the Chenab formula is opposed 
by some Kashmiri politicians, though some, such as Sajjad Lone, have suggested that the non-Muslim part of Jammu 
and Kashmir be separated from Kashmir and handed to India. Some political analysts say that the Pakistan state 
policy shift and mellowing of its aggressive stance may have to do with its total failure in the Kargil War and the 
subsequent 9/11 attacks. These events put pressure on Pakistan to alter its position on terrorism. Many neutral 
parties to the dispute have noted that the UN resolution on Kashmir is no longer relevant. The European Union 
has viewed that the plebiscite is not in Kashmiris' interest. The report notes that the UN conditions for such a 



Kashmir conflict 55 

plebiscite have not been, and can no longer be, met by Pakistan. The Hurriyat Conference observed in 2003 that 
a "plebiscite [is] no longer an option". Besides the popular factions that support either parties, there is a third 
faction which supports independence and withdrawal of both India and Pakistan. These have been the respective 
stands of the parties for long, and there have been no significant changes over the years. As a result, all efforts to 
solve the conflict have been futile so far. 

In a 2001 report titled "Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency" from the American RAND Corporation, the think 
tank noted that "the nature of the Kashmir conflict has been transformed from what was originally a secular, locally 
based struggle (conducted via the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front — JKLF) to one that is now largely carried out by 
foreign militants and rationalized in pan-Islamic religious terms." Most of the militant organizations are composed of 
foreign mercenaries, mostly from the Pakistani Punjab. In 2010, with the support of its intelligence agencies, 
Pakistan has again been 'boosting' Kashmir militants, and recruitment of mujahideen in the Pakistani state of Punjab 
has increased. In 201 1, the FBI revealed that Pakistan's spy agency ISI paid millions of dollars into a United 

States-based non-governmental organization to influence politicians and opinion-makers on the Kashmir issue and 
arrested Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai. 

The Freedom in the World 2006 report categorized Indian-administered Kashmir as "partly free", and 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, as well as the country of Pakistan, as "not free". India claims that contrary to 
popular belief, a large proportion of the Jammu and Kashmir populace wishes to remain with India. A MORI survey 
found that within Indian-administered Kashmir, 61% of respondents said they felt they would be better off as Indian 
citizens, with 33% saying that they did not know, and the remaining 6% favouring Pakistani citizenship. However, 
this support for India was mainly in Ladakh and Jammu regions, not the Kashmir Valley, as only 9% of the 
respondents from the Kashmir Valley said that they would be better off with India. According to a 2007 poll 

conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi, 87% of respondents in the Kashmir 
Valley prefer independence over union with India or Pakistan. However, a survey by the Chatham House in both 
Indian and Pakistani administered Kashmir found that support of independence was at 43% and 44% 
respectively. 

The 2005 Kashmir earthquake, which killed over 80,000 people, led to India and Pakistan finalizing negotiations for 
the opening of a road for disaster relief through Kashmir. 

Efforts to end the crisis 

The 9/11 attacks on the United States resulted in the U.S. government wanting to restrain militancy in the world, 
including Pakistan. They urged Islamabad to cease infiltrations, which continue to this day, by Islamist militants into 
Indian-administered Kashmir. In December 2001, a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament linked to Pakistan, 
resulted in war threats, massive deployment, and international fears of a nuclear war in the subcontinent. 

After intensive diplomatic efforts by other countries, India and Pakistan began to withdraw troops from the 
international border on 10 June 2002, and negotiations began again. Effective 26 November 2003, India and Pakistan 
agreed to maintain a ceasefire along the undisputed international border, the disputed Line of Control, and the 
Siachen glacier. This is the first such "total ceasefire" declared by both powers in nearly 15 years. In February 2004, 
Pakistan increased pressure on Pakistanis fighting in Indian-administered Kashmir to adhere to the ceasefire. The 
neighbours launched several other mutual confidence-building measures. Restarting the bus service between the 
Indian- and Pakistani- administered Kashmir has helped defuse the tensions between the countries. Both India and 
Pakistan have decided to cooperate on economic fronts. 

On 5 December 2006, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told an Indian TV channel that Pakistan would give up 
its claim on Kashmir if India accepted some of his peace proposals, including a phased withdrawal of troops, 
self-governance for locals, no changes in the borders of Kashmir, and a joint supervision mechanism involving India, 
Pakistan, and Kashmir. Musharraf stated that he was ready to give up the United Nations' resolutions regarding 
Kashmir. 



Kashmir conflict 56 

2008 militant attacks 

In the week of 10 March 2008, 17 people were wounded when a blast hit the region's only highway overpass located 
near the Civil Secretariat — the seat of government of Indian-controlled Kashmir — and the region's high court. A gun 
battle between security forces and militants fighting against Indian rule left five people dead and two others injured 
on 23 March 2008. The battle began when security forces raided a house on the outskirts of the capital city of 
Srinagar, housing militants. The Indian Army has been carrying out cordon-and-search operations against militants 
in Indian-administered Kashmir since the violence broke out in 1989. While the authorities say 43,000 persons have 
been killed in the violence, various rights groups and non-governmental organizations have put the figure at twice 
that number. 

According to the Government of India Home Ministry, 2008 was the year with the lowest civilian casualties in 20 
years, with 89 deaths, compared to a high of 1,413 in 1996. 85 security personnel died in 2008 compared to 613 
in 2001, while 102 militants were killed. The human rights situation improved, with only one custodial death, and no 
custodial disappearances. Many analysts say Pakistan's preoccupation with jihadis within its own borders explains 
the relative calm. 

2008 Kashmir protests 

Massive demonstrations occurred after plans by the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir state government to 

2 

transfer 100 acres (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km ) of land to a trust which runs the Hindu Amarnath shrine in 

ri73i 

the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley. This land was to be used to build a shelter to house Hindu pilgrims 

temporarily during their annual pilgrimage to the Amarnath temple. 

Indian security forces and the Indian army responded quickly to keep order. More than 40 unarmed protesters were 

killed and at least 300 were detained. The largest protests saw more than a half million people waving 

ri77i 
Pakistani flags and crying for freedom at a rally on 18 August, according to Time magazine. Pro-independence 

Kashmir leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq warned that the peaceful uprising could lead to an upsurge in violence if 

n 78i 
India's heavy-handed crackdown on protests was not restrained. The United Nations expressed concern on 

India's response to peaceful protests and urged investigations be launched against Indian security personnel who had 

T391 
taken part in the crackdown. 

Separatists and workers of a political party were believed to be behind stone-pelting incidents, which led to 

retaliatory fire by the police. An autorickshaw laden with stones meant for distribution was seized by the 

n 81 in 82i 
police in March 2009. Following the unrest in 2008, secessionist movements got a boost. 

2008 Kashmir elections 

State elections were held in Indian-held Kashmir in seven phases, starting 17 November and finishing on 24 

December 2008. In spite of calls by separatists for a boycott, an unusually high turnout of almost 50% was 

n 8^i 
recorded. The National Conference party, which was founded by Sheikh Abdullah and is regarded as pro-India, 

emerged with a majority of the seats. On 30 December, the Congress Party and the National Conference agreed 

to form a coalition government, with Omar Abdullah as Chief Minister. On 5 January 2009, Abdullah was sworn 

in as the eleventh Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. 

In March 2009, Abdullah stated that only 800 militants were active in the state and out of these only 30% were 
Kashmiris. 



Kashmir conflict 57 

2009 Kashmir protests 

In 2009, protests started over the alleged rape and murder of two young women in Shopian in South Kashmir. 
Suspicion pointed towards the police as the perpetrators. A judicial enquiry by a retired High Court confirmed the 

suspicion, but a CBI enquiry reversed their conclusion. It gave a fresh impetus to the popular agitation against India. 

n ssi 
Significantly, the unity between the separatist parties was lacking this time. 

2010 Kashmir Unrest 

The 2010 Kashmir unrest were a series of protests in the Muslim majority Kashmir Valley in Jammu & Kashmir 
which started in June 2010. These protests occurred in response to 'Quit Jammu Kashmir Movement' which was a 
civil disobedience movement launched by Hurriyat Conference led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Umar 
Farooq, who had called for the complete demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir. The All Parties Hurriyat 
Conference made this call to protest, citing human rights abuses by Indian troops. Protesters shouting 

pro-independence slogans, defied curfew, attacked security forces with stones and burnt police vehicles and 
government buildings. The Jammu and Kashmir Police and Indian Para-military forces fired live 

ammunition on the protesters, resulting in 112 deaths, including many teenagers. The protests subsided after the 

M921 

Indian government announced a package of measures aimed at defusing the tensions in September 2010. 

US President Obama on the conflict 

In an interview with Joe Klein of Time magazine in October 2008, Barack Obama expressed his intention to try to 
work with India and Pakistan to resolve the crisis. He said he had talked to Bill Clinton about it, as Clinton has 
experience being a mediator. In an editorial in The Washington Times, Selig S Harrison, director of the Asia 
Programme at the Center for International Policy and a senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International, called it 
Obama's first foreign policy mistake. In an editorial, The Australian called Obama's idea to appoint a presidential 
negotiator "a very stupid and dangerous move indeed". In an editorial in Forbes, Reihan Salam, associate editor 

for The Atlantic, noted "The smartest thing President Obama could do on Kashmir is probably nothing. We have to 

ri97i 
hope that India and Pakistan can work out their differences on Kashmir on their own". The Boston Globe called 

the idea of appointing Bill Clinton as an envoy to Kashmir "a mistake". President Obama appointed Richard 

Holbrooke as special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan. President Asif Ali Zardari hoped that Holbrooke would 

help mediate to resolve the Kashmir issue. Subsequently Kashmir was removed from the mandate of 

Holbrooke. "Eliminating ... Kashmir from his job description ... is seen as a significant diplomatic concession to 

India that reflects increasingly warm ties between the country and the United States," The Washington Post noted in 

[2021 

a report. Brajesh Mishra, India's former national security adviser, was quoted in the same report as saying that 
"No matter what government is in place, India is not going to relinquish control of Jammu and Kashmir". "That is 

[203] 

written in stone and cannot be changed." According to The Financial Times, India has warned Obama that he 

[2041 

risks "barking up the wrong tree" if he seeks to broker a settlement between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. 

In July 2009, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert O. Blake, Jr. stated that the United States had no plans of 
appointing any special envoy to settle the dispute, calling it an issue which needs to be sorted out bilaterally by India 
and Pakistan. According to Dawn this will be interpreted in Pakistan as an endorsement of India's position on 
Kashmir that no outside power has any role in this dispute. 



Kashmir conflict 58 

Further reading 

Drew, Federic. 1877. The Northern Barrier of India: a popular account of the Jammoo and Kashmir Territories 
with Illustrations. &;#8221; 1st edition: Edward Stanford, London. Reprint: Light & Life Publishers, Jammu. 
1971. 

Dr. Ijaz Hussain, 1998, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective, National Institute of Pakistan 
Studies 

Alastair Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846—1990 (Hertingfordbury, Herts: Roxford Books, 1991) 
Kashmir Study Group, 1947—1997, the Kashmir dispute at fifty : charting paths to peace (New York, 1997) 
Jaspreet Singh, Seventeen Tomatoes— an unprecedented look inside the world of an army camp in Kashmir 
(Vehicle Press; Montreal, Canada, 2004) 

Navnita Behera, State, identity and violence : Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000) 
Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Cambridge : 
Cambridge U.P., 1997) 

Sumantra Bose, The challenge in Kashmir : democracy, self-determination and a just peace (New Delhi: Sage, 
1997) 

Robert Johnson, A Region in Turmoil (London and New York, Reaktion, 2005) 

Hans Kochler, The Kashmir Problem between Law and Realpolitik. Reflections on a Negotiated Settlement 
Keynote speech delivered at the "Global Discourse on Kashmir 2008." European Parliament, Brussels, 1 April 
2008. 

Prem Shankar Jha, Kashmir, 1947: rival versions of history (New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1996) 
Manoj Joshi, The Lost Rebellion (New Delhi: Penguin India, 1999) 

Alexander Evans, "Why Peace Won't Come to Kashmir", Current History (Vol 100, No 645) April 2001 
pl70-175. 

Younghusband, Francis and Molyneux, E. 1917. Kashmir. A. & C. Black, London. 
Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict LB. Tauris, London. 
Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, LB. Tauris, London. 
Andrew Whitehead, A Mission in Kashmir, Penguin India, 2007 

Muhammad Ayub, An Army; Its Role & Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil 
1947-1999). Rosedog Books, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania USA. 2005. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3 
• Kashmir Conflict, Homepage Washington Post. 

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Kashmir conflict 



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April 21, 1948. The Indian army had driven the Pakistanis up to Uri in Kashmir and Poonch in Jammu when ceasefire was ordered in 
December 1948. Mr. Jinnah, the promoter of this invasion, had died in September of that year. Both India and Pakistan accepted the 
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[37 
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Kashmir conflict 60 

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SAS-joins-Kashmir-hunt-for-bin-Laden.html), The Telegraph, 2002-02-23 
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[199] Holbrooke Plans First Trip as Afghanistan-Pakistan Envoy (http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-01-29-voa48.cfm), Voice of 

America 
[200] Partnering With Pakistan (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/27/AR2009012702675.html), The 

Washington Post, 2009-01-28 
[201] Will Kashmir Be an Obama Foreign Policy Focus? (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599, 1874627, 00. html), Time 

2009-01-28 
[202] Kashmir taken out of Holbrooke's brief, says report (http://www.dawn.eom/2009/01/3 l/top4.htm), Dawn, 2009-01-3 1 
[203] "U.S. Removes Kashmir From Envoy's Mandate; India Exults" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/29/ 

AR2009012903737.html), The Washington Post, 2009-01-30 
[204] "India warns Obama over Kashmir" (http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/0/a545f3b0-flf9-l ldd-9678-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=l), The 

Financial Times, 2009-02-03 
[205] US has no plans to appoint special envoy on Kashmir: Blake (http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=83055), The News 

International, 2009-07-16 



Kashmir conflict 65 

[206] US to sign $20 billion defence accords with India (http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/ 
world/ 12-us+to+sign+20+billion+accords+with+india-bi-07), Dawn, 2009-07-17 

External links 

• The Future of Kashmir (http://acdis.illinois.edu/publications/207/publication-The-Future-of-Kashmir.html), 
Matthew A. Rosenstein et al., ACDIS Swords and Ploughshares 16:1 (winter 2007-8), Program in Arms Control, 
Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
Centre for Contemporary Conflict on Kargil War (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/index.asp) 
BBC articles on Kashmir (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/in_depth/south_asia/2002/kashmir_flashpoint/) 
Recent Kashmir developments (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kashmir.htm) 
The Political Economy of the Kashmir Conflict (http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl21.html) U.S. 
Institute of Peace Report, June 2004 

The Kashmir dispute-cause or symptom? (http://www.sasnet.lu.se/ishtiaqkashmir.html) 
LoC-Line of Control situation in Kashmir (http://www.defencejournal.com/sept99/loc.htm) 
An outline of the history of Kashmir (http://www.koausa.org/Crown/history.html) 
News Coverage of Kashmir (http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v613/sri.htm) 
Accession Document (http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/instrument_of_accession.html) 
Conflict in Kashmir: Selected Internet Resources by the Library, University of California, Berkeley, USA; 
[[University of California at Berkeley (http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/SSEAL/SouthAsia/kashmir.html)] 
Library Bibliographies and Web-Bibliographies list] 

• Timeline since April 2003 (http://www.iiss. org/showdocument.php?docID=426) 

• Kashmir resolution of the European Parliament, 24 May 2007 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc. 
do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2007-0214&language=EN) 

• "Election in Kashmir Begins Amid Boycott Calls" (http://www.51voa.com/voa_standard_english/ 
VOA_Standard_English_26465.html) 

• Animated PNG of disputed regions (http://apngs.com/apng/2046/kashmir-conflict#v=ld) 

'The template dammit and Kashmir freedom movement is being euiisi<_k'iv<i for deletion.' 



66 



Stages of the war 



Military operations in Ladakh (1948) 

Military operations took place in Ladakh in 1948 during the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir between the Indian 
Army and Pakistani raiders infiltrated to capture the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir. The eviction of this invading 
force of tribal raiders, who enjoyed numerical superiority, better lines of communication, commanding high ground 
and superior logistics, was a major military achievement for the small force of Indian soldiers. 

Relief of Leh 

Pakistani raiders had besieged and reduced Skardu in early 1948. " It was vital that Leh, the next likely 

target, be relieved before it was attacked by the raiders. Maj Prithi Chand, a Lahauli officer with a band of 40 
volunteers from the 2nd Battalion, Dogra Regiment began a hazardous mid-winter ascent of Zojila pass on 16 
February 1948, with rifles and ammunition for the garrison. They reached Leh on 8 March, where an ad hoc force for 

defence was organised, followed soon by a Jammu and Kashmir State Forces detachment bringing additional 

[2]:195-199 
weapons. 

Reinforcement of Leh 

The slow advance of raiders permitted reinforcement of Leh by air by a coy of 2nd Battalion, 4 Gorkha Rifles (2/4 

T31 ' 109 
GR) and later a coy of 2nd Battalion, 8th Gorkha Rifles (2/8 GR) by air just in time to repulse the raiders. Had 

the raiders kept advancing they could have captured Leh easily. The garrison of Leh held despite shortage of troops, 

weapons and ammunition, sickness and fatigue. In August another coy of 2/8 GR was flown in by air and the 

remaining part of the battalion, codenamed Arjun column, with a large column of supplies on mules, trekked to Leh 

from Manali. Another large mule column, codenamed Chapati column, followed in September to provide adequate 

supplies for the winter. " Lt Col (later Col) HS Parab, CO 2/8 GR, was airlifted to Leh on 23 Aug and later 

designated Commander, Leh Brigade (though the force never exceeded two battalions in strength). Spirited 

small unit actions and guerilla raids on both banks of the Indus effectively held the raiders at bay throughout 

September and October. 



Military operations in Ladakh (1948) 



67 



8: Operation Duck 

15 August 1948 

-31 October 1948 





High Himalayas 



M Keran • Gurais * Kal "9 M 

I ; ... . rabadj^ "^W_ 5-Sep-48 (Ducki 

nel# /*]A J~9 Dras 

Baramula f*^Zoji-La Pass 
IJri ■ Srinagar 

• Gulmarg 
/Punch sJL, Kashmir Valley 

-*£ 

/Kotll # #Rajaun Punch Valley 



•^ 




\« • • 

— Jhagner a Akhnu 



Operation Duck 15 August 1948 - 1 November 1948 



Capture of Zoji La 

When Zoji La fell to the enemy in May 
1948, it was vital for the Indians that the 
pass be recaptured before winter so as to 
relieve Leh. An unsuccessful frontal attack 
was launched by 77 Parachute Brigade 
under Brig Hiralal Atal to capture Zoji La 
pass. Operation Duck, the earlier 

epithet for this assault, was renamed as 
Operation Bison by Lt Gen Cariappa, the 
Western Army commander. M5 Stuart 

light tanks of 7 Cavalry were moved in 
dismantled conditions through Srinagar to 
Baltal while the superhuman efforts of two 
field companies of the Madras Sappers 
working day and night improved the mule 

track from Baltal up the Zoji La to Gumri. " The surprise attack on 1 November by the brigade with armour, 

T41 
led by the division commander Thimayya in the lead tank, and supported by two regiments of 25 pounders and a 

regiment of 3.7 inch guns, saw the enemy being surprised. The pass was forced and the enemy pushed back to 

Matayan. 

Liberation of Leh and Kargil 

Since the raiders were inactive on the Leh front during 77 Para Brigade's operations in Zoji La, Leh Brigade went 
onto the offensive advancing from Tharu to Marol on the north bank of the Indus and from Chilling to Lamayuru to 
Kargil on the south bank. Another detachment advanced along the Shyok River clearing opposition on that axis and 
securing the Nubra Valley flank. 

On the Zoji La front, 77 Parachute Brigade launched a deliberate attack and captured Matayan on 13 November and 
Dras on 15 November. The brigade linked up on 24 November at Kargil with Indian troops advancing from Leh 
while the enemy withdrew northwards toward Skardu. The Indian pursuit was halted by fierce enemy action at 

Chathatang, 5 km ahead of the Marol fork of the Indus. The strong enemy defenses, on both banks of the Indus, 
resisted till 1 January 1949 when a ceasefire was called. 



References 

[1] Prasad, S.N.; Dharm Pal (1987). History of Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948. New Delhi: History Department, Ministry of 

Defence, Government of India, (printed at Thomson Press (India) Limited), pp. 418.. 
[2] Sen, Maj Gen L. P. (1969). Slender Was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48 (http://books.google.co.in/ 

books?id=lYHXmx4cOUsC). New Delhi: Orient Longman, pp. 308. ISBN 0-86131-692-4. . Retrieved 4 August 2010. 
[3] Sinha, Lt. Gen. S.K. (1977). Operation Rescue:Military Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49 (http://books.google.co.in/ 

books?id=SMwBAAAAMAAJ). New Delhi: Vision Books, pp. 174. ISBN 81-7094-012-5. . Retrieved 4 August 2010. 
[4] Khanduri, Chandra B. (1969). Thimayya.An Amazing Life (http://books.google.co.in/books?id=ZWXfAAAAMAAJ). New Delhi: Centre 

for Armed Historical Research, United Service Institution of India, New Delhi through Knowledge World, p. 137. ISBN 81-87966-36-X. . 

Retrieved 6 August 2010. 



Military operations in Poonch (1948) 



68 



Military operations in Poonch (1948) 



Military operations took place in Poonch district, 
then part of the princely state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, in 1948 during the conflict in Jammu and 
Kashmir between the Indian Army and Pakistani 
forces. Poonch withstood a siege by the Pakistanis 
from November 1947 till relieved by an Indian 
offensive, Operation Easy on 20 November 1948. 
The besieged garrison, commanded by Brig Pritam 
Singh, was maintained by air supply. Military 
operations ended with Poonch town and the eastern 
part of Poonch district in Indian hands and western 
Poonch in Pakistani hands. 

Threat to Poonch 

Poonch is a small town in Western Jammu, on the 
confluence of Batar and Suran rivers, which forms 
the Poonch river. In 1947, it was the seat of the Raja 
who was a vassal of Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Prior to 1947, communications 

with Poonch were through the Punjabi town of 
Jhelum; towns in the east such as Rajauri, 
Naushera and Jammu being connected only by 
fair-weather tracks. 




LINKUP OF POONCH BY 163 BDE 
REINFORCEMENT BY 1 KUMAON 
22 NOVA7 






RECAPTURE BY 19 
& 50 BDES 
18 MAR 48 




Wot to Scale 



Operation Easy. Poonch link-up 1 November 1948 - 26 November 1948 



Pakistan had targeted Poonch district, which had a large population of Muslim serving and retired soldiers, as an 
important objective. Pakistani forces comprised regular soldiers, ex-servicemen and Pashtun tribals, along with 

Muslim Poonchies inflamed by reports of massacre of Muslim refugees during the communal violence of 

[3]:18 
partition. 

The attackers infiltrated Poonch, as part of Operation "Gulmarg", as a springboard to capture the Jammu region. The 
town was threatened by the raiders when JAKFORCE HQ decided to reinforce it from the North. 

The relief of Poonch from Jammu was exacerbated by the fact that it lay across many kilometers of hilly terrain with 
poor communications. Paucity of troops, the need to secure the line of communication and to establish a firm base, 
and, Prime Minister Nehru's decision to make the Kashmir Valley the immediate priority led to its relief much after 
the fall of Mirpur, Kotli and Bhimber, towns with predominantly Hindu populations which were swelled by large 
numbers of non-Muslim refugees. The massacre of the populations of the surrounding areas, not only swelled the 
refugee population in Poonch, but also led to Pandit Nehru's insisting that it be held, albeit as a besieged outpost, on 
political grounds over-ruling military advice to vacate it being untenable with the resources at hand. 



Military operations in Poonch (1948) 



69 



Reinforcement of Poonch 



[1]:91 



A total of 40,000 refugees sheltered in Poonch fleeing from tribal atrocities in the West. Since the state forces 

were grossly inadequate to fend off the raiders, a decision to reinforce the garrison was made by Maj Gen Kalwant 
Singh, commander of JAKFORCE. An attempt by 50 Parachute Brigade, under Brig Y.S. Paranjpye, was planned. 

[41-124 

The brigade faced difficult terrain and tough opposition and was not able to relieve Poonch. 161st Infantry 

Brigade, which had pushed the raiders back to Domel on the Muzzafarabad-Srinagar route, was tasked to link up 
with Poonch from the North. 

Just before Poonch was contacted by the raiders, the town was reinforced on 22 Nov 47 by a column from 161 
Brigade which left behind an infantry battalion, 1st Battalion (Parachute), Kumaon Regiment (1 KUMAON) under 
Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier) Pritam Singh who became the commander of Poonch garrison. There was also 
an understrength brigade of J&K State Forces under Brig Kishen Singh already present in Poonch which came under 
command of the Indian Army 



[4]: 124 



In January 1948, another battalion of infantry, the 3rd Battalion, 9 Gorkha Rifles (3/9 GR) was airlifted into Poonch 



to bolster the defences 



[1]:91 



Siege of Poonch 

Poonch was isolated by the raiders soon after the reinforcement. Brig 
Pritam Singh organised the defenses with regular troops, stiffening 
them with the State Forces and two ad hoc militia battalions, organised 
from the refugees. The defenders kept the besiegers at bay by vigorous 
patrolling and fierce small unit actions. An air strip suitable for 
Dakotas was fashioned using the besieged civilians as labour. 

On 12 December 1947, Wing Commander Mehar Singh, accompanied 
by Air Vice Marshal Subroto Mukerjee, carried out a daring trial in a 
Harvard on the makeshift airstrip. The same day, the first Dakotas 
landed on Poonch airstrip carrying with them a complete section of 
mountain artillery. Thereafter the fledgling Royal Indian Air Force 
began what they called the "Punching" drive, an air bridge of Dakotas, first by day and later by night 




Refugees awaiting evacuation by Dakota on 
Poonch airstrip, December 1947. 

[5][6]:304-05[7] 



The air bridge flew in supplies and flew out refugees, despite interdiction by Pakistani mountain artillery, to counter 
which Indian 25 pounder guns were flown in 



[l]:92-93 



[5] 



The air force also attacked the Pakistani columns with Tempests and Harvards. Attacks on Poonch reduced during 

summer due to the protracted operations in the Uri sector and were resumed in August 1948, necessitating an 

Tll'93-94 
immediate relief of Poonch. 

Poonch was referred to as the "Tobruk of Kashmir", though unlike Tobruk, it never fell. 



Military operations in Poonch (1948) 70 

Operation Easy 

A relieving force under Brig Yadunath Singh was assembled at Rajauri, which eventually grew to be division-sized, 
comprising 5 and 19 Infantry Brigade as well as "Rajauri column" with supporting field artillery and two troops of 
Sherman tanks of the Central India Horse. " The codename of the operation was "Operation EASY" to make 
the complex operation appear psychologically easier to execute. 

The operation commenced on the night of 6/7 November with 5 Brigade advancing on the right of the axis of 
advance and 19 Brigade on the left flank. Bhimber Gali, captured by the two brigades, and Ramgarh fort, captured 
by Rajauri Force, were the first features to be captured. In the meantime, 268 Infantry Brigade carried out OP 

RANJIT in which it captured Pir Badesar, a tactically strong locality overlooking the Seri valley which protected 
Jhangar from the north and posed a direct threat to Kotli and thus protected the flank of the advance from a Pakistani 
threat to the line of communication near Chingas. 

19 Infantry Brigade came across determined opposition at Point 5372, a feature southeast of Mendhar, which 
guarded the route to Kotli. Continuing to demonstrate against Point 5372 as a ruse, the major force was switched to 
the right flank where opposition was light. These two brigades then captured Pt 5982 and Topa ridge south of 
Poonch. On 20 November, the Poonch garrison broke through to the south over the hills for the linkup. On 23 
November, Mendhar was a captured in a pincer move by 19 Infantry Brigade from the South permitting the 
Engineers to construct a jeep track via Mendhar to Poonch. 

2 

Operation Easy resulted in capture of 800 square miles (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km ) of territory. Large 
numbers of refugees, including 10,000 Muslims were able to get away and obtain relief from the state 
administration. 

Aftermath 

While Poonch was secured, costly gains made by the Indian 161st Infantry Brigade and 77th Parachute Brigade in 
the Uri sector were lost by ill-advised vacation of Led Gali and Pir Kanthi picquets in the Haji Pir region for the 
winter by the Indian brigade commander responsible, allowing Pakistan to reoccupy these picquets and occupy a 
large salient centred on the Haji Pir pass. Before any action could be taken by the Indians to reduce the salient, 

[4] -289-291 

ceasefire was declared on 02 Jan 1949 leaving these locations secure in Pakistani hands. Poonch continues 

to be a border outpost on the Line of Control in between the Indian and Pakistani administered regions of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 



The decision to hold and relieve Poonch saved thousands of civilian lives but at the military cost of diverting troops 
from the capture of Domel and Muzzafarabad during a period of vulne 
capture of Mirpur and Bhimber, a more meaningful strategical gambit. 



T41 
from the capture of Domel and Muzzafarabad during a period of vulnerability as well as diverting troops from the 



References 

[1] Sinha, Lt. Gen. S.K. (1977). Operation Rescue -.Military Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1947-49 (http://books.google.co.in/ 

books?id=SMwBAAAAMAAJ). New Delhi: Vision Books, pp. 174. ISBN 81-7094-012-5. . Retrieved 4 August 2010. 
[2] Naushera (Nowshehra) is a hamlet near Rajauri in Jammu region. It should not be confused with Nowshera, a district and cantonment town in 

the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, or Naushera, a village in Khushab district of Pakistan. 
[3] Prasad, S.N.; Dharm Pal (1987). History of Operations In Jammu and Kashmir 1947-1948. New Delhi: History Department, Ministry of 

Defence, Government of India, (printed at Thomson Press (India) Limited), pp. 418.. 
[4] Sen, Maj Gen L. P. (1969). Slender Was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation 1947-48 (http://books.google.co.in/ 

books?id=lYHXmx4cOUsC). New Delhi: Orient Longman, pp. 308. ISBN 0-86131-692-4. . Retrieved 4 August 2010. 
[5] Verma, Kunal. "Operation Poonching" (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1948War/Poonch.html). Vayu Aerospace 2000. 

Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 10 September 2010. 
[6] Longer, V. (1974). Red coats to olive green:A history of the Indian Army, 1600-1974. Bombay: Allied Publishers, pp. 543. ISBN 85655 1309. 
[7] Longer (1974) mentions that the aircraft was a Beechcraft while the Bharat Rakshak article, of Air Force origin and post-2000 vintage, 

mentions "Harvard", an aircraft known to have been used extensively in the 1947 Indo-Pakistani operation in the Jammu sector. 



Military operations in Poonch (1948) 71 

External links 

• Brig Pritam Singh,MC, Saviour of Poonch (http://poonch.nic.in/SaviourPch/SOP.htm). On Govt of India 
website on Poonch, Jammu & Kashmir (http://poonch.nic.in/welcome.html). Accessed 24 August 2010. 



72 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and 
September 1965 between Pakistan and India. This conflict became known as the Second Kashmir War fought by 
India and Pakistan over the disputed region of Kashmir, the first having been fought in 1947. The war began 
following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to 

precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides. It 

ri7i 
ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration. 

Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the International Border between 
India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of British India in 
1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001—2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. 
Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, 

ri7i 

and naval operations. Many details of this war, like those of other Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear. 

Pre-war escalation 

Since Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India 
remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir 
conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other 
border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a »■* f°/»|| fSWS 



i::cc:,".:i;5 Y2i53ij,: Department of State 



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barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in ss - "- \ r l~%^- : ^. 

RUFHO^SMEBBflSSlf LONDON 338 ' j^ nftr „ „. ^* 

1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed IL KESlrjSUKPraViB 
area. Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by 

« ,'K,?H : „"S S ™" KTOOS: " Luna bctimkd -bom ran d« 

India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both * S,S" .S^SS^I ,1K SWSSfi "5 £U« 

U t U t O A 'I 1A^C P P T DMA C0.WHM«TIOKOH S . S n,IU>. .FT&, M «I?,v»L SoSSLISluD BOO ' 

countries on each others posts on 8 April 1965. Initially S^?««™iff Sf'S'K S"S 



~;i:i;:37/i;suM :-:z^vcr;r; nva uto *i JS tens 

RUCJHK/CISC? 

STATE GRNC 

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"about riqht™. 



involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon A declassified us State Department letter that confirms 

witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian 

forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events 

successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up 

a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 

1968, saw Pakistan awarded 350 square miles (900 km 2 ) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3500 

square miles (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km ). 

After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian 
Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the 
Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was 
generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating 
saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, codenamed 
Operation Gibraltar The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local 
Kashmiris, and the operation ended in a complete failure. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



73 



The war 

On August 5, 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri 
locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire 
line on August 15 



[5] 




Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army, General 

Muhammad Musa visiting the captured 

Khemkaran Railway Station, India 



[8][11] 



Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing 
three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. 
By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; 
Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch 
and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass, 8 km into 
Pakistan- Administered Kashmir. 

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called 
Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of 
Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off 
supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu 
morale" (as he called Indian Army) won't stand more than two hard 
attacks at the right time and place; although by this time 

Operation Gibraltar had failed, as per his biographer Altaf Gauhar and 
India had captured the Haji Pir Pass. L ° JL11J Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior 
tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India 
responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force 
attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theater of attack into 
Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation 
Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning 
points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. 

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 
September 6, marking an official beginning of the war. On 
September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under 
World War II veteran Major General Prasad, battled a massive 
counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichogil Canal 
(BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The 
General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his 
vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil 
Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of 
Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range 
of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States 
requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in 
Lahore. However, the Pakistani counter attack took Khem Karan from 
Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from 
Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages. 




Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the India's 18th Cavalry 

posing outside a captured Pakistani police station 

(Barkee) in Lahore District. 



The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd 
Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 
September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively 
stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment, 3 Jat, had also crossed 

the Ichogil canal and captured the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The 
same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



74 



Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal 
casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no 
information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from 

ri4i 

Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO 
of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder 
battle due to Pakistani reinforcements. 




Destroyed or abandoned Pakistani Patton and 

Sherman tanks on display near Khem Karan. 

About 97 Pakistani tanks were either destroyed or 



On September 8, 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was 
sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at 
Munabao — a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. 
Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry 
battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in 
Munabao) — as the post has now been christened — the Indian company 
could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A 
company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to 
reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani 
Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train 
coming from B aimer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway 
station. On September 10, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and 
efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed 



[17] 



captured by India during the Battle of Asal 
Uttar. 



On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations 
were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division, labeled 
the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. 
The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda 
and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks. The Pakistanis followed up their 
success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st 
Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in 
Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. 

The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of September 10 lay 
disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of Asal Uttar 
(lit. meaning — "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent — "Fitting Response"). The area became 
known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. 
Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. 
The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th 
Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st 
Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength. 

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 
3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 miles 2 (1,800 km 2 ) 
of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile 2 (550 km 2 ) of Indian territory. The territory occupied by 

ri Q] 

India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors, while Pakistani land gains were primarily 
south in deserts opposite to Sindh and in Chumb sector near Kashmir in north. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



75 



Aerial warfare 

Further information: Indian Air Force#Second Kashmir War 1965 and Pakistan Air Force#Indo-Pakistani War of 
1965 

The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air 
Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. 
Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir 
War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale 
compared to the 1965 conflict. 

The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunter, 
Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE 
Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force 
comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 
B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict the PAF was 




The F-86 Sabre was a front-line fighter of the 
PAF. 



out-numbered by around 5 : 1 



[20] 



The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet 
aeroplanes. It has been widely reported that the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF, but 

according to some experts this is untrue because the IAF's MiG-21, Hawker Hunter and Folland Gnat fighters 

T211 
actually had higher performance than their PAF counter-part, the F-86 Sabre. Although the IAF's de Havilland 

Vampire fighter-bombers were outdated in comparison to the F-86 Sabre, the Hawker Hunter fighters were superior 

in both power and speed to the F-86 according to Air Cdre (retired) Sajjad Haider, who led the PAF's No. 19 

Squadron in combat during the war. 

[221 
According to the Indians, the F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer." 

The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was 

often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this 

reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 

feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment 

[231 
of the region." In combat the starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, 

[241 [25] 

Folland Gnat fighter. Yet it zoomed into an on going dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, 

successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal 
Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the Pakistan Army. The pilot 
claimed that most of his equipment failed and even if he could get some chance on that, the star-fighters snuffed 
it. This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi 

who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was of view that 
Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting. 

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses 
during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of 
either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 
19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and 

no] 

lost 59. According to one independent source, the PAF flew 86 F-86 
Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon 
after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 
PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani 



front-line fighter force 



[29] 




Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF 
Museum Gallery. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



76 



Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought 
to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war. But 
this could be explained by the 5:1 disparity in numbers faced by the PAF. 

"India retained much of its air force in the East, against the possibility of Chinese intervention, and as a result the air 
forces were quite evenly balanced in the West.' 

"The PAF lost some 25 aircraft (11 in air combat), while the Indians lost 60 (25 in air combat). This was an 
impressive result, but it was simply not good enough. Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front 
line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, 
and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent 
and India's losses totalling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and were unable to prevent IAF fighter 
bombers and reconnaissance Canberras from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965 was a stalemate in 



terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority 



[30] 



Tank battles 

The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World 

War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a 

T311 
numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall. 

Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of 

Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman 

tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, 

equipped with 90 mm guns. The bulk of India's tank fleet were 

older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high 

velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older 

models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. 

Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank 

Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, 

PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number 

and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian 

artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik 




Tanks of 1 8th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the 
move during the 1 965 Indo-Pak War. 



[33] 



At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three 
squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee 
light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B 1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's 
two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions — the latter being in the process of formation. 

The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the 
acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with 
M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 
'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 
'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd 
Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also 
the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with 

Centurions. 

[341 
Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour, Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield 

by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on 

roc - ] [~Q£~] 

Amritsar; they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defenses during the 

defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Assal Uttar. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 77 

After Indians breached the Madhupur canal on September 11, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, 

roi 

affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially. Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's 
attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to a grinding 

halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex- 100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. 

T371 
Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any 

great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division 

at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in 

a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda. 

The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, proved superior to the overly complex Pattons 
and their exaggerated reputations. However, in the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly 
well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a 
disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. 

Naval hostilities 

Further information: Operation Dwarka 

Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy 

under the command of Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station 

coastal down of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, 

as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war contested as a nuisance raid by some. 

[43] 
The attack on Dwarka caused the Indian Navy led to questions being asked in India's parliament and subsequent 

[44] [451 

post-war modernization and expansion, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 1 15 crores. 

According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS Ghazi, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant 
besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval 
conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict. Moreover, they note that the 
Vikrant was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that 
the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was 
under maintenance in harbour. 

Covert operations 

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases. On 

September 7, 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According 

to Chief of Army Staff General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian 

airfields(Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster". Only 22 

commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the 

[491 
operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians The reason for 

the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate 

planning or preparation 

Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned 
Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force 
found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles. 

[52] 

India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers. 
Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos 
deep into Pakistan territory, but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



78 



Assessment of losses 

India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of 
damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims. 





Indian claims 


Pakistani 

, • [55] 
claims 


Independent Sources 


Casualties 


— 


— 


3,000 Indian soldiers, 3,800 Pakistani 
soldiers 


Combat 

flying effort 


4,073+ combat sorties 


2,279 combat 
sorties 




Aircraft lost 


59 IAF (official), 43 PAF. [57] In addition, Indian 
sources claim that there were 13 IAF aircraft lost 
in accidents, and 3 Indian civilian aircraft shot 
down. 


19PAF, 104 IAF 


20 PAF, Pakistan claims India rejected 
neutral arbitration. 


Aerial 
victories 


17 + 3 (post war) 


30 


— 


Tanks 
destroyed 


128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 
150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially 471 
Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured 


165 Pakistan 
tanks [62] 




Land area 
won 


2 2 
1,500 mi (3,885 km ) of Pakistani territory 


250 mi 2 
(648 km 2 ) of 
Indian territory 


India held 7 1 mi 2 ( 1 , 1 840 km 2 ) of Pakistani 

territory and Pakistan held 

210 mi 2 (545 km 2 ) of Indian territory 



Neutral assessments 

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most 
of these assessments agree that India had a upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the 
neutral assessments are mentioned below — 

• According to the Library of Congress Country Studies conducted by the Federal Research Division of the United 
States [63] - 

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. 
Losses were relatively heavy — on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. 
Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would 
only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief 
of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by 
"Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they 
considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government. 

2 2 

• TIME magazine reported that India held 690 mi of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 mi of Indian 
territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan. Additionally, Pakistan had lost almost half its armour temporarily. The 
article further elaborates, 

Severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up 
with Red China and turning its back on the U.N. 

• Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book "South Asia in world politics' — 

The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts 
of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United Nations intervened on September 22, 
Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 79 

• In his book "National identity and geopolitical visions", Gertjan Dijkink writes — 

The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on 
into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts. 

• An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's India, summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, 

In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed 
by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before 
either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not 
capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's 
strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin. 

• In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote — 

2 

India won the war. It gained 1840 km (unknown operator: u'strong' sq mi) of Pakistani territory: 

2 

640 km (unknown operator: u'strong 1 sq mi) in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 

2 2 

460 km (unknown operator: u'strong 1 sq mi) of the Sailkot sector; 380 km (unknown operator: 

2 

u'strong' sq mi) far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km (unknown operator: 

2 

u'strong' sq mi) on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km (unknown operator: u'strong' sq mi) of 

2 2 

Indian territory: 490 km (unknown operator: u'strong' sq mi) in the Chhamb sector and 50 km 
(unknown operator: u'strong' sq mi) around Khem Karan. 

• Dennis Kux's "India and the United States estranged democracies " also provides a summary of the war, 

Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, 
India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to 
seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated. 

• BBC reported that the war served game changer in Pakistani politics, 

The defeat in the 1965 war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal 
opposition. This became a surge after his protege, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, deserted him and established the 
Pakistan People's Party. 

• "A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947" by Robert Johnson mentions — 

India's strategic aims were modest — it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in 

2 

possession of 720 square miles (unknown operator: u'strong' km ) of Pakistani territory for the loss of 

2 

just 220 square miles (unknown operator: u'strong' km ) of its own. 

• An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's "Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new 
security environment — 

A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri 
cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. 
Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been 
exposed. 

• English historian John Keay's "India: A History" provides a summary of the 1965 war — 

The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main 
push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight 
of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate. 

• Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book "Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and 

T721 
India-Pakistan" — 

Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to 
mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory. 

T731 

• Newsweek magazine, however, praised the Pakistani military's ability to hold of the much larger Indian Army. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 80 

By just the end of the week, in fact, it was clear that the Pakistanis were more than holding their own. 

Ceasefire 

The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the 
conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted ceasefire 
negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani 
President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 
February 25, 1966. 

With declining stockpiles of ammunition, Pakistani leaders feared the war tilting in India's favor. Therefore, they 

quickly accepted the ceasefire in Tashkent. Despite strong opposition from Indian military leaders, India bowed 

T741 
to growing international diplomatic pressure and accepted the ceasefire. On September 22, the United Nations 

Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The 

war ended the following day. 

India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the declaration of the ceasefire. As a 

consequence, the public outcry in India against the ceasefire declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the 

[751 
ruling Indian National Congress. The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated 

official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The 

protests led to student riots. Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in 

the war — which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India — and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as 

[771 

having forfeited the gains. Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled 

T7R1 

"The Myth of 1965 Victory", allegedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book 
were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent publication because the topic was "too sensitive". 

India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, 

roil 

while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India. In addition to the expected exchange of 
small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of 
Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a 

TR21 

B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala. A 
Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain and on 2 February 1967, 
an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters. 

The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. 

Intelligence failures 

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate — 

Indian miscalculations 

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to 
recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a 
result. 

rssi 
The "Official History of the 1965 War ", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long 

suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on September 22 when the 

Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India 

could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's 

frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was 

determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of 

tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



81 



Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lai, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of 

coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans 

drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the 

order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lai as the "Supremo Syndrome", a 

[541 
patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military. 



Pakistani miscalculations 

The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the 
opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and 
decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided 
with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as 
they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars. 






,. _ __. _ fM^tf~/JUUfi-£&k. 

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INFO AMCONSUL DACCA LAHORE RAWALPINDI UNN 

CONFIDENTIAL I9B700Z OCT 65 



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FQLLOSINS DELINQUENT COMMENTS SUPPLEMENT REACTION 13 TIHE-S 
HAWK CSY REPORTED SEPARATELY. 



PAGE TWO RUQVKH 15JB CONFIDENTIAL 

OF PAK FORCES SEEMS TO HAVE CONVINCED MOST THAT ONLY PaK 
1 FORBEARANCE SAVED THE INDIANS FROM DISASTER. THUS RErUMPTIQH 
HOSTILITIES NOT SERIOUSLY FEARED Blj.'lAN-IN- STF 



VILLAGE 



The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy 
makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a 
second front. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern 
sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support 
penetrating into Kashmir. 

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture 
Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for 
communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a 
failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticized the Ayub Khan 
administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. 
These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew 
the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular 
vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an 
all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnur, General Ayub 
Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik 
and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the 
replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and 
successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya 
Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of 
Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized 
Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to 
fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about 



■© 



WHO SUFFERED BOMB DAMAGE RELIABLY REPORTED REFUSING CT0KEN1 
RELIEF PAYMENTS OR COUTH IB'JTING RELIEF SUMS TO lOT't VOLUNTEERING 
TO VIP VISITORS THAT LOSS OF HOUSE AND PROPERTY ACCEPTABLE 
CONTRIBUTION TO JEHAD ABAINST HINDU INDIA. 
ODDBALL AFTERMATH IS UNSHAKEABLE CONVICTION ALL STRATA THaT 

::-, IV .■,F5hT» BY USA TO FIGHT PAKISTAN, WHILE MANY REFUSE BELIEl/E 
PAHS HAD MODERN AMERICAN WEAPONS. NEWS PHOTO OF US AMMUNITION 
REPEATEDLY CITED AS PROOF DIVERSION US AID FROM PAKISTAN TO INDIA, 
ALTHO SOME WILL AW IT US ONLY MISGUIDED. DECEIVED BY WILY HINDUS. 
XASMIR SETTLEMENT: M AN-IN-STREET PARROTS COMMITMENT TO FIGHT 
FOH THOUSAND YEARS TO WIN SELF DETERMINATION FOR KASHMIRI 
ALTHOUGH UNABL7 t;!T ICULATE WHY * AS MIR SO VITAL TO PAKISTAN, 
INTELLIGENT PEOPLE RECOGNIZE SETTLEMENT CANNOT BE ON STATED 
PAK TERMS, HCPt WITHOUT MUCH CONVICTION THAT WORLD STATESMEN 
CAN DEVISE FORMULA WHICH INDIANS CAN ACCEPT. THESE CONTACTS 
HECOBNTZE THAT TINE BAY .BE NEEDED TO FIND COMMON GROUND, BUT 
TELL US PAKS CANT WAIT'FOR SCME ASSURANCE OF PROGRESS TOWARD 
COHF.IDEBTIAL ■ 



Telegram from the Embassy of the United States 
in Karachi: "Continuing propaganda regarding 

achievements of Pak forces seems to have 

convinced most that only Pak forbearance saved 

the Indians from disaster." 



the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned 



[83] 



Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game — conducted in March 1965, at 
the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan 
would win. Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army 

had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a 
shock". 

Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said that the Pakistan Army, 

ro-7"|roo"| 

and not India, should be blamed for starting the war. However propaganda in Pakistan about the war 

continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan, with most of the blame being heaped on the 

leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when 
then East Pakistan was invaded by India and seceded from West Pakistan, leading to the creation of Bangladesh. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 82 

Involvement of other nations 

Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation in 1959 under which the United States 
agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of Pakistan 
at its request. However, following the start of the 1965 war, the United States was of the view that the conflict 
was largely Pakistan's fault and therefore, it cut all military supplies to the country. However, Pakistan did receive 
significant support from Iran, Indonesia and People's Republic of China. 

Both before and during the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and 

had invariably admonished India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop 

[92] 
movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan. As such, India agreed to the UN mandate in order to avoid a 

war on both borders. 

India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Despite close relations 

between with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both 

[93] [94] 
nations to talks that it would host in Tashkent. 

Aftermath 
India 

Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the 

[95] 
Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir. In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official 

assessing the consequences of the war — 

Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right. 

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" 

[97] 
victory in India. The Indian premier, Lai Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India. 

While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to 

effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan. In his book 

"War in the modern world since 1815", noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" 

during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the 

[99] 
Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates — 

India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and 
their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its 
ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the 
number of serviceable tanks. 

As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the triservices of 
the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India 
established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also 
made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly 
visible during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two 
weeks. 

China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to 
take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons. Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little 
to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict which irked India. At the same 
time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further 
strained the relations between the West and India. These developments led to a significant change in India's 

foreign policy — India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from 
Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of 1960s, the Soviet Union 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 83 

emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India. From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports 
were from the Soviet Union. After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more 
asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far. 

Pakistan 

At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. September 
6 is celebrated as Defence Day in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian 
army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised. 

However, the Pakistani government was accused by foreign analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens 
regarding the actual consequences of the war. In his book "Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign 

policies", S.M. Burke writes — 

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of 
India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her 
adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength. 

Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical 
breakthroughs were not made. Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their 

"martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war. Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst 

t [HO] 
wrote — 

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in a 
blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long. 

Pakistan airforce on the other hand gained a lot of credibility and reliability among Pakistan military and 
international war writers for successful defence of lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation 
to India on the next day. The alertness of the airforce was also related to the fact that some pilots were scrambled 6 
times in less than an hour on indication of Indian air raids. Pakistan airforce along with the army is celebrated for on 
Defence day and Airforce day in commemoration of this in Pakistan (September 6 and 7 respectively). 

Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve 
its goal of capturing Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for 
Pakistan. [112][113][114] 

Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar 
that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, though few citizens realised 
the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticized. Following the 
advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the 
people of Pakistan about the superiority — if not invincibility — of its armed forces, but Pakistan's inability to 
attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability for Ayub. The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions 
in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition. 

One of the most far reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan. 
The cost of the 1965 war put an end to the impressive period economic growth Pakistan had experienced during 
early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting 
tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970—71, defence spending comprised a whopping 55.66% of 
government expenditure. 

Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an 
Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides, 
leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States. After the war, Pakistan would 
increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 84 

Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East 
Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir. Bengali leaders 
accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though 

M221 

large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir. In fact, despite some Pakistan Air 

r 1231 

Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector, 

although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrenghted infantry division (14 Division), sixteen planes and 

ri24i 
no tanks. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West 

Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, which ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and 

another war between India and Pakistan in 1971. 

Military awards 
Battle honours 

After the war, a total of number of 16 battle honours and 3 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian 
Army, the notable amongst which are: 

• Jammu and Kashmir 1965 (theatre honour) • Burki • Kalidhar 

• Punjab 1965 (theatre honour) • Dograi • OP Hill 

• Rajasthan 1965 (theatre honour) • Hajipir • Phillora 

• Assal Uttar 



Gallantry awards 

For bravery, the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries, the Indian 
award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-Haider: 

India 

• Company Quarter Master Havildar Abdul Hamid (Posthumous) 

• Lieutenant-Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore (Posthumous) 

Pakistan 

• Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed (Posthumous) 

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[Ill] Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965 - John Fricker - Google Boeken (http://books. google. com/books ?id=RPttAAAAMAAJ& 

source=gbs_navlinks_s). Books.google.com. . Retrieved 2011-12-21. 
[112] Profile of Pakistan (http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm) — U.S. Department of State, Failure of U.S. 's Pakistan Policy (http:// 

globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Coll/coll-con5.html) — Interview with Steve Coll 
[113] Speech of Bill McCollum (http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1994/940912.htm) in United States House of Representatives September 

12, 1994 
[114] South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-2587-2, p. 26 
[115] Dr. Ahmad Faruqui (http://www.pakistanlink.com/Opinion/2004/Sept04/17/05.html) 
[116] Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. M.E. Sharpe. p. 52. 

ISBN 0-7656-1497-9. 
[117] Embassy of Pakistan (http://www.pakistanembassy.no/fpolicy.html) 
[118] Second opinion: The insidious logic of war Khaled Ahmed's Urdu Press Review (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. 

asp?page=story_3-6-2002_pg3_4) Daily Times June 3, 2002 
[119] Greg Cashman, Leonard C. Robinson. An introduction to the causes of war: patterns of interstate conflict from World War I to Iraq. 

Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. ISBN 0-7425-5510-0. 
[120] Richard N. Haass "Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy", 1998, Council on Foreign Relations, ISBN 0-87609-212-1 ppl72 
[121] Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age By Peter Paret, 1986, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-820097-8 

pp802 
[122] Rounaq Jahan (1972). Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-23 1-03625-6. Pg 166—167 
[123] Reflections on two military presidents By M.P. Bhandara (http://www.dawn.eom/2005/12/25/ed.htm#4) December 25, 2005, Dawn 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 

[124] The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Yahya Khan as Army Chief- 1966- 1971 (http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/pak-army. 

htm) by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin 
[125] Singh, Sarbans (1993). Battle Honours of the Indian Army 1757 - 1971 (http://books.google.com/books/about/ 

Battle_honours_of_the_Indian_Army_1757_l.html?id=5ATfAAAAMAAJ). New Delhi: Vision Books, pp. 242-256. ISBN 81-7094-115-6. . 

Retrieved 3 November 201 1. 

Further reading 

• First & Further reflections on the second Kashmir War (South Asia series) — 2 books by Louis Dupree. 

• Gupta, Hari Ram (1967). India-Pakistan war, 1965 (http://books. google. com/books ?id=3jAxNbnltkEC& 
source=gbs_navlinks_s). 1 (1 ed.). Hariyana Prakashan. ISBN B0006FFBK8. 

• Mohan, Jagan; Chopra, Samir (2005) [2005]. The India Pakistan Air War of 1965 (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=Bz9uAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s) (1 ed.). Manohar Publishers. ISBN 81-7304-641-7. 

• Berindranath, Dewan (1966). The war with Pakistan: A pictorial narration of the fifty days which rocked the 
sub-continent (http://books. google. com/books?id=rtdOAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Asia Press. 

• Ismail Siddiqui, Muhammad (1983). Die to live: A selection of short stories based on the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war 
(http://books. google. com/books?id=bZ-QGAAACAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s) (1 ed.). Wajidalis. 

ISBN B0006EL2OI. 

• Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, its role and rule: a history of the Pakistan Army from Independence to 
Kargil, 1 967-1 999 (http ://books .google . com/books ?id=B 2s aA A A AC A AJ& source=gbs_navlinks_s) . 
RoseDog Books. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3. 

• Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&lpg=PPl&pg=PPl#v=onepage&q=&f=false). United Book Press. 
ISBN 0-87003-214-3, 0-87003-223-2. 

• Singh, Lt. Gen. Harbaksh (1991). War despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict, 1965 (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=pBpuAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Lancer InterConsult, Inc. ISBN 81-7062-117-8. 

• Praval, Maj K C (2009). Indian Army after Independence (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=wAlxPgAACAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Lancer InterConsult, Inc. ISBN 1-935501-10-0. 

• Asghar Khan, Mohammed (1979). The first round: Indo-Pakistan War, 1965 (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=FJ7cAAAACAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Islamic Information Services. ISBN 0-906041-11-2. 

• Faruquii, Ahmad (2003). Rethinking the national security of Pakistan: the price of strategic myopia (http:// 
books. google. com/books ?id=ElHfAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Ashgate Publishing. 

ISBN 0-7546-1497-2. 

• Singh, Bhupinder (1982). 1965 war, role of tanks in India-Pakistan war (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=6DDHAAAAIAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s). B.C. Publishers. ISBN B0000CQ9GQ. 

• Brines, Russell (1968). The Indo-Pakistan Conflict (http://books. google.com/books ?id=BfxtAAAAMAAJ& 
source=gbs_navlinks_s). Pall Mall P. ISBN 0-269-16232-1. 

• Fricker, John (1979). Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965 (http://books.google.com/ 
books?id=RPttAAAAMAAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Ian Allan. ISBN 0-7110-0929-5. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 



Sources and external links 

Indo-Pak war of '65. Who really started it? (http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/ 

dawn/news/pakistan/16-the-guns-of-august-hs-06) 

WTF - Indo-Pak war of '65. Why did we go to war? (http://paki.in/wtf/2008/02/16/ 

indo-pak-war-of-65-why-did-we-go-to-war/-) 

IAF Combat Kills — 1965 war (http://orbat.com/site/cimh/iaf/IAF_1965war_kills.pdf), (Center for Indian 

Military History) 

Mohammed Muhammad Musa (1983). My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965. Wajidalis. 

United States Library of Congress Country Studies — India (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r7frd/ 

cstdy : @ field(DOCID+inO 1 89)) 

Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1965 War with Pakistan (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ 

LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/index.html) 

Story of Pakistan (http://www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A068&Pg=5) 

GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan War 1965 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ 

indo-pak_1965.htm) 

Pakistan Columnist AH Amin analyzes the war. (http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/september/1965.htm) 

Grand Slam — A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin (http://www.defencejournal. 

com/2000/sept/grand-slam.htm) — very detailed roll of events and analysis 

A Critical Look at the 1965 Operations, Air Chief Marshall (retd) PC Lai (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ 

IAF/History/1965War/Lal-65.htm) — dispassionate analysis 

The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40 Years On (http://in.rediff.com/news/indpakwar05.htm) — From Rediff.com 

Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily Times (Pakistan) (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. 

asp?page=story_7-9-2005_pg3_l) 

Pak Army's Kargil like disaster of 1965 — South Asia Tribune (http://www.satribune.com/archives/sept04/ 

Pl_habookl.htm) 

Spirit of '65 & the parallels with today — Ayaz Amir (http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20051021.htm) 

Air Commodore Syed Sajjad Haider on 1965 war and surrounding events (http://www.ummat.com.pk/ 

report_ummat/10022008-misc_reports/interview- 10022008b.html) 



90 



Aerial warfare 



Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1965 



The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 saw the Indian and Pakistani Air Forces engaged in large-scale aerial combat 
against each other for the first time since the Partition in 1947. The war took place during the course of September 
1965 and saw both air forces conduct defensive and offensive operations over Indian and Pakistani airspace. Both 
countries made contradictory claims regarding the number of losses that they suffered and the number of planes that 
they claimed to have shot down. Indian losses have been placed at between 59 and 110, while Pakistani losses were 
between 18 and 43. 



Background 



The war began in early August 1965 and initially the fighting was confined mainly to the ground. Later, however, 
as the war progressed, the war took on another dimension as the two sides began air operations against each other. 
Although the two forces had previously taken part in the First Kashmir War which had occurred shortly after 
Partition, that engagement had been limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict and the air operations that both 
sides had undertaken were limited and largely confined to interdiction and other strategic purposes such as 
re-supply and troop transport operations. Although there had been one incident where Indian fighter aircraft 
intercepted a Pakistani transport, there had been no significant air-to-air combat. During the 1965 conflict, 
however, the PAF flew a total 2,364 sorties while the IAF flew 3,937 sorties. 

All out War erupted between India and Pakistan, and during the vicious 17 day conflict PAF flew defensive CAPs 
over its own bases, offensive counter air missions against Indian airfields, and close - support and interdiction 
sorties, to which the Indians responded in kind. India retained much of its air force in the East, against the possibility 
of Chinese intervention, and as a result the air forces were quite evenly balanced in the West. 

Main battle 

The aerial phase of the war began on September 1, 1965, when the Indian Air Force responded to an urgent call for 
air strikes against the Pakistani Army, which had launched an attack known as Operation Grand Slam. The IAF 
scrambled 3 waves of four Vampire FB Mk 52s. The first wave strafed Pakistani positions and attacked Pakistani 
tanks and ground targets. One Vampire was lost to ground fire. The PAF scrambled two F-86 Sabres armed with 
Sidewinder missiles. These Sabres entered the battlefield just as the second wave of Vampires were coming in for 
the attack. The post World War II vintage Vampires were no match for the PAF Sabres and in the ensuing dogfight, 
three of the four Vampires were shot down by the Sabres. As the Sabres cleared out, the third wave of Vampires 
came in and continued attacking ground targets. 



Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1965 



91 




The appearance of the Sabres necessitated a move by the IAF to send 
the Folland Gnat fighters to the forward base of Pathankot. IAF used 
Mysteres to lure two Sabres to attack them with four Gnats. One sabre 
had to go back without entering the fight when the pilot couldn't 
jettison the fuel tanks. The other one flown by Fit Lt Yusuf Ali, who 
spotted the Gnats just before attacking the Mysteres, positioned 
himself behind them. Just as he got his cross-hairs on them, he felt 
thuds on his own jet from two more Gnats sandwiching him in between 
as well as informing the front ones to break off. He was surrounded in 
a cloud of Gnats repeatedly being attacked. The sole lurking Lockheed 
F-104 Starfighter in the area was pointed to the dog fight by base 
control along with scrambling another one from base. The first 

Starfighter crossed through the dog fight at supper sonic speed to strike sheer awe in the adversaries. The trick 

T71 
worked and the Gnats started egressing. IAF's Squadron Leader Trevor J. Keelor of No. 23 Squadron claimed to 

have shot down the F-86 Sabre on that day (September 3), claiming the first air combat victory to the IAF of the war 

and subsequently received the Vir Chakra. However the sabre he 'shot down' was flown to base in badly damaged 

condition and rough landed at base without further damage. PAF later released its pictures to disappoint IAF. The 

Sabre pilot, Fit Lt Yusuf Ali, was given Sitara-e-Jurat for dog fighting with six Gnats (while his wingman was 

ordered to leave since he couldn't jettison his fuel tanks) and bringing the damaged Sabre back home safely 



Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF 
Museum Gallery. 



[7] 



In the same incident, an IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned 
Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur and was captured by the PAF. The Two Lockheed F-104 Starfighters, that closed in at 

r71T81 

supper sonic speed, forced the Gnat down. This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force 

[71 
Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated 

T71 
its flight performance, was of view that Gnat was no 'Sabre Slayer' when it came to dog fighting. 

During the conflict, the Pakistani F-86 Sabre Flying Ace, Muhammad Mahmood Alam shot down nine Indian 
aircraft as well as claiming two others as 'probable'. Five of Hawker Hunter aircraft were shot down in one minute 
with four being in first 30 seconds 



[9][10][11][12][13] 



On September 6, the Indian Army crossed the border at Lahore to 
relieve pressure off the Chamb Jaurian sector. On the evening of 
the same day, the PAF responded with attacks on Indian airfields 
at Pathankot and Halwara. The attack on Pathankot was successful 
and the IAF lost nearly 10 aircraft on the ground. The attack on 
Halwara was unsuccessful; two of the attacking raiders were shot 
down for the loss of two Indian Hunters. Both the Pakistani pilots 
were killed in the action. One of them was Squadron Leader 
Sarfaraz Rafiqui who had shot down two Vampires on September 

1141 

1 while the other was Flight Lieutenant Yunus Ahmed. Before 

1141 
being shot down, Rafiqui shot down one of the Hunters. He 

was later posthumously awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat and the Hilal-i-Jurat. Both the Indian pilots, Pingle and Gandhi, 




PAF F-86 Sabres 



survived as they ejected near their base 



[15] 



J16] 



On September 7, 1965 PAF parachuted 135 Special Services Group (SSG) para commandos at three Indian 

ri7i 

airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster". Only 10 

1171 
commandos were able to returned to Pakistan, and rest of them were taken as prisoners of war (including one of 

the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), at Halwara and Adampur these troops landed in residential 



areas where the villagers caught and handed them over to police 



[17] 



Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1965 92 

Also on September 7, the IAF mounted over 33 sorties against the heavily guarded PAF airfield complex at 
Sargodha. The IAF lost two Mysteres and three Hunters due to the defence mounted by the Pakistan Air 

Force's local squadrons. One of the crippled Mysteres got involved in a dogfight with an F-104 Starfighter and shot 

each other down, both the pilots ejected and the Indian was captured, made a POW and released after the war. 

T211 
The Indian pilot, Squadron Leader Ajjamada Boppaya Devayya, was later awarded the Maha Vir Chakra 23 years 

later after his feat was revealed by an author appointed by PAF to write their story on 1965 war. 

September 7 also marked the day when the PAF attacked IAF airfields in the Eastern Sector. During the PAF's raid 

[20] [221 

on Kalaikunda Indian pilot, Flight Lieutenant A T Cooke, engaged four Pakistani Sabres, shooting down one 

[231 
while flying at tree-top height and making another a write off in the process. 

The war lessened in intensity after September 8 and there were occasional clashes between the IAF and the PAF. 
Both air forces now changed their doctrine from air interdictions to ground attack and concentrated their efforts on 
knocking out soft skin targets and supply lines like wagons carrying ammunitions and armoured vehicles. During the 

conflict IAF Canberras raided a few of the Pakistani bases. On September 10, one Mystere was downed by 

T241 
anti-aircraft fire in Pakistan but the pilot ejected safely. 

One PAF F-86 Sabre was downed by anti-aircraft fire on September 13 when it attacked Gurdaspur Railway Yard 

T251 T141 

and its pilot was killed. An Indian Gnat was also shot down by PAF F-86 Sabre, although the pilot managed to 

eject safely. On September 14, Indian Canberras undertook the deepest penetration of Pakistani airspace of the war, 

attacking Pakistani bases around Peshawar and Kohat. Rather than bombing the Peshawer airstrip, however, IAF 

bombers mistook the mall road in Peshawer as the runway and dropped there bombs there by accident. The PAF 

admits that the IAF came very close to annihilating its entire B-57 bombers. On their return mission, the Canberras 

were intercepted by a Pakistani F-104, although they managed to evade the Starfighter and returned home safely. 

However, one Pakistani F-86 Sabre crashed, killing the pilot, while conducting an evasive maneuvere in an attempt 

to escape pursuit from Wing Commander Bharat Singh, as he tried to defend the Canberra bombers. Singh was later 

credited with an aerial victory for this incident. Later, one Pakistani B-57 was shot down by anti-aircraft fire over 

Adampur, although both of its crew managed to eject safely and remained POWs. 

On September 15, the PAF employed a number of its C-130s transport aircraft as bombers which proved 

T251 M41 T141 

unsuccessful and two of them were shot by IAF. The following day, one Hunter and an F-86 Sabre were 
shot down over Halwara. The IAF pilot was killed in the encounter, although the Pakistani pilot ejected and spent the 
rest of the war as a POW. A Pakistani Cessna was also shot down that day, as well as an Auster observation 
aircraft. On September 18, one Sabre was shot down by a Gnat over Amritsar, the matter was reported by the 
Collector, who had witness the entire dogfight. The same day a Pakistani Sabre shot down a civilian Indian 
aircraft even after the civilian plane indicated its identity assuming it to be a reconnaissance mission. It became even 
more notable when after 60 years, the PAF pilot wrote a letter to apologize for shooting the aircraft to its Pilot's 

[27] _ r27ir2Sir2Ql 

daughter. The aircraft had been carrying the then Gujarat Chief Minister Balwant Rai and his family. 

On September 19, one Gnat and two Sabres were downed over Chawinda. One of the Sabres that were shot 
down was credited to Squadron Leader Denzil Keelor, the brother of Trevor Keelor, who was credited with the 
first Indian aerial victory of the war. The following day, another two Hunters and an F-86 Sabre were lost 
over Kasur, Pakistan. 

At one stage the IAF was operating 200 air missions simultaneously. IAF Folland Gnats of Nos 9 and 23 squadrons 
played a significant role in major air battles. 

T311 
On September 21, IAF Canberras carried out a daring daylight strike into Pakistan at the radar complex in Badin. 

The raid proved to be successful. Under the command of Wing Commander Peter Wilson, six Canberras from No. 16 

Squadron took off from Agra, over a 1,000 km from Bladin and proceeded towards the radar complex at low 

T311 
level. About 80 miles short of the target, one Canberra climbed to an altitude of 10,000 feet in order to act as a 

decoy before returning to base. The other five Canberras continued on towards the target. The flight then separated 

and four of the aircraft approached the target in two sections, each two minutes apart, at low level before climbing to 



Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1965 93 

7,000 feet from where they carried out bombing runs, dropping approximately 10,000 lbs of explosives. Wilson then 
approached from the south at an altitude of just 30 feet firing a salvo of 68mm rockets at the radar dome. 

ri4i 
On the same day a PAF F-104 intercepted a Canberra bomber on its way back from Sargodha and shot it down, 

while one Hunter pilot who was the son of Chief of the Indian Army was shot down by anti-aircraft fire, he ejected 

F321 rii 

and was taken POW. The ceasefire was declared on the night of September 22, 1965. 

Outcome 

There are conflicting claims by either side on this issue. Pakistani sources suggest that Indian losses were in the 

r51T331 
range of 59—110 and Pakistani losses were around 18—43. Recent works have, however, attempted to move 

beyond the raw statistics of the number of losses each side incurred, arguing that in terms of aircraft lost to sorties 

flown, the Indian Air Force's attrition rate (1.5%) was lower than the Pakistani attrition rate (1.82%). Arguably this 

indicates that had the war continued, the PAF would have found it increasingly difficult to sustain operations at the 

same level. Nevertheless, a similar argument can be made about the IAF also, although it did have a significant 

size advantage that might have proved telling if the war had been prolonged. 

Another factor which makes it difficult to determine the outcome of the 1965 air war is the issue of aircraft lost in 
the air in air-to-air combat or to ground fire as opposed to aircraft lost on the ground due to bombing. Indian 
sources claimed that a large number of Indian aircraft losses occurred on the ground during the attacks on 

[341 

Kalaikkunda and Pathankot — up to 60 per cent by some accounts 

Results of Air Combat: Indian sources have claimed that India lost 24 aircraft in air-to-air combat and ground-to-air 
fire, while PAF lost 37 aircraft in air-to-air combat. Air Commodore Jasjit Singh of India claimed that Pakistan 
ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 
percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting 
would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totalling 15 percent. 

Learning the lessons 

Much of the lessons of the 1965 war lead India to refine tactics which proved decisive in the 1971 war. Pakistani 
forces failed to take account of the extent to which they had relied on two factors which the IAF could not take for 
granted - complete ground based defensive radar coverage and an adequate supply of air-to-air missiles. Much effort 
was expended in India to remedy these deficiencies before 1971. 

With Soviet aid, India established a modern early warning radar system, including the recently introduced 
'Fansong-E' low-level radar, linked with SA-2 'Guideline' surface-to-air missiles and a large number of AA guns. By 
December 1971 the IAF comprised a total of 36 squadrons (of which 10 were deployed in the Bengal sector) with 
some 650 combat aircraft. 

Moreover, the 1965 war resulted in the USA imposing a 10 year arms embargo on both sides. This had no effect, on 
India, which had always looked to Britain, France and even Russia for arms, but was disastrous for Pakistan, which 
was forced to acquire 90 obsolete second hand Sabre via Iran, a mere 28 Mirage Ills from France and 74 
maintenance intensive Shenyang F-6s. It was unable to replace losses among its (already weak) force of B-57s, or to 
acquire a modern interceptor in realistic numbers. 



Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1965 94 

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IAF-defeated-PAF-in-1965-War.html). Vol 22.1 Jan - Mar 2007. . Retrieved 21 November 201 1. 
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jpg.html). Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 22 November 2011. 
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[26] Jagan Mohan, P.V.S; Chopra, Samir (2005). The India-Pakistan air war of 1965 (http://books.google.com/ 

books?id=FAhuAAAAMAAJ&q=shaukat). Manohar. pp. 257-259. ISBN 978-81-7304-641-4. . 
[27] "Fighter pilot says sorry to daughter of man he shot down" (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/ 

fighter-pilot-says-sorry-to-daughter-of-man-he-shot-down-2336256.html). The Independent UK. 12 AUGUST 201 1. . Retrieved 21 

November 2011. 
[28] "Pak pilot says sorry for 1965 downing of plane" (http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/ 

pak-pilot-says-sorry-for-1965-downing-of-plane_725412.html). Zee News. August 10, 2011. . Retrieved 21 November 2011. 
[29] "SIDE SHOW IN THE SOUTH-WESTERN SECTOR" (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1965War/Chapter8.html). 

HISTORY PAGE, 1965 WAR. Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 21 November 2011. 
[30] Lalwani, Ramesh. "Sabre Killers: Keelor Brothers" (http://mangalorean.com/browsearticles. php?arttype=Feature&articleid=637). . 

Retrieved 2009-06-10. 



Indo-Pakistani Air War of 1965 95 

[31] Gupta, Aditya. "The Kashmir War, 1965: Raid on Badin" (http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_325.shtml). Air Combat 

Information Group. . Retrieved 2009-06-10. 
[32] Fricker, John (1979). Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965 (http://books.google.com/books?id=FAhuAAAAMAAJ&q=cariappa). I. 

Allan, p. 130. . 
[33] Osama, Athar. "1965 War: A Different Legacy" (http://pakistaniat.com/2007/09/06/1965-war-a-different-legacy/comment-page-6/). . 

Retrieved 2009-06-10. 
[34] Khan, J A (2004). Air Power and Challenges to IAF. APH Publishing, p. 185. ISBN 978-81-7648-593-7. 
[35] The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare Edited by Chris Bishop (amber publishing 1997, republished 2004 pages 384-387 ISBN 

1-904687-26-1) 



Indian Air Force 



Indian Air Force 



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Indian Air Force Active 8 October 1932 - present Country India Size 127,000 personnel approx. 1,380 aircraft 
Part of Ministry of Defence (India)Ministry of Defencelndian Armed Forces Headquarters New Delhi, India Motto 
•Pf :?T3J' <flH$lH .Sanskrit languageSanskrit: Nabhah-Sprsam Diptam "Touch the Sky with Glory" "The IAF Motto". 
Official Website. Webmaster IAF - Air Headquarters. . Retrieved 7 April 2009. Colors Navy blue, sky blue & white 
Anniversaries Air Force Day: 8 October "A Mother in India: 8th October". 22 October 2007. . Retrieved 20 July 
2010. Engagements Website indianairforce.nic.in Commanders Chief of the Air Staff (India)Chief of the Air 
StaffAir Chief Marshal Norman Anil Kumar Browne Insignia Air Force Ensign RoundelRoundelFin flashesFin 
flashThe IAF Fin Flash Aircraft flown Attack aircraftAttackSEPECAT JaguarJaguar, MiG-27, IAI 
HarpyHarpyFighter aircraftFighterMiG-2 1 , Mirage 2000, MiG-29, Su-30MKI, HAL TejasHelicopterHAL 
DhruvDhruv, HAL ChetakChetak, HAL CheetahCheetah, Mil Mi-8Mi-8, Mi-17, Mi-26, Mil 
Mi-24Mi-25/35Surveillance aircraftReconnaissancelAI SearcherSearcher II, IAI HeronHeronTrainer 
(aircraft)TrainerHPT-32 Deepak, HAL KiranHJT-16 Kiran, BAE HawkHawk Mk 132, Pilatus PC-7Pilatus C-7 Mk 
IlCargo aircraftTransportIl-76, An-32, HS 748, Do 228, Boeing 737, Embraer ERJ 145 familyERJ 135, 11-7811-78 
MKI, C-130JThe Indian Air Force (IAF; Devanagari: HTT^fPT TR1 ?T TT, Bhartiya Vayu Sena) is the air forceair 
arm of the Indian armed forces. Its primary responsibility is to secure Indian airspace and to conduct aerial warfare 
during a conflict. It was officially established on 8 October 1932 as an auxiliary air force of the British Raj and the 
prefix Royal was added in 1945 in recognition of its services during World War II. After India achieved 
independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, the Royal Indian Air Force served the Dominion of India, with the 
prefix being dropped when India became a republic in 1950. Since independence, the IAF has been involved in 
Indo-Pakistani Warsfour wars with neighbouring Pakistan and one with the People's Republic of China. Other major 
operations undertaken by the IAF include Invasion of GoaOperation Vijay - the invasion of Goa, Operation 
MeghdootOperation Meghdoot, Operation CactusOperation Cactus and Operation Poomalai. Apart from conflicts, 
the IAF has been an active participant in History of United Nations peacekeepingUnited Nations peacekeeping 
missions. The President of India serves as the Commander-in-Chief, IndiaCommander-in-Chief of the IAF. The 
Chief of Air Staff (India)Chief of Air Staff, an Air Chief Marshal (ACM), is a four-star rankfour-star commander 
and commands the Air Force. There is never more than one serving ACM at any given time in the IAF. One officer 
Arjan Singh, DFC has been conferred the rank of Marshal of the Air Force, a five-star rank and the officer serves as 
the ceremonial chief. In its publication the Military Balance 2010, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
estimates that the Indian Air Force has a strength of 127,000 active personnel and operated around List of aircraft of 
the Indian Air Force#Current aircraftl,380 aircraft. However, various reliable sources provided notably divergent 
estimates of its strength over the years. MissionEvolution of the IAF Roundel over the years:l)1933-1942 
2)1942-19453)1947-1950 4)1950 - present "INDIAN AIR FORCE MUSEUM - Heraldry (Badges and Insignia)". 
Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 16 January 2012. The IAF's mission is defined by the Armed Forces Act of 1947, 
Constitution of India and the Air Force Act of 1950, Air Force Act, 1950. Ministry of Law & Justice. . Retrieved 16 
January 2012. in the aerial battlespace, as: " Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for 
defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective 
demobilisation. " Thus, the IAF has the primary objective of safeguarding Indian territory and national interests from 



Indian Air Force 97 

all threats in conjunction with the other branches of the armed forces by defending Indian airspace. The IAF provides 
close air support to the Indian Army troops in the battlefield and also provides strategic and tactical airlift 
capabilities. The IAF also operates the Integrated Space Cell together with the other two branches of the Indian 
Armed Forces, the civilian Department of Space and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) to utilise more 
effectively the country's space-based assets for military purposes and to look into threats to these assets. "India in 
aerospace defence plan". BBC. 28 January 2011. . Retrieved 24 April 2009. "India Begins Work On Space Weapons 
Command". Indo-Asian News Service (IANS). 12 April 2006. Archived from the original on 24 April 2006. . 
Retrieved 16 January 2012. The Indian Air Force along with the other branches of the Indian Armed Forces provide 
assistance in disaster relief such as during natural calamities by undertaking evacuation or search-and-rescue (SAR) 
operations and air dropping relief supplies in affected areas. "Aid to Civil Power". . Retrieved 7 July 2010. The IAF 
provided extensive assistance to relief operations during natural calamities such as the Gujarat cyclone in 1998 and 
the Tsunami in 2004. The IAF also provides assistance to other countries during relief activities such as Operation 
Rainbow in Sri Lanka.HistoryFormation and World War IIA Westland Wapiti, one of the first aircraft of the Indian 
Air Force. The Indian Air Force was established in British India as an auxiliary air force "HC Deb 3 April 2011 vol 
276 ccl473-501". Hansard. Parliament of the United Kingdom. . Retrieved 8 April 2009. of the Royal Air Force with 
the enactment of the Indian Air Force Act 1932 on 8 October that year "History of the IAF". Official Website. 
Webmaster IAF - Air Headquarters. . Retrieved 7 April 2009. Bedi, Sanjeev (Summer 2008). "Strategic Role of Air 
Power". Air Power Journal (Center for Air Power Studies) 3 (2): 27-45. and adopted the Royal Air Force uniforms, 
badges, brevets and insignia. On 1 April 1933, the IAF commissioned its first squadron, No. 1 Squadron, Indian Air 
ForceNo.l Squadron, with four Westland Wapiti biplanes and five Indian pilots. The Indian pilots were led by Flight 
Lieutenant (later Air Vice Marshal) Sir Cecil BouchierCecil Bouchier.Goyal, S.N. (October 1993). "1939-45 Second 
World War: Air Force Reminiscences". Sainik Samachar. Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 8 April 2009. Until 1941, 
No. 1 Squadron remained the only squadron of the IAF, though two more Flight (military unit)flights were added. 
There were only two branches in the Air Force when it was formed, namely the General Duties (GD) branch and the 
Logistics branch. During World War II, the red centre was removed from the IAF roundel to eliminate confusion 
with the Japanese Hinomaru ("Rising Sun") emblem. The Air Force grew to seven squadrons in 1943 and to nine 
squadrons in 1945, equipping with Vultee Vengeance dive bombers and Hurricanes, along with a transport unit with 
the surviving Armstrong Whitworth AtalantaA.W. 15 Atalantas until 1944. The IAF helped in blocking the advance 
of the Imperial JapanJapanese army in MyanmarBurma, where its first air strike was on the Japanese military base in 
Rakhine StateArakan. It also carried out strike missions against the Japanese airbases at Mae Hong Son, Chiang Mai 
and Chiang Rai in northern Thailand. In recognition of the crucial role played by the IAF, George VI of the United 
KingdomKing George VI conferred it the prefix "Royal" in 1945.D'Souza, Bart (October 2010). "Indian Air Force : 
Down the Memory Lane". Sainik Samachar. . Retrieved 7 April 2010. During the war, many youths joined the Indian 
National Army. Forty five of them (known as the Tokyo Boys) were sent to train as fighter pilots at the Imperial 
Japanese Army Air Force Academy in 1944 by Subhas Chandra Bose. "Bharat Rakshak Book Review". Burma to 
Japan with Azad Hind: A War Memoir (1941-1945) by Ramesh S Benegal. September 2011. . Retrieved 4 July 
2010. After the war, they were interned by the Allies of World War IIAllies and were court-martialled. After Indian 
independence, some of them rejoined the IAF for service. First years of independence (1947-1950)Refugees awaiting 
Military operations in Poonch (1948)evacuation by IAF Douglas C-47 SkytrainDakota on Poonch airstrip, December 
1947. After gaining independence from the British Empire in 1947, British RajBritish India was partition of 
Indiapartitioned into the new states of the Union of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. Along the lines of the 
geographical partition, the assets of the air force were divided between the new countries. India's air force retained 
the name of the Royal Indian Air Force, but three of the ten operational squadrons and facilities, located within the 
borders of Pakistan, were transferred to the Pakistan Air ForceRoyal Pakistan Air Force. Engineer, Aspy M. 
(February 1993). "Air Marshal Aspy Engineer's Recollections". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 8 April 2010. The RIAF 
Roundel was changed to an interim 'Chakra' roundel derived from the Ashoka Chakra. Around the same time, conflict 
broke out between them over the control of the Jammu and Kashmir (princely state)princely state of Jammu & 



Indian Air Force 

Kashmir. With Pakistani forces moving into the state, its Maharaja decided to accede to India in order to receive 
military help. Lyon 2008, p. 79 The day after Instrument of Accession (Jammu and Kashmir)instrument of accession 
was signed, the RIAF was called upon to transport troops into the war-zone. And this was when a good management 
of logistics came into help. This led to the eruption of full scale war between India and Pakistan, though there was no 
formal declaration of war.Massey 2005, p. 97 During the war, the RIAF did not engage the Pakistan Air Force in 
air-to-air combat; however, it did provide effective transport and close air support to the Indian troops. Barua 2005, 
p. 192When India became a republic in 1950, the prefix 'Royal' was dropped from the Indian Air Force. At the same 
time, the current IAF roundel was adapted. Congo crisis and liberation of Goa (1960-1961) The IAF saw significant 
conflict in 1960, when Belgian colonial empireBelgium's 75-year rule over Republic of the Congo 
(Leopoldville)Congo ended abruptly, engulfing the nation in Congo Crisiswidespread violence and rebellion. "The 
Congolese Rescue Operation". US Army History. . Retrieved 25 April 2009. IAF sent No. 5 Squadron, Indian Air 
ForceNo. 5 Squadron, equipped with English Electric Canberra, to support United Nations Operation in the Congo. 
The squadron started undertaking operational missions in November.Singh, Charanjit (Monsoon 2005). "The Congo 
Diary". Air Power Journal (Center for Air Power Studies) 2 (3): 27—45. The unit remained there until 1966, when the 
UN mission ended. Operating from KinshasaLeopoldville and Kamina, the Canberras soon destroyed the rebel Air 
Force and provided the UN ground forces with its only long-range air support force. "Air Force History". Global 
Security. . Retrieved 8 July 2010. In late 1961, the Indian government decided to deploy the armed forces in an effort 
to evict the Portuguese out of Goa and other Enclaves after years of negotiation.Jagan Pillarisetti. "THE 
LIBERATION OF GOA: 1961". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 17 January 2012. The Indian Air Force was requested 
to provide support elements to the ground force in what was called Operation Vijay (1961)Operation Vijay. Probing 
flights by some fighters and bombers were carried out from 8-18 December to draw out the Portuguese Air Force, 
but to no avail. On 18 December, two waves of English Electric CanberraCanberra bombers bombed the runway of 
Dabolim airfield taking care not to bomb the Terminals and the ATC tower. Two Portuguese transport aircraft (a 
Super Constellation and a DC-6) found on the airfield were left alone so that they can be captured intact. However 
the Portuguese pilots managed to take off the aircraft from the still damaged airfield and made their getaway to 
Portugal. Hawker HunterHunters attacked the wireless station at Bambolim. De Havilland VampireVampires were 
used to provide air support to the ground forces. In Daman, Daman and DiuDaman, Dassault Mystere IVMysteres 
were used to strike Portuguese gun positions. Dassault OuraganOuragans (called Toofanis in the IAF) bombed the 
runways at Diu, IndiaDiu and destroyed the control tower, wireless station and the meteorological station.Border 
disputes and changes in the IAF (1962-1971)In 1962, border disagreements between China and India escalated to a 
war when China mobilised its troops across the Indian border.Pradhan 2010, p. 185 During the Sino-Indian War, 
India's military planners failed to deploy and effectively use the IAF against the invading Chinese forces. This 
resulted in India losing a significant amount of advantage to the Chinese; especially in Jammu and Kashmir.Three 
years after the Sino-Indian conflict, in 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, a surprise invasion into India 
which came to be known as the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965Second Kashmir War.Qadir, Shaukat (9 September 
2005). "Operation Gibraltar: Battle that never was". The 1965 War, 40 Years On. Rediff News. . Retrieved 17 
January 2012. "Pakistan ... undertook a guerrilla operation inside Indian held Kashmir with a large number of regular 
soldiers ... expecting to be welcomed by the local population and raise them up in arms against the Indian 
government." This was the first time the IAF actively engaged an enemy air force. Pradhan & Chavan 2007, p. xiv 
However, instead of providing close air support to the Indian Army, Thomas 1996, p. 11 the IAF carried out 
independent raids against Pakistan Air ForcePAF bases. Sisodia & Bhaskar 2005, p. 82 These bases were situated 
deep inside Pakistani territory, making IAF fighters vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. Gupta 1997, p. 43 During the 
course of the conflict, the PAF enjoyed technological superiority over the IAF and had achieved substantial strategic 
and tactical advantage due to their sudden attack. The IAF was restrained by the government from retaliating to PAF 
attacks in the eastern sector while a substantive part of its combat force was deployed there and could not be 
transferred to the western sector, against the possibility of Chinese intervention. Moreover, international (UN) 
stipulations and norms did not permit military force to be introduced into the Indian state of J&K beyond what was 



Indian Air Force 99 

agreed during the 1949 ceasefire. Despite this, the IAF was able to prevent the PAF from gaining air superiority over 
conflict zones. Dixit 2002, p. 149 The small and nimble IAF Folland Gnats proved effective against the F-86 Sabres 
of the PAF earning it the nickname "Sabre Slayers". Air Marshal Ashok K Goel(retd.). "Sabre Slayers - The Gnat in 
India". . By the time the conflict had ended, the IAF lost 59 aircraft (24 lost in air combat), while the PAF lost 43 
aircraft (37 lost in air combat). More than 60% of IAF's air combat losses took place during the battles over 
Kalaikunda and Pathankot; where most of the aircraft were destroyed while parked on the ground. Khan 2004, 
p. 185HAL HF-24 Marut, the first indigenous fighter jet to enter service with the IAF. After the 1965 war, the IAF 
underwent a series of changes to improve its capabilities. In 1966, the Para Commandos (India)Para Commandos 
regiment was created.Praval 1975, p. 6 To increase its logistics supply and rescue operations ability, the IAF 
inducted 72 HS 748s which were built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under license from Avro.Jones 
1985, p. 78 India started to put more stress on indigenous manufacture of fighter aircraft. As a result, HAL HF-24 
Marut, designed by the famed German aerospace engineer Kurt Tank,Boyne & Fopp 2002, p. 619 were inducted into 
the air force. HAL also started developing an improved version of the Folland Gnat, known as HAL Ajeet. "The 
Folland Gnat / HAL Ajeet". 1 December 2009. . Retrieved 7 July 2010. At the same time, the IAF also started 
inducting Mach speedMach 2 capable Soviet MiG-21 and Sukhoi Su-7 fighters. "A Whale of a Fighter: the Su-7 in 
IAF Service". Bharat Rakshak . Retrieved 5 July 2010.Bangladesh Liberation War (1971) By late 1971, the 
intensification of the independence movement in erstwhile East Pakistan lead to the Bangladesh Liberation War 
between India and Pakistan .Sisson & Rose 1991, p. 229 On 22 November 1971, 10 days before the start of a 
full-scale war, four PAF F-86 Sabre jets attacked Indian and Mukti Bahini positions at Battle of GaribpurGaribpur, 
near the international border. Two of the four PAF Sabres Battle of Boyrawere shot down and one damaged by the 
IAF's Folland Gnats.Jagan Pillarisetti. "Boyra Encounter - 22nd November 1971". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 19 
January 2012. On 3 December, India formally Indo-Pakistani War of 1971declared war against Pakistan following 
massive Operation Chengiz Khanpreemptive strikes by the PAF against Indian Air Force installations in Srinagar, 
Ambala, Sirsa, Halwara and Jodhpur. However, the IAF did not suffer significantly because the leadership had 
anticipated such a move and precautions were taken. Newsweek: 34. 20 December 1971. ISSN 0028-9604. "Trying to 
catch the Indian Air Force napping, Yahya Khan, launched a Pakistani version of Israel's 1967 air blitz in hopes that 
one quick blow would cripple India's far superior air power. But India was alert and Yahya's strategy of scattering 
his thin air force over a dozen air fields failed!" The Indian Air Force was quick to respond to Pakistani air strikes, 
following which the PAF carried out mostly defensive sorties. Kainikara 2011, p. 195Within the first two weeks, the 
IAF had carried out almost 2,000 sorties over East Pakistan and also provided East Pakistan Operations 1971close 
air support to the advancing Indian Army. "The War Of December 1971". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 3 May 2009. 
IAF also assisted the Indian Navy in its operations against the Pakistani Navy and Paramilitary forces of 
PakistanMaritime Security Agency in the Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea. On the western front, the IAF destroyed 
more than 29 Pakistani tanks, 40 Armoured personnel carrierAPCs and a railway train during the Battle of 
Longewala.Shorey, Anil (February 2005). "Battle of Longewala: Best of Braves". Sainik Samachar 52 (4). . 
Retrieved 12 April 2009. The IAF undertook strategic bombing of West Pakistan by carrying out raids on oil 
installations in Karachi, the Mangla Dam and a gas plant in Sindh.Mohan, Jagan. "When lightning strikes". Bharat 
Rakshak. . Retrieved 12 April 2009. Similar strategy was also deployed in East Pakistan and as the IAF achieved 
complete air superiority on the eastern front, the ordnance factories, runways, and other vital areas of East Pakistan 
were severely damaged. "Bangladesh: Out of War, a Nation Is Born". Time (magazine)TIME (Time Inc.). 20 
December 1971. . Retrieved 12 April 2011. By the time Pakistani forces surrendered, the IAF claimed that 94 PAF 
aircraft, including 54 F-86 Sabres had been shot down.Wilson 2002, p. 58 The IAF had flown over 6,000 sorties on 
both East and West fronts; including sorties by transport aircraft and helicopters. Towards the end of the war, IAF's 
transport planes dropped leaflets over Dhaka urging the Pakistani forces to surrender, demoralising Pakistani troops 
in East Pakistan. Choudhury, Ishfaq Ilahi. "Air aspect of the Liberation War 1971". Daily Star. . Retrieved 8 April 
2009.1ncidents before Kargil (1984-1988) In 1984, India launched Operation Meghdoot to capture the Siachen 
Glacier in the contested Kashmir region.Ives 2004, p. 186 In Op Meghdoot, IAF's Mil Mi-8Mi-8, Aerospatiale 



Indian Air Force 100 

Alouette IHChetak and Aerospatiale LamaCheetah helicopters airlifted hundreds of Indian troops to Siachen.Talbott 
2006, p. 164 Launched on 13 April 1984, this military operation was unique because of Siachen's inhospitable terrain 
and climate. The military action was successful, given the fact that under a previous agreement, neither Pakistan nor 
India had stationed any personnel in the area. The Indian forces, facing no opposition, took control over most of the 
heights on the glacier. Karthikey an et al. 2011, p. 109IAF An-32s were used to airdrop humanitarian supplies in 
Operation Poomalai. Following the failure to negotiate an end to the Sri Lankan Civil War, and to provide 
humanitarian aid through an unarmed convoy of ships, Pillarisetti, Jagan. "Operation Poomalai - The Jaffna Food 
drop". The Indian Air Force in Sri Lanka - 1987-90. Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 17 January 2012. the Indian 
Government decided to carry out an airdrop of the humanitarian supplies on the evening of 4 June 1987 designated 
Operation Poomalai (Tamil languageTamil: Garland) or Eagle Mission 4. Five An-32s escorted by five Mirage 
2000s carried out the supply drop which faced no opposition from the Sri Lankan Armed Forces .Weisman, Steven R. 
(5 June 1987). "India Airlifts Aid to Tamil Rebels". The New York Times. . Retrieved 17 January 2012. Sri Lanka 
accused India of "blatant violation of sovereignty". India insisted that it was acting only on humanitarian grounds. In 
1987, the IAF supported the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in northern and eastern Sri Lanka in Operation 
Pawan. About 70,000 sorties were flown by the IAF's transport and helicopter force in support of nearly 100,000 
troops and paramilitary forces without a single aircraft lost or mission aborted. "OP Pwan". Know Us. Indian Air 
Force. . Retrieved 24 July 2010. IAF An-32s maintained a continuous air link between air bases in South India and 
Northern Sri Lanka transporting men, equipment, rations and evacuating casualties. Mi-8s supported the ground 
forces and also provided air transportation to the Sri Lankan civil administration during the elections. Mi-25s of No. 
125 Helicopter Unit were utilised to provide suppressive fire against militant strong points and to interdict coastal 
and clandestine riverine traffic. On the night of 3 November 1988, the Indian Air Force mounted special operations to 
airlift a parachute battalion group from Agra, non-stop over 2000 kilometres to the remote Indian Ocean archipelago 
of the Maldives in response to Maldivian president Gayoom's request for military help against a mercenary invasion 
in Operation Cactus. The IL-76s of No. 44 Squadron landed at Hulhule at 0030 hours and the Indian paratroopers 
secured the airfield and restored Government rule at Male within hours. "Official website of Indian Air Force". . 
Retrieved 28 July 2010.Kargil War (1999)During the Kargil conflict Dassault Mirage 2000IAF Mirage 2000Hs, 
along with MiG-27s carried out strikes against enemy positions. On 11 May 1999, the Indian Air Force was called in 
to provide close air support to the Indian Army at the height of the ongoing Kargil conflict with the use of 
helicopters. The IAF strike was code named Operation Safed Sagar. The first strikes were launched on 26 May, 
when the Indian Air Force struck infiltrator positions with fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships. "India launches 
Kashmir air attack". BBC News. 26 May 1999. . Retrieved 17 January 2012. The initial strikes saw MiG-27s 
carrying out offensive sorties, with MiG-21s and later MiG-29s providing fighter cover.Camp, Philip. "The Mirage 
2000 at Kargil". Kargil 1999. Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 17 January 2012. The IAF also deployed its radars and the 
MiG-29 fighters in vast numbers to keep check on Pakistani military movements across the border.Bammi 2002 
Srinagar Airport was at this time closed to civilian air-traffic and dedicated to the Indian Air Force. On 27 May, the 
Indian Air Force suffered its first fatality when it lost a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21MiG-21 and a MiG-27 in quick 
succession. According to an Indian reports, a MiG-27 crashed from engine trouble and the escorting MiG-21 was 
shot down by Pakistani fire while trying to aid the downed pilot. The MiG-21 pilot was killed and the MiG-27 pilot 
was taken as a war prisoner. Pakistan claims both jets were downed by Pakistani air defence after they crossed into 
its territory. India claims they were lost over Indian territory. "India loses two jets". BBC News. 27 May 1999. . 
Retrieved 17 January 2012. "Flyer pushes frontier again - Nachiketa returns to area where his plane was shot down". 
Telegraph India. 22 May 2006. . Retrieved 17 January 2012. The following day, while on an offensive sortie, a 
Mi-17 was shot down by three FIM-92 StingerStinger missiles and lost its entire crew of four. Following these losses 
the IAF immediately withdrew helicopters from offensive roles as a measure against the threat of Man-portable 
air-defense systems (MANPAD). On 30 May, the Mirage 2000s were introduced in offensive capability, as they 
were deemed better in performance under the of high-altitude conditions of the conflict zone. Mirage 2000s were not 
only better equipped to counter the MANPAD threat compared to the MiGs, but also gave IAF the ability to carry 



Indian Air Force 101 

out aerial raids at night. The MiG-29s were used extensively to provide fighter escort to the Mirage 2000. Ganguly & 
Kapur 2008, p. 105 The Mirages successfully targeted enemy camps and logistic bases in Kargil and severely 
disrupted their supply lines. Jones 2003, p. 97 Mirage 2000s were used for strikes on Muntho Dhalo and the heavily 
defended Tiger Hill, KargilTiger Hill and paved the way for their early recapture. At the height of the conflict, the 
IAF was conducting over forty sorties daily over the Kargil region. By 26 July, the Indian forces had successfully 
repulsed the Pakistani forces from Kargil. Kapur 2007, p. 122Post Kargil incidents (1999-present) On 10 August 
1999, IAF MiG-21s intercepted a Pakistan Navy Breguet Atlantic which was flying over the disputed region of Sir 
Creek. Atlantique IncidentThe aircraft was shot down killing all 16 Pakistani Navy personnel on board. "IAF Scores 
a Kill !!! Factual Account of Interception". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 12 April 2009. India claimed that the 
Atlantic was on a mission to gather information on IAF air defence, "IAF shoots down Pak intruder plane". The 
Indian Express. 1 1 August 1999. . Retrieved 25 April 2009. a charge emphatically rejected by Pakistan which argued 
that the unarmed aircraft was on a training mission.Ian MacKinnon (11 August 1999). "16 dead as India shoots down 
Pakistani naval plane". The Independent (London). . Retrieved 7 June 2009. Since the late 1990s, the Indian Air 
Force has been modernising its fleet to counter challenges in the new century. The fleet size of the IAF has decreased 
to 33 squadrons during this period because of the retirement of older aircraft. Still, India maintains the fourth largest 
air force in the world. The squadron strength is being raised to 42 squadrons. IAF to have 42 combat aircraft 
squadronsStructure Ex-Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Vasant NaikThe President of India is the 
Commander-in-chief#IndiaSupreme Commander of all Indian armed forces and by virtue of that fact is the notional 
Commander-in-chief of the Air Force. Chief of the Air Staff (India)Chief of the Air Staff with the rank of Air Chief 
Marshal is the Commander of the Indian Air Force. He is assisted by six officers: a Vice Chief of the Air Staff 
(India) Vice Chief of the Air Staff, a Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, the Air Officer in Charge of Administration, the 
Air Officer in Charge of Personnel, the Air Officer in Charge of Maintenance, and the Inspector General of Flight 
Safety. "Branches at Air HQ & PSOs". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 4 May 2009. In January 2002, the Government 
of Indiagovernment conferred the rank of Marshal of the Air Force on Arjan Singh making him the first and only 
five-star rankFive-star officer with the Indian Air Force and ceremonial chief of the air force. "Marshal of the Indian 
Air Force". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 4 May 2009. Commands and structure The Indian Air Force is divided into 
five operational and two functional Command (military formation)commands. Each Command is headed by an Air 
Officer Commanding-in-Chief with the rank of Air Marshal. The purpose of an operational command is to conduct 
military operations using aircraft within its area of responsibility, whereas the responsibility of functional commands 
is to maintain combat readiness. Aside from the Training Command at Bangalore, the centre for primary flight 
training is located at the Air Force Academy in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, followed by operational training at 
various other schools. Advanced officer training for command positions is also conducted at the Defence Services 
Staff College; specialised advanced flight training schools are located at Bidar, Karnataka, and Hakimpet, Andhra 
Pradesh (also the location for helicopter training). Technical schools are found at a number of other locations. 
"Indian Air Force". GlobalSecurity.org. . Retrieved 29 June 20 10. Operational CommandsCentral Air Command, 
Indian Air ForceCentral Air Command (CAC), headquartered at Allahabad, Uttar PradeshEastern Air Command, 
Indian Air ForceEastern Air Command (EAC), headquartered at Shillong, MeghalayaSouthern Air Command, Indian 
Air ForceSouthern Air Command (SAC), headquartered at Thiruvananthapuram, KeralaSouth Western Air 
Command, Indian Air ForceSouth Western Air Command (SWAC), headquartered at Gandhinagar, GujaratWestern 
Air Command, Indian Air ForceWestern Air Command (WAC), headquartered at Subroto Park, New 
DelhiFunctional CommandsTraining Command, Indian Air ForceTraining Command (TC), headquartered at 
Bangalore, KarnatakaMaintenance Command, Indian Air ForceMaintenance Command (MC), headquartered at 
Nagpur, MaharashtraBasesIndian Air Force is located in IndiaAllahabadCentral Air CmdAllahabadCentral Air 
CmdShillongEasternAir CmdShillongEasternAir CmdThiruvananthapuramSouthern Air 

CmdThiruvananthapuramSouthern Air CmdGandhinagarSouthwestern Air CmdGandhinagarSouthwestern Air 
CmdNew DelhiWestern Air CmdNew DelhiWestern Air CmdBangaloreTraining CmdBangaloreTraining 
CmdNagpurMaintenance CmdNagpurMaintenance CmdCommands of the Indian Air Force The IAF operates over 



Indian Air Force 102 

sixty air bases, with more being built or planned. "Indian Air Force to Establish Missle, Air Base in Rajasthan". India 
Defence. 6 January 2009. . Retrieved 4 May 2009. Western Air Command is the largest Air Command. It operates 
sixteen air bases from Punjab, IndiaPunjab to Uttar Pradesh. Eastern Air Command operates fifteen Air bases in 
Eastern and North-eastern India. Central Air Command operates seven Air Bases in Madhya Pradesh and 
surrounding states of central India. Southern Air Command, a strategically important Air command, in line with 
India's latest doctrine of protecting the vital shipping routes. It operates nine Air bases in Southern India and two in 
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. South Western Air Command is the front line of defence against Pakistan, this 
important Command operates twelve air bases in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan. India also operates the 
Farkhor Air Base in Tajikistan. "Asia Times Online :: South Asia news - India's foray into Central Asia". . Retrieved 
9 July 2010. Depending on size, a base is typically commanded by a Group Captain or Air Commodore.Wings A 
Wing (air force unit) Wing is a formation intermediate between a Command and a Squadron. It generally consists of 
two or three IAF Squadrons and Helicopter Units, along with Forward Base Support Units (FBSU). FBSUs do not 
have or host any Squadrons or Helicopter units but act as transit airbases for routine operations. In times of war, they 
can become fully fledged air bases playing host to various Squadrons. In all, about 47 Wings and 19 FBSUs make up 
the IAF. "Air Force Wings, FBSUs and CMUs". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 10 July 2009. "Air Force FBSUs and 
CMUs". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 10 July 2009. Wings are typically commanded by a Group Captain. 
SquadronsSquadron (aviation)Squadrons are the field units and formations attached to static locations. Thus, a 
Flying Squadron is a sub-unit of an air force station which carries out the primary task of the IAF. All fighter 
squadrons are headed by a Commanding Officer with the rank of Wing Commander (rank)Wing Commander. 
"Indian Air Force". 10 August 2009. . Retrieved 7 July 2010. Some Transport squadrons and Helicopter Units are 
headed by a Commanding Officer with the rank of Group Captain. FlightsFlight (military unit)Flights are 
sub-divisions of Squadron (aviation)Squadrons, commanded by a Squadron Leader. Within this formation structure, 
IAF has several service branches for day-to-day operations. They are: "Indian Air Force: Career Opportunities". 
Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 21 April 2009. Flying Branch Flying Technical Branch Engineering Ground Branch 
Logistics Administration Accounts Education Medical & Dental Meteorological Garud Commando Forceln 
September 2004, the IAF established its own Special Forces of Indiaspecial operation unit called the Garud 
Commando Force, consisting of approximately 1500 personnel. The unit derives its name from Garuda, a divine 
bird-like creature of Hindu Mythology, but more commonly the word for eagle in Sanskrit. Garud is tasked with the 
protection of critical installations; search and rescue during peace and hostilities and disaster relief during calamities. 
"Constitution of Commando Force" (Press release). Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 18 December 
2003. . Retrieved 25 July 2008. Integrated Space CellAn Integrated Space Cell, which will be jointly operated by all 
the three services of the Indian armed forces, the civilian Department of Space and the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO) has been set up to utilise more effectively the country's space-based assets for military purposes 
and to look into threats to these assets. This command will leverage space technology including satellites. Unlike an 
aerospace command, where the air force controls most of its activities, the Integrated Space Cell envisages 
cooperation and coordination between the three services as well as civilian agencies dealing with space. "India goes 
to war in space". 18 June 2008. . Retrieved 2 July 2010. India currently has 
10http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/agni-v-launch-india-takes-on-china-drdo-vijay-saraswat/l/l 86367.html India 
attains the capability to target, destroy space satellites in orbit remote sensing satellites in orbit. Though most are not 
meant to be dedicated military satellites, some have a spacial resolution of 1 metre or below which can be also used 
for military applications. Noteworthy satellites include the Technology Experiment Satellite (TES) which has a 
panchromatic camera (PAN) with a resolution of 1 metre, "India's spy satellite boost". BBC. 27 November 2001. . 
Retrieved 31 July 2009. the RISAT-2 which is capable of imaging in all-weather conditions and has a resolution of 
one metre,Herman, Steve (20 April 2008). "India Launches High-Tech Imaging Satellite". Voice of America. . 
Retrieved 31 July 2009. the CARTOSAT-2, CARTOSAT-2A "CARTOSAT-2A". Earth Observation Satellites. 
ISRO. . Retrieved 17 January 2012. (a dedicated military satellite) "NDTV.com: India to launch first military 
satellite in August". 10 June 2008. . Retrieved 18 July 2010. and CARTOSAT-2B "Spy satellite to catch miners, land 



Indian Air Force 103 

encroachers". 12 July 2010. . Retrieved 14 July, which carries a panchromatic camera which has a resolution of 80 
centimetres (black and white only). Display TeamsHAL HJT-16 Kirans of the Surya Kiran display team flying in 
formation. Surya Kiran (Sanskrit for Sun Rays) is an aerobatics demonstration team of the Indian Air Force. The 
Surya Kiran Aerobatic Team (SKAT) was formed in 1996 and are successors to the Thunderbolts. 
"SURYAKIRANS". armedforces.nic.in. . The team has a total of 13 pilots (selected from the fighter stream of the 
IAF) and operate 9 HAL KiranHAL HJT-16 Kiran Mk.2 trainer aircraft painted in a "day-glo orange" and white 
Color schemecolour scheme. The Surya Kiran team were conferred squadron status in 2006, and presently have the 
designation of 52 Squadron, Air force ("The Sharks"). "Squadrons and Helicopter Units". Bharat Rakshak. . 
Retrieved 17 January 2012. Surya Kiran Aerobatic Team is based at the Indian Air Force Station at Bidar. The 
HJT-16 Kiran is to be replaced by the HAL HJT-36 Sitara. The IAF have already given an order for 12 Limited 
Series Production aircraft for the Surya Kiran team. "IAF's Surya Kirans to fly Hawk's". 10 October 2010. . 
Retrieved 10 October 2010. Meanwhile, IAF has begun the process of converting Surya Kirans to BAE Hawks. It 
will take 2-3 years for the team to completely shift to Hawks. Sarang is the Helicopter Display Team of the Indian 
Air Force. The name Sarang (Sanskrit for Peacock) is symbolic as it is the national bird of India. The team was 
formed in October 2003 and their first public performance was at the Asian Aerospace Show, Singapore, 2004. "ILA 
2008: Proud as Peacocks". . The team flies four HAL Dhruvs "IAFs Sarang helicopter display team adjudged the 
best at Berlin air show". 12 June 2008. . Retrieved 20 July 2010. painted in red and white with a peacock figure at 
each side of the fuselage. The Sarang display team is based at the Indian Air Force base at Air Force Station Sulur, 
Coimbatore.PersonnelOfficers of the IAF in their uniform. Over the years reliable sources provided notably divergent 
estimates of the personnel strength of the Indian Air Force after analysing open-source intelligence. The public 
policy organisation GlobalSecurity.org had estimated that the IAF had an estimated strength of 110,000 active 
personnel in 1994. In 2006, Anthony Cordesman estimated that strength to be 170,000 in the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS) publication "The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006". Cordesman & Kleiber 
2006, p. 24 In 2010, James Hackett revised that estimate to an approximate strength of 127,000 active personnel in 
the IISS publication "Military Balance 2010". Hackett 2010, p. 360The rank structure of the Indian Air Force is based 
on that of the Royal Air Force. The highest rank attainable in the IAF is Marshal of the Air Force#IndiaMarshal of 
the Indian Air Force, conferred by the President of India after exceptional service during wartime. MIAF Arjan 
Singh is the only officer to have achieved this rank. The head of the Indian Air Force is the Chief of the Air Staff 
(India)Chief of the Air Staff, who holds the rank of Air Chief Marshal. The current Chief of the Air Staff is Air 
Chief Marshal Norman Anil Kumar Browne with effect from 1 August 2011. Officers Anyone holding Indian 
citizenship can apply to be an officer in the Air Force as long as they satisfy the eligibility criteria. There are four 
entry points to become an officer. Male applicants, who are between the ages of I6V2 and 19 and have passed high 
school graduation, can apply at the Intermediate level. "Career Opportunities as an Officer: Intermediate (10+2)". 
Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 21 April 2009. Men and women applicants, who have graduated from college (three 
year course) and are between the ages of 18 and 28, can apply at the Graduate level entry. "Career Opportunities as 
an Officer: Graduate". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 21 April 2009. Graduates of engineering colleges can apply at 
the Engineer level if they are between the ages of 18 and 28 years. The age limit for the flying and ground duty 
branch is 23 years of age and for technical branch is 28 years of age. "Career Opportunities as an Officer: Engineer". 
Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 21 April 2009. After completing a master's degree, men and women between the ages 
of 18 and 28 years can apply at the Post Graduate level. Post graduate applicants do not qualify for the flying branch. 
For the technical branch the age limit is 28 years and for the ground duty branch it is 25. "Career Opportunities as an 
Officer: Post Graduate". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 21 April 2009. At the time of application, all applicants must 
be single. "Career Opportunities as an Officer". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 21 April 2009. The IAF selects 
candidates for officer training from these applicants. After completion of training, a candidate is commissioned as a 
Flying Officer. "Career Graph (for Officers)". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 5 July 2010.ShoulderSleeveRankMarshal 
of the Air ForceMarshal of the Air Force 1 Air Chief MarshalAir Chief MarshalAir MarshalAir Vice MarshalAir Vice 
MarshalAir CommodoreAir CommodoreGroup CaptainGroup CaptainWing Commander (rank)Wing 



Indian Air Force 104 

CommanderSquadron LeaderSquadron LeaderFlight LieutenantFlight LieutenantFlying OfficerFlying OfficerPilot 
OfficerPilot Officer2 ' Honorary/War time rank. 2 Rank no longer exist. 1+ Ranks of the Indian Air Force- Officer 
RanksAirmenA Squadron Leader leading the IAF Airmen during a Honor guardguard of honour ceremony to Lula 
da Silva at the Rashtrapati Bhavan.The duty of an airman in the Indian Air Force is to make sure that all the air and 
ground operations run smoothly. From operating Air Defence systems to fitting missiles, they are involved in all 
activities of an air base and give support to various technical and non-technical jobs. "Central Airmen Selection 
Board". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 22 April 2009. The recruitment of personnel below officer rank is conducted 
through All India Selection Tests and Recruitment Rallies. All India Selection Tests are conducted among 14 Airmen 
Selection Centres (ASCs) located all over India. These centres are under the direct functional control of Central 
Airmen Selection Board (CASB), with administrative control and support by respective commands. The role of 
CASB is to carry out selection and enrolment of airmen from the Airmen Selection Centres for their respective 
commands. Candidates initially take a written test at the time of application. Those passing the written test undergo a 
physical fitness test, an interview conducted in English, and medical examination. Candidates for training are 
selected from individuals passing the battery of tests, on the basis of their performance. Upon completion of training, 
an individual becomes an Airman. Some MWOs and WOs are granted honorary commission in the last year of their 
service as an honorary Flying Officer or Flight Lieutenant before retiring from the service. Ranks of the Indian Air 
Force - Enlisted RanksJunior Commissioned OfficerEnlistedShoulderArmSleeveRankWarrant OfficerMaster 
Warrant OfficerWarrant OfficerWarrant OfficerJunior Warrant OfficerSergeantCorporalLeading 
AircraftsmanLeading AircraftsmanAircraftsmanNon Combatants Enrolled and civilians Non Combatants Enrolled 
(NCs(E)) were established in British India as personal assistants to the officer class, and are equivalent to the orderly 
or sahayak of the Indian Army. "Air HQ Communication Squadron". Global Security. . Retrieved 8 July 
2010. Almost all the commands have some percentage of civilian strength which are central government employees. 
These are regular ranks which are prevalent in ministries. They are usually not posted outside their stations and are 
employed in administrative and non-technical work. "Non Combatant(Enrolled) - Pension Chart". Principal 
Controller of Defence Accounts. . Retrieved 6 July 2010. "AFRO Career Planning". Indian Air Force. . Retrieved 6 
July 2010. Training and educationThe Sudan Block of the National Defence Academy (India)National Defence 
Academy (NDA). NDA serves as the joint services academy for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The Indian 
Armed Forces has set up numerous military academies across India for training its personnel. Military schools, 
Sainik Schools, and the Rashtriya Indian Military College were founded to broaden the recruitment base of the 
Defence Forces. The three branches of the Indian Armed Forces jointly operate several institutions such as the 
National Defence Academy (India)National Defence Academy (NDA), Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), 
National Defence College, IndiaNational Defence College (NDC) and the College of Defence Management (CDM) 
for training its officers. The Armed Forces Medical College, PuneArmed Forces Medical College (AFMC) at Pune, 
MaharashtraPune is responsible for providing the entire pool of medical staff to the Armed Forces by giving them in 
service training. Besides these Tri-service institutions, the Indian Air Force has a Training Command, Indian Air 
ForceTraining Command and several training establishments. While technical and other support staff are trained at 
various Ground Training Schools, the pilots are trained at the Air Force Academy located at Dindigul. The Pilot 
Training Establishment at Allahabad, the Air Force Administrative College at Coimbatore, the School of Aviation 
Medicine at Bangalore, the Air Force Technical College, Bangalore at Jalahalli and the Paratrooper's Training 
School at Agra are some of the other training establishments of the IAF. Aircraft inventory The Indian Air Force has 
aircraft and equipment of Russian (erstwhile Soviet Union), British, French, Israeli, U.S. and Indian origins with 
Russian aircraft dominating its inventory. HAL produces some of the Russian and British aircraft in India under 
licence. The exact number of aircraft in service with the Indian Air Force cannot be determined with precision from 
open sources. Various reliable sources provide notably divergent estimates for a variety of high-visibility aircraft. 
"Air Force Equipment". Global Security.org. . Retrieved 22 April 2009. Fighter and multi-role combat aircraftSukhoi 
Su-30 MKI The primary role of the fighter aircraft in the Indian Air Force inventory is to achieve and maintain air 
supremacy over the battle field. Air superiority fighters are fast and manoeuvrable aircraft designed primarily for 



Indian Air Force 105 

air-to-air combat with limited capability to strike ground targets. Multi-role aircraft on the other hand are capable of 
conducting air-to air combat and ground attack with equal ease; sometimes within the same mission. This ability of 
combining different operational tasks offers considerable cost-of-ownership benefits to the operators. "Eurofighter 
Typhoon, Mission configuration, Swing Role". Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH. . Retrieved 25 January 2012. The 
Su-30MKISukhoi Su-30MKI is the IAF's primary air superiority fighter with the capability to conduct strike 
missions. The IAF have placed an order for a total of 272 Su-30MKIs "Indian Air Force Opts for More Su-30MKI, 
Despite Problems". 18 December 2011. . Retrieved 27 December 2011. of which 146 are in service as of 2011. "Air 
Chief flies SU-30 to restore confidence in pilots". 21 December 2011. . Retrieved 27 December 2011. The Mikoyan 
MiG-29 known as Baaz (Hindi languageHindi for Hawk) is the IAF's dedicated air superiority fighter and forms the 
second line of defence for the IAF after the Sukhoi Su-30MKI. The IAF operates 68 MiG-29s, all of which are 
currently being upgraded to the MiG-29UPG standard. Anton Denisov (5 February 2011). "Russia tests upgraded 
MiG-29 fighter for IAF". en.rian.ru. . Retrieved 9 February 2011. The Dassault Mirage 2000, known as Vajra 
(Sanskrit languages anskrit for Thunderbolt) in Indian service, is the IAF's primary multirole fighter. The IAF 
currently operates 5 1 Mirage 2000Hs which are currently being upgraded to the Mirage 2000-5 standard. "Two IAF 
Mirage aircraft flown to France for upgradation". 6 December 2011. . Retrieved 27 December 2011.. 
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-02-01/india/31012278_l_rafale-mmrca-project-french-air-force.The 
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 serves as an Interceptor aircraft in the IAF. The IAF have phased out most of its 
MiG-21s and plans to keep only 125 that have been upgraded to MiG-21 Bison standard. "India's Fighter 
Modernization: Add MiG-29s to the List". Defense Industry Daily. 28 April 2011. . Retrieved 17 January 2011. 
These aircraft will be phased out between 2014 and 2017. "MiG 21s to be phased out from 2014: Antony". The 
Hindu. 29 Februsry 2012. . Retrieved 29 February 2012. The MiG-21s are planned to be replaced by the 
indigenously built HAL Tejas. "LCA Tejas makes successful flight". Times of India. 23 April 2010. . "Light combat 
aircraft flies with near-full gear". Daily News and Analysis. India. .Strike, attack and close support aircraftSEPECAT 
Jaguar These are military aircraft designed to attack targets on the ground. They are often deployed as close air 
support for, and in proximity to, their own ground forces, requiring precision strikes from these aircraft. The 
SEPECAT Jaguar known as Shamsher and the Mikoyan MiG -27 known as Bahadur (Hindi for Valiant) serve as the 
IAF's primary ground attack force. Naik, V.P. (26 September 2008). "IAF aiming for Diverse Capabilities, says Vice 
Chief of Air Staff". Air Marshal P V Naik's Keynote Address on Fighter Technology and Advance Systems. India 
Strategic. . Retrieved 22 April 2009. The IAF currently operates 139 Jaguars "HAL To Tie-Up With BAE Systems 
For Jaguar Upgrade". 30 November 2009. . Retrieved 23 July 2010. and over 100 MiG-27s. "MiG-27 crashes into 
field, 1 killed". The Times of India. 25 July 2010. . Retrieved 26 July 2010. Airborne early warning aircraftlAF 
Beriev A-50EI Mainstay AEW&C These aircraft are designed to detect and distinguish hostile aircraft. The system 
can be used to direct fighters and strike aircraft to their targets and warn them of hostile enemy aircraft in the area. 
The IAF currently operates the EL/M-2075 Phalcon AEW&C. A total of 3 such systems are currently in service, 
with possible orders for 2 more. "Russia sends 3rd AW ACS plane to India". 4 November 2010. . Retrieved 4 
November 20 10. Tanker aircraftlAF I1-78MKI These aircraft are used for aerial refuelling which allows IAF aircraft 
to remain airborne for longer periods, hence enhancing their effective range. Aerial refuelling also allows aircraft to 
take-off with greater payload (by carrying less fuel during take-off). The IAF currently operates 6 Ilyushin 
Il-78MKIs for aerial refuelling roles .Mukherjee, Amit (29 September 2004). "IAF to get 5th IL-78 refueller soon". 
The Times of India. . Retrieved 22 April 2009. Kopp, Carlo. "The PLA-AF's Aerial Refuelling Programs". Air Power 
Australia. . Retrieved 22 April 2009. Transport aircraftlAF 11-76 landing at Leh airfield. Transport aircraft are 
typically used to deliver troops, weapons, supplies and other military equipment to the IAF field of operations. The 
IAF currently operate different types of transport aircraft for different roles. The IAF operates Ilyushin Il-76s known 
as Gajraj (Hindi for King Elephant) for military transport roles such as strategic or airliftheavy lift at all operational 
levels. "Illyushin I1-76MD [Candid Gajraj"]. . Retrieved 10 July 2010. The IAF currently operates 17 Il-76s. "". 28 
April 2010. . Retrieved 2 September 2010. The Il-76s are to be replaced by C-17 Globemaster IIIs.Bedi, Rahul (5 
July 2010). "IAF completes C-17 test-flight". . Retrieved 21 July 2010. "Indian Air Force :: Illyushin 76MD, 78MKI, 



Indian Air Force 106 

A-50 - Serials". Bharat-rakshak.com. . Retrieved 24 September 2011. The C-130J of the IAF is used by special 
forces for combined Army-Air Force operations. "Lockheed delivers fifth C130J to IAF". . Retrieved 9 December 
2011. There are currently 6 C-130Js in service. "Deals for Acquisition of C-130 J Super Hercules (Press Release)". 7 
December 2011. . Retrieved 16 December 2011. The Antonov An-32 known as Sutlej (name of an Sutlej Riverlndian 
river) serves as medium transport aircraft in the IAF. The aircraft is also used in bombing roles and para-dropping 
operations. "IAF An-32 planes in Ukraine for upgrades". 21 March 2010. . Retrieved 20 July 2010. The IAF 
currently operates 105 An-32s, all of which are being upgraded.The Hawker Siddeley HS 748 once formed the 
backbone of the IAF's transport fleet, but are now used mainly for transport training and communication duties. 
"HAL HS 748M Avro". Bharat Rakshak . Retrieved 10 July 2010. The Dornier Do 228 serves as light transport 
aircraft in the IAF. "Dornier Do-228". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 10 July 2010. The IAF also operates Boeing 737s 
"Boeing 737". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 10 July 2010. and Embraer ECJ-135 Legacy aircraft "Embraer EMB135 
Legacy". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 10 July 2010. as VIP Transports. The IAF operates aircraft for the President of 
India as well as the Prime Minister of India under the call sign Air India One. "April 1 date for President with 
business jets". Zee News. 16 March 2009. . Retrieved 8 April 2011. Training aircraftlAF BAE HawkBAE Hawk Mk 
132 Training aircraft are used to develop piloting and nagivational skills in pilots and air crew. The HAL HPT-32 
Deepak is IAF's basic flight training aircraft for cadets. "HAL HPT-32 Deepak". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 23 
April 2009. The HPT-32 was grounded in July 2009 following a crash that killed two senior flight instructors, "IAF 
gives nod for HPT-32 revival". The Hindu. 16 May 2010. . Retrieved 17 May 2010. but was revived in May 2010 
and is to be fitted with a parachute recovery system (PRS) to enhance survivability during an emergency in the air 
and to bring the trainer down safely. The HPT-32 is to be phased out soon. The IAF uses the HAL HJT-16 KiranHAL 
HJT-16 Kiran mk.I for intermediate flight training of cadets, while the HJT-16 Kiran mk.II provides advanced flight 
and weapons training. "HAL HJT-16 Kiran Mk.l/IA". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 23 April 2009. "HAL HJT-16 
Kiran Mk.II". Bharat Rakshak. . Retrieved 23 April 2009. The HAL HJT-16 Kiran Mk.2 is also operated by the 
Surya Kiran Aerobatic Team (SKAT) of the IAF. "SURYAKIRANS". . Retrieved 20 July 2010. The Kiran is to be 
replaced by the HAL HJT-36 Sitara. "HJT-36 Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer, India". . Retrieved 6 July 2010. The 
BAE HawkBAE Hawk Mk 132 serves as an advanced jet trainer in the IAF and is progressively replacing the Kiran 
Mk.II. The IAF has begun the process of converting the Surya Kiran display team to Hawks. A total of 106 BAE 
Hawk trainers have been ordered by the IAF of which 39 have entered service as of July 2010. "India inks deal with 
BAE for 57 Hawk aircraft". The Times Of India. 28 July 2010. . Retrieved 31 July 2010. The purchase of 75 Pilatus 
PC-7 Mk-II aircraft has been cleared by the Cabinet Committee. The decision has been made in the wake of acute 
shortage of basic trainer aircrafts. "Cabinet clears Rs 3000 crore deal IAF trainer jet deal". . Retrieved 10 May 2012. 
On 24th May 2012, IAF signed a Rs 2800 crore deal with the Swiss company to purchase 75 Pilatus Planes. "IAF 
signs Rs 2,800 crore deal for acquisition of Pilatus planes.". . Retrieved 24 May 2012.HelicoptersIAF Mi-8 at Aero 
India 2011. HAL Dhruv of the Indian Air Force Sarang (military)Sarang Helicopter Display Team An important 
objective of the IAF is to support ground troops by providing air cover and by transporting men and essential 
commodities across the battlefield. For this purpose the Air Force maintains a fleet of helicopters. The HAL Dhruv 
serves primarily as a light utility helicopter in the IAF. In addition to transport and utility roles, Dhruvs are also used 
as attack helicopters. "HAL Dhruv". . Retrieved 20 July 2010. "IAF Dhruvs, can carry a 20mm gun plus eight 
anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or four air-to-air missiles or four 68mm rocket pods on outriggers." 4 Dhruvs are 
also operated by the Indian Air Force Sarang (military)Sarang Helicopter Display Team.IAF Mil Mi-24Mil Mi-35 
Hind Akbar The HAL Chetak is a light utility helicopter and is used primarily for training, rescue and light transport 
roles in the IAF. "HAL Chetak (Alouette III)". . Retrieved 20 July 2010. The HAL Chetak is scheduled to be 
replaced by HAL's Advanced Light Helicopter.The HAL Cheetah is a light utility helicopter used for high altitude 
operations. It is used for both transport and search-and-rescue missions in the IAF. "HAL Cheetah (Alouette II)". . 
Retrieved 20 July 2010.The Mil Mi-8 and the Mil Mi-17 are operated by the IAF for medium utility roles. The Mi-8 
is being progressively replaced by the Mi-17. "Mil Mi-8 (Hip) Rana". . Retrieved 7 July 2010. "Mil Mi-17 (Hip) 
Pratap". . Retrieved 7 July 2010. The IAF has ordered 80 Mi-17V-5s to replace and augment its existing fleet of 



Indian Air Force 107 

Mi-8s and Mi-17s, with an order for 59 additional helicopters to follow soon.Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok 
Goel (Retd) (August 2010). "". India Strategic. . Retrieved 20 August 2010.The Mil Mi-26 serves as a heavy lift 
helicopter in the IAF. It can also be used to transport troops or as a flying ambulance. The IAF currently operates 4 
Mi-26s. "Mil Mi-26 (Halo)". . Retrieved 20 July 2010.The Mil Mi-24Mil Mi-35 serves primarily as an attack 
helicopter in the IAF. The Mil Mi-35 can also act as a low-capacity troop transport. The IAF currently operates 2 
squadrons (No. 104 Firebirds and No. 125 Gladiators) of Mi-25/35s. "Mil Mi-25 / Mi-35 (Hind) Akbar". . Retrieved 
20 July 20 10. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles The primary role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) is to provide aerial 
surveillance and reconnaissance. UAVs can also be used as unmanned combat aircraft or pilotless target aircraft. The 
IAF currently uses the IAI SearcherlAI Searcher II "Searcher Mk II Delivered To India", israeli-weapons.com. . 
Retrieved 22 April 2009. and IAI Heron "Heron MALE System — Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV". 
defence-update.com. . Retrieved 22 April 2009. for reconnaissance and surveillance purposes. The IAI Harpy serves 
as an Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) which is designed to attack radar systems. Pandit, Raj at (5 July 
2010). "Air Force hunts for combat drones". The Times Of India. . Retrieved 14 July 2010. The IAF also operates 
the DRDO Lakshya which serves as realistic towed aerial sub-targets for live fire training. "Press Information 
Bureau". Government of India. . Retrieved 22 April 2009. Land-based air defenceSurface-to-air missile 
systemsAkash missile. The IAF currently operates the S-125 Neva/PechoraS-125 Pechora MissileUnits.html "Air 
Force Equipment - Missiles - SAM". Bharat Rakshak. MissileUnits.html. Retrieved 23 April 2009. and the 9K33 
Osa as Surface-to-air missile systems. The IAF is also currently inducting the Akash missileAkash medium range 
surface-to-air missile system. A total of 8 squadrons has been ordered so far. "Akash Missile". 13 April 2010. . 
Retrieved 17 July 2010. Ballistic missiles The IAF currently operates the Prithvi-II short-range ballistic missile 
(SRBM). The Prithvi-II is an IAF-specific variant of the Prithvi missilePrithvi ballistic missile. "Prithvi". 5 
November 2002. . Retrieved 17 July 2010.Anti-ballistic missile systems The S-300 (missile)S-300 SAM 
"S-300PMU". Federation of American Scientists. . Retrieved 23 April 2009. serves as an Anti-Tactical Ballistic 
Missile (ATBM) system in the IAF. The S-300 is also able to detect, track, and destroy incoming cruise missiles and 
low-flying aircraft. "S-300P (SA-10 Grumble)". . Retrieved 18 July 2010. Future The number of aircraft in the IAF 
has been decreasing from the late 1990s due to retirement of older aircraft and several crashes. To deal with the 
depletion of force levels, the IAF has started to modernise its fleet. This includes both upgrade of existing aircraft, 
equipment and infrastructure as well as induction of new aircraft and equipment, both indigenous and imported. As 
new aircraft enter service and numbers recover, the IAF plans to have a fleet of 42 squadrons. "IAF fighter squadrons 
to rise to 42 by 2022: Antony". The Times of India. 18 February 2009. . Retrieved 24 April 2009.UpgradesThe air 
launched version of Brahmos. The IAF is currently upgrading its 69 MiG-29s (to the UPG standard) and 105 
An-32s. IAF's HAL HPT-32 Deepak trainers are to be fitted with a parachute recovery system (PRS) to enhance 
survivability during an emergency in the air and to bring the trainer down safely. There are also a contract to upgrade 
its 51 Mirage 2000Hs to the Mirage-2000-5 Mk 2 

varianthttp://weapons. technology. youngester.com/2011/05/2-billion-for-iaf-mirage-2000-upgrade. html and 40 
Su-30MKIs with new radars, on-board computers, Electronic warfareelectronic warfare systems "Russia wins large 
contract to modernize Indian Su-30MKI fighters - media". RIA Novosti. . Retrieved 1 July 2010. and the capability 
of carrying the air launched version of the BrahMos cruise missile. "40 Indian fighter jets to be fitted with BrahMos 
missiles". Economic Times (India). 22 April 2010. . Retrieved 1 July 2010. "IAF might get missile-armed Sukhois 
by 2012". The Hindu. . Retrieved 1 July 2010. Under procurementHAL TejasHAL Light Combat Helicopter The IAF 
has placed orders for 48 indigenous HAL Tejas aircraft, "Air force to get 20 more Tejas fighter aircraft, says 
Antony". 7 July 2010. . 72 HAL HJT-36 Sitara trainers and 65 HAL Light Combat Helicopters, "Light Combat 
Helicopter (LCH)". Knol. 17 August 2010. . Retrieved 23 August 2010. and will order 126 Dassault Rafale multirole 
fighters,K.V. Prasad (31 January 2012). "Rafale edges out Eurofighter". . Retrieved 31 January 2012. 22 AH-64 
ApacheAH-64D Apache Longbow heavy attack helicopters, "US offers famous 'Stinger' missiles to India". 12 
January 2012. . Retrieved 1 February 2012. 10 C-17 Globemaster III strategic air-lifters, "India to buy six more C-17 
air-lifters from US". Hindustan Times. 4 August 2010. . Retrieved 4 August 2010. 139 Mi-17Mi-17V-5 helicopters, 



Indian Air Force 108 

"IAF orders additional 59 Mi-17 choppers from Russia", domain-b.com. 9 September 2010. . Retrieved 9 September 
2010. 12 VVIP-configured AgustaWestland AW101 helicopters/Tom Kington (11 March 2010). "Indian AF To Buy 
12 AgustaWestland AW101 Helos". . Retrieved 13 July 2010. and IAI Harop UCAVs.Egozi, Arie (9 April 2010). 
"Indian air force orders Harop loitering munitions". . Retrieved 14 July 2010. The IAF has also ordered 18 Israeli 
SPYDER Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). "IAF orders Israeli Spyder Missile". September 2008. . Retrieved 12 July 
2010.Pilatus PC-7 is selected for a tender to equip the IAF with 75 basic trainer aircraft.Jay Menon (16 June 2011). 
"India Selects Pilatus Basic Trainer". Aviation Week. . Retrieved 19 June 2011. The IAF is planning to procure 15 
heavy lift helicopters for which the CH-47 Chinook and Mi-26 are being considered. Saurabh Joshi (18 July 2010). 
"IAF begins Apache trials". Stratpost. . Retrieved 23 July 2010. A Request for Proposal for 6 additional tanker 
aircraft was issued, for which the EADS A330 MMRT and the 11-78 are the competing aircraft. "Boeing withdraws 
from Indian Air Force tanker tender". Zurf Military Aircraft. . Retrieved 21 January 2011. The IAF has issued a 
Request for Information (RFI) for 16 C-27J Spartan medium military transport aircraft. "IAF issues RFI for C 27J 
Spartan". July 2010. . Retrieved 22 July 2010. The IAF also submitted a request for information to international 
suppliers for a stealth unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) "India canvasses global suppliers for stealthy UCAV". 
7 July 2010. . Retrieved 12 July 2010. and the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD) will float a tender for 125 light 
helicopters. Under developmentHAL HJT-36 Sitara Indian defence companies such as HAL and DRDO are 
developing several aircraft for the IAF such as the HAL Tejas, Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), "India 
reveals plan to develop indigenous medium fighter". . DRDO AEW&CS (revived from the Airborne Surveillance 
PlatformAiravat Project), "Cabinet panel nod for "Airawat' project". The Hindu. 10 September 2004. . Retrieved 24 
April 2009. NAL Saras, "Lighter version of Saras aircraft to fly out next year". The Hindu (Chennai, India). 26 June 
2008. . HAL HJT-36 Sitara, "HAL's intermediate jet trainer HJT-36 makes maiden flight with Russian engine". The 
Hindu (Chennai, India). 14 May 2009. . Retrieved 12 July 2010. HAL HTT-40, HAL Light Combat Helicopter 
(LCH), "Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)Specifications". GlobalSecurity.org. . Retrieved 26 April 2009. HAL Light 
Observation Helicopter (LOH), "HAL looks at foreign partners for chopper project". The Times Of India. 29 
September 2008. . DRDO Rustom "India developing UAV similar to American Predator drone". The Economic 
Times. 14 November 2011. . Retrieved 16 January 2012. and AURA UAV AURA (Autonomous Unmanned 
Research Aircraft) UCAV.Aroor, Shiv (11 June 2010). "AURA: India's UCAV Program". . Retrieved 2 July 2010. 
DRDO has developed the Akash missile system for the IAF "IAF initiates process for inducting Akash and Trishul 
SAM's". Frontier India. 3 May 2007. . Retrieved 23 April 2009. "IAF to induct Akash missile". The Indian Express. 
26 December 2007. . Retrieved 24 April 2009. and is developing the Maitri missileMaitri SAM with MBDA. 
"Indo-French Maitri SR-SAM Awaits Workshare Clearance". 11 February 2010. . Retrieved 12 July 2010. DRDO is 
also developing the Prithvi missilePrithvi II ballistic missile. "Prithvi". Federation of American Scientists. . 
Retrieved 24 April 2009. HAL has undertaken the joint development of the Sukhoi/HAL FGFA (Fifth Generation 
Fighter Aircraft)Pubby, Manu (12 October 2007). "India, Russia to ink pact for developing fighters". The Indian 
Express. . Retrieved 1 August 2009. (a derivative project of the Sukhoi PAK FA) and the UAC/HAL 11-214 
Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) "Russia, India may form military transport planes JV in 2-3 months". . with 
Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (UAC). DRDO has entered in a joint venture with Israel Aerospace Industries 
(IAI) to develop the Barak 8 (missile)Barak 8 SAM. "Barak-2 LR-SAM maiden flight later this year". 1 February 
2010. . Retrieved 12 July 2010. DRDO is developing the air launched version of the Brahmos cruise missile in a 
joint venture with Russia's NPO Mashinostroeyenia. DRDO is also developing the nuclear capable Nirbhay cruise 
missile. "IAF Sukhoi Fleet to be Equipped with Homemade Nirbhay Missiles". 21 May 2010. . Retrieved 16 July 
2010.FootnotesReferencesBibliographyBammi, Y.M. (2002). Kargil 1999, Impregnable Conquered. Gorkha 
Publishers, xxviii, 558, 65, 8 p. ISBN 978-81-7525-352-0. LCCN 2003305922.Bajwa, Kuldip Singh (2005). The 
Dynamics of Soldiering. Har-Anand Publications. 292. ISBN 978-81-241-0940-3.Barua, Pradeep (2005). The State 
at War in South Asia. University of Nebraska Press, xvi; 437. ISBN 978-0-8032- 1344-9.Walter J. BoyneBoyne, 
Walter J.; Fopp, Michael (2002). Air Warfare: An International Encyclopedia (Illustrated ed.). ABC-CLIO, xvi; 437. 
ISBN978-l-57607-345-2.Chadha, Vivek (2005). Low Intensity Conflicts in India (Illustrated ed.). SAGE. 513. 



Indian Air Force 109 

ISBN 978-0-7619-3325-0.Coggins, Ed (2000). Wings That Stay on (Illustrated ed.). Turner Publishing Company, iii; 
244. ISBN 978-1 -563 ll-568-4.Cordesman, Anthony H.; Kleiber, Martin (2006). The Asian Conventional Military 
Balance in 2006: Overview of major Asian Powers. Center for Strategic & International Studies. 48. Dixit, Jyotindra 
Nath (2002). India-Pakistan in War & Peace. Routledge. 501. ISBN 978-0-415-30472-6.Europa Publications (2005). 
Far East and Australasia 2003. Europa Publications. 1538. ISBN 978-l-85743-133-9.Ganguly, Sumit; Kapur, S. Paul 
(2008). Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia (illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. Xii; 251. 
ISBN 978-0-415-44049-3. Gupta, Amit (1997). Building an Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional Power Force 
Structures (Illustrated ed.). Greenwood Publishing Group, xi; 217. ISBN 978-0-275-95787-2.Ives, Jack D. (2004). 
Himalayan Perceptions: Environmental Change and the Well-being of Mountain Peoples (Illustrated ed.). Routledge. 
xxi; 271. ISBN 978-0-415-3 1798-6.International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002). The Military Balance 
2002/2003 (Map ed.). International Institute for Strategic Studies. ISBN 978-0-19-851672-9. International Institute 
for Strategic Studieslnternational Institute for Strategic Studies; Hackett, James (ed.) (3 February 2010). The 
Military Balance 2010. London: Routledge. ISBN l-85743-557-5.Jones, Aubrey (1985). Britain's Economy: The 
Roots of Stagnation (illustrated ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-30816-8. Jones, Owen Bennett 
(2003). Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (2, illustrated, revised ed.). Yale University Press. 328. 
ISBN 978-0-300-10147-8. Kainikara, Sanu (2007). Red Air: Politics in Russian Air Power. Universal Publishers. 
ISBN 978-1-581 12-983-0.Kapur, S. Paul (2007). Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict 
in South Asia (Annotated ed.). Stanford University Press. 280. ISBN 978-0-8047-5549-8. Karthikeyan, K.R.; Gupta; 
Sendilkumar, R.; Jaganathan, D. (2008). A Textbook of Agricultural Extension Management. Atlantic Publishers & 
Distributors, v; 192. ISBN 978-8 1-269-088 l-3.Khan, J.A. (2004). Air Power and Challenges to IAF. APH 
Publishing, xxxii; 361. ISBN 978-8 l-7648-593-7.Lyon, Peter (2008). Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An 
Encyclopedia (illustrated ed.). ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-l-57607-712-2.Massey, Reginald (2005). Azaadi!. Abhinav 
Publications. ISBN 978-81-7017-469-l.Pradhan, R.D. (1999). Debacle to Revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence 
Minister, 1962-65. Orient Blackswan. xii; 316. ISBN 978-81-250-1477-5.Pradhan, R. D.; Chavan, Yashwantrao 
Balwantrao (2007). 1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War. 
Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, xviii; 141. ISBN 978-8 1-269-0762-5. Praval, Karam Chand (1975). India's 
Paratroopers (A History of the Parachute Regiment of India). Leo Cooper, London. ISBN 978-0-85052-184-9. Shiva, 
Vandana (2005). India Divided: Diversity and Democracy Under Attack. Seven Stories Press. 191. 
ISBN978-l-58322-540-0.Sisodia, N.S.; Bhaskar, Chitrapu Uday (2005). Emerging India: Security and Foreign 
Policy Perspectives. Bibliophile South Asia, xx; 376. ISBN 978-81-86019-51-1. Sisson, Richard; Rose, Leo E. 
(1991). War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (revised ed.). University of California 
Press. ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5.Thomas, Raju G.C. (1996). India's Security Environment: Towards the Year 2000. 
DIANE Publishing, iv; 33. ISBN 978-1 -4289- 1389-9.Warikoo, K. (2009). Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, 
Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives (Illustrated ed.). Taylor & Francis. xv; 240. 
ISBN978-0-415-46839-8.Wilson, Stewart (2002). North American F-86 SABRE (Illustrated ed.). Wilson Media 
Pty, Limited. 64. ISBN 978-l-876722-05-0.External links Official website of The Indian Air Force Indian Air Force 
on bharat-rakshak.com Global Security article on Indo-Pakistani Wars Designators Batches of Indian Air Force 



Pakistan Air Force 



110 



Pakistan Air Force 



Pakistan Air Force 


o 

Pakistan Air Force Ensign 




Founded 


14 August 1947 


Country 


Pakistan 


Size 


65,000 full-time personnel 
(including 3,000 pilots) 
10,000 reservists 
902 aircrafts 


Part of 


Pakistan Armed Forces 


Air 
Headquarters 


AHQ, Islamabad 


Anniversaries 


Air Force Day: September 7 


Engagements 


1947 Indo-Pak War 

1965 Rann of Kutch Skirmish 

1965 Indo-Pak War 

1971 Indo-Pak War 

1979-1988 Soviet-Afghan War 

1999 Kargil Conflict 

2001-2002 Indo-Pak Stand-off 

War in North- West Pakistan (2007-present) 


Commanders 


Chief of Air 
Staff 


Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt 


Notable 
commanders 


ACM Farooq Feroze Khan 
ACM Anwar Shamim 
AM Malick Nur Khan 


Insignia 


PAF Roundel 


o 


PAF Fin flash 


Q 


Aircraft flown 


Attack 


Mirage 5 


Electronic 
warfare 


Falcon DA-20, Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C, Shaanxi AEW&C 


Fighter 


F-16C/D, F-16A/B, IF- 17, Mirage III, F-7P/PG 


Helicopter 


AlouetteUI, Mi-171 



Pakistan Air Force 



111 



Reconnaissance 



Mirage IIIRP, Falco UAV, Jasoos II Bravo+ 



Trainer 
Transport 



FT-5, K-8P, MFI-17, MFI-395, C-12, T-37 

An-26, Boeing 707, Airbus A310, Cessna Citation V, Gulfstream IV, C-130, CN-235, IL-78MP, Phenom 100, 
Fokker F27 Friendship, Saab 2000 



The Pakistan Air Force (Urdu: <LoLai i_S"L; English IPA: pak h fiz h ce'jd, Pak Fiza'ya), abbrieviated as PAF, is the 
leading air warfare and the uniform service branch of the Pakistan Armed Forces, primarily tasked with the aerial 
offense and defence of Islamic Republic of Pakistan with a secondary role of providing air logistics support to the 
Pakistan Army and the Pakistan Navy. The PAF also has a tertiary role of providing strategic air transport and 
logistics capability to Pakistan. The PAF employs approximately 65,000 full-time personnel (including 
approximately 3,000 pilots) and, currently, operates 550 combat aircraft as well as various transport and training 



aircraft 



[l] 



History 

In 1933, British colonial government of India established the subcontinent's first Air Force station near Drigh Road, 
now called PAF Base Faisal. In 1934, this element of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) was extended to the North 
for operations in the North West Frontier Province. Later the RIAF contributed to the defeat of the Japanese invasion 
during World War II. 




1947-1951: The Formative Years 

The Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF) was established on 14 August 

1947 with the independence of Pakistan from British India. The RPAF 

began with 2,332 personnel, a fleet of 24 Tempest II fighter-bombers, 

16 Hawker Typhoon fighters, 2 H.P.57 Halifax bombers, 2 Auster 

aircraft, 12 North American Harvard trainers and 10 de Havilland 

Tiger Moth biplanes. It also received 8 C-47 Dakota cargo planes 

which it used to transport supplies to soldiers fighting in the 1947 War 

in Kashmir against India. However, the RPAF did not receive all of the 

aircraft that it was originally allotted at the time of independence of South Asia. L ^ J It started with 7 operational 

airbases scattered all over the provinces. The prefix Royal was removed when Pakistan became a republic on 23 

March 1956. It has since been called the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). 

Operating these inherited aircraft was far from ideal in Pakistan's diverse terrains, deserts, and mountains, with 
frequent attrition and injuries resulting. However, by 1948 the air force acquired better aircraft such as the Hawker 
Sea Fury fighter-bomber and the Bristol Freighter. These new aircraft gave a much-needed boost to the morale and 
combat capability of the Pakistan Air Force; 93 Hawker Fury and roughly 50-70 Bristol Freighter aircraft were 
inducted into the PAF by 1950. 



PAF Hawker Sea Fury two-seat trainer 



[2] 



Pakistan Air Force 



112 




The F-86 Sabre was in PAF service from 1955 to 
1980. 



1951-1961: PAF enters the Jet Age 

Although the Pakistan Air Force had limited funds to utilize and few 
markets to choose from, it entered the jet age relatively early. Initially 
it planned to acquire U.S. built F-94Cs, F-86s, or F-84s and produce its 
order in Pakistan. However, lack of funds and strong British pressure 
persuaded the PAF to acquire the British Supermarine Attacker. The 
Supermarine Attacker had a rather unsatisfactory service in the 
Pakistan Air Force with frequent attrition and maintenance problems. 
In 1957 the Pakistan Air Force received 100 American-built F-86 
Sabres under the U.S. aid program. Many squadrons in the PAF retired 
its Hawker Furys and Supermarine Attackers, and replaced them with 
F-86 jet fighters. In 1957 thirty-six year old Air Marshal Asghar Khan 
became the Pakistan Air Force's first commander-in-chief. 

1959: PAF Draws First Blood' 

On 10 April 1959, on the occasion of the Islamic Eid ul-Fitr festival 
holiday in Pakistan, an Indian Air Force (IAF) English Electric 
Canberra B(I)58 entered Pakistani airspace on a photo reconnaissance 
mission. Two PAF F-86F Sabres from No. 15 Squadron on Air 
Defence Alert (ADA) were scrambled from Peshawar Air Base to 
intercept the IAF aircraft. The Sabre pilots were Fit. Lt. M. N. Butt 
(leader) and Fit. Lt. M. Yunis (wingman)(Later Air Vice Marshal) 

whereas Pilot Officer Rab Nawaz was the on-duty Air Defence Controller for this mission. Nawaz successfully 
vectored both Sabres to the location of the high-flying Canberra. Butt attempted to bring down the Canberra by firing 
his Sabre's machine guns, but the Canberra was flying at an altitude of more than 50,000 feet - beyond the 
operational ceiling of the F-86F. When Yunis took over from his leader, the Canberra suddenly lost height while 
executing a turn over Rawalpindi. Yunis grabbed this opportunity and fired a burst from his 12.7 mm guns that 
struck the Canberra at an altitude of 47,500 feet and brought it down over Rawat, near Rawalpindi. Marking the first 
aerial victory of the PAF . '55-5005' was the serial number of the F-86F Sabre that was flown by Fit. Lt. Yunis that 
day. Both the occupants of the IAF Canberra, namely Sqn. Ldr. J.C. Sen Gupta (pilot) and Fit. Lt. S.N. Rampal 
(navigator) from the IAF's No. 106 Sqn., ejected and were captured by Pakistani authorities and were subsequently 
released after remaining in detention for some time 




Flying Officer Waleed Ehsanul Karim poses in 
front of his F-86. 



[3] 



1965 India-Pakistan Rann of Kutch Border Skirmish 

In June 1965, prior to the outbreak of the 1965 India-Pakistan War, India and Pakistan had a border skirmish in the 
Rann of Kutch region near the south-eastern coastline of Pakistan. The PAF was tasked with providing point-defence 
to the Rann of Kutch region to prevent the Indian Air Force (IAF) from entering Pakistani airspace and attacking 
Pakistan Army positions. On 24 June 1965, an IAF Ouragan fighter (Serial No. IC 698), flown by Fit. Lt. Rana Lai 
Chand Sikka of No. 51 Auxiliary Squadron from the IAF's Jamnagar Air Station entered Pakistani airspace. A PAF 
F-104A Starfighter from No. 9 Squadron intercepted the IAF fighter near Badin in Sindh, Pakistan. Just as the PAF 
pilot locked on to the Indian fighter and was about to release his AIM-9B Sidewinder Air-to-Air Missile (AAM), the 
Indian pilot lowered his aircraft's landing gear (an internationally recognized sign of aerial surrender). The IAF pilot 
landed at an open field near Jangshahi village near Badin. The IAF pilot was taken prisoner and released on 14 
August 1965 - as a goodwill gesture on the 18th Anniversary of Pakistan's Independence Day. The IAF Ouragan 
fighter was retained by the PAF as a trophy and flown by a PAF pilot to an airbase in Karachi. (NOTE: This event is 



Pakistan Air Force 113 

not to be confused with the surrender of an IAF Gnat on 4 September 1965 during the 1965 India-Pakistan War, 
which is on display at the PAF Museum Karachi) 

1965 India-Pakistan War 

The PAF fleet at the time consisted of 12 F-104 Starfighters, some 120 
F-86 Sabres and around 20 B-57 Canberra bombers. The PAF claims 

to have had complete air superiority over the battle area from the 

T71 
second day of operations. 

Many publications have credited the PAF's successes to U.S. 

equipment, claiming it to be superior to the aircraft operated by the 

IAF and giving the PAF a "qualitative advantage". However some 

people refute this argument. As per them, the IAF's MiG-21, Hawker 

Hunter and Folland Gnat aircraft had better performance than the 

PAF's F-86 fighters. [8] According to Air Cdre (retired) Sajad Haider, PAF B-57 Canberra bombers lined up at an 

the F-86 Sabre was inferior in both power and speed to the IAF's 

Hawker Hunter. 




airbase. 



According to Air Commodore (retired) Sajjad Haider who flew with No. 19 squadron, the F-104 Starfighter did not 
deserve its reputation as "the pride of the PAF" because it "was unsuited to the tactical environment of the region. It 
was a high-level interceptor designed to neutralize Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet." 
Nevertheless the IAF is believed to have feared the Starfighter although, according to some, it was not as 
effective as the IAF's Folland Gnat. According to Indian sources, the F-86F performed reasonably well against 
the IAF Hawker Hunters but not as well against the Folland Gnat, which was nicknamed Sabre Slayer by the 

IAp [12][13] 

ri4i 

According to Indian sources most aircraft losses of IAF were on ground while PAF lost most in aerial combat. 
Even though the IAF flew a larger offensive air campaign by devoting 40% of its air effort to offensive air support 
alone, according to Indian sources the majority of its losses came from aircraft destroyed on the ground through PAF 
air strikes. The PAF without doubt, had achieved far more in terms of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground but 
the IAF had achieved much more in the close support role. 

During the last days of the war Pakistani aircraft flew over Indian cities and airbases without any response from the 
opposing side. Thus the outnumbered PAF emerged triumphant over a four times larger force, its air defence 
controllers, engineers, logisticians and hands just as much the heroes as its pilots. At the end of the war, India had 
lost 110 aircraft with 19 damaged, not including those destroyed on the ground at night, against a loss of 16 PAF 

i [15] 

planes. 

1967 The Six-Day War 

During this conflict the PAF sent personnel to Egypt, Jordan and Syria to support the Arabs in their battle against the 
Israelis. PAF pilots managed to shoot down ten Israeli aircraft, including Mirages, Mysteres and Vautours, without 
losses on their own side. The PAF pilots operated with Egyptian, Jordanese and Iraqi combat aircraft. 

1971 India-Pakistan War 

In December 1971, India and Pakistan went to war over East Pakistan. At the start of the war, the PAF inventory 
contained around 270 combat aircraft while the IAF had over 1,200 - outnumbering the PAF 4:1 in West Pakistan 

ri7i 

and 10:1 in East Pakistan. 

One of the major operations of the war by PAF was Operation Chengiz Khan which inflicted heavy damages to IAF 
with all PAF fighters landing home unscratched. 



Pakistan Air Force 1 14 

At the end of the war, the Indian Air Force claimed that it had shot down 94 PAF aircraft (including 54 F-86 Sabres) 

compared to 44 to 130 IAF aircraft losses. A later research, conducted by B. Harry, reported that the overall 

T221 
attrition rate (losses per 100 sorties) was 0.48 for the IAF and 1.42 for the PAF, the PAF flying 2914 combat 

[23] [24] [251 

sorties while the IAF flew 7,346 combat sorties during the conflict. 

Close air support to the Pakistan Army was unexpectedly effective and the PAF is widely considered to have 

[7] 

neutralized the large difference in military strength of India and Pakistan. 

1973 Yom Kippur War 

During this war 16 PAF pilots volunteered to leave for the Middle East in order to support Egypt and Syria but by 
the time they arrived Egypt had already agreed on a cease-fire. Syria remained in a state of war against Israel so the 
PAF pilots became instructors there and formed the A-flight of 67 Squadron at Dumayr AB. Later on PAF pilot Fit. 
Lt. Sattar Alvi was honoured by the Syrian government. 

1979-1988 Soviet-Afghan War 

In 1979, the PAF's Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim, was told by then President, and Chief of 
Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq, that Pakistan had reliable intels on Indian plans to attack and destroy the Pakistan's 
nuclear research facilities at Kahuta. ACM Shamim told General Zia that, "Indian aircraft could reach the area in 3 
minutes whereas the PAF would take 8 minutes, allowing the Indians to attack the facility and return before the PAF 
could defend it". Because Kahuta was close to the Indian border it was decided that the best way to deter an Indian 
attack would be to procure new advanced fighters and weaponry. These could be used to mount a retaliatory attack 
on India's nuclear research facilities at Trombay in the event of an Indian attack on Kahuta. It was decided the most 
suitable aircraft would be the F-16 Fighting Falcon, which the United States eventually agreed to supply after the 
PAF refused to purchase the F-5E and F-5G In 1983, when the first batch of F-16s reached Pakistan, ACM Shamim 
informed Zia of the PAF's capability to respond to an attack on the nuclear research facilities at Kahuta. 

A letter of agreement for up to 28 F-16A's and 12 F-16B's was signed December 1981. The contracts, Peace Gate I 
and Peace Gate II, were for 6 and 34 Block 15 models respectively which would be powered by the F100-PW-200 
engine. The fist Peace Gate I aircraft was accepted at Fort Worth in October 1982. Two F-16A and four F-16B were 
delivered to Pakistan in 1983, the first F-16 arriving at PAF Base Sargodha (now known as PAF Base Mushaf) on 15 
January 1983 flown by Squadron Leader Shahid Javed. The 34 remaining Peace Gate II aircraft were delivered 

[2Q][9Q] 

between 1983 and 1987. Six F-16A and four F-16B Block 15 OCU models were ordered as attrition 

replacements in December 1988 under the Peace Gate III contract. Another 60 F-16A/B were ordered in September 
1989 under Peace Gate IV, but were later embargoed. 

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, in support of the pro-Soviet government in Kabul, which was being 
hard-pressed by Mujaheddin rebel forces, marked the start of a decade-long occupation. Mujaheddin rebels 
continued to harass the occupying Soviet military force as well as the forces of the Afghan regime that it was 
supporting. The war soon spilled over into neighboring Pakistan, with a large numbers of refugees fleeing to camps 
across the border in an attempt to escape the conflict. In addition, many of the rebels used Pakistan as a sanctuary 
from which to carry out forays into Afghanistan, and a steady flow of US-supplied arms were carried into 
Afghanistan from staging areas in Pakistan near the border. This inevitably resulted in border violations by Soviet 
and Afghan aircraft attempting to interdict these operations. 

Between May 1986 and November 1988, PAF F-16s have shot down at least eight intruders from Afghanistan. 
The first three of these (one Su-22, one probable Su-22, and one An-26) were shot down by two pilots from No. 9 
Squadron. Pilots of No. 14 Squadron destroyed the remaining five intruders (two Su-22s, two MiG-23s, and one 
Su-25). Most of these kills were by the AIM-9 Sidewinder, but at least one (a Su-22) was destroyed by cannon 
fire. Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mahmoud is credited with three of these kills. One F-16 was lost in these battles 
during an encounter between two F-16s and four Soviet Air Force MiG 23s on 29 April 1987. The pilot, Flight 



Pakistan Air Force 115 

T321 
Lieutenant Shahid Sikandar Khan, ejected safely. 

In 1985, Pakistan Air Force selected ATLIS II for its F-16 aircraft, making it the first non-European operator of this 
system. ATLIS-II pod is carried on the 5L intake station on the F-16. First public demonstration of dropping Laser 
Guided Bombs Laser guided bomb with ATLIS II was seen in Exercise High Mark 1989. Since then, ATLIS II has 

been a key element of PAF' s precision strike capability. Over the years precision targeting has been a distinct 

i T331 

phenomenon over-viewed regularly in PAF s operational exercises. 

The PAF is believed to have evaluated the Dassault Mirage 2000 in early 1981 and was planning to evaluate the 
F-16 Fighting Falcon afterwards. 

Project Sabre II was initiated by the PAF in 1987 and was aimed at developing a replacement for the aging Shenyang 
F-6 fleet. The Pak-American relationship were at a high during the Afghan-Soviet war, and Grumman Aerospace 
was asked to conduct a design study and consult on this project, with Pakistan and China being the expected 
end-users. However, after the Afghan-Soviet war ended, the subsequent US-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, and 
those on China resulted in Grumman Aerospace backing out, and the project was abandoned. The Chengdu F-7P was 
introduced in 1988 to replace the F-6. 

1990-2001: The Lost Decade 



Pakistan Air Force 



Pakistan Air Force 



116 




History 

History of the PAF 

Aircraft 

Air Force weaponry 

Units and infrastructure 

Air Headquarters 

Pakistan Air Force Squadrons 

Air Force Bases 

Special Services Wing 

Air Force Strategic Command 

Personnel 

Chief of Air Staff 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee 

Other information 

Air Force Educational System 

Air intelligence 



After the Pressler amendment was passed, the U.S. placed sanctions and an arms embargo on Pakistan on 6 October 
1990 due to the country's continued nuclear weapons programme. All eleven Peace Gate III F-16s, along with 7 

F-16A and 10 F-16B of the 60 Peace Gate IV F-16s, which had been built by the end of 1994 were embargoed and 

r2sir2Qi 
put into storage in the United States. 

Desperate for a new high-tech combat aircraft, between late 1990 and 1993 the PAF evaluated the European Panavia 
Tornado MRCA (multi-role combat aircraft) and rejected it. The Mirage 2000E and an offer from Poland for the 
supply of MiG-29 and Su-27 were also considered but nothing materialised. In 1992 the PAF again looked at the 
Mirage 2000, reviving a proposal from the early 1980s to procure around 20-40 aircraft, but again a sale did not 
occur because France did not want to sell a fully capable version due to political reasons. In August 1994 the PAF 
was offered the Saab JAS-39 Gripen by Sweden, but again the sale did not occur because 20% of the Gripen's 



components were from the U.S. and Pakistan was still under U.S. sanctions 



[35] 



In mid-1992 Pakistan was close to signing a contract for the supply of 40 Dassault Mirage 2000, equipped with 



Thomson-CSF RDM/7 radars, from France 



[36] 



In mid- 1994 it was reported that the Russian manufacturers Sukhoi and Mikoyan were offering the Su-27 and 

T371 T381 

MiG-29. But Pakistan was later reported to be negotiating for supply of the Dassault Mirage 2000-5. French 
and Russian teams visited Pakistan on 27 November 1994 and it was speculated that interest in the Russian aircraft 



Pakistan Air Force 117 

[391 
was to pressure France into reducing the price of the Mirage 2000. Stated requirement was for up to 40 aircraft. 

1999 India-Pakistan Kargil Conflict 

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) did not see active combat during the low-intensity Kargil Conflict between India and 
Pakistan during the summer of 1999 but remained on high air defence alert (ADA) and performed F-16 and F-7MP 
combat air patrols (CAPs) near the eastern border with India. The PAF closely monitored and tracked the IAF's 
movements near the Line of Control in Kashmir as well as the India-Pakistan international border. 

2008 Air Alert 

After the 2008 Bombay attacks PAF was put on high alert and asked to carry out combat patrols. PAF was put on 
high alert after the Indian Foreign Minister's threat and denial phone call incident. 

Pakistani press reported an outstanding order to launch a counter attack in case of an air attack from India after 
Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee threatened Pakistani President in rough tone. 

On the morning of 14 December Indian aircraft started moving towards Pakistan, PAF moved swiftly and intercepted 
them before they entered international borders. Two of the aircraft did cross the border but Indian aircraft managed 
to turn back. PAF was ordered to carry on the defensive combat patrols but avoid hostile action unless further hostile 
action was to take place. 

2011 Abottabad Operation 

An initial investigation report revealed that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) reported the movement of some 
half-a-dozen planes near the Jalalabad border at 1 1 pm before the US helicopters entered Abbottabad to kill Osama 

bin Laden. "One aircraft was identified as a US AW ACS and the remaining five were recognised as F-18 jets of the 

T431 
US. These planes flew near the Pakistani border, but did not cross into the airspace of Pakistan, PAF was 

working under the peace time conditions prior to May 2 incident on the eastern border.Defence Secretary Lt-Gen 

(retd) Syed Athar Ali provided a detailed statement explaining the salient features of Pakistan's defence policy. "He 

apprised the commission that none of the government departments including the ministry of defence, the Joint Staff 

Headquarters or any military service ever considered the US or Afghanistan a direct threat," said an official handout 

T441 
issued after the meeting. On learning about the intrusion, The PAF Jets were scrambled and PAF immediately 

took adequate operational measures as per standard operating procedure. 

The PAF aircraft continued their presence in Abbottabad area till early morning and later returned to their air 
bases. 

Counter-insurgency Operations and Modernization 

Counter-insurgency operations 

The Pakistan Army faced several problems during its 2009 offensive against the Taliban in north-west Pakistan. 
Hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis vacated the area when the offensive was announced and, eventually, over 2 
million had to be accommodated in refugee camps. The offensive was to be completed as quickly as possible to 
allow the refugees to return to their homes but the army's fleet attack helicopters were not sufficient to provide 
adequate support to the infantry. The PAF was sent into action against the Taliban to make up for the lack of 
helicopter gunships. Because the PAF was trained and equipped to fight a conventional war, a new "counter-terrorist 
doctrine" had to be improvised. 

The PAF's Saffron Bandit 2009/2010 exercise focused on extensive training of combat personnel to undertake COIN 
operations. New equipment was inducted to improve the PAF's joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) capabilities. A C-130 transport aircraft was indigenously modified for day/night ISR operations. 



Pakistan Air Force 



118 



The PAF had initially been forced to use Google Earth for reconnaissance imagery until high resolution infra-red 

sensors were provided by the U.S. prior to the army's 2009 campaign in the Swat valley. These were installed on 

around 10 of the PAF's F-16 Fighting Falcon fighters and used to gather detailed reconnaissance imagery of the 

entire valley. During close air support missions for Pak Army from late 2008 to mid-2009, PAF conducted more than 

5,500 bombing missions and dropped 10,600 bombs in northwest tribal areas. Use of laser-guided bombs was 

increased to 80% of munitions used, as compared to 40% in the previous 2008 Bajaur campaign. A small corps of 

[49] 
ground spotters were trained and used by the PAF, in addition to PA spotters, to identify high value targets. 

Prior to the PA's offensive into South Waziristan the PAF attacked militant infrastructure with 500 lb and 2000 lb 



bombs 



[49] 



A number of civilian deaths occurred during PAF air strikes on 10 April 2010 in the Khyber tribal region. According 
to a Pakistani military source, the first bombing was targeted at a gathering of militants in a compound. Local 
people, who had quickly moved onto the scene to recover the dead and wounded, were then killed during a second 
air strike. There was no confirmed death toll but at least 30 civilian deaths had occurred according to the military 
source, whereas a local official stated at least 73 locals, including women and children, were killed. A 
six-member committee of tribal elders from the area, tasked with finding the exact number of civilian casualties, 
reported that 61 civilians were killed and 21 wounded. This was not confirmed by military or political leaders but 
Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, gave a public apology on 17 April. It is reported that 

BBC news and several other media correspondences were not allowed to take interviews from injured which makes 
the whole episode more mysterious. 



Modernisation and acquisitions 

In light of Pakistan's significant contribution to the War on 
Terror, the United States and Western European countries, 

namely Germany and France, lifted their defense related sanctions on 
Pakistan; enabling the country to once again seek advanced Western 
military hardware. Since the lifting of sanctions, the Pakistan Air Force 
(PAF) became heavily active in evaluating potential military hardware 
such as new fighter aircraft, radars and land based air-defense systems. 
However the urgent relief needed in Kashmir after the 2005 Kashmir 
earthquake forced the Pakistani military to stall its modernisation 
programme so it could divert its resources for fuel and operations 
during the rescue efforts. 




The first F-16D Block 52+ fighter of PAF, rolled 

out on 13 October 2009, undergoing flight testing 

in the U.S. prior to delivery. 



The modernisation stall ended in April 2006 when the Pakistani 

cabinet approved the PAF's proposals to procure new aircraft and systems from several sources, including modern 

combat aircraft from the U.S. and China. The AFFDP 2019 (Armed Forces Development Programme 2019) would 



oversee the modernisation of the Pakistan Air Force from 2006 to 2019 



[56] 



The Bush administration on July 24, 2008 informed the US Congress it plans to shift nearly $230 million of $300 

1571 
million in aid from counterterrorism programs to upgrading Pakistan's aging F-16s. The Bush administration 

previously announced on June 27, 2008 it was proposing to sell Pakistan ITT Corporation's electronic warfare gear 

rcoi 

valued at up to $75 million to enhance Islamabad's existing F-16s. Pakistan has asked about buying as many as 21 
AN/ALQ-211(V)9 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suite pods, or AIDEWS, and related 
equipment. The proposed sale will ensure that the existing fleet is "compatible" with new F-16 Block 50/52 
fighters being purchased by Islamabad. 

After 9/1 1 the U.S. and Pakistan began discussing the release of the embargoed F-16s and a purchase of new aircraft. 
Of the 28 F-16A/B built under the Peace Gate III/IV contracts and embargoed in 1990, 14 delivered as EDA (Excess 
Defense Articles) from 2005 to 2008., [60] two of which were delivered on 10 July 2007. [61] 



Pakistan Air Force 119 

Between 2005 and 2008, 14 F-16A/B Block 15 OCU fighters were delivered to the PAF under renewed post-9/11 
ties between the U.S. and Pakistan. These had originally been built for Pakistan under the Peace Gate III/IV contracts 
but were never delivered due to the U.S. arms embargo imposed in 1990. 

To upgrade the F-16A/B fleet, 32 Falcon STAR kits were purchased for the original Peace Gate I aircraft and 35 
Mid-Life Update (MLU) kits were ordered, with 11 more MLU kits optional, in . 4 F-16A/B being upgraded in the 
U.S. to F-16AM/BM, delivery expected December 2011. F-16A/B in PAF service to be upgraded starting 
October 2010 by Turkish Aerospace Industries, 1 per month. 

The Peace Drive I contract for 12 F-16C and 6 F-16D Block 52+ (Advanced Block 52) aircraft, powered by 

F100-PW-229 engines was signed on 30 September 2006. The first F-16 to be completed, an F-16D, was 

rolled out on 13 October 2009 and began flight testing. [67][68][69][70][71] The first batch of F-16C/D Block 52+, two 

[72] [731 
F-16D and one F-16C, landed at PAF Base Shahbaz, Jacobabad, on 26 June 2010 and one more F-16C was 

received by 5 July 2010. [74] 

On 13 December 2008, the Government of Pakistan stated that two Indian Air Force aircraft were intercepted by the 

[75] 
PAF kilometres within Pakistani airspace. This charge was denied by the Indian government. 

During talks with a delegation from the French Senate on Monday 28 September 2009, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza 
Gilani stated that the PAF had used most of its stockpile of laser-guided munitions against militants in the Malakand 
and FATA regions and that replacements for such types of equipment were urgently required. 

December 2009 saw the delivery of the PAF's first Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C from Sweden and I1-78MP Midas 
aerial refuelling tanker/military transport aircraft from Ukraine. 

The PAF is reported to be considering purchasing the Hongdu L-15 advanced jet trainer to train pilots for high-tech 
fighters such as the FC-20. Extensive evaluations of the aircraft took place in Pakistan during December 2009. 

On 26 June 2010 the first batch of 3 F-16C/D Block 52+ fighters were delivered to PAF Base Shahbaz, 

TOO] 

Jacobabad. According to Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman (the then Chief of Air Staff) the new fighters 

roi] 

would eliminate the PAF's limitations in precision night-time strike operations, the existing capability being 
based on around 34 Dassault Mirage 5 fighters upgraded with new avionics for night-time precision strike missions 
under the Retrofit Of Strike Element (ROSE) programme during 1 999-2004. [84][85][86] SABIR (Special Airborne 
Mission Installation & Response System) which is a FLIR System that has Brite Star II and Star Safire III EO/IR 
sensors installed on the one 0130. (this a 'bolt on system' and is installed in place of the parachute door) This system 
was extensively used during operation in FATA. 

Exercises 

The PAF sent a contingent of six F-16A/B fighters to the international 
Anatolian Eagle 2004 exercise in Turkey. 

After around 1 year of planning, in 2005 the PAF launched the High 
Mark 2005 exercise which lasted for one month and also involved the 
Pakistan Army and Pakistan Navy. The scenario saw two opposing 
forces, Blueland and Foxland, engaging in simulated combat involving 
both offensive and defensive operations. It was stated that the exercise 
would have 3 stages and PAF aircraft would fly 8200 sorties. 

A PAF F-7PG flies alongside a Mirage 2000-9 

Involvement of army and navy units was aimed at providing more ,„,„_., , ,_„ . , . ,,, , ur . r 

J J f b and F-16E/F Block 60 fighters of the UAEAF and 

realistic operational scenarios. High Mark 2005 followed the a RJAF F-16 during ATLC 2009. 

Tempest- 1 exercise which was focused purely on air power but 
differed in terms of duration, intensity and complexity of air operations. 

A contingent of six F-16A/B fighters was sent to Turkey's international Anatolian Eagle 2006 exercise. In 2008 the 
Turkish Air Force sent five F-16C/D fighters and 50 personnel of 191 Kobras Filo (191 Cobras Squadron) to 




Pakistan Air Force 



120 



Pakistan to take part in the joint Operation Indus Viper 2008 exercise at PAF Base Mushaf (Sargodha) 



[88] 



In the summer of 2005 a PAF team of 20 airmen, including pilots, navigators, engineers, maintenance technicians 



and a C-130E was sent to the U.S. to take part in the AMC (Air Mobility Command) Rodeo 
part in the July 2007 AMC Rodeo. [91][92] 



[90] 



The PAF later took 




A PAF Mirage III of No. 7 Bandits Squadron 

alongside a US Navy F-18 and F-16s of the 

U.S.A.F. andR.J.A.F. 



In 2009, while undertaking combat operations against militants in 
FATA and Swat, the PAF initiated the Saffron Bandit exercise with the 
aim of training the PAF's entire combat force to undertake such 

[93] [94] 

anti-terrorist operations. 

In December 2009 the PAF sent six Chengdu F-7PG fighters, of No. 
31 Wing based at PAF Base Samungli, to the United Arab Emirates to 
take part in the Air Tactics Leadership Course (ATLC), also known as 



Operation Iron Falcon, at Al Dhafra Air Base 



[95] [96] [97] 




PAF F-16s arrive at Red Flag 2010 in Nevada 



_^^^^__ The PAF's High Mark 2010 exercise was launched on 15 March 2010, 

the first time a High Mark exercise had been conducted since 2005, 
after all PAF received their Air Tasking Orders (ATO). The 
1^%r^ ^^ country-wide exercise involved units based all over Pakistan, from 

Skardu to the Arabian Sea, at all Main Operating Bases and Forward 
Operating Bases. Joint operations involving the Pakistan Army and 
Pakistan Navy were also conducted, aiming to test and improve 
integration and cooperation between the three arms. Operations 
emphasised a near-realistic simulation of the war-time environment, 
exposure of PAF aircrews to contemporary concepts of air combat, 
new employment concepts and joint operations between air force, army and navy. New inductions such as the JF-17 
Thunder fighter, Saab 2000 Erieye AEW&C and 11-78 Multi-Role Tanker Transports also took part. [98] On 6 April 
2010 the end of the first phase of exercise High Mark 2010 was celebrated with a firepower demonstration at the 
PAF's firing range facility in the deserts of Thai. The 90 minute demo involved the new JF-17 Thunder fighter, Saab 
2000 Erieye AEW&C and 11-78 MRTT aircraft. The H-2 SOW (Stand-Off Weapon) was also shown to the public for 
the first time, being launched from around 60 km away before hitting its target, and a mock counter-insurgency 
operation was performed by troops. The demo heralded the beginning of High Mark 2010's second phase where the 
PAF would practice joint operations with the Pakistan Army during the army's exercise Azm-e-Nau-3 (New Resolve 
3). During High Mark 2010 a Chengdu F-7 and Mirage 5 fighter (flown by Squadron Leader Nasir Mehmood and 
Wing Commander Atta ur Rehman respectively) practised landing, refuelling and take-off operations from a 
Pakistani motorway. It was reported that the PAF is in negotiations with the Ministry of Communications to set up 
all required facilities for Air Force operations on the motorways and highways of Pakistan. 



Pakistan Air Force 



121 




A PAF F-16 is refuelled in-flight by 

a U.S.A.F. KC-135 tanker during 

Red Flag 2010. 



In July 2010 the PAF sent six F-16B fighters of No. 9 Griffins 
Squadron and 100 PAF personnel to Nellis Air Force Base in the 
U.S.A. to participate in the international Red Flag exercise for the first 
time. During the exercise the PAF pilots practised in-flight refuelling 
of their F-16s with the KC-135 Stratotanker. [102][103][104][105][106] 




A PAF Mirage III competes in the Alert Scramble 

Competition during Falcon Air Meet 2010 in 

Jordan. 



TEJ External videos 



Mirage III ROSE fighters of the PAF's No. 7 Bandits Squadron take part in the Falcon Air Meet 2010 exercise 



[107] 



In October 2010 the PAF's No. 7 Bandits Squadron sent a team of its Dassault Mirage III ROSE fighters to Jordan to 
participate in the Falcon Air Meet 2010 exercise at Azraq Royal Jordanian Air Base. January 2011 saw a 

PAF contingent of F-16A/B and Dassault Mirage fighters take part in the Al-Saqoor II exercise in Saudi Arabia with 
the Royal Saudi Air Force. [109][110][111] 

In March 2011 a joint Sino-Pakistani exercise, Shaheen 1, was conducted involving a contingent of Chinese aircraft 
and personnel from the PLAAF. Information on which aircraft were used by each side in the exercise was not 
released, but photos of Pakistani pilots inspecting what appeared to be Chinese Shenyang J-11B fighters were 
released on the internet. The exercise lasted for around 4 weeks and was the first time the PLAAF had deployed to 
and conducted "operational" aerial maneuvers in Pakistan with the PAF 



[113] 



Pakistan Air Force 



122 



Organization 

The Air Force has about 65,000 active personnel with about 10,000 reserves. The Chief of the Air Staff holds the 
operational and administrative powers. He is assisted by a Vice Chief of Air Staff and six Deputy Chiefs of the Air 
Staff who control and administer the Administration, Operations, Engineering, Supply (logistics), Personnel, and 
Training divisions of the PAF respectively. Recently, the Air Headquarters (AHQ) has been moved from Chaklala to 
Islamabad. Major Air force bases are at Shorkot, Karachi, Quetta, Kamra, Peshawar, Mianwali, Sargodha and 
Risalpur. There are many war-time operational forward bases, civilian airstrips and runways as well as emergency 
motorways. 

Commands 

• Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC), Islamabad 

• Northern Air Command (NAC), Peshawar 

• Central Air Command (CAC), Lahore 

• Southern Air Command (SAC), Karachi 

• Air Defence Command (ADC), Chaklala, Rawalpindi 



Bases 



[114], 



These are the bases from which the PAF planes operate during peace time. They have complete infrastructure of 
hardened shelters, control towers, workshops, ordnance depots etc. There are ten flying bases and also seven 
non-flying bases: 



Flying bases 

PAF Base Mushaf (Sargodha) 

PAF Base Masroor (Karachi) 

PAF Base Rafiqui (Shorkot) 

PAF Base Peshawar (Peshawar) 

PAF Base Samungli (Quetta) 

PAF Base Mianwali (Mianwali) 

PAF Base Minhas (Kamra) 

PAF Base Chaklala (Rawalpindi) 

PAF Base Faisal (Karachi) 

PAF Base Risalpur (Pakistan Air Force Academy) (Risalpur) 

PAF Base Shahbaz (Jacobabad) 



Non-flying bases 

PAF Base Korangi Creek (Karachi) 
PAF Base Malir (Karachi) 
PAF Base Kohat (Kohat) 
PAF Base Lahore (Lahore) 
PAF Base Sakesar (Sakesar) 
PAF Base Lower Topa (Murree) 
PAF Base Kalabagh (Nathia Gali) 



Rank structure 



Structure of the Commissioned officer rank of the Pakistan Air Force 



Pakistan Air Force 



123 



Pay grade 

Insignia 



O-10 



0-9 0-8 



0-7 



0-6 









0-5 




0-4 



m 



0-3 



0-2 O-l 



HB| 



Title 



Abbreviation 



Air 

Chief 

Marshal 

ACM 



Air Marshal Air-vice Air-Commodore Group-Captain 
Marshal 



AM 



AVM 



Air Cdre 



Gr Capt 



Wing-Commander 



WCdr 



Squadron 
Leader 



S/Ldr 



Flight 
Lieutenant 



FtLt 



Flying Pilot 
Officer Officer 



F/O P/O 



NATO Code 

Rank 
Hierarchy 



OF- 10 

4-star 

Air 

Marshal 



OF-9 



OF-1 



3-star 2-star 

Air-Marshall Air-Marshal 



OF-7 
1-star Officer 



OF-6 



OF-5 



OF-4 



OF-3 



OF-2 OF-1 



Structure of the Enlisted rank of the Pakistan Air Force 



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128 



Naval hostilities 



Operation Dwarka 



Operation Dwarka, also known as "Operation Somnath", was a naval operation commenced by the Pakistan 
Navy to attack the Indian coastal town of Dwarka on 7 September 1965. This was the first use of Pakistan Navy in 
any of the Indo-Pakistan Wars. It was one of the significant naval events of the 1965 Indo-Pak war, and Pakistan 
celebrates September 8 as "Victory Day" for Pakistan Navy. 

As the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 broke out between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, armies and air forces of both 
nations were involved in intense fighting in the Punjab region and in Kashmir. To relieve pressure on the southern 
front, Pakistan decided to use its navy in the war by launching a quick strike on Indian coast. The primary objective 
of the attack was to destroy the radar station at Dwarka which Pakistani Naval intelligence believed had a Huff/Duff 
beacon to guide Indian bombers. Pakistani high command also hoped to divert the operations of the Indian Air 
Force away from the north. 

Objectives 

The mission objectives of Pakistan Navy are listed below.: 

• To draw the heavy enemy units out of Bombay for the submarine PNS Ghazi to attack. 

• To destroy the radar installation at Dwarka. 

• To lower Indian morale. 

• To divert Indian Air Force effort away from the north. 

The Naval attack 

On the night of September 7 Pakistan Navy launched its assault on Western Indian shores. Dwarka was chosen for 
its proximity (200 km from Karachi Port), its lower defences and historical relevance. The plan called for a fleet of 7 
naval vessels of Pakistan to bomb the tiny town of Dwarka. It was aimed at luring the major ships anchored in 
Bombay to attack the Pakistan ships. The intention was that the submarine PNS Ghazi lurking in the Arabian Sea 
would then take out the Indian ships. Accordingly a fleet of seven ships comprising PNS Babur, PNS Khaibar, PNS 
Badr, PNS Jahangir, PNS Alamgir, PNS Shah Jahan and PNS Tipu Sultan set sail for Dwarka and bombed the tiny 
town. 

The heavy ships could not be attacked by the submarine PNS Ghazi as the ships in Bombay were under refit, and it 
did not encounter the active combatants on the West coast. The objective to divert the Indian Air Force attacking 
Pakistan's Southern front worked as the Indian Airforce raids on the city of Karachi ceased, presumed by Pakistani 
sources to be due to lack of availability of the radar guidance to the IAF fighter jets, which was damaged in the 
attack. 

Indian Navy's official version states that at around 2355 hours, the Pakistani vessels fired over the main temple of 
Dwarka for more than 20 minutes. The ships fired around 50 shells each, which included some 5.25 inch rounds 
fired by the Pak cruiser PNS Babur. It adds that most shells fell between the temple and the railway station, which 
lay 3 km from the lighthouse. Some buildings were hit, with only the Railway Guest House suffering some minor 
damages and a cement factory of Associated Cement Company was also hit and smoke could be seen 20 km away by 
Pakistani ships. 



Operation Dwarka 129 

The radar installation was shelled during the bombardment but neither the radar was damaged nor were any 
casualties reported by Indian sources. A frigate INS Talwar was in nearby Okha port undergoing repairs and did 
not intervene. Hiranandani's history of the Indian Navy states that: 

Next morning she (INS Talwar) was directed to send a team to Dwarka to assess the damage. The team found 
that most of the shells had fallen on the soft soil between the temple and the radio station and failed to 
explode. The air attack had damaged a railway engine and blown off a portion of a railway guesthouse. 

A total of forty unexploded shells were also recovered intact. Interestingly, the shells bore the mark "INDIAN 
ORDNANCE"; these were dated from the 1940s - period before the Partition of India and creation of India and 
Pakistan. 

Radio Pakistan, however, transmitted that Dwarka was badly destroyed. 

Naval Command 

The following is the list of Commanding officers of the Operation Dwarka: 

Commodore S.M. Anwar, OTC - Officer Commanding of Operation Dwarka 
Captain MAK Lodhi - Officer commanding of PNS Babur, the destroyer. 
Captain A Hanif-Officer Commanding of PNS Khaibar, the destroyer. 
Commander IH Malik - Commanding officer of PNS Badr, the frigate. 
Commander KM Hussain - Commanding officer of PNS Jahangir, the cruiser. 
Commander Iqbal F. Quadir - Commanding officer of PNS Alamgir, the destoyer. 
Commander SZ Shamsie - Commanding officer of PNS Shah Jahan, the destroyer. 
Commander Amir Aslam - Commanding officer of PNS Tipu Sultan, the destroyer. 
Commander Karamat Rahman Niazi - Commanding officer of PNS Ghazi, the submarine. 

Aftermath 

Operation Dwarka was a significant naval operation of the 1965 war, considered by some as a nuisance raid or of 
little strategic value. The Ministry of Defence had issued written instructions which ordered the Indian Navy 

"not to proceed two hundred miles beyond Bombay nor North of the parallel of Porbander". The lack of response 
by the Indian Navy to the attack on Dwarka led to questions being asked in Indian parliament and was considered 
a humiliation by Indian citizens and Navy personnel and a challenge to be answered by others. The Chief of 

Naval Staff, Vice Admiral B.S. Soman was restrained from retaliation for the Dwarka raid by the Defence 
Minister. Of the Indian Navy's 23 ships, ten were under refit in Bombay, including the Vikrant, the cruiser Delhi, 

three destroyers and two frigates. An Indian source explained this by saying that the Indian Government did not 

ri2i 
want to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, but wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict. The failure 

ri3i 

of INS Talwar to retaliate, then undergoing repairs to her condensors in Okha, has been lamented by Indian Vice 
Admiral N. Krishnan who said that no Government would blame a warship going into action, if attacked. PNS 

Ghazi continued to patrol Kachhh and Bombay coasts spotting aircraft positions when snorkeling. 

The Dwarka raid is considered by Pakistani sources as being a prime reason for the Indian Navy's subsequent 
post-war modernization and expansion, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores. The 
Dwarka raid, as per an Indian historian G M Hiranandani, led to the procurement of missile boats by the Indian 
Navy from the Soviet Union for the Defense of Kutch. These were subsequently used by India in Operation Trident 
in the 1971 war. However, he attributes the expansion of the Indian Navy in the period 1965 to 1975 to the 

post- 1962 planned expansion of the Indian Navy with many ships being negotiated and purchased from the Soviet 

tt • ■ t ,u [4]:8-ll 

Union prior to the war. 



Operation Dwarka 130 

Popular culture 

In 1998, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) financed and produced the dramatization of the operation named, 
"Operation Dwarka, 1965", which was based on this incident. The film was directed by Pakistani film director 
Qasim Jalali and it was written by Hameed Kashmiri. 

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understand what was holding the fleet back.' 

[II] Qadir, Iqbal, Vice Admiral (retd) (1998). "Pakistan and its three wars" (http://www.defencejournal.com/march98/pak3warsl.htm). 
www.defencejournal.com. . Retrieved 10 November 201 1. 

[12] Hiranandani, Vice Adm Gulab, IN (Retd) (Spring 2002). "The Indian End Of The Telescope — India and Its Navy" (http://web. archive. 

org/web/20060916122311/http://www. usnwc.edu/press/Review/2002/spring/art4-sp2. htm). Naval War College Review LV (2). . 

Retrieved 08 November 2011. 
[13] Hiranandani, "Transition to triumph", pp 34. Talwar encountering contamination of her boilers due to leakage of her condensors put in to 

Okha for temporary repairs. 
[14] Roy, Mihir K. (1995) "War in the Indian Ocean" (http://books.google.com/books?id=Tqr8r7EB18wC&pg=PA84#v=onepage&q& 

f=false), pp 84-85. 

'As Vice Admiral N. Krishnan is supposed to have said. "One of our frigates Talwar was at Okha. It is 
unfortunate that she could not sail forth and seek battle. Even if there was a mandate against the Navy 
participating in the war, no Government could blame a warship going into action, if attacked. An affront 
to our national honour is no joke and we cannot laugh it away by saying All the Pakistani's did was to 
kill a cow'. Let us at least create a memorial to the 'unknown cow' who died with her boots on in a battle 
against the Pakistan Navy.'" 



Operation Dwarka 131 

External links 

• Operation Dwarka (http://www.paknavy.gov.pk/HISTORY/DWARKA/history-dwarks.htm) 

• The Shelling of Dwarka (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1965War/Dwarka.html) 



132 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 



The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a military conflict between India and Pakistan. Indian, Bangladeshi and 
international sources consider the beginning of the war to be Operation Chengiz Khan, Pakistan's 3 December 1971 
pre-emptive strike on 11 Indian airbases. Lasting just 13 days it is considered one of the shortest wars in 

history. 

During the course of the war, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed on the eastern and western fronts. The war 
effectively came to an end after the Eastern Command of the Pakistani Armed Forces signed the Instrument of 
Surrender, on 16 December 1971 following which East Pakistan seceded as the independent state of Bangladesh. 
Between 90,000 and 93,000 members of the Pakistan Armed Forces including paramilitary personnel were taken as 
Prisoners of War by the Indian Army It is estimated that between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 civilians were killed 

ro] 

in Bangladesh, and up to four hundred thousand women raped by the Pakistani armed forces, especially 
Hindus. As a result of the conflict, a further eight to ten million people fled the country at the time to seek 

refuge in neighbouring India. 

Background 

The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a conflict between the traditionally 
dominant West Pakistanis and the majority East Pakistanis. The Bangladesh Liberation war ignited after the 1970 
Pakistani election, in which the East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan and secured a 
simple majority in the 313-seat lower house of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament of Pakistan). Awami League leader 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman presented the Six Points to the President of Pakistan and claimed the right to form the 
government. After the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, refused to yield the premiership of 
Pakistan to Mujibur, President Yahya Khan called the military, dominated by West Pakistanis, to suppress 
dissent. 

Mass arrests of dissidents began, and attempts were made to disarm East Pakistani soldiers and police. After several 
days of strikes and non-cooperation movements, the Pakistani military cracked down on Dhaka on the night of 25 
March 1971. The Awami League was banished, and many members fled into exile in India. Mujib was arrested on 
the night of 25—26 March 1971 at about 1:30 a.m. (as per Radio Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971) and taken to 
West Pakistan. The next action carried out was Operation Searchlight, an attempt to kill the intellectual elite of the 
east. [8] 

On 27 March 1971, Ziaur Rahman, a major in the Pakistani army, declared the independence of Bangladesh on 
behalf of Mujibur. In April, exiled Awami League leaders formed a government-in-exile in Baidyanathtala of 
Meherpur. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, defected to the rebellion. Bangladesh Force namely Mukti 
Bahini consisting of Niyomito Bahini (Regular Force) and Gono Bahini (Guerilla Force) was formed under the 
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Mohammad Ataul Ghani Osmany. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 133 

India's involvement in Bangladesh Liberation War 

The Pakistan army conducted a widespread genocide against the Bengali population of East Pakistan, aimed in 
particular at the minority Hindu population, leading to approximately 10 million people fleeing East 

Pakistan and taking refuge in the neighbouring Indian states. The East Pakistan-India border was opened to 

allow refugees safe shelter in India. The governments of West Bengal, Bihar, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura 
established refugee camps along the border. The resulting flood of impoverished East Pakistani refugees placed an 

no] 

intolerable strain on India's already overburdened economy. 

General Tikka Khan earned the nickname 'Butcher of Bengal' due to the widespread atrocities he committed. 
General Niazi commenting on his actions noted 'On the night between 25/26 March 1971 General Tikka struck. 
Peaceful night was turned into a time of wailing, crying and burning. General Tikka let loose everything at his 
disposal as if raiding an enemy, not dealing with his own misguided and misled people. The military action was a 
display of stark cruelty more merciless than the massacres at Bukhara and Baghdad by Chengiz Khan and Halaku 
Khan... General Tikka... resorted to the killing of civilians and a scorched earth policy. His orders to his troops were: 

'I want the land not the people...' Major General Farman had written in his table diary, "Green land of East Pakistan 

T211 
will be painted red". It was painted red by Bengali blood. 

T221 
The Indian government repeatedly appealed to the international community, but failing to elicit any response, 

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on 27 March 1971 expressed full support of her government for the independence 

struggle of the people of East Pakistan. The Indian leadership under Prime Minister Gandhi quickly decided that it 

was more effective to end the genocide by taking armed action against Pakistan than to simply give refuge to those 

who made it across to refugee camps. Exiled East Pakistan army officers and members of the Indian Intelligence 

[231 
immediately started using these camps for recruitment and training of Mukti Bahini guerrillas. 

The mood in West Pakistan had also turned increasingly jingoistic and militaristic against East Pakistan and India. 
By the end of September, an organised propaganda campaign, possibly orchestrated by elements within the 
Government of Pakistan, resulted in stickers proclaiming Crush India becoming a standard feature on the rear 

windows of vehicles in Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Lahore and soon spread to the rest of West Pakistan. By October, 

T241 
other stickers proclaimed Hang the Traitor in an apparent reference to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 



134 



India's official engagement with Pakistan 



Objective 

By November, war seemed inevitable. Throughout 
November, thousands of people led by West Pakistani 
politicians marched in Lahore and across West 
Pakistan, calling for Pakistan to Crush India. 
India responded by starting a massive buildup of Indian 
forces on the border with East Pakistan. The Indian 
military waited until December, when the drier ground 
would make for easier operations and Himalayan 
passes would be closed by snow, preventing any 
Chinese intervention. On 23 November, Yahya Khan 
declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan and told 
his people to prepare for war. 

On the evening of 3 December Sunday, at about 

no] 

5:40 p.m., the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) launched a 
pre-emptive strike on eleven airfields in north-western 
India, including Agra which was 300 miles (unknown 
operator: u'strong 1 km) from the border. During this 
attack the Taj Mahal was camouflaged with a forest of 
twigs and leaves and draped with burlap because its 

[291 

marble glowed like a white beacon in the moonlight. 



NFPfll Mow " ^^*£xlf, 

r'XXXIII Corps 

6(- ~ 




Illustration showing military units and troop movements during 
operations in the Eastern sector of the war. 



This preemptive strike known as Operation Chengiz 

Khan, was inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab-Israeli Six Day War. But, unlike the Israeli 

attack on Arab airbases in 1967 which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 

i t i a- [30][31] 

planes to India. 

In an address to the nation on radio that same evening, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held that the air strikes were a 
declaration of war against India and the Indian Air Force responded with initial air strikes that very night. 

These air strikes were expanded to massive retaliatory air strikes the next morning and thereafter which followed 
interceptions by Pakistanis anticipating this action. 

This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the 
immediate mobilisation of troops and launched the full-scale invasion. This involved Indian forces in a massive 
coordinated air, sea, and land assault. Indian Air Force started flying sorties against Pakistan from 
midnight. The main Indian objective on the western front was to prevent Pakistan from entering Indian 

no] 

soil. There was no Indian intention of conducting any major offensive into West Pakistan. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 



135 



Naval hostilities 

Naval reconnaissance submarine operations were 
started by the Pakistan Navy on both eastern and 
western front. In the western theatre of the war, the 
Indian Navy, under the command of Vice Admiral S.N. 
Kohli, successfully attacked Karachi's port in Operation 

F121 T121 

Trident on the night of 4—5 December, using 
missile boats, sinking Pakistani destroyer PNS Khyber 
and a minesweeper PNS Muhafiz; PNS Shah Jahan was 

ri2i 

badly damaged. 720 Pakistani sailors were killed or 
wounded, and Pakistan lost reserve fuel and many 
commercial ships, thus crippling the Pakistan Navy's 
further involvement in the conflict. Operation Trident 

ri2i 

was followed by Operation Python on the night of 
8—9 December, in which Indian missile boats 
attacked the Karachi port, resulting in further destruction of reserve fuel tanks and the sinking of three Pakistani 




Pakistan's PNS Ghazi sank off the fairway buoy of Visakhapatnam 

near the eastern coast of India, making it the first submarine casualty 

in the waters around the Indian subcontinent. 



merchant ships 



[12] 



In the eastern theatre of the war, the Indian Eastern Naval Command, under Vice Admiral Krishnan, completely 
isolated East Pakistan by a naval blockade in the Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistani Navy and eight 
foreign merchant ships in their ports. From 4 December onwards, the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was deployed, and 
its Sea Hawk fighter-bombers attacked many coastal towns in East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox's 

Bazaar. Pakistan countered the threat by sending the submarine PNS Ghazi, which sank en route under mysterious 

r^7ir^Ri r^Qi 

circumstances off Vishakapatnam's coast reducing Pakistan's control of Bangladeshi coastline. But on 9 

December, the Indian Navy suffered its biggest wartime loss when the Pakistani submarine PNS Hangor sank the 

frigate INS Khukri in the Arabian Sea resulting in a loss of 18 officers and 176 sailors 



[40] 



The damage inflicted on the Pakistani Navy stood at 7 gunboats, 1 minesweeper, 1 submarine, 2 destroyers, 3 patrol 
crafts belonging to the coast guard, 18 cargo, supply and communication vessels, and large scale damage inflicted on 
the naval base and docks in the coastal town of Karachi. Three merchant navy ships — Anwar Baksh, Pasni and 

[41] [421 

Madhumathi — and ten smaller vessels were captured. Around 1900 personnel were lost, while 1413 
servicemen were captured by Indian forces in Dhaka. According to one Pakistan scholar, Tariq Ali, the Pakistan 

[44] 

Navy lost a third of its force in the war. 



Air operations 

After the initial preemptive strike, PAF adopted a defensive stance in response to the Indian retaliation. As the war 

[45] 

progressed, the Indian Air Force continued to battle the PAF over conflict zones, but the number of sorties flown 
by the PAF gradually decreased day-by-day. The Indian Air Force flew 4,000 sorties while its counterpart, the 

[121 

PAF offered little in retaliation, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel. This lack of 
retaliation has also been attributed to the deliberate decision of the PAF High Command to cut its losses as it had 

[47] 

already incurred huge losses in the conflict. Though PAF did not intervene during the Indian Navy's raid on 
Pakistani naval port city of Karachi, it retaliated with bombing the Okha harbour destroying the fuel tanks used by 
the boats that attacked. [48][49][50] 

In the east, the small air contingent of Pakistan Air Force No. 14 Sqn was destroyed, putting the Dhaka airfield out 

[121 

of commission and resulting in Indian air superiority in the east. 
Attacks on Pakistan 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 136 

While India's grip on what had been East Pakistan tightened, the IAF continued to press home attacks against 
Pakistan itself. The campaign settled down to series of daylight anti-airfield, anti-radar and close-support attacks by 
fighters, with night attacks against airfields and strategic targets by B-57s and C-130 (Pakistan), and Canberras and 
An- 12s (India). The PAF's F-6s were employed mainly on defensive combat air patrols over their own bases, but 
without air superiority the PAF was unable to conduct effective offensive operations, and its attacks were largely 
ineffective. During the IAF's airfield attacks one US and one UN aircraft were damaged in Dacca, while a Canadian 
Air Force Caribou was destroyed at Islamabad, along with US military liaison chief Brigadier General Chuck 
Yeager's USAF Beech U-8 light twin. 

Sporadic raids by the IAF continued against Pakistan's forward air bases in the West until the end of the war, and 
large scale interdiction and close-support operations, and were maintained. The PAF played a more limited part in 
the operations, and were reinforced by F-104s from Jordan, Mirages from an unidentified Middle Eastern ally 
(probably Libya) and by F-86s from Saudi Arabia. Their arrival helped camouflage the extent of Pakistan's losses. 
Libyan F-5s were reportedly deployed to Sargodha, perhaps as a potential training unit to prepare Pakistani pilots for 
an influx of more F-5s from Saudi Arabia. 

Hostilities officially ended at 14:30 GMT on 17 December, after the fall of Dacca on 15 December. India claimed 
large gains of territory in West Pakistan (although pre-war boundaries were recognised after the war), though the 
independence of Pakistan's East wing as Bangladesh was confirmed. India flew 1,978 sorties in the East and about 
4,000 in the West, while PAF flew about 30 and 2,840. More than 80 percent of the IAF's sorties were close-support 
and interdiction, and about 65 IAF aircraft were lost (54 losses were admitted), perhaps as many as 27 of them in air 
combat. Pakistan lost 72 aircraft (51 of them combat types, but admitting only 25 to enemy action). At least 16 of the 
Pakistani losses, and 24 fell in air combat (although only 10 air combat losses were admitted, not including any F-6s, 
Mirage Ills, or the six Jordanian F-104s which failed to return to their donors). But the imbalance in air losses was 
explained by the IAF's considerably higher sortie rate, and its emphasis on ground-attack missions. On the ground 
Pakistan suffered most, with 8,000 killed and 25,000 wounded while India lost 3,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. The 
losses of armoured vehicles were similarly imbalanced. This represented a major defeat for Pakistan. 

Ground operations 

Pakistan attacked at several places along India's western border with Pakistan, but the Indian army successfully held 
their positions. The Indian Army quickly responded to the Pakistan Army's movements in the west and made some 

2 r52ir531 

initial gains, including capturing around 5500 square miles (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km ) of Pakistan 

territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir, Pakistani Punjab and Sindh sectors was later ceded in the Simla 
Agreement of 1972, as a gesture of goodwill). 

On the eastern front, the Indian Army joined forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini ("Allied 
Forces"); Unlike the 1965 war which had emphasised set-piece battles and slow advances, this time the strategy 
adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armoured units and close air 
support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan. 

Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, who commanded the eighth, twenty-third, and fifty-seventh divisions, led 
the Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As these forces attacked Pakistani formations, the Indian Air Force rapidly 
destroyed the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of commission. In the meantime, 
the Indian Navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan. 

The Indian campaign employed "blitzkrieg" techniques, exploiting weakness in the enemy's positions and bypassing 

T541 
opposition, and resulted in a swift victory. Faced with insurmountable losses, the Pakistani military capitulated in 

less than a fortnight. On 16 December, the Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan surrendered. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 



137 



Surrender of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan 

The Instrument of Surrender of Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan was signed at Ramna Race Course in 
Dhaka at 16.31 1ST on 16 December 1971, by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer 
Commanding-in-chief of Eastern Command of the Indian Army and Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi, Commander 
of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. As Aurora accepted the surrender, the surrounding crowds on the race course 
began shouting anti-Niazi and anti-Pakistan slogans. 

India took approximately 90,000 prisoners of war, including Pakistani soldiers and their East Pakistani civilian 
supporters. 79,676 prisoners were uniformed personnel, of which 55,692 were Army, 16,354 Paramilitary, 5,296 
Police, 1000 Navy and 800 PAF. The remaining prisoners were civilians — either family members of the military 
personnel or collaborators (razakars). The Hamoodur Rahman Commission report instituted by Pakistan lists the 
Pakistani POWs as follows: Apart from soldiers, it was estimated that 15,000 Bengali civilians were also made 



prisoners of war. 



[571 



Branch 


Number of captured Pakistani POWs 


Army 


54,154 


Navy 


1,381 


Air Force 


833 


Paramilitary including police 


22,000 


Civilian personnel 


12,000 


Total: 


90,368 



Foreign involvement 



United States and Soviet Union 



$?A 



POL I VHK- U i> 

Department of State TElCftDAIUI 



The Soviet Union sympathised with the Bangladeshis, and supported 
the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini during the war, recognising that the 
independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its 
rivals — the United States and China. The USSR gave assurances to 
India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, 
it would take counter-measures. This assurance was enshrined in the 



Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971 



[58] 



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The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. 

President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 

[591 
feared Soviet expansion into South and Southeast Asia. Pakistan 

was a close ally of the People's Republic of China, with whom Nixon 

had been negotiating a rapprochement and where he intended to visit 

in February 1972. Nixon feared that an Indian invasion of West 

Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it 

would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and 

the regional position of America's new tacit ally, China. In order to 

demonstrate to China the bona fides of the United States as an ally, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan, routing 

them through Jordan and Iran, while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan. The Nixon 

administration also ignored reports it received of the "genocidal" activities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, 
most notably the Blood telegram. This prompted widespread criticism and condemnation both by Congress and in 



The Blood Telegram 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 138 

the international press. 

Then-US ambassador to the United Nations George H.W. Bush — later 41st President of the United 
States — introduced a resolution in the UN Security Council calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed 
forces by India and Pakistan. It was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The following days witnessed a great pressure on 
the Soviets from the Nixon-Kissinger duo to get India to withdraw, but to no avail. 

It has been documented that President Nixon requested Iran and Jordan to send their F-86, F-104 and F-5 fighter jets 
in aid of Pakistan. 

When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon deployed a carrier battle group led by the aircraft 
carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. The Enterprise and its escort ships arrived on station on 1 1 December 
1971. According to a Russian documentary, the United Kingdom deployed a carrier battle group led by the aircraft 
carrier HMS Eagle to the Bay, although this is unlikely as the Eagle was decommissioned at Portsmouth, 

England in January 1972. 

On 6 and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of cruisers and destroyers and a submarine armed 
with nuclear missiles from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 
1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also had a nuclear submarine to help ward off the threat posed by USS 
Enterprise task force in the Indian Ocean. 

China 

As a long-standing ally of Pakistan, the People's Republic of China reacted with alarm to the evolving situation in 
East Pakistan and the prospect of India invading West Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Believing that just 
such an Indian attack was imminent, Nixon encouraged China to mobilise its armed forces along its border with 
India to discourage it. The Chinese did not, however, respond to this encouragement, because unlike the 1962 
Sino-Indian War when India was caught entirely unaware, this time the Indian Army was prepared and had deployed 
eight mountain divisions to the Sino-Indian border to guard against such an eventuality. China instead threw its 
weight behind demands for an immediate ceasefire. 

When Bangladesh applied for membership to the United Nations in 1972, China vetoed their application because 
two United Nations resolutions regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians had not yet been 
implemented. China was also among the last countries to recognise independent Bangladesh, refusing to do so 
until 31 August 1975. [71][69] 

Aftermath 
India 

The war stripped Pakistan of more than half of its population and with nearly one-third of its army in captivity, 

ri9i 

clearly established India's military dominance of the subcontinent. In spite of the magnitude of the victory, India 
was surprisingly restrained in its reaction. Mostly, Indian leaders seemed pleased by the relative ease with which 
they had accomplished their goals — the establishment of Bangladesh and the prospect of an early return to their 
homeland of the 10 million Bengali refugees who were the cause of the war. In announcing the Pakistani 
surrender, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared in the Indian Parliament: 

"Dacca is now the free capital of a free country. We hail the people of Bangladesh in their hour of 
triumph. All nations who value the human spirit will recognize it as a significant milestone in man's 
quest for liberty." 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 



139 



Pakistan 




A Pakistan stamp depicting the 90,000 POWs in 
Indian camps. This stamp was issued by Pakistan 
with the political aim of raising global support to 

help secure their release. The POWs were 

released by India after the signing and ratification 

of the Simla Agreement. 



T191 

For Pakistan it was a complete and humiliating defeat, a 
psychological setback that came from a defeat at the hands of intense 
rival India. Pakistan lost half its population and a significant portion 
of its economy and suffered setbacks to its geo-political role in South 
Asia. Pakistan feared that the two-nation theory was disproved 

and that the Islamic ideology had proved insufficient to keep Bengalis 
part of Pakistan. Also, the Pakistani military suffered further 
humiliation by having their 90,000 prisoners of war (POWs) released 
by India only after the negotiation and signing of the Simla Agreement 
on 2 July 1972. In addition to repatriation of prisoners of war also, the 
agreement established an ongoing structure for the negotiated 
resolution of future conflicts between India and Pakistan (referring to 
the remaining western provinces that now composed the totality of 
Pakistan). In signing the agreement, Pakistan also, by implication, 
recognised the former East Pakistan as the now independent and sovereign state of Bangladesh. 

The Pakistani people were not mentally prepared to accept defeat, as the state-controlled media in West Pakistan had 
been projecting imaginary victories. When the surrender in East Pakistan was finally announced, people could not 
come terms with the magnitude of defeat, spontaneous demonstrations and mass protests erupted on the streets of 
major cities in West Pakistan. Also, referring to the remaining rump Western Pakistan as simply "Pakistan" added to 
the effect of the defeat as international acceptance of the secession of the eastern half of the country and its creation 
as the independent state of Bangladesh developed and was given more credence. The cost of the war for Pakistan 
in monetary and human resources was very high. Demoralized and finding himself unable to control the situation, 
General Yahya Khan surrendered power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was sworn-in on 20 December 1971 as President 
and as the (first civilian) Chief Martial Law Administrator. A new and smaller western-based Pakistan emerged on 
16 December 1 97 1. [72] 

The loss of East Pakistan shattered the prestige of the Pakistani military. Pakistan lost half its navy, a quarter of its 

T731 
air force and a third of its army. The war also exposed the shortcomings of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine 

T741 
that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan". Hussain Haqqani, in his book Pakistan: Between 

Mosque and Military notes, 

"Moreover, the army had failed to fulfill its promises of fighting to the last man. The eastern command had 

laid down arms after losing only 1,300 men in battle. In West Pakistan 1,200 military deaths had accompanied 

T751 
lackluster military performance." 

In his book The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative Pakistani Major General Hakeem Arshad Qureshi a 
veteran of this conflict noted, 

"We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own 
country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who alone 
were the cause of our break-up, but a corrupted system and a flawed social order that our own apathy 
had allowed to remain in place for years. At the most critical moment in our history we failed to check 
the limitless ambitions of individuals with dubious antecedents and to thwart their selfish and 
irresponsible behaviour. It was our collective conduct' that had provided the enemy an opportunity to 



dismember us 



.,[76] 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 140 

Bangladesh 

Bangladesh became an independent nation, the world's third most populous Muslim state. Mujibur Rahman was 
released from a West Pakistani prison, returned to Dhaka on 10 January 1972 and to become first President of 
Bangladesh and later its Prime Minister. 

On the brink of defeat around 14 December, the Pakistani Army, and its local collaborators, systematically killed a 

T77ir7Rl 

large number of Bengali doctors, teachers and intellectuals, part of a pogrom against the Hindu minorities who 

constituted the majority of urban educated intellectuals. Young men, especially students, who were seen as 

possible rebels were also targeted. The extent of casualties in East Pakistan is not known. R.J. Rummel cites 
estimates ranging from one to three million people killed. Other estimates place the death toll lower, at 300,000. 
Bangladesh government figures state that Pakistani forces aided by collaborators killed three million people, raped 

roil 

200,000 women and displaced millions of others. In 2010 Bangladesh government set up a tribunal to prosecute 

rs2i 
the people involved in alleged war crimes and those who collaborated with Pakistan. According to the 

Government, the defendants would be charged with Crimes against humanity, genocide, murder, rape and arson. 

Hamoodur Rahman Commission 

In aftermath of war Pakistan Government constituted the Hamoodur Rahman Commission headed by Justice 
Hamoodur Rahman in 1971 to investigate the political and military causes for defeat and the Bangladesh atrocities 
during the war. The commission's report was classified and its publication banned by Bhutto as it put the military in 
poor light, until some parts of the report surfaced in Indian media in 2000. 

When it was declassified, it showed many failings from the strategic to the tactical levels. It confirmed the looting, 

rapes and the killings by the Pakistan Army and their local agents. It lay the blame squarely on Pakistani generals, 

rs7i 
accusing them of debauchery, smuggling, war crimes and neglect of duty. Though no actions were ever taken on 

commissions findings, the commission had recommended public trial of Pakistan Army generals on the charges 

reel 

that they had been responsible for the situation in the first place and that they had succumbed without a fight. 

Simla Agreement 

In 1972 the Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan, the treaty ensured that Pakistan recognised the 

independence of Bangladesh in exchange for the return of the Pakistani POWs. India treated all the POWs in strict 

[291 
accordance with the Geneva Convention, rule 1925. It released more than 90,000 Pakistani PoWs in five 

months. Further, as a gesture of goodwill, nearly 200 soldiers who were sought for war crimes by Bengalis were 

also pardoned by India. 

The accord also gave back more than 13,000 km 2 of land that Indian troops had seized in West Pakistan during the 
war, though India retained a few strategic areas. But some in India felt that the treaty had been too lenient to 
Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, arguing that the fragile democracy in Pakistan would crumble if the accord 
was perceived as being overly harsh by Pakistanis and that he would be accused of losing Kashmir in addition to the 
loss of East Pakistan. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 141 

Long term consequences 

• Steve Coll, in his book Ghost Wars, argues that the Pakistan military's experience with India, including Pervez 
Musharraf s experience in 1971, influenced the Pakistani government to support jihadist groups in Afghanistan 
even after the Soviets left, because the jihadists were a tool to use against India, including bogging down the 
Indian Army in Kashmir. 

• After the war, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power. Pakistan launched Project-706, a secret nuclear weapon 
development program, to defend itself from India. A vast majority of Pakistani nuclear scientists who were 
working at the International Atomic Energy Agency and European and American nuclear programs immediately 
came to Pakistan and joined Project-706. 

• Writing about the war in Foreign Affairs magazine Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stated 'There is no parallel in 

contemporary history to the cataclysm which engulfed Pakistan in 1971. A tragic civil war, which rent asunder 

the people of the two parts of Pakistan, was seized by India as an opportunity for armed intervention. The country 

[93] 
was dismembered, its economy shattered and the nation's self-confidence totally undermined. This statement 

of Bhutto has given rise to the myth of betrayal prevalent in modern Pakistan. This view was contradicted by the 

post-War Hamoodur Rahman Commission, ordered by Bhutto himself, which in its 1974 report indicted generals 

of the Pakistan Army for creating conditions which led to the eventual loss of East Pakistan and for inept handling 

of military operations in the East. 

Important dates 

• 7 March 1971: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declares that, "The current struggle is a struggle for independence", in a 
public meeting attended by almost a million people in Dhaka. 

• 25 March 1971: Pakistani forces start Operation Searchlight, a systematic plan to eliminate any resistance. 
Thousands of people are killed in student dormitories and police barracks in Dhaka. 

• 26 March 1971: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed an official declaration of independence and sent it through a 
radio message on the night of 25 March (the morning of 26 March). Later Major Ziaur Rahman and other Awami 
League leaders announced the declaration of independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujib from Kalurghat Radio 
Station, Chittagong. The message is relayed to the world by Indian radio stations. 

• 27 March 1971: Bangladesh Force namely Mukti Bahini {consisting Niyomito Bahini (Regular Force) and Gono 
Bahini (Guerilla Force)} was formed under the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) General Mohammad Ataul Ghani 
Osmany. 

• 17 April 1971: Exiled leaders of Awami League form a provisional government. 

• 3 December 1971: War between India and Pakistan officially begins when West Pakistan launches a series of 
preemptive air strikes on Indian airfields. 

• 6 December 1971: East Pakistan is recognised as Bangladesh by India. 

• 14 December 1971: Systematic elimination of Bengali intellectuals is started by Pakistani Army and local 
collaborators. 

• 16 December 1971: Lieutenant-General A. A. K. Niazi, supreme commander of Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, 
surrenders to the Allied Forces (Mitro Bahini) represented by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Arora of Indian 
Army at the surrender. India and Bangladesh gain victory. 

• 12 January 1972: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman comes to power. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 



142 



Military awards 



Battle honours 



After the war, a total of number of 41 battle honours and 4 theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian 

[941 
Army, the notable amongst which are: 



East Pakistan 1971 (theatre honour) • Chhamb 

Sindh 1971 (theatre honour) • Defence of Punch 

Jammu and Kashmir 1971 (theatre honour) • Dera Baba Nanak 

Punjab 1971 (theatre honour) • GadraCity 

Basantar River • Harar Kalan 

Bogra • Hilli 

Chachro 



Longanewala 

Parbat Ali 

Poongli Bridge 

Shehjra 

Shingo River Valley 

Sylhet 



Gallantry awards 

For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers on both sides were awarded the highest gallantry award of their 
respective countries. Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award Param Vir Chakra, Bangladeshi award 
Bir Sreshtho and the Pakistani award Nishan-E-Haider: 

India 

Recipients of the Param Vir Chakra: 

• Lance Naik Albert Ekka (Posthumously) 

• Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon (Posthumously) 

• Major Hoshiar Singh 

• Second Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal (Posthumously) 

Bangladesh 

Recipients of the Bir Sreshtho: 

Captain Mohiuddin Jahangir (Posthumously) 

Lance Naik Munshi Abdur Rouf (Posthumously) 

Sepoy Hamidur Rahman (Posthumously) 

Sepoy Mostafa Kamal (Posthumously) 

ERA Mohammad Ruhul Amin (Posthumously) 

Flight Lieutenant Matiur Rahman (Posthumously) 

Lance Naik Nur Mohammad Sheikh (Posthumously) 

Pakistan 

Recipients of the Nishan-E-Haider: 

• Major Muhammad Akram (Posthumously) 

• Pilot Officer Rashid Minhas (Posthumously) 

• Major Shabbir Sharif (Posthumously) 

• Sarwar Muhammad Hussain (Posthumously) 

• Lance Naik Muhammad Mahfuz (Posthumously) 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 143 

Civilian Awards 

On 25 July 2011, Bangladesh Freedom Honour was posthumously conferred on former Indian prime minister 
Indira Gandhi. President of Bangladesh Zillur Rahman and the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina conferred Bangladesh 
Liberation War Honour and Friends of Liberation War Honour to 75 individuals, six organisations, Mitra 
Bahini and the people of India at a special ceremony on 28 March 2012 at the Bangabandhu International 
Conference Centre. This included eight heads of states viz. former Nepalese President Ram Baran Yadav, the third 
King of Bhutan Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, former Soviet presidents Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and Nikolai Viktorovich 
Podgorny, ex-Soviet prime minister Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, former Yugoslav president Marshal Josip Broz 
Tito, ex-UK prime minister Sir Edward Richard George Heath and former Nepalese prime minister Bishweshwar 
Prasad Koirala. The organisations include the BBC, Akashbani (All India Radio), International Committee of the 
Red Cross, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Oxfam and Kolkata University Shahayak Samiti. The 
list of foreign friends of Bangladesh include 257 Indians, 88 Americans, 41 Pakistanis, 39 Britons, nine Russians, 18 
Nepalese, 16 French and 18 Japanese. 

Dramatization 

Films (Indian) 

• Border, a 1997 Bollywood war film directed by J.P.Dutta. This movie is an adaptation from real life events that 

happened at the Battle of Longewala fought in Rajasthan (Western Theatre) during the 1971 Indo-Pak war. 

[99] 
Border at the Internet Movie Database 

• Hindustan Ki Kasam, a 1973 Bollywood war film directed by Chetan Anand. The aircraft in the film are all 
authentic aircraft used in the 1971 war against Pakistan. These include MiG-21s, Gnats, Hunters and Su-7s. Some 
of these aircraft were also flown by war veterans such as Samar Bikram Shah (2 kills) and Manbir Singh. 
Hindustan Ki Kasam at the Internet Movie Database 

• Aakraman, 1975 Bollywood film set during this war featuring a romantic Love triangle. 

• 1971 - Prisoners of War, a 2007 Bollywood war film directed by Sagar Brothers. Set against the backdrop of a 
prisoners' camp in Pakistan, follows six Indian prisoners awaiting release after their capture in the 1971 
India-Pakistan war. 

Miniseries/Dramas (Pakistani) 

• PNS Ghazi (Shaheed), an Urdu drama based on sinking of PNS Ghazi, ISPR 

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[91] Coll, Steve (2005). Ghost Wars (http://books.google.com/?id=ToYxFL5wmBIC&lpg=PPl&pg=PPl#v=onepage&q=). The Penguin 

Press. ISBN 978-1-59420-007-6. . pg 221, 475. 
[92] Kreisler interview with Coll "Conversations with history", 2005 Mar 25 (http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/Coll/coll-con0.html), 

UC Berkeley Institute of International Studies 
[93] Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali (April 1973). "Pakistan Builds Anew" (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24423/zulfikar-ali-bhutto/ 

pakistan-builds-anew). Foreign Affairs. . Retrieved 8 July 2011. 
[94] Singh, Sarbans (1993). Battle Honours of the Indian Army 1757 — 1971 (http://books.google.com/books/about/ 

Battle_honours_of_the_Indian_Army_1757_l.html?id=5ATfAAAAMAAJ). New Delhi: Vision Books, pp. 257-278. ISBN 81-7094-115-6. . 

Retrieved 3 November 201 1. 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 147 

[95] "Martyrs" (http://nda.nic.in/html/nda-martyrs.html). National Defense Academy, Pune. . 

[96] "Param Vir Chakra" (http://india.gov.in/myindia/paramvirchakra_awards_listl.php). Government of India. . 

[97] Friends of freedom honoured (http://www. thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details. php?nid=228046), Wednesday, 28 March 2012, 

thedailystar.net 
[98] B'desh honours foreign friends (http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd. com/more. php?news_id=124849&date=2012-03-28), VOL 20 NO 

339 REGD NO DA 1589; Dhaka, Wednesday 28 March 2012, The Financial Express 

Further reading 

Haqqani, Hussain (2005). Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (http://books.google.com/ 

?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&lpg=PPl&pg=PPl#v=onepage&q=). United Book Press. ISBN 978-0-87003-214-1. 

Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An army, its role and rule: a history of the Pakistan Army from Independence to 

Kargil, 1967-1999 (http://books.google.com/?id=B2saAAAACAAJ). RoseDog Books. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3, 

9780805995947. 

Palit, D K (1972). The Lightning Campaign: The Indo-Pakistan War 1971 (http://books.google.com/ 

?id=rPmTAAAACAAJ). Compton Press Ltd. ISBN 978-0-900193-10-1. 

Saigal, J R (2000). Pakistan Splits: The Birth of Bangladesh (http://books.google.com/?id=gUfaAAAACAAJ). 

Manas Publications. ISBN 81-7049-124-X, 9788170491248. 

Hanhimaki, Jussi M. (2004). The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (http://books. 

google. com/?id=3wolOABSg_YC&lpg=PPl&pg=PPl#v=onepage&q=). Oxford University Press. 

ISBN 0-19-517221-3, 978-0-19-517221-8. 

Niazi, General A. A. K. (1999). Betrayal of East Pakistan (http://books. google. com/?id=nYppZ_dEjdIC& 

lpg=PPl&pg=PPl#v=onepage&q=). Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-579275-0, 9780195792751. 

Raja, Dewan Mohammad Tasawwar (2010). O GENERAL MY GENERAL (Life and Works of General MA G 

Osmany). The Osmany Memorial Trust, Dhaka, Bangladesh. ISBN 978-984-8866-18-4. 

Cilano, Cara, ed. (2010). Pakistaniaat: Special issue on 1971 War. 

External links 

Video of General Niazi Surrendering (http://www.youtube. com/watch ?v=Q8M052QQ6_o) 

A complete coverage of the war from the Indian perspective (http://www.freeindia.org/1971war/) 

An Atlas of the 1971 India — Pakistan War: The Creation of Bangladesh by John H. Gill (http://www.ndu.edu/ 

nesa/docs/Gill atlas final version.pdf) 

Actual conversation from the then US President Nixon and Henry Kissinger during the 1971 War (http://www. 

state. gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xi/) — US Department of State's Official archive. 

Indian Army: Major Operations (http://indianarmy.nic.in/armajop.htm) 

Pakistan: Partition and Military Succession USA Archives (http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ 

pakistan.htm) 

Pakistan intensifies airraid on India BBC (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/3/ 

newsid_2519000/2519133.stm) 

A day by day account of the war as seen in a virtual newspaper, (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/1971/) 

The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971. (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 

NSAEBB79/) 

16 December 1971: any lessons learned? By Ayaz Amir (http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20051216. 

htm) — Pakistan's Dawn (newspaper) 

India-Pakistan 1971 War as covered by TIME (http://www.vidyasoft.com/interest/war/war71.html) 

Indian Air Force Combat Kills in the 1971 war (unofficial), Centre for Indian Military History (http://www. 

orbat.com/site/cimh/iaf/IAF_1971_kills_revl.pdf) 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 148 

• Op Cactus Lilly: 19 Infantry Division in 1971, a personal recall by Lt Col Balwant Singh Sahore (http:// 
frontierindia.net/op-cactus-lilly-19-infantry-division-in-1971/) 

• All for a bottle of Scotch, a personal recall of Major (later Major General) C K Karumbaya, SM, the battle for 
Magura (http://frontierindia.net/all-for-a-bottle-of-scotch/) 

• TIME Magazine article from 20 December 1971 describing the War (http://www.time.com/time/printout/ 
0,8816,878969,00.html) 

• TIME Magazine article from 20 December 1971 critical of the US policy during this war (http://www.time. 
com/time/printout/0,8816,878970,00.html) 

• "The Rediff Interview/Lt Gen A A Khan Niazi" (http://www.rediff.com/. ./news/2004/feb/02interl .htm). 
Rediff. 2 February 2004. 



149 



Background 



Bangladesh Liberation War 



The Bangladesh Liberation War (Bengali: *J^5'l<!\f Muktijuddho) was an armed conflict over a duration of 
about 9 months, putting East Pakistan and India against the State of Pakistan. The war started on 26 March 1971 
between the State of Pakistan and East Pakistan, India intervened on 3 December 1971. Armed conflict ended on 16 
December 1971 and resulted in the secession of East Pakistan, which became the independent nation of Bangladesh. 

The war broke out when army units directed by the State of Pakistan (then controlled by West Pakistan) launched a 
military operation called Operation Searchlight in East Pakistan against Bengali civilians, students, intelligentsia, 
and armed personnel who were demanding for the military regime to honor the results of the first ever 1970 
democratic elections in Pakistan won by an East Pakistan party or to allow separation of the East from West 
Pakistan. Bengali military, paramilitary, and civilians formed the Mukti Bahini (Bengali: SRSv^T <RMl "Liberation 
Army") on March 26, 1971, in response to Operation Searchlight and used guerrilla warfare tactics to fight against 
the West Pakistan army. India provided economic, military and diplomatic support to the Mukti Bahini rebels, 
leading West Pakistan to launch Operation Chengiz Khan, a pre-emptive attack on the western border of India which 
started the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. 

On 16 December 1971, the allied forces of the Indian army and the Mukti Bahini defeated the West Pakistani forces 
deployed in the East. The resulting surrender was the largest in number of prisoners of war since World War II. 

Background 

In August 1947, the Partition of British India gave rise to two new states; the Dominion of India and the Dominion 
of Pakistan, the latter intended to be a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent. The Dominion of 
Pakistan comprised two geographically and culturally separate areas to the east and the west of India. The western 
zone was popularly (and for a period of time, also officially) termed West Pakistan and the eastern zone (modern-day 
Bangladesh) was initially termed East Bengal and later, East Pakistan. Although the population of the two zones was 
close to equal, political power was concentrated in West Pakistan and it was widely perceived that East Pakistan was 
being exploited economically, leading to many grievances. Administration of two discontinuous territories was also 
seen as a challenge. 

On 25 March 1971, rising political discontent and cultural nationalism in East Pakistan was met by brutal 
suppressive force from the ruling elite of the West Pakistan establishment, in what came to be termed Operation 
Searchlight. [6] 

The violent crackdown by West Pakistan forces led to Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declaring 

ro] 

East Pakistan's independence as the state of Bangladesh on 26 March 1971. Pakistani President Agha Mohammed 

ro] 

Yahya ordered the Pakistani military to restore the Pakistani government's authority, beginning the civil war. The 



war led to a sea of refugees (estimated at the time to be about 10 million) flooding into the eastern provinces of 

India. Facing a mounting humanitarian and econom 
Bangladeshi resistance army known as the Mukti Bahini. 



India. Facing a mounting humanitarian and economic crisis, India started actively aiding and organising the 



Bangladesh Liberation War 150 

Language controversy 

In 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's first Governor-General, declared in Dhaka (then usually spelled Dacca in 
English) that "Urdu, and only Urdu" would be the common language for all of Pakistan. This proved highly 
controversial, since Urdu was a language that was only spoken in the West by Muhajirs and in the East by Biharis, 
although the Urdu language had been promoted as the lingua franca of Indian Muslims by political and religious 
leaders such as Sir Khwaja Salimullah, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk and Maulvi Abdul Haq. The 
language was considered a vital element of the Islamic culture for Indian Muslims; Hindi and the Devanagari script 
were seen as fundamentals of Hindu culture. The majority groups in the western provinces of the Dominion of 

Pakistan (merged in 1956 as West Pakistan) spoke Punjabi, while the Bengali language was spoken by the vast 

ri2i 
majority of East Bengalis (from 1956, East Pakistan). The language controversy eventually reached a point where 

East Bengal revolted while the other part of Pakistan remained calm even though Punjabi was spoken by the 

majority of the population of the western provinces. Several students and civilians lost their lives in a police 

crackdown on 21 February 1952. The day is revered in Bangladesh and in West Bengal as the Language Martyrs' 

Day. Later, in memory of the 1952 deaths, UNESCO declared 21 February as the International Mother Language 

Day in 1999. [13] 

ri4i 

In the western provinces, the movement was seen as a sectional uprising against Pakistani national interests and 
the founding ideology of Pakistan, the Two-Nation Theory. West Pakistani politicians considered Urdu a product 
of Indian Islamic culture, as Ayub Khan said, as late as 1967, "East Pakistanis... still are under considerable 
Hindu culture and influence." However, the deaths led to bitter feelings among East Bengalis, and they were a 
major factor in the push for independence in 197 1 . 

Disparities 

Although East Pakistan had a larger population, West Pakistan dominated the divided country politically and 
received more money from the common budget. 



Year 


Spending on West Pakistan (in millions of 
Pakistani rupees) 


Spending on East Pakistan (in millions of 
Pakistani rupees) 


Amount spent on East as 
percentage of West 


1950-55 


11,290 


5,240 


46.4 


1955-60 


16,550 


5,240 


31.7 


1960-65 


33,550 


14,040 


41.8 


1965-70 


51,950 


21,410 


41.2 


Total 


113,340 


45,930 


40.5 


Source: Reports of the Advisor}' Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970—75, Vol. I, published by the planning 


commission of Pakistan. 





Bengalis were underrepresented in the Pakistan military. Officers of Bengali origin in the different wings of the 
armed forces made up just 5% of overall force by 1965; of these, only a few were in command positions, with the 

ri7i 

majority in technical or administrative posts. West Pakistanis believed that Bengalis were not "martially inclined" 

ri7i 

unlike Pashtuns and Punjabis; the "martial races" notion was dismissed as ridiculous and humiliating by Bengalis. 
Moreover, despite huge defence spending, East Pakistan received none of the benefits, such as contracts, purchasing 
and military support jobs. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 over Kashmir also highlighted the sense of military 
insecurity among Bengalis, as only an under-strength infantry division and 15 combat aircraft without tank support 
were in East Pakistan to thwart any Indian retaliations during the conflict. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 151 

Political differences 

Although East Pakistan accounted for a slight majority of the country's population, political power remained in 
the hands of West Pakistanis. Since a straightforward system of representation based on population would have 
concentrated political power in East Pakistan, the West Pakistani establishment came up with the "One Unit" 
scheme, where all of West Pakistan was considered one province. This was solely to counterbalance the East wing's 
votes. 

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first prime minister, in 1951, political power began to devolve 
to the President of Pakistan, and eventually, the military. The nominal elected chief executive, the Prime Minister, 
was frequently sacked by the establishment, acting through the President. 

The East Pakistanis observed that the West Pakistani establishment would swiftly depose any East Pakistanis elected 
Prime Minister of Pakistan, such as Khawaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra, or Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. 
Their suspicions were further influenced by the military dictatorships of Ayub Khan (27 October 1958 — 25 March 
1969) and Yahya Khan (25 March 1969 — 20 December 1971), both West Pakistanis. The situation reached a climax 
in 1970, when the Awami League, the largest East Pakistani political party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won a 
landslide victory in the national elections. The party won 167 of the 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan, and thus a 
majority of the 313 seats in the National Assembly. This gave the Awami League the constitutional right to form a 
government. However, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (a Sindhi and former professor), the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, 
refused to allow Rahman to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Instead, he proposed the idea of having two 
Prime Ministers, one for each wing. The proposal elicited outrage in the east wing, already chafing under the other 
constitutional innovation, the "one unit scheme". Bhutto also refused to accept Rahman's Six Points. On 3 March 
1971, the two leaders of the two wings along with the President General Yahya Khan met in Dhaka to decide the fate 

of the country. After their discussions yielded no satisfactory results, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman called for a 

T211 
nationwide strike. Bhutto feared a civil war, therefore, he sent his trusted companion, Dr. Mubashir Hassan. A 

T211 
message was convened and Mujib decided to meet Bhutto. Upon his arrival, Mujib met with Bhutto and both 

r2ii 
agreed to form a coalition government with Mujib as Premier and Bhutto as President. However, the military was 

T211 
unaware of these developments, and Bhutto increased his pressure on Mujib to reached a decision. 

On 7 March 1971, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (soon to be the prime minister) delivered a speech at the Racecourse 
Ground (now called the Suhrawardy Udyan). In this speech he mentioned a further four-point condition to consider 
at the National Assembly Meeting on 25 March: 

• The immediate lifting of martial law. 

• Immediate withdrawal of all military personnel to their barracks. 

• An inquiry into the loss of life. 

• Immediate transfer of power to the elected representative of the people before the assembly meeting 25 March. 

He urged his people to turn every house into a fort of resistance. He closed his speech saying, "Our struggle is for 
our freedom. Our struggle is for our independence." This speech is considered the main event that inspired the nation 
to fight for its independence. General Tikka Khan was flown in to Dhaka to become Governor of East Bengal. 
East-Pakistani judges, including Justice Siddique, refused to swear him in. 

Between 10 and 13 March, Pakistan International Airlines cancelled all their international routes to urgently fly 
"government passengers" to Dhaka. These "government passengers" were almost all Pakistani soldiers in civilian 
dress. MV Swat, a ship of the Pakistan Navy carrying ammunition and soldiers, was harboured in Chittagong Port, 
but the Bengali workers and sailors at the port refused to unload the ship. A unit of East Pakistan Rifles refused to 
obey commands to fire on the Bengali demonstrators, beginning a mutiny among the Bengali soldiers. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 152 

Response to the 1970 cyclone 

The 1970 Bhola cyclone made landfall on the East Pakistan coastline during the evening of 12 November, around the 

T221 
same time as a local high tide, killing an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 people. Though the exact death toll is not 

known, it is considered the deadliest tropical cyclone on record. A week after the landfall, President Khan 

conceded that his government had made "slips" and "mistakes" in its handling of the relief efforts due to a lack of 

understanding of the magnitude of the disaster. 

A statement released by eleven political leaders in East Pakistan ten days after the cyclone hit charged the 
government with "gross neglect, callous and utter indifference". They also accused the president of playing down the 
magnitude of the problem in news coverage. On 19 November, students held a march in Dhaka protesting the 
slowness of the government's response. Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani addressed a rally of 50,000 people 
on 24 November, where he accused the president of inefficiency and demanded his resignation. 

As the conflict between East and West Pakistan developed in March, the Dhaka offices of the two government 
organisations directly involved in relief efforts were closed for at least two weeks, first by a general strike and then 
by a ban on government work in East Pakistan by the Awami League. With this increase in tension, foreign 
personnel were evacuated over fears of violence. Relief work continued in the field, but long-term planning was 
curtailed. This conflict widened into the Bangladesh Liberation War in December and concluded with the 

T281 

creation of Bangladesh. This is one of the first times that a natural event helped to trigger a civil war. 

Operation Searchlight 

A planned military pacification carried out by the Pakistan Army — codenamed Operation Searchlight — started on 

[291 
25 March to curb the Bengali nationalist movement by taking control of the major cities on 26 March, and then 

eliminating all opposition, political or military, within one month. Before the beginning of the operation, all 

[31] 
foreign journalists were systematically deported from East Pakistan. 

The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major town in Bengali hands in mid-May. 
The operation also began the 1971 Bangladesh atrocities. These systematic killings served only to enrage the 
Bengalis, which ultimately resulted in the secession of East Pakistan later in the same year. The international media 

and reference books in English have published casualty figures which vary greatly, from 5,000—35,000 in Dhaka, 

T321 
and 200,000—3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole, and the atrocities have been referred to as acts of 

genocide. 

According to the Asia Times, 

At a meeting of the military top brass, Yahya Khan declared: "Kill 3 million of them and the rest will eat 
out of our hands." Accordingly, on the night of 25 March, the Pakistani Army launched Operation 
Searchlight to "crush" Bengali resistance in which Bengali members of military services were disarmed 
and killed, students and the intelligentsia systematically liquidated and able-bodied Bengali males just 
picked up and gunned down. 

Although the violence focused on the provincial capital, Dhaka, it also affected all parts of East Pakistan. Residential 
halls of the University of Dhaka were particularly targeted. The only Hindu residential hall — the Jagannath Hall — 
was destroyed by the Pakistani armed forces, and an estimated 600 to 700 of its residents were murdered. The 
Pakistani army denied any cold blooded killings at the university, though the Hamood-ur-Rehman commission in 
Pakistan concluded that overwhelming force was used at the university. This fact and the massacre at Jagannath Hall 
and nearby student dormitories of Dhaka University are corroborated by a videotape secretly filmed by Prof. Nurul 
Ullah of the East Pakistan Engineering University, whose residence was directly opposite the student dormitories. 

The scale of the atrocities was first made clear in the West when Anthony Mascarenhas, a Pakistani journalist who 
had been sent to the province by the military authorities to write a story favourable to Pakistan's actions, instead fled 
to the United Kingdom and, on 13 June 1971, published an article in the Sunday Times describing the systematic 



Bangladesh Liberation War 153 

killings by the military. The BBC wrote: "There is little doubt that Mascarenhas' reportage played its part in ending 
the war. It helped turn world opinion against Pakistan and encouraged India to play a decisive role", with Indian 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi herself stating that Mascarenhas' article has led her "to prepare the ground for India's 
armed intervention". 

Hindu areas suffered particularly heavy blows. By midnight, Dhaka was burning, especially the Hindu dominated 
eastern part of the city. Time magazine reported on 2 August 1971, "The Hindus, who account for three-fourths of 
the refugees and a majority of the dead, have borne the brunt of the Pakistani military hatred." 

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested by the Pakistani Army. Yahya Khan appointed Brigadier (later General) 
Rahimuddin Khan to preside over a special tribunal prosecuting Mujib with multiple charges. The tribunal's sentence 
was never made public, but Yahya caused the verdict to be held in abeyance in any case. Other Awami League 
leaders were arrested as well, while a few fled Dhaka to avoid arrest. The Awami League was banned by General 
Yahya Khan. 

Declaration of independence 

The violence unleashed by the Pakistani forces on 25 March 1971, proved the last straw to the efforts to negotiate a 
settlement. Following these outrages, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman signed an official declaration that read: 

Today Bangladesh is a sovereign and independent country. On Thursday night, West Pakistani armed 
forces suddenly attacked the police barracks at Razarbagh and the EPR headquarters at Pilkhana in 
Dhaka. Many innocent and unarmed have been killed in Dhaka city and other places of Bangladesh. 
Violent clashes between E.P.R. and Police on the one hand and the armed forces of Pakistan on the 
other, are going on. The Bengalis are fighting the enemy with great courage for an independent 
Bangladesh. May Allah aid us in our fight for freedom. Joy Bangla. 

T411 
Sheikh Mujib also called upon the people to resist the occupation forces through a radio message. Mujib was 

arrested on the night of 25—26 March 1971 at about 1:30 am (as per Radio Pakistan's news on 29 March 1971). 

A telegram containing the text of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's declaration reached some students in Chittagong. The 
message was translated to Bengali by Dr. Manjula Anwar. The students failed to secure permission from higher 
authorities to broadcast the message from the nearby Agrabad Station of Radio Pakistan. They crossed Kalurghat 
Bridge into an area controlled by an East Bengal Regiment under Major Ziaur Rahman. Bengali soldiers guarded the 
station as engineers prepared for transmission. At 19:45 hrs on 27 March 1971, Major Ziaur Rahman broadcast the 
announcement of the declaration of independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur. On 28 March Major Ziaur Rahman 
made another announcement, which was as follows: 

This is Shadhin Bangla Betar Kendro. I, Major Ziaur Rahman, at the direction of Bangobondhu Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, hereby declare that the independent People's Republic of Bangladesh has been 
established. At his direction, I have taken command as the temporary Head of the Republic. In the name 
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, I call upon all Bengalis to rise against the attack by the West Pakistani 

Army. We shall fight to the last to free our Motherland. By the grace of Allah, victory is ours. Joy 

d i [42] 
Bangla. 

The Kalurghat Radio Station's transmission capability was limited. The message was picked up by a Japanese ship in 
Bay of Bengal. It was then re-transmitted by Radio Australia and later by the British Broadcasting Corporation. 

M A Hannan, an Awami League leader from Chittagong, is said to have made the first announcement of the 

T431 
declaration of independence over the radio on 26 March 1971. There is controversy now as to when Major Zia 

gave his speech. BNP sources maintain that it was 26 March, and there was no message regarding declaration of 

independence from Mujibur Rahman. Pakistani sources, like Siddiq Salik in Witness to Surrender had written that he 

heard about Mujibor Rahman's message on the Radio while Operation Searchlight was going on, and Maj. Gen. 

Hakeem A. Qureshi in his book The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative, gives the date of Zia's speech as 27 



Bangladesh Liberation War 



154 



March 1971. [44] 

26 March 1971 is considered the official Independence Day of Bangladesh, and the name Bangladesh was in effect 
henceforth. In July 1971, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi openly referred to the former East Pakistan as 
Bangladesh. Some Pakistani and Indian officials continued to use the name "East Pakistan" until 16 December 
1971. 

Liberation war 



March to June 

At first resistance was spontaneous and disorganised, and was not 
expected to be prolonged. However, when the Pakistani Army 
cracked down upon the population, resistance grew. The Mukti Bahini 
became increasingly active. The Pakistani military sought to quell 
them, but increasing numbers of Bengali soldiers defected to the 
underground "Bangladesh army". These Bengali units slowly merged 
into the Mukti Bahini and bolstered their weaponry with supplies from 
India. Pakistan responded by airlifting in two infantry divisions and 
reorganising their forces. They also raised paramilitary forces of 
Razakars, Al-Badrs and Al-Shams (who were mostly members of the 
Muslim League, then the government party, and other Islamist groups), 
as well as other Bengalis who opposed independence, and Bihari 
Muslims who had settled during the time of partition. 

On 17 April 1971, a provisional government was formed in Meherpur district in western Bangladesh bordering India 
with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was in prison in Pakistan, as President, Syed Nazrul Islam as Acting President, 
Tajuddin Ahmed as Prime Minister, and General Muhammad Ataul Ghani Osmani as Commander-in-Chief, 

Bangladesh Forces. As fighting grew between the occupation army and the Bengali Mukti Bahini, an estimated 10 

T471 
million Bengalis, sought refuge in the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal. 




Leaflets and pamphlets played an important role 
in driving public opinion during the war. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 



155 



i ® 


\ 






Sectors of Liberation War 

International Bonn da iy 

Sector Boundary 


50 100 km 




f 


v ® 

^T __y 






L 


® © 


* ' 1 ) \ 




aj 


© \ 

i 




BAY OF BENGAL J ^\ 



The eleven sectors 



June - September 

Bangladesh forces command was set up on 11 July, with Col. M. A. G. 
Osmani as commander-in-chief (C-in-C) with the status of Cabinet 
Minister, Lt. Col., Abdur Rabb as chief of Staff (COS), Group Captain 
A K Khandker as Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) and Major A R 
Chowdhury as Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS). 

General Osmani had differences of opinion with the Indian leadership 
regarding the role of the Mukti Bahini in the conflict. Indian leadership 
initially envisioned Bengali forces to be trained into a small elite 
guerrilla force of 8,000 members, led by the surviving East Bengal 
Regiment soldiers operating in small cells around Bangladesh to 
facilitate the eventual Indian intervention, but the Bangladesh 
Government in exile and General Osmani favored the following 

, , [49] [50] 

strategy: 

• Bengali conventional force would occupy lodgment areas inside 
Bangladesh and then Bangladesh government would request 
international diplomatic recognition and intervention. Initially 
Mymensingh was picked for this operation, but Gen. Osmani later 
settled on Sylhet. 

• Sending the maximum number to guerrillas inside Bangladesh as soon as possible with the following 

,. .. [51][52] 

objectives: 

• Increasing Pakistani casualties through raids and ambush. 

• Cripple economic activity by hitting power stations, railway lines, storage depots and communication 
networks. 

• Destroy Pakistan army mobility by blowing up bridges/culverts, fuel depots, trains and river crafts. 

• The strategic objective was to make the Pakistanis spread their forces inside the province, so attacks could be 
made on isolated Pakistani detachments. 

[531 
Bangladesh was divided into eleven sectors in July, each with a commander chosen from defected officers of the 

Pakistani army who joined the Mukti Bahini to conduct guerrilla operations and train fighters. Most of their training 

camps were situated near the border area and were operated with assistance from India. The 10th Sector was directly 

placed under the Commander in Chief (C-in-C) General M. A. G. Osmani and included the Naval Commandos and 

[541 
C-in-C's special force. Three brigades (11 Battalions) were raised for conventional warfare; a large guerrilla force 

(estimated at 100,000) was trained. [55] 

Three brigades (8 infantry battalions and 3 artillery batteries) were put into action between July - September. 
During June — July, Mukti Bahini had regrouped across the border with Indian aid through Operation Jackpot and 

[57] 

began sending 2000 — 5000 guerrillas across the border, the so called Moonsoon Offensive, which for various 
reasons (lack of proper training, supply shortage, lack of a proper support network inside Bangladesh etc.) failed to 
achieve its objectives. Bengali regular forces also attacked BOPs in Mymensingh, Comilla and Sylhet, but 

the results were mixed. Pakistani authorities concluded that they had successfully contained the Monsoon Offensive, 
which proved a near-accurate observation. 

Guerrilla operations, which slackened during the training phase, picked up after August. Economic and military 
targets in Dhaka were attacked. The major success story was Operation Jackpot, in which naval commandos mined 
and blew up berthed ships in Chittagong on 16 August 1971. Pakistani reprisals claimed lives of thousands of 
civilians. The Indian army took over supplying the Mukti Bahini from the BSF. They organised six sectors for 
supplying the Bangladesh forces. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 



156 



October — December 

Bangladesh conventional forces attacked border outposts. Kamalpur, Belonia and the Battle of Boyra are a few 
examples. 90 out of 370 BOPs fell to Bengali forces. Guerrilla attacks intensified, as did Pakistani and Razakar 
reprisals on civilian populations. Pakistani forces were reinforced by eight battalions from West Pakistan. The 
Bangladeshi independence fighters even managed to temporarily capture airstrips at Lalmonirhat and Shalutikar. 
Both of these were used for flying in supplies and arms from India. Pakistan sent another 5 battalions from West 
Pakistan as reinforcements. 



Indian involvement 








Unit Key 

Type Size Nation 

[S] = Paratroop hM_ . -'° J9, *" Bsl □ 

53 I l36 Brigade 

I^SJ = Mountain £S£ 5S«^™ I I = Mukti Bahini 




Illustration showing military units and troop 
movements during the war. 



Major battles 


• Battle of Boyra 


• Battle of Garibpur 


• Battle of Dhalai 


• Battle of Hilli 


• Battle of Kushtia 



Wary of the growing involvement of India, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on Indian Air 
Force bases on 3 December 1971. The attack was modelled on the Israeli Air Force's Operation Focus during the 
Six-Day War, and intended to neutralize the Indian Air Force planes on the ground. The strike was seen by India as 
an open act of unprovoked aggression. This marked the official start of the Indo-Pakistani War. 

As a response to the attack, both India and Pakistan formally acknowledged the "existence of a state of war between 
the two countries", even though neither government had formally issued a Declaration of War. 

Three Indian corps were involved in the invasion of East Pakistan. They were supported by nearly three brigades of 
Mukti Bahini fighting alongside them, and many more fighting irregularly. This was far superior to the Pakistani 
army of three divisions. The Indians quickly overran the country, selectively engaging or bypassing heavily 
defended strongholds. Pakistani forces were unable to effectively counter the Indian attack, as they had been 
deployed in small units around the border to counter guerrilla attacks by the Mukti Bahini. Unable to defend 
Dhaka, the Pakistanis surrendered on 16 December 1971. 

The speed of the Indian strategy can be gauged by the fact that one of the regiments of the Indian army (7 Punjab, 
now 8 Mechanised Inf Regiment) fought the liberation war along the Jessore and Khulna axis. They were newly 



Bangladesh Liberation War 157 

converted to a mechanised regiment, and it took them just one week to reach Khulna after capturing Jessore. Their 
losses were limited to just 2 newly acquired APCs (SKOT) from the Russians. 

India's external intelligence agency, the RAW, played a crucial role in providing logistic support to the Mukti Bahini 
during the initial stages of the war. RAW's operation, in then East Pakistan, was the largest covert operation in the 
history of South Asia. 

Pakistani response 

Pakistan launched a number of armoured thrusts along India's western front in attempts to force Indian troops away 
from East Pakistan. Pakistan tried to fight back and boost the sagging morale by incorporating the Special Services 
Group commandos in sabotage and rescue missions. 

The air and naval war 

The Indian Air Force carried out several sorties against Pakistan, and within a week, IAF aircraft dominated the skies 
of East Pakistan. It achieved near-total air supremacy by the end of the first week as the entire Pakistani air 
contingent in the east, PAF No. 14 Squadron, was grounded because of Indian airstrikes at Tejgaon, Kurmitolla, Lai 
Munir Hat and Shamsher Nagar. Sea Hawks from INS Vikrant also struck Chittagong, Barisal and Cox's Bazar, 
destroying the eastern wing of the Pakistan Navy and effectively blockading the East Pakistan ports, thereby cutting 
off any escape routes for the stranded Pakistani soldiers. The nascent Bangladesh Navy (comprising officers and 
sailors who defected from the Pakistani Navy) aided the Indians in the marine warfare, carrying out attacks, most 
notably Operation Jackpot. 

Surrender and aftermath 

On 16 December 1971, Lt. Gen A. A. K. Niazi, CO of Pakistan Army forces located in East Pakistan signed the 
Instrument of Surrender. At the time of surrender only a few countries had provided diplomatic recognition to the 
new nation. Over 93,000 Pakistani troops surrendered to the Indian forces, making it the largest surrender since 
World War II. Bangladesh sought admission in the UN with most voting in its favour, but China vetoed this as 
Pakistan was its key ally. The United States, also a key ally of Pakistan, was one of the last nations to accord 
Bangladesh recognition. To ensure a smooth transition, in 1972 the Simla Agreement was signed between India 
and Pakistan. The treaty ensured that Pakistan recognised the independence of Bangladesh in exchange for the return 
of the Pakistani PoWs. India treated all the PoWs in strict accordance with the Geneva Convention, rule 1925. It 
released more than 93,000 Pakistani PoWs in five months. 

Further, as a gesture of goodwill, nearly 200 soldiers who were sought for war crimes by Bengalis were also 

2 

pardoned by India. The accord also gave back more than 13000 km (unknown operator: u'strong' sq mi) of land 

T711 
that Indian troops had seized in West Pakistan during the war, though India retained a few strategic areas; most 

notably Kargil (which would in turn again be the focal point for a war between the two nations in 1999). This was 

done as a measure of promoting "lasting peace" and was acknowledged by many observers as a sign of maturity by 

India. However, some in India felt that the treaty had been too lenient to Bhutto, who had pleaded for leniency, 

arguing that the fragile democracy in Pakistan would crumble if the accord was perceived as being overly harsh by 

Pakistanis. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 158 

Reaction in West Pakistan to the war 

Reaction to the defeat and dismemberment of half the nation was a shocking loss to top military and civilians alike. 
No one had expected that they would lose the formal war in under a fortnight, and there was also unsettlement over 
what was perceived as a meek surrender of the army in East Pakistan. Yahya Khan's dictatorship collapsed and gave 
way to Bhutto, who took the opportunity to rise to power. General Niazi, who surrendered along with 93,000 troops, 
was viewed with suspicion and contempt upon his return to Pakistan. He was shunned and branded a traitor. The war 
also exposed the shortcomings of Pakistan's declared strategic doctrine that the "defence of East Pakistan lay in West 

T721 

Pakistan". Pakistan also failed to gather international support, and found itself fighting a lone battle with only the 
USA providing any external help. This further embittered the Pakistanis, who had faced the worst military defeat of 
an army in decades. 

The debacle immediately prompted an enquiry headed by Justice Hamoodur Rahman. Called the Hamoodur Rahman 
Commission, it was initially suppressed by Bhutto as it put the military in a poor light. When it was declassified, it 
showed many failings from the strategic to the tactical levels. It also condemned the atrocities and the war crimes 
committed by the armed forces. It confirmed the looting, rapes and the killings by the Pakistan Army and their local 
agents although the figures are far lower than the ones quoted by Bangladesh. According to Bangladeshi sources, 
200,000 women were raped and over 3 million people were killed, while the Rahman Commission report in Pakistan 
claimed 26,000 died and the rapes were in the hundreds. However, the army's role in splintering Pakistan after its 
greatest military debacle was largely ignored by successive Pakistani governments. 

Atrocities 

During the war there were widespread killings and other atrocities — including the displacement of civilians in 
Bangladesh (East Pakistan at the time) and widespread violations of human rights — carried out by the Pakistan 

Army with support from political and religious militias, beginning with the start of Operation Searchlight on 25 

T321 
March 1971. Bangladeshi authorities claimed that three million people were killed, while the Hamoodur Rahman 

T731 
Commission, an official Pakistan Government investigation, put the figure at 26,000 civilian casualties. The 

international media and reference books in English by authors and genocide scholars such as Samuel Totten have 

T741 
also published figures of up to 3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole, although independent researchers put the toll 

r-7C"i r76i 

at 300,000 to 500,000. A further eight to ten million people fled the country to seek safety in India. 

A large section of the intellectual community of Bangladesh were murdered, mostly by the Al-Shams and Al-Badr 

T771 T7R1 

forces, at the instruction of the Pakistani Army. Just two days before the surrender, on 14 December 1971, 

Pakistan Army and Razakar militia (local collaborators) picked up at least 100 physicians, professors, writers and 

[791 
engineers in Dhaka, and murdered them, leaving the dead bodies in a mass grave. There are many mass graves in 

Bangladesh, with an increasing number discovered throughout the proceeding years (such as one in an old well near 

a mosque in Dhaka, located in the non-Bengali region of the city, which was discovered in August 1999). The 

first night of war on Bengalis, which is documented in telegrams from the American Consulate in Dhaka to the 

roil 

United States State Department, saw indiscriminate killings of students of Dhaka University and other civilians. 
Numerous women were tortured, raped and killed during the war; the exact numbers are not known and are a subject 

of debate. Bangladeshi sources cite a figure of 200,000 women raped, giving birth to thousands of war 

rs2irs3irs4i 
babies. The Pakistan Army also kept numerous Bengali women as sex-slaves inside the Dhaka 

roc] 

Cantonment. Most of the girls were captured from Dhaka University and private homes. There was significant 

sectarian violence not only perpetrated and encouraged by the Pakistani army, but also by Bengali nationalists 

rs7i 
against non-Bengali minorities, especially Biharis. 

On 16 December 2002, the George Washington University's National Security Archive published a collection of 
declassified documents, consisting mostly of communications between US embassy officials and United States 

roo] 

Information Service centres in Dhaka and India, and officials in Washington DC. These documents show that US 
officials working in diplomatic institutions within Bangladesh used the terms "selective genocide" and "genocide" 



Bangladesh Liberation War 159 

(see The Blood Telegram) for information on events they had knowledge of at the time). Genocide is the term that is 
still used to describe the event in almost every major publication and newspaper in Bangladesh, although 

elsewhere, particularly in Pakistan, the actual death toll, motives, extent, and destructive impact of the actions of the 
Pakistani forces are disputed. 

Foreign reaction 
United Nations 

Though the United Nations condemned the human rights violations during and following Operation Searchlight, it 
failed to defuse the situation politically before the start of the war. 

Following Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's declaration of independence in March 1971, India undertook a world-wide 

campaign to drum up political, democratic and humanitarian support for the people of Bangladesh for their liberation 

struggle. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi toured a large number of countries in a bid to create awareness of the 

Pakistani atrocities against Bengalis. This effort was to prove vital later during the war, in framing the world's 

[92] 
context of the war and to justify military action by India. Also, following Pakistan's defeat, it ensured prompt 

recognition of the newly independent state of Bangladesh. 

Following India's entry into the war, Pakistan, fearing certain defeat, made urgent appeals to the United Nations to 
intervene and force India to agree to a cease fire. The UN Security Council assembled on 4 December 1971 to 
discuss the hostilities in South Asia. After lengthy discussions on 7 December, the United States made a resolution 
for "immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops". While supported by the majority, the USSR vetoed the 
resolution twice. In light of the Pakistani atrocities against Bengalis, the United Kingdom and France abstained on 
the resolution. 

On 12 December, with Pakistan facing imminent defeat, the United States requested that the Security Council be 

reconvened. Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was rushed to New York 

City to make the case for a resolution on the cease fire. The council continued deliberations for four days. By the 

time proposals were finalised, Pakistan's forces in the East had surrendered and the war had ended, making the 

measures merely academic. Bhutto, frustrated by the failure of the resolution and the inaction of the United Nations, 

[93] 
ripped up his speech and left the council. 

[92] 
Most UN member nations were quick to recognize Bangladesh within months of its independence. 

USA and USSR 

[94] 
The United States supported Pakistan both politically and materially. U.S. President Richard Nixon denied getting 

involved in the situation, saying that it was an internal matter of Pakistan, but when Pakistan's defeat seemed certain, 

[95] 
Nixon sent the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal, a move deemed by the Indians as a nuclear 

threat. Enterprise arrived on station on 11 December 1971. On 6 and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two 

groups of ships, armed with nuclear missiles, from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 in the Indian Ocean 

from 18 December until 7 January 1972. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 



160 



^ "' 


- 


■-■ 






t^^m? 





The Nixon administration provided support to 

Pakistani President Yahya Khan during the 

turmoil. 



Nixon and Henry Kissinger feared Soviet expansion into South and 

Southeast Asia. Pakistan was a close ally of the People's Republic of 

China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and 

which he intended to visit in February 1972. Nixon feared that an 

Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination 

of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position 

of the United States and the regional position of America's new tacit 

ally, China. In order to demonstrate to China the bona fides of the 

United States as an ally, and in direct violation of the US 

Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies 

to Pakistan and routed them through Jordan and Iran, while also 

encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan. The Nixon 

administration also ignored reports it received of the genocidal activities of the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan, 

most notably the Blood telegram. 

The Soviet Union supported Bangladesh and Indian armies, as well as the Mukti Bahini during the war, recognising 
that the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its rivals — the United States and China. It gave 
assurances to India that if a confrontation with the United States or China developed, the USSR would take 
countermeasures. This was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971. The Soviets also 
sent a nuclear submarine to ward off the threat posed by USS Enterprise in the Indian Ocean. 

At the end of the war, the Warsaw Pact countries were among the first to recognize Bangladesh. The Soviet Union 
accorded recognition to Bangladesh on 25 January 1972. The United States delayed recognition for some months, 



before according it on 8 April 1972 



[98] 



China 

As a long-standing ally of Pakistan, the People's Republic of China reacted with alarm to the evolving situation in 
East Pakistan and the prospect of India invading West Pakistan and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. Believing that just 
such an Indian attack was imminent, Nixon encouraged China to mobilise its armed forces along its border with 
India to discourage it. The Chinese did not, however, respond to this encouragement, because unlike the 1962 
Sino-Indian War when India was caught entirely unaware, this time the Indian Army was prepared and had deployed 
eight mountain divisions to the Sino-Indian border to guard against such an eventuality. China instead threw its 

weight behind demands for an immediate ceasefire. 

[99] 
When Bangladesh applied for membership to the United Nations in 1972, China vetoed their application because 

two United Nations resolutions regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war and civilians had not yet been 

implemented. China was also among the last countries to recognize independent Bangladesh, refusing to do so 

until 31 August 1975 



[92] [99] 



Bangladesh Liberation War 161 

Footnotes 

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[2] Grover, Preston (8 June 1947). "India Partition Will Present Many Problems" (http://news.google.com/ 

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[7] The Pakistani Slaughter That Nixon Ignored , Syndicated Column by Sydney Schanberg, New York Times, 3 May 1994 
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pg=2676,6420028&dq=east+pakistan+independence&hl=en). Associated Press. Daytona Beach, Florida, USA: Daytona Beach Morning 

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[9] Crisis in South Asia —A report by Senator Edward Kennedy to the Subcommittee investigating the Problem of Refugees and Their 

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0,9171,910155-2,00.html). TIME. 13 December 1971. . Retrieved 23 June 2011. 

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Bangladesh Liberation War 162 

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CHAP8.HTM), ISBN 3-8258-4010-7, Chapter 8, Table 8.2 Pakistan Genocide in Bangladesh Estimates, Sources, and Calcualtions (http:// 

www. hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB8. 2. GIF): lowest estimate two million claimed by Pakistan (reported by Aziz, Qutubuddin. Blood 

and tears Karachi: United Press of Pakistan, 1974. pp. 74,226), all the other sources used by Rummel suggest a figure of between 8 and 10 

million with one (Johnson, B. L. C. Bangladesh. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975. pp. 73,75) that "could have been" 12 million. 
[77] Many of the eyewitness accounts of relations that were picked up by "Al Badr" forces describe them as Bengali men. The only survivor of 

the Rayerbazar killings describes the captors and killers of Bengali professionals as fellow Bengalis. See 37 Dilawar Hossain, account 

reproduced in 'Ekattorer Ghatok-dalalera ke Kothay' (Muktijuddha Chetona Bikash Kendro, Dhaka, 1989) 
[78] Asadullah Khan The loss continues to haunt us (http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/12/14/d512141501 115.htm) in The Daily Star 14 

December 2005 
[79] "125 Slain in Dacca Area, Believed Elite of Bengal" (http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract. 

html?res=F50C13F83C5E127A93CBA81789D95F458785F9). New York Times (New York, NY, USA): p. 1. 19 December 1971. . Retrieved 

4 January 2008. "At least 125 persons, believed to be physicians, professors, writers and teachers were found murdered today in a field outside 

Dacca. All the victims' hands were tied behind their backs and they had been bayoneted, garroted or shot. They were among an estimated 300 

Bengali intellectuals who had been seized by West Pakistani soldiers and locally recruited supporters." 
[80] DPA report Mass grave found in Bangladesh (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/1999/99aug08/world.htm#7) in The Chandigarh Tribune 8 

August 1999 
[81] Sajit Gandhi The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 (http://www. 

gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/) 16 December 2002 
[82] "Bengali Wives Raped in War Are Said to Face Ostracism" (http://www.docstrangelove.com/uploads/1971/foreign/ 

19720118_nyt_bengali_wives_raped_in_war_are_said_to_face_ostracism.pdf). The New York Times. 1972-01-08. . Retrieved 2011-11-10. 
[83] Menen, Aubrey (1972-07-23). "The Rapes of Bangladesh" (http://www.docstrangelove.com/uploads/1971/foreign/ 

19720723_nyt_the_rapes_of_bangladesh.pdf). The New York Times. . Retrieved 201 1-1 1-10. 
[84] Astrachan, Anthony (1972-03-22). "U.N. Asked to Aid Bengali Abortions" (http://www.docstrangelove.com/uploads/1971/foreign/ 

19720322_wp_un_asked_to_aid_bengali_abortions.pdf). The Washington Post. . Retrieved 2011-11-10. 
[85] East Pakistan: Even the Skies Weep (http://www.time.eom/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 877316, 00. html), Time Magazine, 25 October 

1971. 
[86] U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere 

(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB6.pdf), 31 March 1971, Confidential, 3 pp 
[87] Sen, Sumit (1999). "Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: the Bihari Refugees of South Asia, Part 1 " (http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ 

cgi/reprint/1 1/4/625. pdf) (PDF). International Journal of Refugee Law 11 (4): 625-645. doi:10.1093/ijrl/l 1.4.625. . Retrieved 20 October 

2006. 
[88] Gandhi, Sajit, ed. (16 December 2002), The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 

NSAEBB79/): National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 
[89] U.S. Consulate in Dacca (27 March 1971), Selective genocide (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBBl.pdf), 

Cable (PDF) 
[90] Editorial " The Jamaat Talks Back (http://www.bangladeshobserveronline.com/new/2005/12/30/editorial.htm)" in The Bangladesh 

Observer 30 December 2005 
[91] Dr. N. Rabbee " Remembering a Martyr (http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2005/12/03/remembrance.htm)" Star weekend 

Magazine, The Daily Star 16 December 2005 
[92] "The Recognition Story" (http://www. bdsdf.org/forum/index. php?showtopic=3072). Bangladesh Strategic and Development Forum. . 

Retrieved 201 1-08-17. 
[93] "Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's farewell speech to the United Nations Security Council - Wikisource" (http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/ 

Zulfiqar_Ali_Bhutto's_farewell_speech_to_the_United_Nations_Security_Council). En.wikisource.org. . Retrieved 2011-10-26. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 164 

[94] "Nixon and Pakistan: An Unpopular Alliance" (http://news. google.com/newspapers ?id=lLslAAAAIBAJ&sjid=R_MFAAAAIBAJ& 

pg=3565,2560587&dq=nixon+pakistan&hl=en). Reuters. Miami, Florida, USA: The Miami News, via Google News. 17 December 1971. . 
[95] Scott, Paul (21 December 1971). "Naval 'Show of Force' By Nixon Meant As Blunt Warning to India" (http://news.google.com/ 

newspapers ?id=HUU0AAAAIBAJ&sjid=IeEIAAAAIBAJ&pg=5099,2016461&dq=nixon+pakistan+military&hl=en). Bangor, Maine, 

USA: Bangor Daily News, via Google News. . 
[96] Shalom, Stephen R., The Men Behind Yahya in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 (http://coat.ncf.ca/our_magazine/links/issue47/articles/a07. 

htm) 
[97] "USSR, Czechoslovakia Recognize Bangladesh" (http://news. google.com/newspapers ?id=OdIoAAAAIBAJ&sjid=gQYGAAAAIBAJ& 

pg=2219,2272476&dq=bangladesh+ussr+recognize&hl=en). Associated Press. Sumter, South Carolina, USA: The Sumter Daily Item, via 

Google News. January 25, 1972. . 
[98] "Nixon Hopes for Subcontinent Peace" (http://news. google.com/newspapers ?id=5TMsAAAAIBAJ&sjid=5ssEAAAAIBAJ& 

pg=3505,1398456&dq=usa+recognize+bangladesh&hl=en). Associated Press. Spartanburg, South Carolina, USA: Herald-Journal, via 

Google News. 9 April 1972. . 
[99] "China Recognizes Bangladesh" (http://news. google.com/newspapers ?id=rnVKAAAAIBAJ&sjid=RSINAAAAIBAJ& 

pg=4237,20391&dq=china+recognize+bangladesh&hl=en). Associated Press. Oxnard, California, USA: The Press Courier, via Google 

News. 1 September 1975. . 
[100] "China Veto Downs Bangladesh UN Entry" (http://news. google.com/newspapers ?id=GQsyAAAAIBAJ&sjid=w6EFAAAAIBAJ& 

pg=4712,6055847&dq=bangladesh+united-nations+china&hl=en). United Press International. Montreal, Quebec, Canada: The Montreal 

Gazette, via Google News. August 26, 1972. . 

References 

• Pierre Stephen and Robert Payne: Massacre, Macmillan, New York, (1973). ISBN 0-02-595240-4 

• Christopher Hitchens "The Trials of Henry Kissinger", Verso (2001). ISBN 1-85984-631-9 

• Library of Congress Country Studies 

Further reading 

Ayoob, Mohammed and Subrahmanyam, K., The Liberation War, S. Chand and Co. pvt Ltd. New Delhi, 1972. 

Bhargava, G.S., Crush India or Pakistan's Death Wish, ISSD, New Delhi, 1972. 

Bhattacharyya, S. K., Genocide in East Pakistan/Bangladesh: A Horror Story, A. Ghosh Publishers, 1988. 

Brownmiller, Susan: Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, Ballantine Books, 1993. 

Choudhury, G.W., "Bangladesh: Why It Happened." International Affairs . (1973). 48(2): 242-249. 

Choudhury, G.W., The Last Days of United Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 1994. 

Govt, of Bangladesh, Documents of the war of Independence, Vol 01-16, Ministry of Information. 

Kanjilal, Kalidas, The Perishing Humanity, Sahitya Loke, Calcutta, 1976 

Johnson, Rob, 'A Region in Turmoil' (New York and London, 2005) 

Malik, Amita, The Year of the Vulture, Orient Longmans, New Delhi, 1972. 

Mascarenhas, Anthony, The Rape ofBangla Desh, Vikas Publications, 1972. 

Matinuddin, General Kamal, Tragedy of Errors: East Pakistan Crisis, 1968—1971, Wajidalis, Lahore, Pakistan, 

1994. 

Mookherjee, Nayanika, A Lot of History: Sexual Violence, Public Memories and the Bangladesh Liberation War 

of 1971, D. Phil thesis in Social Anthropology, SOAS, University of London, 2002. 

National Security Archive, The Tilt: the U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 (http://www.gwu.edu/ 

~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79) 

Quereshi, Major General Hakeem Arshad, The 1971 Indo-Pak War, A Soldiers Narrative, Oxford University 

Press, 2002. 

Rummel, R.J., Death By Government, Transaction Publishers, 1997. 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, 1977. 

Sisson, Richard & Rose, Leo, War and secession: Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh, University of 

California Press (Berkeley), 1990. 



Bangladesh Liberation War 165 

• Totten, Samuel et al., eds., Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, Garland Reference 
Library, 1997 

• US Department of State Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States: Nixon-Ford 
Administrations, vol. E-7, Documents on South Asia 1969—1972 (http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/ 
xi) 

• Zaheer, Hasan: The separation of East Pakistan: The rise and realization of Bengali Muslim nationalism, Oxford 
University Press, 1994. 

• Raja, Dewan Mohammad Tasawwar (2010). O GENERAL MY GENERAL (Life and Works of General M. A. G. 
Osmani). The Osmani Memorial Trust, Dhaka, Bangladesh. ISBN 978-984-8866-18-4. 

External links 

• Banglapedia article on the Liberation war of Bangladesh (http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/W_0020. 
htm) 

1971 Bangladesh Genocide Archive (http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/) 

Video Streaming of 5 Liberation war documentaries (http://www.banglagallery.net/vdo/index.php) 
Video, audio footage, news reports, pictures and resources from Mukto-mona (http://www.mukto-mona.com/ 
1 97 1/English/ archive, htm) 

Picture Gallery of the Language Movement 1952 & the Independence War 1971 of Bangladesh (http://ethikana. 
com/gallery /w ar. htm) 

Bangladesh Liberation War. Mujibnagar. Government Documents 1971 (http://www.newagebd.com/2005/ 
feb/18/febl8/xtra_also3.html) 

Torture in Bangladesh 1971—2004 (PDF) (http://www.redress.org/publications/Bangladesh.pdf) 
Eyewitness Accounts: Genocide in Bangladesh (http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocidel971/witness/ 
rounaq.htm) 

Genocide 1971 (http://www.engr.uconn.edu/~faisal/Genocide.html) 

The women of 1971. Tales of abuse and rape by the Pakistan Army, (http://drishtipat.org/1971/war.htm) 
Mathematics of a Massacre, Abul Kashem (http://www.mukto-mona.com/new_site/mukto-mona/Articles/ 
kasem/mathematics_genocide . htm) 

The complete Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/ 
Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/default.shtm) 

1971 Massacre in Bangladesh and the Fallacy in the Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report, Dr. M.A. Hasan 
(http://www.bangladeshmariners.com/HmdrRprt/71mass.html) 

Women of Pakistan Apologize for War Crimes, 1996 (http://www.adhunika.com/issues/wpawc7 1 .html) 
Pakistan Army not involved (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. asp?page=story_30-6-2005_pgl_2) 
Sheikh Mujib wanted a confederation: US papers, by Anwar Iqbal, Dawn, 7 July 2005 (http://www.dawn.com/ 
2005/07/07/nat3.htm) 

Page containing copies of the surrender documents (http://www.muktadhara.net/pagell.html) 
A website dedicated to Liberation war of Bangladesh (http://www.jonmojuddho.org/) 
Video clip of the surrender by Pakistan (http://indianarmy.nic.in/arimage/Pak_surrender.WMV) 
Bangladesh Liberation War Picture Gallery (http://www.banglagallery. com/gallery/categories. php?cat_id=5) 

Graphic images, viewer discretion advised 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 166 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 



Beginning with the start of Operation Searchlight on 25 March 1971 and due to the Bangladesh Liberation War, 
there were numerous human rights abuses in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) perpetrated by the Pakistan Army, with 
support from local political and religious militias, especially against Hindus. Time reported a high ranking U.S. 

official as saying "It is the most incredible, calculated thing since the days of the Nazis in Poland." 

Bangladeshi authorities claim that as many as 3 million people were killed, although the Hamoodur Rahman 

Ml 

Commission, an official Pakistan Government investigation, put the figure as low as 26,000 civilian casualties. 
The international media and reference books in English have also published figures which vary greatly from 200,000 
to 3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole, with 300,000 to 500,000 being a figure quoted by news outlets such as the 
BBC for the estimated death toll as counted by independent researchers. As a result of the conflict, a further eight 
to ten million people fled the country at the time to seek refuge in neighboring India. 

Many of those killed were the victims of militias who fought with the West Pakistan Army: Razakars, Al-Shams and 

T71 rsi 

Al-Badr forces, at the instruction of the Pakistani Army. There are many mass graves in Bangladesh, and more 

are continually being discovered (such as one in an old well near a mosque in Dhaka, located in the non-Bengali 

region of the city, which was discovered in August 1999). The first night of war on Bengalis, which is documented 

in telegrams from the American Consulate in Dhaka to the United States State Department, saw indiscriminate 

killings of students of Dhaka University and other civilians. 

Some women were raped, tortured and killed during the war. The exact numbers are not known and are a subject of 
debate with some sources quoting figures as high as 400,000. One particular revelation concerns 563 young Bengali 
women, some only 18, who were held captive inside Dhaka's dingy military cantonment since the first days of the 
fighting. They were seized from Dhaka University and private homes and forced into military brothels, with some of 
the women carrying war babies being released. 

There was significant sectarian violence not only perpetrated by the West Pakistani army, but also by Bengali 

ri2i 
nationalists against non-Bengali minorities, especially Biharis. 

On 16 December 2002, the George Washington University's National Security Archive published a collection of 
declassified documents, consisting mostly of communications between US embassy officials and USIS centers in 
Dhaka and India, and officials in Washington DC. These documents show that US officials working in diplomatic 
institutions within Bangladesh used the terms selective genocide and genocide (see The Blood Telegram) to 

describe events they had knowledge of at the time. The complete chronology of events as reported to the Nixon 
administration can be found on the Department of State website. 

Every major publication and newspaper in Bangladesh and some international publications on genocide and human 
rights abuses use the term genocide to describe the event. 

Matthew J. White, in his 2012 book The Great Big Book of Horrible Things, estimates the total death toll of the 
Bengali genocide at 1.5 million. He ranks the Bengali genocide as the third worst genocide of the 20th century, after 

the The Holocaust (the Jewish genocide), for which he gives an estimate of 5.5 million, and the Holodomor (the 

T221 
Ukrainian genocide), for which he gives an estimate of 4.2 million. 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 167 

Operation Searchlight 

Operation Searchlight was a planned military operation carried out by the Pakistan Army to curb elements of the 

T231 
separatist Bengali nationalist movement in erstwhile East Pakistan in March 1971. Ordered by the government in 

West Pakistan, this was seen as the sequel to Operation Blitz which had been launched in November 1970. 

The original plan envisioned taking control of the major cities on 26 March 1971, and then eliminating all 

T241 
opposition, political or military, within one month. The prolonged Bengali resistance was not anticipated by 

[251 
Pakistani planners. The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major town in Bengali 

hands in mid May. 

Casualties 

The number of civilians that died in the Bangladesh War is not accurately known. There is a great disparity in the 
casualty figures put forth by Pakistan on one hand (25,000, as reported in the Hamoodur Rahman Commission ) 

and India and Bangladesh on the other hand. (From 1972 to 1975 the first post-war prime minister of Bangladesh, 

T271 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, claimed on several occasions that at least three million died). The international media 

and reference books in English have also published figures which vary greatly: varying from 5,000—35,000 in 

Dhaka, and 200,000-3,000,000 for Bangladesh as a whole.Virtual Bangladesh: History: The Bangali Genocide, 1971 

rofil T2R1 

</ref> It is believed in certain quarters that the figure of three million has its origins in comments made by 
Yahya Khan to the journalist Robert Payne on 22 February 1971: "Kill three million of them, and the rest will eat out 

f . , ,,[29] [30] 

of our hands. 

In October 1997 R. J. Rummel published a book, which is available on the web, titled Statistics of Democide: 
Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900. In Chapter 8, Statistics Of Pakistan's Democide - Estimates, Calculations, 
And Sources, he states: 

In East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) [General Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan and his top generals] also planned to murder its Bengali 
intellectual, cultural, and political elite. They also planned to indiscriminately murder hundreds of thousands of its Hindus and drive the rest 
into India. And they planned to destroy its economic base to insure that it would be subordinate to West Pakistan for at least a generation to 
come. This despicable and cutthroat plan was outright genocide. 



Rummel goes on to collate what he considers the most credible estimates published by others into what he calls 
democide. He writes that "Consolidating both ranges, I give a final estimate of Pakistan's democide to be 300,000 to 
3,000,000, or a prudent 1,500,000." 

The Office of the Historian of the United States Department of State held a two-day conference in late June 2005 on 

[31] 

U.S. policy in South Asia between 1961 and 1972. According to a newspaper report published in both Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi newspapers, Bangladeshi speakers at the conference stated that the official Bangladeshi figure of 
civilian deaths was close to 300,000, which was wrongly translated from Bengali into English as three million. 
Ambassador Shamsher M. Chowdhury acknowledged that Bangladesh alone cannot correct this mistake and 

suggested that Pakistan and Bangladesh should form a joint commission to investigate the 1971 disaster and prepare 

,. [32] 
a report. 

Killing of intellectuals 

During the war, the Pakistan Army and its local collaborators carried out a systematic execution of the leading 
Bengali intellectuals. A number of professors from Dhaka University were killed during the first few days of the 

[2][33] 

war. However, the most extreme cases of targeted killing of intellectuals took place during the last few days of 

the war. Professors, journalists, doctors, artists, engineers, writers were rounded up by Pakistan Army and the 
Razakar militia in Dhaka, blindfolded, taken to torture cells in Mirpur, Mohammadpur, Nakhalpara, Rajarbagh and 
other locations in different sections of the city to be executed en masse , most notably at Rayerbazar and 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 168 

Mirpur. Allegedly, the Pakistani Army and its paramilitary arm, the Al-Badr and Al-Shams forces 

created a list of doctors, teachers, poets, and scholars. 

During the nine month duration of the war, the Pakistani army, with the assistance of local collaborators 
systematically executed an estimated 991 teachers, 13 journalists, 49 physicians, 42 lawyers, and 16 writers, artists 
and engineers. Even after the official ending of the war on 16 December there were reports of firing from the 
armed Pakistani soldiers or their collaborators. In one such incident, notable film-maker Jahir Raihan was killed on 
January 30, 1972 in Mirpur allegedly by the armed Beharis. In memory of the persons killed, December 14 is 
mourned in Bangladesh as Shaheed Buddhijibi Dibosh ("Day of the Martyred Intellectuals"). 

Several noted intellectuals who were killed from the time period of 25 March to 16 December 1971 in different parts 
of the country include Dhaka University professors Dr. Govinda Chandra Dev (Philosophy), Dr. Munier Chowdhury 
(Bengali Literature), Dr. Mufazzal Haider Chaudhury (Bengali Literature), Dr. Anwar Pasha (Bengali Literature), Dr 
M Abul Khair (History), Dr. Jyotirmoy Guhathakurta (English Literature), Humayun Kabir (English Literature), 
Rashidul Hasan (English Literature) and Saidul Hassan (Physics), as well Dr. Hobibur Rahman (Professor of 

Mathematics at Rajshahi University), Dr. Mohammed Fazle Rabbee (Cardiologist), Dr. Alim Chowdhury 

T421 
(Ophthalmologist), Shahidullah Kaiser (Journalist), Nizamuddin Ahmed (Journalist), Selina Parvin (Journalist), 

Altaf Mahmud (Lyricist and musician), Dhirendranath Datta (Politician), Ranadaprasad Saha (Philanthropist) and 

Ayman Zaman (Entrepreneur & Musician). Shaheed Mohammad Salimullah (philanthropist)Shaheed Salimullah had 

been killed in front of his house, the road near his house was named after him in Dhaka, Mohammadpur, the roads 

name "Shaheed Salimullah". 

Violence against women 

[431 
Numerous women were tortured, raped and killed during the war. Again, exact numbers are not known and are a 

subject of debate. Bangladeshi sources cite a figure of 200,000 women raped, giving birth to thousands of 

war-babies. The Pakistan Army also kept numerous Bengali women as sex-slaves inside the Dhaka Cantonment. 

Most of the girls were captured from Dhaka University and private homes. 

Among other sources, Susan Brownmiller refers to an even higher number of over 400,000. Pakistani sources claim 
the number is much lower, though having not completely denied rape incidents. Brownmiller quotes: 

Khadiga, thirteen years old, was interviewed by a photojournalist in Dacca. She was walking to school 
with four other girls when they were kidnapped by a gang of Pakistani soldiers. All five were put in a 
military brothel in Mohammedpur and held captive for six months until the end of the war. 

The licentious attitude of the soldiers, although generally supported by the superiors, alarmed the regional high 
command of Pakistan army. On April 15, 1971, in a secret memorandum to the divisional commanders, Niazi 
complained, 

Since my arrival, I have heard numerous reports of troops indulging in loot and arson, killing people at random and without reasons in areas 
cleared of the anti state elements; of late there have been reports of rape and even the West Pakistanis are not being spared; on 12 April two 
East Pakistani women were raped, and an attempt was made on two others. 



Another work that has included direct experiences from the women raped is Ami Birangona Bolchhi ("I, the heroine, 
speak") by Nilima Ibrahim. The work includes in its name from the word Birangona (Heroine), given by Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman after the war, to the raped and tortured women during the war. This was a conscious effort to 
alleviate any social stigma the women might face in the society. How successful this effort was is doubtful, though. 
In October 2005 Sarmila Bose (a Boston, Massachusetts born Harvard-educated Bengali Indian academic), published 
a paper suggesting that the casualties and rape allegations in the war have been greatly exaggerated for political 
purposes. A number of researchers have shown inaccuracies in the work, including flawed methodology of 

statistical analysis, misrepresentation of referenced sources, and disproportionate weight to Pakistan army 
testimonies. 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 169 

Violence against minorities 

The minorities of Bangladesh, especially the Hindus, were specific targets of the Pakistan army. There was 

widespread killing of Hindu males, and rapes of women. Documented incidents in which Hindus were massacred in 

[52] 
large numbers include the Chuknagar massacre, the Jathibhanga massacre, and the Shankharipara massacre. More 

T531 
than 60% of the Bengali refugees who fled to India were Hindus. It is not exactly known what percentage of the 

T541 
people killed by the Pakistan army were Hindus, but it is safe to say it was disproportionately high. This 

widespread violence against Hindus was motivated by a policy to purge East Pakistan of what was seen as Hindu and 

Indian influences. The West Pakistani rulers identified the Bengali culture with Hindu and Indian culture, and 

thought that the eradication of Hindus would remove such influences from the majority Muslims in East Pakistan. 

Buddhist temples and Buddhist monks were also attacked through the course of the year. 

RJ. Rummel has stated states that 

The genocide and gendercidal atrocities were also perpetrated by lower-ranking officers and ordinary soldiers. 
These "willing executioners" were fueled by an abiding anti-Bengali racism, especially against the Hindu 
minority. "Bengalis were often compared with monkeys and chickens. Said General Niazi, 'It was a low lying 
land of low lying people.' The Hindus among the Bengalis were as Jews to the Nazis: scum and vermin that 
[should] best be exterminated. As to the Moslem Bengalis, they were to live only on the sufferance of the 
soldiers: any infraction, any suspicion cast on them, any need for reprisal, could mean their death. And the 
soldiers were free to kill at will. The journalist Dan Coggin quoted one Pakistani captain as telling him, "We 
can kill anyone for anything. We are accountable to no one." This is the arrogance of Power. 

T571 
— R.J. Rummel, Death by Government 

Violence against alleged collaborators 

In 1947, at the time of partition and the establishment of the state of Pakistan, Bihari Muslims, many of whom were 
fleeing the violence that took place during partition, migrated from India to the newly independent East Pakistan. 
These Urdu-speaking people held a disproportionate number in the new country's population. Biharis were adverse 
to the Bengali language movement and the subsequent nationalist movements as they maintained allegiance toward 
West Pakistani rulers, causing anti-Bihari sentiments among local nationalist Bengalis. Between December 1970 and 
March 1971, Bengali nationalists subjected non-Bengali minorities, especially Biharis, to systematic persecution. It 
is estimated that between 15,000 and 50,000 Biharis were killed during this period, and is believed by some that 

elements of the Mukti Bahini, with active support from the BDR and intelligence, either led or failed to stop the 

ri2i 
violence against the Biharis. When the war broke out in 1971, the Biharis sided with the Pakistan army. Some of 

them joined Razakar and Al-Shams militia groups and participated in the persecution and genocide of their Bengali 

countrymen including the widespread looting of Bengali properties and abetting in other criminal activities against 

them. [2] 

There are many reports of massacres of Biharis and alleged collaborators that took place in the period following the 
surrender of the Pakistan Army on December 16, 1971. In an incident on December 19, 1971, captured on camera 
and attended by members of foreign press, Abdul Kader Siddiqui and Mukti Bahini guerrilas under his command 
bayoneted and shot to death a group of war prisoners accused of belonging to the Razakar paramilitary forces. 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 170 

Genocide debate 

Time reported a high U.S. official as saying "It is the most incredible, calculated thing since the days of the Nazis in 
Poland." Genocide is the term that is used to describe the event in almost every major publication and newspaper 
in Bangladesh, and is defined as "the deliberate and systematic destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, 

racial, religious, or national group" 

A 1972 report by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) noted that both sides in the conflict accused each 
other of perpetrating genocide. The report observed that it may be difficult to substantiate claims that 'whole of the 
military action and repressive measures taken by the Pakistan army and their auxiliary forces constituted genocide' 
intended to destroy the Bengali people in whole or in part by the Pakistan army, and that 'preventing a nation from 
attaining political autonomy does not constitute genocide: the intention must be to destroy in whole or in part the 
people as such'. The difficulty of proving intent was considered to be further complicated by the fact that three 
specific sections of the Bengali people were targeted in killings by the Pakistan army and their collaborators: 
members of the Awami League, students, and East Pakistan citizens of Hindu religion. The report observed, 
however, that there are is strong prima facie case that there were particular acts of genocide committed, especially 
towards the end of the war, where Bengalis were targeted indiscriminately. Similarly, it was felt that there is a strong 
prima facie face that crimes of genocide were committed against the Hindu population of East Pakistan. 

As regards the massacres of non-Bengalis by Bengalis during and after the Liberation War, the ICJ report argued that 
it is improbable that 'spontaneous and frenzied mob violence against a particular section of the community from 
whom the mob senses danger and hostility is to be regarded as possessing the necessary element of conscious intent 
to constitute the crime of genocide', but that, if the dolus specialis were to be proved in particular cases, this would 
have constituted acts of genocide against non-Bengalis. 

Many international publications on genocide and human rights abuses classify the atrocities of 1971 as an act of 
genocide by West Pakistan. [18][19][20][21][65] 

After the minimum 20 countries became parties to the Genocide Convention, it came into force as international law 
on 12 January 1951. At that time however, only two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council 
were parties to the treaty, and it was not until after the last of the last five permanent members ratified the treaty in 
1988, and the Cold War came to an end, that the international law on the crime of genocide began to be enforced. As 
such, the allegation that genocide took place during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 was never investigated 
by an international tribunal set up under the auspices of the United Nations. 

Although both Pakistan and its primary ally USA have denied genocide allegations, the word 'genocide' was and 
is used frequently amongst observers and scholars of the events that transpired during the 1971 war. It is also 

used in some publications outside the subcontinent; for example, The Guinness Book of Records lists the Bengali 
atrocities as one of the top 5 genocides in the 20th century. 

On 16 December 2002, the George Washington University's National Security Archives published a collection of 
declassified documents, mostly consisting of communications between US officials working in embassies and USIS 
centers in Dhaka and in India, and officials in Washington DC. These documents show that US officials working 

>ri4i i 

in diplomatic institutions within Bangladesh used the terms selective genocide and genocide (Blood telegram) 
to describe events they had knowledge of at the time. They also show that President Nixon, advised by Henry 
Kissinger, decided to downplay this secret internal advice, because he wanted to protect the interests of Pakistan as 
he was apprehensive of India's friendship with the USSR, and he was seeking a closer relationship with China, who 
supported Pakistan. 

In his book The Trial of Henry Kissinger, Christopher Hitchens elaborates on what he saw as the efforts of Kissinger 
to subvert the aspirations of independence on the part of the Bengalis. Hitchens not only claims that the term 
genocide is appropriate to describe the results of the struggle, but also points to the efforts of Henry Kissinger in 
undermining others who condemned the then ongoing atrocities as being a genocide. 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 171 

However according to Sarmila Bose, a senior research fellow at Oxford University, many Bangladeshi civilians 
themselves took part in the atrocities and Pakistani troops did not act alone her book has proved highly controversial 
within India and Bangladesh as the popular narrative she states within these countries is that Bangladeshi nationalists 
won independence in 1971 from Pakistan. She also stated that the death toll was highly inflated. 

War trial attempts 

Immediately after the war, the topic of putting the war criminals to trial arose. Just as the war ended, Bangladeshi 
prime minister Tajuddin Ahmed admitted to Professor Anisuzzaman that the trial of the alleged Pakistani military 
personnel may not be possible because of pressures from the U.S., and that neither India nor the Soviet Union were 
interested in seeing a trial. As early as December 22, 1971, the Indian Army was conducting investigations of senior 
Pakistani Army officers connected to the massacre of intellectuals in Dhaka, with the aim of collecting sufficient 
evidence to have them tried as war criminals. They produced a list of officers who were in positions of command at 

T721 

the time, or were connected to the Inter-Services Screening Committee. 

On December 24, 1971 Home minister of Bangladesh A. H. M. Qamaruzzaman said, "war criminals will not survive 
from the hands of law. Pakistani military personnel who were involved with killing and raping have to face tribunal." 
In a joint statement after a meeting between Sheikh Mujib and Indira Gandhi, the Indian government assured that it 
would give all necessary assistance for bringing war criminals into justice. In February 1972, the government of 
Bangladesh announced plans to put 100 senior Pakistani officers and officials on trial for crimes of genocide. The list 
included General A. K. Niazi and four other generals. After the war, the Indian Army held 92,000 Pakistani 
prisoners of war, and 195 of those were suspected of committing war crimes. All 195 of them were released in 
April 1974 following the tripartite Simla agreement between Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, and repatriated to 

T751 

Pakistan, in return for Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. Furthermore, there was no obligation on Pakistan to 
carry out investigations of allegations against the suspects, or to provide reparation to Bangladesh. 

On July 30, 2009, the Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs of Bangladesh stated that no Pakistanis 
would be tried under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973. This decision has drawn criticism by 
international jurists, as it effectively gives immunity to the army commanders of the Pakistan Army who are 
generally considered to be ultimately responsible for the majority of crimes of 1971. 

Trials of collaborators 

The Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 was promulgated to bring to trial those Bangladeshis 

T771 
who collaborated with and aided the Pakistan Armed forces during the Liberation War of 1971. There are 

conflicting accounts of the number of persons brought to trial under the 1972 Collaborators Order, ranging between 

T7R1 

10,000 and 40,000. At the time, the trials were considered problematic by local and external observers, as they 
appear to have been used for carrying out political vendettas. R. MacLennan, a British MP who was an observer at 
the trials stated that 'In the dock, the defendants are scarcely more pitiable than the succession of confused 
prosecution witnesses driven (by the 88-year old defence counsel) to admit that they, too, served the Pakistan 
government but are now ready to swear blind that their real loyalty was to the government of Bangladesh in 
exile.' [79] 

The government of Bangladesh issued a general amnesty on November 30, 1973, applying to all persons except 

T7R1 

those who were punished or accused of rape, murder, attempt of murder or arson. The Collaborators Order 1972 
was revoked in 1975. 

The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 was promulgated to prosecute any persons, irrespective of 
nationality, accused of committing crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, war crimes, "violations of any 
humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts laid out in the Geneva Conventions of 1949" and "any other crimes 
under international law". Detainees held under the 1972 Collaborators order who were not released by the general 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 172 

amnesty of 1973 were going to be tried under this Act. However, no trials were actually held, and all activities 
related to the Act ceased after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. 

There are no known instances of criminal investigations or trials outside of Bangladesh of alleged perpetrators of war 
crimes during the 1971 war. Initial steps were taken by the Metropolitan Police to investigate individuals resident in 
the United Kingdom who were alleged to have committed war crimes in a Channel 4 documentary film aired in 

roin 

1995. To date, no charges have been brought against these individuals. 

On December 29, 1991 Ghulam Azam, who was accused of being a collaborator with Pakistan during 1971, became 
the Chairman or Ameer of the political party Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh, which caused controversy. This 
prompted the creation of a 'National Committee for Resisting the Killers and Collaborators of 1971', after a proposal 
of writer and political activist Jahanara Imam. A mock people's court was formed which on March 26, 1992, found 
Ghulam Azam guilty in a mock trial and sentenced him to death. 

A case was filed in the Federal Court of Australia on September 20, 2006 for alleged crimes of genocide, war crimes 

and crimes against humanity during 1971 by the Pakistani Armed Forces and its collaborators. Raymond Solaiman & 

rx2i 
Associates acting for the plaintiff Mr. Solaiman, have released a press statement which among other things says: 

We are glad to announce that a case has been filed in the Federal Magistrate's Court of Australia today under the Genocide Conventions Act 
1949 and War Crimes Act. This is the first time in history that someone is attending a court proceeding in relation to the [alleged] crimes of 
Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity during 1971 by the Pakistani Armed Forces and its collaborators. The Proceeding number 
is SYG 2672 of 2006. On October 25, 2006, a direction hearing will take place in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia, Sydney registry 
before Federal Magistrate His Honor Nicholls. 



On May 21, 2007, at the request of the applicant "Leave is granted to the applicant to discontinue his application 
filed on September 20, 2006." (FILE NO: (P)SYG2672/2006) [83] 

In March 2010, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) was formed in Bangladesh to hold trials of Bangladeshi 
citizens accused of involvement in crimes against humanity, including genocide, rape, murder and arson during the 
1971 Liberation war. The ICT, despite its name, is of local nature and has had no involvement from the United 

Nations. It has been criticised by the Human Rights Watch and prominent Western jurists for bias and deficient 

11 • • [85] 

legal provisions. 

Charge such as planning to commit crime, murder and torture have been framed against eight members, including 
former leader Ghulam Azam, of Jamaat-e-Islami party. Three of these have been indicted. The members have termed 
the charges as political. 



Further reading 



roo] 

• Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971 , A Gendercide Watch case study 

• Khan, Muazzam Hussain (2003), "Killing of Intellectuals" , Banglapedia, Asiatic Society of Bangladesh 

• Shaiduzzaman (December 14, 2005), "Martyred intellectuals: martyred history" , The Daily New Age, 
Bangladesh 

• Pakistan Genocide in Bangladesh - Estimates, Sources, and Calculations 

[92] 

• The 1971 Genocide in Pakistan - A Realist Perspective 

• 1971 Bangladesh Genocide Archive - An online archive of chronology of events, documentations, audio, 
video, images, media reports and eyewitness accounts of the 1971 Genocide in Bangladesh. 

• warcrimetrialwatch The proceedings of the warcrime trials in Bangladesh. 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 173 

References 

• Pierre, Stephen and Robert Payne (1973), Massacre, New York: Macmillan, ISBN 0-02-595240-4 

• Brownmiller, Susan, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, ISBN 0-449-90820-8 

• Ibrahim, Nilima, Ami Virangana Bolchhi (I, the Heroine, Speak) 

• Hitchens, Christopher (2001), The Trials of Henry Kissinger, Verso, ISBN 1-85984-631-9 

rs7i 

• NBC news about Pakistan Army atrocities in Bangladeash 

Notes 

[I] U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties Elsewhere 
(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB6.pdf), March 31, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp 

[2] Telegram 978 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 29, 1971, 1 130Z (http://www.state.gov/documents/ 

organization/48049 . pdf) 
[3] Pakistan: The Ravaging of Golden Bengal (http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,878408,00.html), Time, 1971-08-02 
[4] Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/ 

default. shtm), chapter 2 (http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/chapter2.shtm), 

paragraph 33 
[5] "Bangladesh Islamist leader Ghulam Azam charged" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18049515). BBC. 13 May 2012. . Retrieved 

13 May 2012. 
[6] Rummel, Rudolph J., "Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900" (http://www.Hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD. 

CHAP8.HTM), ISBN 3-8258-4010-7, Chapter 8, Table 8.2 Pakistan Genocide in Bangladesh Estimates, Sources, and Calcualtions (http:// 

www. hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.TAB8. 2. GIF): lowest estimate 2 million claimed by Pakistan (reported by Aziz, Qutubuddin. Blood and 

tears Karachi: United Press of Pakistan, 1974. pp. 74,226), some other sources used by Rummel suggest a figure of between 8 and 10 million 

with one (Johnson, B. L. C. Bangladesh. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1975. pp. 73,75) that "could have been" 12 million. 
[7] Many of the eyewitness accounts of relations that were picked up by ' Al Badr" forces describe them as Bengali men. The only survivor of the 

Rayerbazar killings describes the captors and killers of Bengali professionals as fellow Bengalis. See 37 Dilawar Hossain, account reproduced 

in 'Ekattorer Ghatok-dalalera ke Kothay' (Muktijuddha Chetona Bikash Kendro, Dhaka, 1989) 
[8] Asadullah Khan The loss continues to haunt us (http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/12/14/d512141501115.htm) in The Daily Star 

(Bangladesh) 14 December 2005 
[9] DPA report Mass grave found in Bangladesh (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/1999/99aug08/world.htm#7) in The Chandigarh Tribune 8 

August 1999 
[10] Sajit Gandhi The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 (http://www. 

gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/) 16 December 2002 

[II] East Pakistan: Even the Skies Weep (http://www.time.eom/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 877316, 00. html), Time Magazine, October 
25, 1971. 

[12] Sen, Sumit (1999). "Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: the Bihari Refugees of South Asia, Part 1 " (http://ijrl.oxfordjournals.org/ 

cgi/reprint/1 1/4/625. pdf) (PDF). International Journal of Refugee Law 11 (4): 625-645. doi:10.1093/ijrl/11.4.625. . Retrieved October 20, 

2006. 
[13] Gandhi, Sajit, ed. (16 December 2002), The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971 (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ 

NSAEBB79/): National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 
[14] U.S. Consulate in Dacca (March 27, 1971), Selective genocide (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBBl.pdf), 

Cable (PDF) 
[15] Telegram 959 From the US Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 28, 1971, 0540Z (http://www.state.gov/ 

documents/organization/48048.pdf) ("Selective Genocide") 
[16] Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972 (http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7/ 

48213.htm) 
[17] Dr. N. Rabbee Remembering a Martyr (http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2005/12/03/remembrance.htm) Star weekend Magazine, 

The Daily Star 16 December 2005 
[18] Rummel, Rudolph J. (1998). Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 (http://books.google.com/ 

?id=qP0FEK351mQC). Berlin: LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Munster. pp. 153-164. ISBN 3-8258-4010-7. . 
[19] Totten, Samuel; Parsons, William S.; Charny, Israel W. (2004). Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts (http:// 

books.google.com/?id=5Ef8Hrx8CdOC). London: Routledge. pp. 295-321. ISBN 0-415-94430-9. . 
[20] Charny, Israel W. (1999). Encyclopedia of Genocide (http://books.google.com/?id=8Q30HcvCVuIC). California: ABC-Clio Inc.. 

pp. 115, 116. ISBN 0-87436-928-2. . 
[21] Totten, Samuel (2000). Teaching About Genocide: Issues, Approaches and Resources (http://books. google. com/?id=LoQo50YPzTUC). 

North Carolina: Information age publishing, pp. 143-155. ISBN 1-593 11-074-X. . 
[22] White, Matthew J. The Great Big Book of Horrible Things New York:2012 W.W. Norton Page 190 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 174 

[23] SarmilaBose Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971: Military: Action: Operation Searchlight (http://www. 

epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2005&leaf=10&filename=9223&filetype=html) Economic and Political Weekly Special Articles, 8 

October 2005 
[24] Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p63, p228-9 ISBN= 984-05-1373-7 
[25] Pakistan Defence Journal, 1977, Vol 2, p2-3 
[26] Hamoodur Rahman Commission (http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/default. 

shtm), Chapter 2 (http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/chapter2.shtm), Paragraph 33 
[27] "3 MILLION Slaughtered Sheik MUJIB Charges 'Greatest Massacre"' The Portsmouth Herald, Monday, 17 January 1972, Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire 
[28] Bangladesh war crimes (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/7470000.stm) 
[29] Pierre Stephen and Robert Payne References needs a page number 

[30] Scott Lamb Never Again? (http://www.spiegel.de/international/0, 1518, 338612, 00. html) in Der Spiegel 26 January 2005 
[31] "Conference Agenda" (http://web.archive.Org/web/20080409154649/http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/46059.htm). State.gov. The 

Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs. Archived from the original (http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ho/46059.htm) on 

April 9, 2008. . 
[32] Anwar Iqbal Sheikh Mujib wanted a confederation: US papers (http://www.dawn.com/2005/07/07/nat3.htm), The Dawn, 7 July 2005, 

this article was also published in the in Financial Express (http://www. financialexpress-bd.com/aboutus. asp?cnd=12/16/2005), 16 

December 2005 under the byline US State Department's declassified documents 
[33] Ajoy Roy, "Homage to my martyr colleagues" (http://www.mukto-mona.com/Articles/ajoy/martyr_intellectual.htm), 2002 
[34] "125 Slain in Dacca Area, Believed Elite of Bengal" (http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract. 

html?res=F50C13F83C5E127A93CBA81789D95F458785F9). New York Times (New York, NY, USA): p. 1. 19 December 1971. . Retrieved 

2008-01-04. "At least 125 persons, believed to be physicians, professors, writers and teachers were found murdered today in a field outside 

Dacca. All the victims' hands were tied behind their backs and they had been bayoneted, garroted or shot. They were among an estimated 300 

Bengali intellectuals who had been seized by West Pakistani soldiers and locally recruited supporters." 
[35] Murshid, Tazeen M. (December 2, 1997). "State, nation, identity: The quest for legitimacy in Bangladesh". South Asia: Journal of South 

Asian Studies, (Routledge) 20 (2): 1-34. doi: 10.1080/00856409708723294. ISSN 14790270. 
[36] Khan, Muazzam Hussain (2003), "Killing of Intellectuals" (http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/K_0261.htm), Banglapedia, Asiatic 

Society of Bangladesh 
[37] Shaiduzzaman (December 14, 2005), "Martyred intellectuals: martyred history" (http://www.newagebd.com/2005/dec/15/murdered/ 

murdered.html), The Daily New Age, Bangladesh 
[38] Dr. Rashid Askari, "Our martyerd intellectuals" (http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/12/14/d51214020321.htm), editorial, the Daily Star, 

December 14, 2005 
[39] Dr. M.A. Hasan, Juddhaporadh, Gonohatya o bicharer anneshan, War Crimes Fact Finding Committee and Genocide archive & Human 

Studies Centre, Dhaka, 2001 
[40] Shahiduzzaman No count of the nation's intellectual loss (http://www.newagebd.com/2005/dec/15/murdered/murdered.html) The New 

Age, December 15, 2005 
[41] Killing of Intellectuals (http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/K_0261.htm) Asiatic Society of Bangladesh 
[42] Story of a Martyred Intellectual of 71's war (http://adnan.quaium.com/blog/56) 
[43] (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KJyHBTliCgA&feature=player_embedded#!) 
[44] Debasish Roy Chowdhury Indians are bastards anyway' (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GF23Df04.html) in Asia Times 

23 June 2005 "In Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape, Susan Brownmiller likens it to the Japanese rapes in Nanjing and German rapes 

in Russia during World War II. "... 200,000, 300,000 or possibly 400,000 women (three sets of statistics have been variously quoted) were 

raped. "" 
[45] Brownmiller, Susan, "Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape" ISBN 0-449-90820-8, page 81 
[46] Hamoodur Rahman Commission (http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/default. 

shtm), Chapter 2 (http://www.bangla2000.com/Bangladesh/Independence-War/Report-Hamoodur-Rahman/chapter2.shtm), Paragraphs 

32,34 
[47] GlobalWeb post, 1975 published reprint of extract from Susan Brownmiller's book (http://globalwebpost.com/genocidel971/chaps/ 

brownmiller.htm) 
[48] Mamoon, Muntassir; translation by Kushal Ibrahim (June 2000). The Vanquished Generals and the Liberation War of Bangladesh (First 

ed.). Somoy Prokashon. pp. 30. ISBN 984-458-210-5. 
[49] Sarmila Bose Anatomy of violence: An Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971 (http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles. 

php?root=2005&leaf=10&filename=9223&filetype=html), later published in the Indian Journal, Economic and Political Weekly, issue 8 

October 2005 
[50] Editorial [ New impartial evidence debunks 1971 rape allegations against Pakistan Army], Daily Times (Pakistan), 2 July 2005 
[51] Salma Khatun Sarmila Bose Rewrites history (http://drishtipat.org/sarmila/sarmila.htm) website of Drishtipat "A non-profit, non-political 

expatriate Bangladeshi organization ... registered public charity in the Unitied States." 
[52] S. Bose, 'Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 Bangladesh War', Hust and Co, London, 2011, pg. 73, 122. 
[53] US State Department, "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976", Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971", Page 165 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 175 

[54] Kennedy, Senator Edward, "Crisis in South Asia - A report to the Subcommittee investigating the Problem of Refugees and Their 

Settlement, Submitted to U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee", November 1, 1971, U.S. Govt. Press, page 66. Sen. Kennedy wrote, "Field 

reports to the U.S. Government, countless eye-witness journalistic accounts, reports of International agencies such as World Bank and 

additional information available to the subcommittee document the reign of terror which grips East Bengal (East Pakistan). Hardest hit have 

been members of the Hindu community who have been robbed of their lands and shops, systematically slaughtered, and in some places, 

painted with yellow patches marked 'H. All of this has been officially sanctioned, ordered and implemented under martial law from 

Islamabad." 
[55] "The Government's policy for East Bengal was spelled out to me in the Eastern Command headquarters at Dacca. It has three elements: 1. 

The Bengalis have proved themselves unreliable and must be ruled by West Pakistanis; 2. The Bengalis will have to be re-educated along 

proper Islamic lines. The - Islamization of the masses - this is the official jargon - is intended to eliminate secessionist tendencies and provide 

a strong religious bond with West Pakistan; 3. When the Hindus have been eliminated by death and fight, their property will be used as a 

golden carrot to win over the under privileged Muslim middle-class. This will provide the base for erecting administrative and political 

structures in the future." Peter Hazelhurst (13 June 1971). "Dwindling flow of refugees suggests West Bengal border has been closed" (http:// 

archive.timesonline.co.uk). The Times of London. . 
[56] BANGLADESH: A BENGALI ABBASI LURKING SOMEWHERE? (http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers3/paper232.html) South 

Asia Analysis Group - April 23, 2001 
[57] DEATH BY GOVERNMENT, By R.J. Rummel New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994 (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/ 

NOTEl.HTM) 
[58] ICJ EAST PAKISTAN 1971 REPORT, supra note 5, at 44-45, quoted in S. Linton.Criminal Law Forum (2010), p. 205. 
[59] H. Stanhope, 'Mukti Bahini Bayonet Prisoners After Prayers, The Times, December 20, 1971, pg. 4. 
[60] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN PAKISTAN: A LEGAL STUDY BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 9 (1972) 
[61] Editorial The Jamaat Talks Back (http://www.bangladeshobserveronline.com/new/2005/12/30/editorial.htm)in The Bangladesh 

Observer December 30, 2005. Accessed 2009-05-25. Archived (http://www.webcitation.org/5h6qlF2Ge) 2009-05-28. 
[62] Funk, T. Marcus (2010). Victims' Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal Court. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, p. 

(http://www.oup. com/us/catalog/ general/subject/Law/PublicInternationalLaw/InternationalCriminalandHumanita/?view=usa& 

ci=9780199737475). ISBN 0-19-973747-9. 
[63] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN PAKISTAN: A LEGAL STUDY BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 9 (1972), p. 56., cited in S. Linton, 'Completing the circle: accountability for the crimes of 

the 1971 Bangladesh war of liberation', Criminal Law Forum (2010) 21:191-311, p. 243. 
[64] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN PAKISTAN: A LEGAL STUDY BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE 

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS 9 (1972), p. 57. 
[65] Guinness World Records (2006). Guinness World Records 2007 (http://books. google. com/?id=j lYnAAAACAAJ). London: Guinness 

World Records Ltd.. pp. 118, 119. ISBN 1-904994-12-1. . 
[66] Genocide Denial; The Case of Bangladesh by Donald W. Beachler - Online summary hosted at Institute for the Study of Genocide (http:// 

www.isg-iags.org/events/2005iagsconference/abstracts/IAGS 2005.proposal.doc) 
[67] DISENT FROM U.S. POLICY TOWARD EAST PAKISTAN (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/BEBB8.pdf) 

(PDF) 6 April 1971. Accessed 2009-05-25. Archived (http://www.webcitation.org/5h6q25iI9) 2009-05-28. 
[68] Gandhi, Sajit (ed.), The Tilt: The U.S. and the South Asian Crisis of 1971: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79 

(http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/). Accessed 2009-05-25. 
[69] Memorandam for the Record (http://www.gwu.edU/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/B EBB21.pdf)(PDF) August 1 1, 1971. Accessed 

2009-05-25. Archived (http://www.webcitation.org/5h6q25iI9) 2009-05-28. 
[70] Christopher Hitchens The Trials of Henry Kissinger (http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Kissinger/Bangladesh_TOHK.html) 

References Pages 44,50 
[71] "Controversial book accuses Bengalis of 1971 war crimes" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13417170). BBC News. 16 

June 2011.. 
[72] S. Dring, 'Pakistani officers on list for war crimes trials', The Times, December 23, 1971, pg. 5. 
[73] The Times, '100 face genocide charges', The Times, February 23, 1972, pg. 7. 
[74] Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India) (Req. for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection) (Order of Jul. 13, 1973), — 1, 

available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/60/10697.pdf 
[75] S. Linton, 'Completing the circle: accountability for the crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh war of liberation', Criminal Law Forum (2010) 

21:191-311, p. 203. 
[76] S. Linton, Criminal Law Forum (2010), p. 228. 

[77] President's Order No. 8 of 1972 (1972) (Bangl.); Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order (1972) (Bangl.). 
[78] S. Linton,Criminal Law Forum (2010), p. 205. 

[79] A. Mascarenhas, 'Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood', Hodder and Stoughton, 1986, p. 25. 
[80] S. Linton,Criminal Law Forum (2010), p. 206. 
[81] REDRESS, Torture in Bangladesh 1971-2004: Making International Commitments a Reality and Providing Justice and Reparations to 

Victims, August 2004, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf3a6e92.html [accessed 4 February 2012] 



1971 Bangladesh atrocities 176 

[82] Raymond Faisal Solaiman v People's Republic of Bangladesh & Ors (http://www.rayimmigration.com.au/pressrelease.htm) In The 

Federal Magistrates Court of Australia at Sydney. 
[83] This judgement can be found via the Federal Court of Australia home page (http://esearch.fedcourt.gov.au/) by following the links and 

using SYG/2672/2006 as the key for the database 
[84] http://www.hrw.org/news/201 1/1 1/02/bangladesh-stop-harassment-defense-war-tribunal 
[85] Bangladesh war crimes are "unfair" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWNwXfOh-GI), Steven Kay QC, Al Jazeera English, October 

2011. 
[86] Bangladesh Islamist leader Ghulam Azam charged (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18049515), 13 May 2012, bbc.co.uk 
[87] "YouTube - Pakistan terrorism since 1971: Bangladesh Rape Victims" (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3v7uppdmCsA). Archived 

(http://www.webcitation.org/5io7733Ky) from the original on 2009-08-05. . Retrieved 2009-08-01. 



177 



Naval hostilities 



Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 

The Indo-Pakistani Naval warfare of 1971 were the series of aggressive naval battles fought by the Indian and 
Pakistani Navy during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. These battles were an integral part of India-Pakistan War of 
1971 and the Pakistan war in Bangladesh. The series of naval operations began by the Indian Navy to exert pressure 
from the seas while the Indian Army and Indian Air Force moved in to close the ring round East Pakistan from 
several directions on land. The naval operations incorporated the naval interdiction, air defence, ground support, and 
logistics missions. 

With the success of the Indian Navy's operations in East Pakistan, the Indian Navy commenced two large-scale 
operations, Operation Trident and Operation Python in the Western front, prior to the start of formal combat between 
India and Pakistan. 

Background 

The Indian Navy did not play a vital and integral role during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 as the war was more 
focused on the land based conflict. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of 
Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 
miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Having known as Operation Dwarka. This was one of the 
most significant operation of 1965 war. This was a successful operation which caused the Indian Navy 

undergo rapid modernization and expansion. Consequently, the Indian Navy budget grew from Rs. 35 crores to tRs. 
1 15 crores. The Indian Navy's Combatant Fleet was augmented by addition of Submarine squadron and acquisition 
of six Osa missile ship from the Soviet Union. The Indian Naval Air Arm was also strengthened. As the crises 
between East and West-Pakistan began, the Indian Armed Forces intervened, hence, starting the Bangladesh 
Liberation War. 

Pakistani Eastern Naval Command 

The Eastern Naval Command was established in 1969 and Rear- Admiral Mohammad Shariff (later four-star 
Admiral) was made its first Flag Officer Commanding. Admiral Shariff administratively ran the Eastern Naval 
Command, and was credited for leading the administrative operations of Eastern Naval Command. Under his 
command, SSG(N), Pakistan Marines and SEALs teams were well established, where they had ran both covert and 
overt operations in Eastern wing. 

Having a well-established administrative Naval command, the Pakistan Combatant Forces' GHQ, Headquarter of 
Pakistan Army, had declined substantial naval contingent for the defense of East Pakistan. The Pakistan Naval 
Forces had inadequate ships to challenge the Indian Navy on both fronts, and the PAF was unable to protect these 
ships from both Indian Air Force and the Indian Naval Air Arm. Furthermore, Chief of Naval Staff of Pakistan 
Navy, Vice- Admiral Muzaffar Hassan, had ordered to deploy all of the naval power in Western-Front. Most of the 
Pakistan Navy's combatant vessels were deployed in West Pakistan while only one destroyer, PNS Sylhet, was 
assigned in East-Pakistan on the personal request of Admiral Shariff. 



Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 



178 



During the conflict, East Pakistan's naval ports were left 
defenseless as the Eastern Military Command of Pakistan 
had decided to fight the war without the navy and faced 
with a hopeless task against overwhelming odds, the navy 



planned to remain in the ports when war broke out 



[4] 



In eastern wing, the Pakistan Navy had heavily depended on 
her gun boat squadron. The Pakistan's Eastern Naval 
Command was in direct command of Flag Officer 
Commanding (FOC) Rear- Admiral Mohammad Shariff who 
also served as the right-hand of Lieutenant-General Niazi. 
The Pakistan Navy had 4 (PNS Jessore, Rajshahi, Comilla, 
and Sylhet). The boats were capable of attaining maximum 
speed of 20 knots (37 km/h), were crewed by 29 sailors. 
Having known as Pakistan Navy's brown water navy, the 
gun boats were equipped with various weapons, including 
heavy machine guns. The boats were adequate for patrolling 
and led anti-insurgency operations. But they were 
hopelessly out of place in a conventional warfare 



[6] 




Locations of Pakistan Navy's Combatant forces on December 

1971 in and around East Pakistan. Some unit locations are not 

shown. Map not to exact scale. 



In the early of April, Pakistan Navy began the naval 

operations around the East-Pakistan to support the Army's 

executed Operation Searchlight. The Rear-Admiral 

Mohammad Shariff had coordinated all of these projected missions. On April 26, Pakistan Navy had successfully 

completed the Operation Barisal, but it resulted in temporary occupation of city of Barisal. 

The bloody ubran guerrilla warfare ensued and Operation Jackpot had severely damaged the operational capability of 
Pakistan Navy. Before the starting of the hostilities, all the naval gun boats were stationed at the Chittagong. As 
the air operations were begun, the IAF aircraft damaged the Rajshahi, while Comilla sunk on 4 December. On 
December 5, the IAF sank two patrol boats in Khulna. The PNS Sylhet was destroyed on December 6 and the 
Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. On 11 December, the PNS Jessore was destroyed, while Rajshahi was 
repaired. Rajashahi under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Shikder Hayat managed to evade the Indian 
blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16. 



Naval operations in the Eastern theatre 

The Indian Navy started the covert naval operations, which were executed successfully. The Eastern Naval 
Command of Indian Navy had coordinated, planned, and executed these covert naval operations. In the end months 
of 1971, the Indian Navy's Eastern Naval Command had effectively applied a naval blockade which also completely 
isolated East-Pakistan's Bay of Bengal, trapping the Eastern Pakistan Navy and eight foreign merchant ships in their 
ports. The Pakistan Army's Combatant High Command, The GHQ, insisted and pressured Pakistan Navy to deploy 
PNS Ghazi and to extend its sphere of naval operations, into East-Pakistan shores. The Officer in Command of 
Submarine Service Branch of Pakistan Navy opposed the idea of deploying aging submarine, PNS Ghazi, in the Bay 
of Bengal. It was difficult to sustain prolonged operations in a distant area, in the total absence of repair, logistic and 
recreational facilities in the vicinity. At this time, submarine repair facilities were totally absent at Chittagong — the 
only sea port in the east during this period. Her commander and other officers objected the plan as when it was 
proposed by the senior Army and Naval officers. 

In the Eastern wing of Pakistan, the Navy had never maintained a squadron of warships, despite the calls were made 
by Eastern Naval Command's Flag Officer Commanding Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff. Instead, a brown water 



Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 



179 



navy was formed consisting a gun boats riverine craft on a permanent basis. Consequently, in eastern wing, repair 
and logistic facilities were not developed at Chittagong. The Indian Navy's Eastern Naval Command virtually faced 
no opposition from Eastern theater. The aircraft carrier INS Vikrant, along with her escort LST ships INS Guldar, 
INS Gharial, INS Magar, and the submarine INS Khanderi, executed their operations independently. 

On December 4 of 1971, the INS Vikrant, the aircraft carrier, was also deployed in which its Sea Hawk attack 
aircrafts contributed in Air Operations in East Pakistan. The aircrafts successfully attacked many coastal towns in 
East Pakistan including Chittagong and Cox's Bazaar. The continuous attacks later dismantle the PAF's capability to 
retaliate 



[81 



The Pakistan Navy responded by deploying her aging 
long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, to counter the threat 
as the Naval Command had overruled the objections by 
her officers. The PNS Ghazi, under the command of 
Commander Zafar Muhammad Khan, was assumed to 
locate the INS Vikrant, but when it was not able to 
locate, decided to mine the port of Vishakapatnam — 
the Headquarter of Eastern Naval Command. The 
Indian Navy's Naval Intelligence laid a trap to sink the 
submarine by giving fake reports about the aircraft 
carrier. At around midnight of 3—4 December, the PNS 
Ghazi began its operation of laying mines. While 
Indian Navy dispatched INS Rajput to counter the 
threat. 




Pakistan's Ghazi was the only long range submarine operated by 

either of the warring nations in 1965. The sinking of PNS Ghazi 

played a point of turning role in Indian Naval operations in East 

Pakistan 



[10] 



The INS Rajput's sonar radar reported the disturbance underwater and two of the depth charges were released. 
The deadly game ended when the submarine sank mysteriously while laying a mine with all 92 hands on board 
around midnight on 3 December 1971 off the Vishakapatnam coast. 

The sinking of Ghazi turned out to be a major blow and set back for Pakistan Naval operations in East-Pakistan. It 
diminished the possibilities of carry out the large scale of Pakistan naval operations in Bay of Bengal. It also 
eliminated further threat possessed by Pakistan Navy to Indian Eastern Naval Command. On reconnaissance 
mission, the Ghazi was ordered to report back to her garrison on November 26, and admitted a report Naval 
Combatant Headquarter, NHQ. However, it was failed to return to her garrison. Anxiety grew day by day at the 
NHQ and NHQ had pressed frantic efforts to establish communications with the submarine failed to produce results. 
By the December 3rd prior to starting of the war, the doubts about the fate of submarine had already began to agitate 
the commanders at the Naval Headquarter (NHQ). 

On 5/6 December 1971, naval air operations were carried out Chittagong, Khulna, and Mangla harbours, and at ships 
in the Pussur river. The oil installations were destroyed at Chittagong, and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie 
was sunk at the outer anchorage. On December 7/8, the airfields of PAF were destroyed, and the campaign continued 
until 9 December. On December 12, Pakistan Navy laid mines on amphibious landing approaches to Chittagong. 
This proves a useful trap for some time, and it had denied any direct access to Chittagong port for a long time, even 
after the instrument of surrender had been signed. The Indian Navy therefore decided to carry out an amphibious 
landing at Cox Bazar with the aim cutting off the line of re-treat for Pakistan Army troops. On December 12, 
additional amphibious battalion was aboard on INS Vishwa Vijaya was sailed from Calcutta port. On the night of 
December 15/16, the amphibious landing was carried out, immediately after IAF bombardment of the beach a day 
earlier. After fighting for days, the human cost was very high for Pakistani forces, and no opposition or resistance 
was offered by Pakistani forces to Indian forces. During this episode Eastern theater, Indian forces suffered only 2 
deaths in the operation. While, Pakistan forces was reported to suffered hundreds death. By the dawn of 17 
December, Indian Navy was free to operate at will in the Bay of Bengal. 



Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 180 

Furthermore, the successful Indian Air Operations and Operation Jackpot, led by the Bengali units with the support 
of Indian Army, had undermine the operational capability of Pakistan Navy. Many naval officers (mostly Bengalis) 

ri4i 

had defected from the Navy and fought against the Pakistan Navy. By the time Pakistan Defences Forces 
surrendered, the Navy had suffered the most damages as almost all of the gun boats, destroyer (PNS Sylhet), and the 
long-range submarine, PNS Ghazi, was lost in the conflict, including their officers. 

On December 16, at 16:13hrs, Deputy Command of Eastern Command and the Commander of Eastern Naval 
Command, Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff surrendered his Naval Command to Vice-Admiral R.N. Krishna 
Eastern Naval Command. His TT Pistol is still placed in "cover glass" where his name is printed in big golden 
alphabets at the Indian Military Academy's Museum. In 1972, U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and 
Indian Navy's Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sardarilal Mathradas Nanda also paid him a visit with basket of fruits 
and cakes which initially surprised him, and was concern of his health. While meeting with them, Admiral Shariff 
summed up that: 

At then end of conflict.... We [Eastern Naval Command] had no intelligence and hence, were both deaf and 
blind with the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force pounding us day and night.... 

— Admiral Mohammad Sharif telling Admiral Zumwalt in 1971, 

Sinking of INS Khukri 

As the Indian military offensive in East Pakistan increases, the Pakistan Navy had dispatched her entire submarine 
squadron on both front. Codename Operation Falcon, the Pakistan Navy began their reconnaissance submarine 
operations by deploying PNS Hangor, a Daphne class submarine, near the coastal water of West-Pakistan, and PNS 
Ghazi, Tench class submarine long range submarine, near the coastal areas of East-Pakistan. 

According to the Lieutenant R. Qadri, an Electrical engineer officer at Hangor during the time, the assigned mission 
was considered quite difficult and highly dangerous, with the submarine squadron sailing under the assumption that 
the dangerous nature of this mission meant a great mortal risk to the submarine and her crew. 

On the midnight of 21 November 1971, PNS Hangor, under the command of Commander Ahmed Tasnim, began her 
reconnaissance operations. Both PNS Ghazi and PNS Hangor maintained coordination and communication 
throughout patrol operations. 

On December 2 and 3 December, Hangor had detected a large formation of ships from Indian Navy's Western fleet 
which included cruiser INS Mysore. Hangor had passed an intelligence to Pakistan naval forces of a possible attack 
by the observed Indian Armada near Karachi. The Indian Naval Intelligence intercepted these transmissions, and 
dispatched two ASW frigates, INS Khukri and the INS Kirpan of 14th Squadron - Western Naval Command. 

On 9 December 1971, at 1957 hours, Hangor sunk Khukri with two homing torpedoes. According to her 
commander, the frigate sank within the matter of two minutes. The frigate sank with 192 hands on board. Hangor 
also attacked the INS Kirpan on two separate occasions, but the torpedoes had missed their target. Kirpan quickly 
disengaged and successfully evaded the fired torpedoes. 

Attack on Karachi 

On 4 December, the Indian Navy, equipped with P-15 Termit anti-ship missiles, launched Operation Trident against 
the port of Karachi. During this time, Karachi was home to the Headquarters of the Pakistan Navy as well as the 
backbone of Pakistan's economy. The Indian Navy's preemptive strike resulted in an ultimate success. The Indian 
missile ships successfully sunk the minesweeper PNS Muhafiz and the destroyer PNS Khaibar. Operation Trident 
was an enormous success with no physical damage to any of the ships in the Indian task group, which returned safely 
to their garrison. 



Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 



181 




Pakistan Airforce retaliated to these attacks by bombing Okha 
harbour scoring direct hits on fuelling facilities for missile boats, 
ammunition dump and the missile boats jetty. Indians were 

ready for this and had already moved the missile boats to other 

ri9i 

locations to prevent any losses. But the destruction of the 
special fuel tank prevented any further incursions until Operation 
Python. On the way back from the bombing the PAF aircrafts 



encountered an Alize 203 Indian aircraft and shot it down 



[][] 



Map of Karachi, indicting Karachi Deep Sea port and 
Masroor Air Force Base (Click to enlarge). 



On December 6, a false alarm by a Pakistani Fokker aircraft 
carrying naval observers caused a friendly fire confrontation 
between Pakistan's Navy and Air Force. A PAF jet mistakenly 
strafed the frigate PNS Zulfikar, breaking off shortly after the ship 

got itself recognized by frantic efforts. The crew suffered some casualties besides the damage to ship. The ship was 

taken back to port for repair. 

The Indian Navy launched a second large-scale operation on the midnight of December 8 and December 9 of 1971. 

The operation, codenamed Operation Python, was commenced under the command of Chief of Naval Staff of the 

T211 
Indian Navy Admiral S.M. Nanda. The INS Vinash, a missile boat, and two multipurpose frigates, INS Talwar 

and INS Trishul participated in the operation. The attack squadron approached Karachi and fired four missiles. 

During the raid, the Panamanian vessel Gulf Star, Pakistan Navy's PNS Dacca, a destroyer, and the British ship SS 

[20] [221 

Harmattan were badly damaged. More than 50% of Karachi's total fuel reserves were destroyed in the attack. 
More than $3 billion worth of economic and social sector damage was inflicted by the Indian Navy. Most of 
Karachi's oil reserves were lost and warehouses and naval workshops destroyed. The operation damaged the 
Pakistani economy and hindered the Pakistan Navy's operations along the western coast. 



Ending 

After the successful operations by Indian Navy, India had established complete control over the oil route from the 

T251 
Persian Gulf to Pakistani ports. The Pakistani Navy's main ships were either destroyed or forced to remain in port. 

A partial naval blockade was imposed by the Indian Navy on the port of Karachi and no merchant ship could 

approach Karachi. Shipping traffic to and from Karachi, Pakistan's only major port at that time, ceased. 

Within a few days after the attacks on Karachi, the Eastern fleet of Indian Navy had success over the Pakistani forces 

1241 
in East Pakistan. By the end of the war, the Indian Navy controlled the seas around both the wings of Pakistan. 

The War ended for both the fronts after the Instrument of Surrender of Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan 
was signed at Ramna Race Course in Dhaka at 16.31 1ST on 16 December 1971, by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh 
Aurora, General Officer Commanding-in-chief of Eastern Command of the Indian Army and Lieutenant General A. 
A. K. Niazi, Commander of Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. 

In a thesis written by Admiral Shariff in 2010, Admiral Shariff wrote that "the generals in Air Force and Army, were 
blaming each other for their failure whilst each of them projected them as hero of the war who fought well and 

inflicted heavy casualties on the advancing Indians". At the end, each general officers in the Air Force and Army 

r?Ri 
placed General Niazi's incompetency and failure as responsible for causing the war, Sharif concluded. Sharif also 

noted that: 



The initial military success {Searchlight and Barisal) in regaining the law and order situation in East-Pakistan 
in March of 1971 was misunderstood as a complete success.... In actuality, the law and order situation 
deteriorated with time, particularly after September of the same year when the population turned increasingly 
against the [Pakistan] Armed Forces as well as the [Yahya's military] government. The rapid increase in the 
number of troops though bloated the overall strength, however, [it] did not add to our fighting strength to the 



Indo-Pakistani Naval War of 1971 182 

extent that was required. A sizeable proportion of the new additions were too old, inexperienced or 
unwilling.... 

rofil 

— Admiral Mohammad Sharif, Commander of Eastern Naval Command, 

References 

[I] http://www.paknavy.gov.pk/history.htm 

[2] Pakistan Intelligence, Security Activities & Operations Handbook By IBP USA 

[3] India's Quest for Security: defence policies, 1947-1965 By Lome John Kavic, 1967, University of California Press, pp 190 

[4] Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, p 135 

[5] Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, pl34 

[6] Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, pl35 

[7] Bangladesh at War, Shafiullah, Maj. Gen. K.M. Bir Uttam, p 21 1 

[8] IAF claim of PAF Losses 

[9] Mihir K. Roy (1995) War in the Indian Ocean, Spantech & Lancer. ISBN 978-1-897829-1 1-0 

[10] "End of an era: INS Vikrant's final farewell" (http://www.rediff.com/news/jan/09vikran.htm). 2009. . Retrieved 2011. 

[II] Till, Geoffrey (2004). Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century. Great Britain: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 179. ISBN 0-7146-8436-8. 
Retrieved 2010-05-28. 

[12] Harry, B. (2001). "The Sinking of PNS Ghazi: The bait is taken." (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-2/harry.html). 

Bharat Rakhsak. . Retrieved 201 1. 
[13] Shariff, Admiral (retired) Mohammad, Admiral's Diary, ppl40 
[14] Operation Jackpot, Mahmud, Sezan, p 14 
[15] Roy, Admiral Mihir K. (1995). War in the Indian Ocean (http://books.google.com/books?id=Tqr8r7EB18wC&pg=PA218& 

dq=admiral+mohammad+shariff&hl=en&ei=KFjyTsLU04SjiALD64ynCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=book-thumbnail&resnum=4& 

ved=0CEEQ6wEwAw#v=onepage&q=admiral mohammad shariff&f=false). United States: Lancer's Publishers and Distributions. 

pp. 218-230. ISBN 1-897829-11-6. . 
[16] Till, Geoffry (2004). Sea Power: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 (http://books.google.com/books?id=ZcejlMRYNAAC&pg=PA179& 

dq=PNS+Ghazi&ei=LKdDSKG0H4KijgGslqG-BQ&sig=9YcFuLJttkAY3wIH965XTx6eUlY#v=onepage&q&f=false). Frank Class 

Publishers, pp. 179. ISBN 0-7146-5542-2. . 
[17] http://www.paffalcons.com/gallery/aviation-art/syed-hussaini/trauma-and-reconstruction.php 
[18] http ://www. globalsecurity. org/ military/world/ pakistan/air- force-combat.htm 
[19] "NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND" (http://indiannavy.nic.in/t2t2e/Trans2Trimph/chapters/10_1971 

wncl.htm). Indian Navy. . 
[20] Harry, B. (Wednesday, 07 July 2004). "Operation Trident, Grandslam and Python: Attacks on Karachi" (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/ 

NAVY/History/ 197 lWar/44- Attacks-On-Karachi.html). History 1971 India-Pakistan War. Bharat Rakhsak. . 
[21] "Our superiority will prevail" (http://in.rediff.com/news/2002/jan/09nad.htm). . 
[22] "Bangladeshi War of Independence and Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 " (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ 

indo-pak_1971.htm). GlobalSecurity.org. 2000. . Retrieved 2011. 
[23] "China's pearl in Pakistan's waters" (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC04Df06.html). Asia Times. March 4, 2005. . 

Retrieved 27 October 201 1. 
[24] "Blockade From the Seas" (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/Banerjee.html). . Retrieved 16 October 2011. 
[25] "Spectrum" (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2004/20040111/spectrum/bookl.htm). The Tribune. Sunday, January 11, 2004. . Retrieved 3 

November 2011. 
[26] Singh, Sukhwant (2009). India's Wars Since Independence (http://books.google.co.in/books?id=jlVawuyUS-cC&lpg=PA431& 

0ts=EpR51a2plW&dq=Well old boy, this happens in war.I am sorry your ships have been sunk&pg=PA480#v=onepage&q&f=false). 

Lancer Publishers,, pp. 480. ISBN 978-1-935501-13-8. . 
[27] "History" (http://www.indiandefence.com/indian-navy/). Indian Navy. Indian Defence. . Retrieved 27 October 201 1. 
[28] Staff Report. "Excerpt: How the East was lost: Excerpted with permission from" (http://www.dawn.com/2010/10/24/ 

excerpt-how-the-east-was-lost.html). Dawn Newspapers (Admira's Diary:). Dawn Newspapers and Admiral's Diary. . Retrieved 21 December 

2011. 



183 



Air operations 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 

East Pakistan Air Operations incorporate the interdiction, air defence, ground support, and logistics missions 
flown by the Indian Air Force and the Bangladesh Air Force in support of the advancing Mitro Bahini (called 
Operation Cactus Lilly) in the eastern theatre of the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1971. Although the first of the 
engagements between the opposing airpowers occurred before the formal declaration of hostilities, the events 
described below include only those conducted after the declaration of war. Indian Air force also helped the Mukti 
Bahini form a formation of light aircraft called Kilo flight, which was manned and serviced by Bengali pilots and 
technicians who had defected from the Pakistan Air Force. This unit had launched attacks on targets in Bangladesh 
on December 3, 1971, prior to the start of formal combat between India and Pakistan. 

Background 

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was one of the defining conflicts which led to the birth of the new nation of 
Bangladesh. The engagements between the Mitro Bahini against the Pakistani Army lasted a short but intense 14 
days, between 3 December and 16 December 1971. The speedy conclusion was only possible because the objectives 
set by the Mitro Bahini in the east were achieved in that time. This was only possible due to excellent co-ordination 
between the Indian Army, Air Force, and the Navy and the Mukti Bahini. 

Although the western theatre saw engagements that have defined the rules of 20th century warfare, including the 
Battle of Longewala, Operation Trident, as well as Battle of the bases between the two rival Air Forces, the eastern 
theatre would be marked by a near total domination by the Indian Forces and the Mitro Bahini. Two major reasons 
stand out, the first and major was the fact that the Bengali population and the Awami League led resistance had 
already greatly weakened the Pakistani Forces. The second, and possibly equally important, is the total air 
supremacy that the IAF came to achieve within the opening days of the war. 

The Eastern Theater: Historical Background 

East Pakistan saw no air combat when Pakistan and India came to blows over Kashmir in 1947, although both 
countries possessed functional air forces. All Pakistani air assets were deployed in West Pakistan at the time, and 
India also concentrated on the Western front as well. India began upgrading its air capabilities on its eastern border 
after the war— in 1958 the Eastern operational group was formed in Kolkata, which was upgraded into a command 
the following year. Following the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the Eastern Air command HQ shifted to Shillong and 
extensive efforts to increase its operational capabilities (in terms of number of squadrons and modernization of its 
warplanes and operational infrastructure) began, as added emphasis was given to countering any possible Chinese 
threat. In contrast, Pakistan High Command posted only 1 squadron of 12 F-86 Canadair Sabres in East Pakistan. 
The Sabres were deployed at Dhaka on October 1964, while PAF infrastructure development in the province was 
largely ignored. 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 184 

1965 Indo-Pakistan War: Eastern Theater 

Air forces of both countries actively launched attacks against each other during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 in the 
eastern theater. The IAF bombed airfields and airstrips located in East Pakistan (at Chittagong, Dhaka, Lalmanurhat 
and Jessore) and the PAF managed to launch two celebrated raids on the Indian Air Force base at Kalaikudda, West 
Bengal. The PAF raids, which took place on September 7, destroyed several Canberra bombers and Vampire aircraft 
on the ground while the IAF claimed 2 aerial kills (Pakistani sources record 1 F-86 lost). The first PAF Kalaikudda 
raid by 5 Sabres had achieved total surprise but the second wave was opposed by Indian interceptors, leading to the 
loss. The PAF also launched attacks on Bagdogra on September 10 and Barrackpur on September 14, with varying 
results. The IAF did hit back with airstrikes on Dacca, Jessore and Lalmunirhat, but failed to destroy any aircraft. 
Mid-air interceptions and dogfights rarely happened, and barring some skirmishing between the EPR and BSF along 
the border, the air forces of both countries provided most of the combat activities in the eastern theater during the 
1965 War. The final tally was 12 Indian aircraft destroyed on the ground (PAF claim is 21 aircraft destroyed) and 2 
Pakistani Sabres shot down (PAF records one aircraft lost) and 1 PAF Sabre lost due to accident. Following the 
war, the IAF continued its steady growth in combat capacity, while Pakistan boosted its squadron strength to 20 
planes, although it neglected to expand its operational infrastructure substantially. 

PAF during Operation Searchlight in 1971 

PAF had 20 Canadair Sabres (No 14. Squadron Tail-choppers), three T-33 trainers and two helicopters stationed in 
East Pakistan, while army aviation squadron No.4 had eight helicopters present for service. PAF operational 
effectiveness suffered a little because most Bengali pilots and technicians had been grounded during the political 
unrest in March 1971. When Operation Searchlight was launched to quell the Awami League led political 
movement, PAF contribution was crucial to its success. 

Pakistan high command had been using four C-130 Hercules planes and the entire PIA fleet was employed to 
transfer troops to East Pakistan and after the war started, two entire infantry division in an operation dubbed Great 
Fly-In was airlifted to East Pakistan from West Pakistan between March 26 — May 2. The Pakistani airplanes had 
to make the trip to East Pakistan via Sri Lanka as overflights over India had been banned since February 1971. 
Moving two entire infantry divisions, which were sorely needed to bolster the army in East Pakistan where it was 
facing stiff opposition in a span of two weeks was a vital factor in sustaining the army operation. Most Pakistani 
army bases in East Pakistan had been cut off from each other since March 29 and Helicopters and C-130 planes were 
used to ferry troops and munitions to army bases cut off from supplies and surrounded by the Mukti Bahini, and this 
proved crucial for the initial survival and ultimate success of the Pakistani troops during the early phases of the 
battle. Helicopters also evacuated the Pakistani wounded from isolated bases, acted as artillery spotters, flew 

reconnaissance missions over hostile territory and dropped combat troops off in remote places to outflank and cutoff 
Mukti Bahini positions. The PAF enjoyed total air supremacy during March— November as the Mukti Bahini 
lacked both planes and air defense capability to counter their efforts, and flew nearly 100 to 170 sorties between 
March— November in support of the army. Pakistani forces defeated the Bengali resistance by mid-May 1971 and 
occupied the province by June, 1971. The PAF had requisitioned and jury -rigged crop dusters and light civilian 
aircraft to augment its recon and ground attack capabilities during this period. 

PAF preparations for Indian intervention 

Pakistan high command was fully aware that the IAF considerably outnumbered the PAF eastern detachment and 
they held the qualitative edge as well in the eastern theater. Pakistani planners had anticipated the PAF being 

ro] 

neutralized with 24 hours of the IAF commencing combat operations over East Pakistan. There was only one fully 
functional airbase (at Tejgaon near Dhaka) in East Pakistan, all the satellite air bases in the province lacked the 
service facilities for sustaining prolonged operations. The PAF had plans to deploy a squadron of Shenyang F-6 
planes at Kurmitola (Now Shahjalal International Airport) in 1971, these planes were temporarily deployed but 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 185 

ultimately withdrawn because, although the runway was functional at that base, the base was not fully functional to 
support the planes, and the lack of infrastructure meant PAF could not deploy additional planes. This 
marginalization or neglect of East Pakistan defense since 1948 had hamstrung the PAF Eastern contingent in 1971, 
when its capabilities was put to the test. Pakistan deployed no additional air defence assets other than the one light 
Ack-Ack regiment and a few batteries to assist the PAF in 1971. The 6th light Ack Ack guarded Dhaka, 46th 
Light Ack-Ack battery was in Chittagong, and elements of the 43rd Ack-Ack were present in areas around East 
Pakistan. The caliber of the regiment was not enhanced to heavy, and no S AMs were deployed in East Pakistan. The 
only long range radar (Russian P-35 model) was also taken to West Pakistan along with all the C-130 Hercules 
planes. Several Dummies were deployed at the airbases to deceive the IAF. To augment the short radar cover, which 
could now provide only a 3-5 minute warning to the planes, observers were deployed around the country armed with 
radios and telephones. They in turn were exposed to Mukti Bahini attacks, which reduced their effectiveness. The 
IAF had flown reconnaissance flights over East Pakistan since June 1971 and had engaged their opponents earlier in 
the east than they did in the west, having clashed with PAF over the Salient of Boyra in West Bengal on 22 
November. Between then and 3 December 1971, there were no engagements of the two airforces. Pakistanis had lost 
3 planes (2 shot down and 1 damaged) on November 22 over Boyra, so were down to 17 operational Sabres in 
December 1971 as no replacement aircraft were sent from West Pakistan. 

IAF Operations in 1971 

The IAF had assembled units from the Central and Eastern Air commands in Eastern command bases for the 
campaign by December 1971. The Central Air Command HQ was located at Allahabad while the Eastern Command 
was HQed in Shillong, so Air Marshal P.C Lai created an advanced HQ at Fort William to better coordinate matters 

ri2i 

after a consultation with Lt. Gen. Jacob, COS Army Eastern Command. in addition to redrawing the operational 
boundaries of the respective commands for the campaign. Several Central Command units were temporarily housed 
in Eastern Air Command bases for the duration of the campaign. 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 



186 



Eastern Air Command Order of Battle 1971 



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Location of IAF, PAF and BAF units on December 1971 in and around 
Bangladesh. Some unit locations are not shown. Map not to exact scale 



• No. 22 Squadron (Swifts): Folland Gnat MK 1 
Dumdum, then Kalaikudda, then Calcutta (WC 
Sikand) 

• No. 30 Squadron (Charging Rhinos): Mig 21 
FL — Kalaikudda (WC Chudda) - Fighter 
Interceptor 

• No. 14 Squadron (Bulls): Hawker Hunter F. 
MK 56 - Kalaikudda (WC Sundersan) - Fighter 

• No. 16 Squadron (Rattlers): Canberra - 
Kalaikudda - (WC Gautum) - Bomber 

• No. 221 Squadron (Valiants): Su-7 BMK - 
Fighter/Bomber 

• No. 7 Squadron (Battle Axes): Hawker Hunter 
F. MK 56 and 2 F. MK 1 - Bagdogra (WC 
Ceolho, then WC Suri). The squadron was 
moved Chamb after December 12. 

• No. 104 (Alluotte 3) and No. 104 (Mi-4) Heli 
units 

ri3i 

North East and North Western Sector: (Areas 

to the East of Jamuna River) 

CO: Air Vice Marshal Devasher HQ: Shillong 

• No. 17 Squadron (Golden Arrows): Hawker 
Hunter F MK 56 - Hashimara (WC Chatrath) 

No 37 Squadron (Black Panthers): Hawker Hunter F MK 10 - Hashimara (WC Kaul) 
No. 4 Squadron (Oorials): Mig 21 FL Gauhati (WC JV Gole) 
No. 24 Squadron (Hunting Hawks): Folland Gnat Gauhati (WC Bhadwar) 
No. 15 Squadron (Flying Lancers): Folland Gnat — Gauhati then Agortala (WC Singh) 
No. 28 Squadron (First Supersonics): Mig 21FL Gauhati (WC Bishnu) 
No. 105 (Mi-4) and 121 (Alouette III) Helicopter Squadrons — Agartola 



Mukti Bahini airforce: Kilo Flight 

The Indian Army was helping the Mukti Bahini through Operation Jackpot since May 1971, while the Indian navy 
had helped set up the Bengali Naval commando unit and had provided command staff for the Bengali gunboats 
which were busy mining riverine crafts and harassing merchant marine operations in East Pakistan. The IAF could 
not come to grips with the PAF until formal hostilities commenced, but the Bengali airmen joined the act when 9 

Bengali pilots and 50 technicians, formerly of the PAF and serving with the Mukti Bahini in various capacity were 

ri4i 
gathered for a special mission on 28 September 1971 at Dimapur in Nagaland. A number of Bengali civilian 

pilots from the PIA later joined this group. Indian civilian authorities and the IAF donated 1 DC-3 Dakota (gifted by 

the Maharaja of Jodhpor), 1 Twin Otter plane and 1 Alouette III helicopter for the new born Bangladesh Air Force, 

which was to take advantage of the lack of night fighting capability of the PAF to launch hit and run attacks on 

sensitive targets inside Bangladesh from the air. The Bengali rank and file fixed up the WWII vintage runway at 

Dimapur, then added began rigging the aircraft for combat duty. The Dakota was modified to carry 5000 lb 

(unknown operator: u'strong' kg) bombs, but for technical reasons it was used to ferry Bangladesh government 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 187 

personnel, Captain Abdul Khalek, Captain Alamgir Satter and Captain Abdul Mukit, all destined to earn the Bir 
Pratik award, piloted the Dakota. The Helicopter was rigged to fire 14 rockets from pylons attached to its side and 
had .303 Browning machine guns attached to it, in addition to having 1-inch (unknown operator: u'strong 1 mm) 
steel plate welded to its floor for extra protection. Squadron Leader Sultan Mahmood, Flight Lieutenant Bodiul Alam 
and Captain Shahabuddin, all of whom later won the Bir Uttam award, operated the helicopter. The Otter boasted 7 
rockets under each of its wings and could launch ten 25 pound bombs. The bombs were rolled out by hand through a 
makeshift door. Flight Lt. Shamsul Alam, along with Captains Akram Ahmed and Sharfuddin Ahmad flew the Otter, 
all three were later awarded Bir Uttam for their service in 1971. This tiny force was dubbed Kilo Flight, the first 
fighting formation of Bangladesh Air force. 

Under the command of Group Captain A.K. Khandkar and Squadron Leader Sultan Mahmood, intense training took 
place in night flying and instrumental navigation. After 2 months of training, the formation was activated for combat. 
The first sortie was scheduled to take place on November 28, but was moved back 6 days to December 2, 1971. The 
Otter (Flown by Flight Lt. Shamsul Alam, co pilot FL Akram) was moved to Kailashsahar, and was prepared for a 
mission against targets in Chittagong. The Helicopter (Pilot Flight Lt. Sultan Mahmood and Fl. Lt. Bodiul Alam) 
was to hit Narayangang, flying from Teliamura, near Agartola. 

In the early hours of December 3, 1971, the twin otter and the helicopter took off from their respective bases and hit 
the oil depots at Naryanganj and Chittagong, which the Mukti Bahini guerrillas had been unable to sabotage due 
to the tight security. Ironically, the PAF initiated Operation Chengis Khan on the same night, and the IAF 
commenced offensive operations in the East from December 3, 1971. Kilo flight would in total fly 12 missions in 

ri4i 

1971, hitting various targets in Chittagong, Naryanganj and Bhairab. The formation base was moved from 
Dimapur to Shamshernagar after it was liberated on December 4, then finally was moved to Agartala before the end 
of the war. The BAF contingent was present in Dhaka when the surrender ceremony took place on December 16, 
1971. 

IAF commences Operations: December 3, 1971 

Following the preemptive strike by the PAF on its airfields in the western sector, the IAF went into action on the 
midnight of 3 December 1971. However, the western air campaign was, at least in the initial days, limited to striking 
PAF forward bases and providing ground support, but was not aimed at achieving air supremacy. In the east, 
however, faced with only the No. 14 Squadron defending the whole sector, the Eastern Air Command was given the 
task to achieve total air dominance, which ultimately it did. 

On 3 December Pakistan launched what was intended to be a decisive pre-emptive strike against Indian airfields, but 
managed only 50 sorties. The IAF hit back with retaliatory strikes. 

The PAF's handful of Sabres at Tezgaon near Dacca in East Pakistan put up a useful resistance against all out attacks 
by Indian fighers from 4 December. Between 4 and 1 1 of the attackers were claimed shot down in air combat, with 
17 more lost to ground fire. Five Sabres were shot down in air combat. On 6 December, an IAF attack cratered the 
runways at both Tezgaon and Kurmitola, effectively putting them out of action for the rest of the campaign. Apart 
from the IAF squadrons deployed in the East Bengal, India's sole aircraft-carrier INS Vikrant (with its Sea Hawk 
fighter bombers and Breguet Alize ASW aircraft) mounted attacks against the civil airport at Cox's bazaar and 
Chittagong harbor. The embryo Bangladesh air force, with three DHC Otters (fitted with machine guns) of Mukti 
Bahini Air Wing made an appearance on 7 December. Indian airborne troops, in battalion strength, made an assault 
on Dacca on 11 December usnig An-12s, and Fairchild C-119Gs. This was preceded on 7 December by a heliborne 

ri7i 

infantry assault by two companies, in some nine Mil Mi-4s and Mi-8s, escorted by 'gunship' Alouttes. 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 188 

3—4 December 

Canberra bombers struck Tejgaon repeatedly on the night of 3 December. The PAF No. 14 operated only Sabres 
which lacked night fighting capability, so the bombers were opposed only by the guns of the Pakistani light ack-ack 
regiment. By the morning of 4 December, however, strike missions against Tejgaon were assigned to Hunters of the 
No. 7, No. 14 sqn, No. 17 sqn and No. 37 sqn, Su-7s (No. 221 Sqn) and MiG-21s (No. 28 sqn). 

The first daytime raids in East Pakistan were flown by Hunters of No. 17 Sqn and these were given top cover by four 
MiG-21s from No. 28 Sqn. It proved unnecessary, the Hunters shot down one Sabre when intercepted before the 
rendezvous took place. No. 14 sqn also struck Kurmitola AFB, hitting the Hangars and Installations with rockets. By 
the afternoon, Hunter's would strike Narayangunj fuel depots. Hunters from No. 14 Sqn also struck Chittagong 
Harbour on the morning of 4 December. In an afternoon strike on Tejgaon by MiGs from 28 Sqn, a Twin otter was 
destroyed on the ground. 

For the interceptors sent up to challenge the strikes, PAF was to suffer the loss of three Sabres in dog fights over 
Dhaka, two to Hunters striking Kumitola. Of these, Wg Cdr S M Ahmed and Fit. Lt. Saeed ejected safely over the 
village of Ghazipur, but were not found by search parties and were listed as "missing" for the duration of the war. 
Later reports would suggest that both pilots were killed by hostile local populace. 

Though not programmed or required to fly, Ahmad had insisted — in keeping with the PAF's tradition 
of its seniors leading in combat — and was soon in the thick of battle with 4 Hunters, joined minutes 
later by some MiG-21s and Su-7s. In the melee, the Hunters' leader shot down Ahmad's F-86, forcing 
him to eject 5 miles from Kurmitola; despite an air and ground search he was never found. Rashidi, in 
the meanwhile, successfully extricated himself from the 'one-versus-several' situation just as another 
pair of PAF F-86s, comprising Sdn. Ldr. Afzaal and Fit. Lt. Saeed, was engaging 3 Hunters, a few miles 
away. Both Afzaal and Saeed were immediately set upon by another Hunter and was himself shot down. 
Only minutes later Afzaal had avenged this loss by chasing a MiG-21 and shooting it down. Although 
Saeed had ejected safely, he too was never found; reportedly both Saeed and Ahmad were taken away 
by Mukti supporters. 

The last of the Sabres lost that day was to an afternoon strike on Narayangunj, Fg Off Sajjad Noor was shot down 
while attempting to engage a strike by Hunters from No. 14Sqn. Noor ejected safely over the village of Zinjira and 
was later rescued. 

The IAF also suffered some of its heaviest losses on these missions, losing six Hunters and one Su-7. No. 7 sqn, on a 
strike mission against an ammunition train at Lai Munir Hat, would suffer one Pilot- Fit Lt A R Da Costa KIA, along 

with the loss of two Hunters- both hit by fierce ground fire and crashing in Indian territory. One of the pilots of the 

n si 
stricken planes, Sqn Ldr S K Gupta safely ejected at Bagdogra. No. 14 Sqn also lost two Hunters on the day to 

no] 

ack ack. Both the pilots, Sqn Ldr K D Mehra and Fit Lt K C Tremenhere, ejected safely. Tremenhere was taken 
POW while Mehra managed to evade capture and get back to Indian territory. The highest price of the day was 
however, paid by No. 37 Sqn, which suffered the death of two pilots- Sqn Ldr S B Samanta and Fg Off S G 

no] r 1 on 

Khonde. No. 221 Sqn was to suffer one Su-7 shot down with the pilot, Sqn Ldr V. Bhutani taken POW. 

IAF Canberra planes had also struck Chittagong airport, oil tanks and refinery on December 4, and lost 2 planes but 
managed to damage the installations. In total the PAF had flown 32 operational sorties against IAF incursions on 
December 4 and had expanded 30,000 rounds of ammunition, while the ground based weapons had fired 70,000 
rounds, the highest expenditure per day per aircraft of ammunition in the history of the PAF. Pakistani authorities 
claimed between 10 to 12 IAF planes destroyed, and took measures to conserve ammunition in anticipation of a long 
war. 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 189 

5—7 December 

People of Dhaka witnessed thrilling low-level dogfights throughout 4 and 5 December. The IAF concentrated in 
attacking the aircraft on the ground. However, for the dear price paid, it failed to cause significant damage to the 
PAF assets in well-dispersed and camouflaged locations. IAF also flew ground support missions, and the lessening 
pressure meant that the PAF managed to fly some ground support missions over Comilla and other areas. In total 20 
operational sorties were flown by the Sabres, and 12,000 rounds of ammunition were used up during December 5 by 

ri9i 

the PAF. By the evening of 5 December the IAF realised that a change of tactic was necessary. The Ack-Ack 
regiment managed to defend the airbase during 5 December and the night of the early hours of the 6th against Indian 
attacks successfully. 

On the morning of 6 December four MiG-21s (No. 28 Sqn), flying from Gauhati at very low level, climbed up to 
5,000 m and dived at 900 km/h, hitting Tejgaon airstrip with 500 kg bombs, scoring several hits on the runway, and 
rendering it unusable for operations. The airport was without air cover at that time, as a PAF ground support mission 
had just landed and the duty flight had not taken off. Two craters, ten meters deep and twenty meters wide, 
separated by 1200 meters had rendered the runway unusable (the bombs were BETAB-500, anti-airstrip ordnance). 
However, Kurmitola was to remain operational till the morning of 7 December, when Mig-21s of No. 28 Sqn again 
hit that runway. No. 7 Sqn was pulled out of the eastern ops on the 6 December to help the army in the west. 
Repeated attack by MiG-21s and Hunters of No. 14 and No. 28 however, kept the runway cratered. An aviation 
website noted : "A notable fact remains that the MiG-21FL was neither as easy to fly nor to operate in combat under 
conditions the IAF had to expect in the case of a new war with Pakistan. It was designed as simple point-defence 
fighter-interceptor that was to operate under close GCI-control and attack its targets from the rear hemisphere with 
R-3S (ASCC-Code AA-2 Atoll) heat-seeking missiles. However, pleased with the speed and handling of the MiGs 
during operational conversions, Indian pilots trained intensively and gained not only considerable confidence, but 
also expertise. The Indians were to use it as an air superiority fighter as well as fighter bomber over extended ranges 
and well inside the enemy airspace, with minimal or no GCI-support at all. " 

Effectively, MiG-21 had success as interdiction-strike aircraft, taking-out an important air base with only eight 
sorties. The results of the IAF's assault was that by 7 December, the PAF in the East was effectively grounded. The 
IAF also bombed other airfields including the abandoned WWII airfields of Comilla, Lai Munir Hat and Shamsher 
Nagar throughout the war, denying their use to PAF planes that may be moved by road, as well as to any external 
aerial reinforcement. Jessore Airfield had come under Mitro Bahini control by this time, so it was spared. Pakistani 
authorities made repeated attempts to repair the runways. Airforce and army engineers, helped by civilian workers, 
worked round the clock during Dec 6-7, and by 4:50 AM Dec 7, only 8 hours of respite was needed to regain fully 
operational status at Tejgaon, However, the IAF hit the base on the 7th, and it was estimated 36 hours of work 
without further damage was needed to make the base operational again. The IAF ensured no such respite took place. 
In desperation, it was suggested that the broad streets at second capital be used as runways, but technical problems 
ruled out that possibility — grounding the PAF Sabres forever in East Pakistan. 

PAF fighter pilots were sent to West Pakistan via Burma on 8 December and 9 December when it became clear at 
least 36 hours of uninterrupted work was needed to fix the runways and the ack-ack units were unable to keep the 

IAF away. Pakistani authorities claimed that between 4—15 December the IAF had lost 22 to 24 aircraft, 7 to the 

T221 
PAF and the rest to ack-ack units. The IAF records 19 aircraft lost in East Pakistan, 3 in air combat, 6 to accidents 

T231 
and the rest to ack-ack while 5 Sabres were shot down by IAF planes. After the liberation of Dhaka, 13 airframes 

T241 
were found at the Tejgaon airport by the Mitro Bahini in various states of sabotage. 2 T-33 trainers were 

inoperable, but 8 Sabres were made operational later. 5 of them were incorporated in the Bangladesh Air Force in 

1972. The Pakistan HQ had issued orders to blow up the aircraft, but Air Commodore Enam had pointed out that the 

sight of burning planes would demoralize the Pakistani troops defending Dacca. PAF personnel destroyed the 

ammunition stocks and sabotaged the electric and hydraulic systems of the aircraft on 15 December. 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 190 

The PAF continued to use helicopters at night to fly reinforcements to remote bases and airlift munitions. Prior to the 
surrender of Pakistan Eastern Command on 16 December the Army Aviation squadron, commanded by Lt. Col. 
Liaquat Bokhari, escaped to Burma with selected personnel, including Maj. Gen. Rahim Khan (GOC 39th Ad Hoc 
division). 

Operations in Support of Ground Forces 

With the PAF in the east effectively neutralised, the IAF could now concentrate in supporting their advancing army. 
Movements of Pakistani troops during day time came to a virtual halt due to relentless IAF air attack. Ferries across 
major river crossings were sunk by the IAF thus denying the Pak army its line of retreat to Dhaka. On 7 December, 
INS Vikrant, the navy's sole aircraft carrier at the time, joined the operation. Sea Hawks operating from the deck of 
Vikrant struck Chittagong harbour, Cox's Bazar and Barisal. Whatever remained of the Pakistani Navy was 
destroyed or sunk. The airfields in Cox's Bazar, Chiringa and Feni were made inoperative. 

On 10 December IAF helilifted troops of the IV Corps from Ashuganj to Raipura and Narsingi in what came to be 
termed the Operation Cactus-Lilly (also known as the Helibridge over Meghna). Entire Brigade strengths were 
lifted over the River Meghna, allowing the Indian Army to continue their advance in spite of stiff resistance at 
Ashuganj, where the retreating Pakistani Army also blew up the Bridge. 

To the south of this area near Chandpur, the 39 division (CO: General Rahim Khan) HQ at had requested evacuation 
by river on December 8. Under the escort of a gunboat, the flotilla, made up of local launches sailed in the early 
hours of December 10. The IAF spotted and bombed the ships, which were either sunk or beached themselves and 
failed to reach Dhaka. The survivors later were evacuated by ships operating at night and by helicopters. 

On 11 December, India airdropped Para Bn Gp 130 in the now famous Tangail airdrop. The operation involved 
An-12, C-119s, 2 Caribous and Dakotas from 11 sqn and 48 Sn. In total, about 1000 troops were airdropped. The 
only hitch was one paratrooper who a static line hangup. Gnats from No. 22 sqn provided top cover for the operation, 
which ultimately went unhindered. Also on the 11th of December three converted An-12s from the No.44 Squadron 
struck the Jaydebpur Ordnance factory in East Pakistan. 

On the morning of 14 December, a message was intercepted by Indian Intelligence of a high-level meeting of the 
civilian administration in East Pakistan and a decision was made to mount an attack. Within 15 minutes interception 
of the message, a strike was launched against Dhaka. Armed with tourist guide maps of the city, four Mig 21s of No. 
28 Sqn got Airborne. A few minutes had passed after the meeting had started, when the IAF MIG's came screaming 
& blasted the Governors House with 57 mm rockets in the first, thereby ripping the massive roof of the main hall and 
turning the building into a smouldering wreck. The Governor of East Pakistan, Mr. A H Malik, was so shocked with 
the incident that he resigned on the spot by writing on a piece of paper and thereby renouncing all ties with the West 
Pakistani administration, to take refuge at the Red Cross Center in Dhaka. 

Fate of Pakistan Navy in East Pakistan 

Pakistan Forces GHQ had declined a substantial naval contingent for the defense of East Pakistan for two reasons: 
they had inadequate ships to challenge the Indian navy on both fronts and the PAF in the east was not deemed strong 
enough to protect the ships from Indian airpower (The IAF and Indian Navy air arm). The fate of Pakistani naval 
vessels in December was ample proof of the soundness of this decision and the repercussion of neglecting East 
Pakistan defense infrastructure (the reason PAF could only station 1 squadron of planes there). Pakistan Eastern 

Command had planned to fight the war without the navy and faced with a hopeless task against overwhelming odds, 

T271 
the navy planned to remain in the ports when war broke out. 

The Pakistan Navy had 4 Gunboats (PNS Jessore, Rajshahi, Comilla, and Sylhet), all 345 ton vessels capable of 
attaining a maximum speed of 20 knots (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km/h), were crewed by 29 sailors and fitted 
with 40/60 mm cannons and machine guns in East Pakistan. 1 patrol boat ("Balaghat") and 17 armed boats (armed 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 191 

with 12.7mm/20mm guns and/or .50 or.303 Browning machine guns) in addition to various civilian owned Pakistan 
forces requisitioned and jury rigged boats armed with various weapons were also part of the Pakistan naval 

T2S1 

contingent. The improvised armed boats were adequate for patrolling and anti-insurgency ops but hopelessly out 

of place in conventional warfare. Before the start of hostilities in December PNS Jessore was in Khulna with 4 other 

boats, PNS Rajshahi, Comilla and Balaghat was at Chittagong. PNS Sylhet was undergoing repairs at a dry-dock 

[291 
near Dhaka. The outbreak of hostilities on December 3 found most of the boats scattered around the province. 

Indian aircraft attacked the Rajshahi and Comilla near Chittagong on the 4 December, the Rajshahi was damaged 
and the Comilla sunk. The Balaghat, which was not attacked, rescued the Comilla crew and the surviving ships 
returned to Chittagong. On December 5, Indian planes sank two patrol boats in Khulna. The PNS Sylhet was 
destroyed on December 6 and the Balaghat on December 9 by Indian aircraft. PNS Jessore, which had withdrawn 
from Khulna to Dacca, was destroyed on December 11 while escorting boats evacuating Pakistani troops from 
Chandpur. PNS Rajshahi was repaired, and under the command of Lt. Commander Shikder Hayat managed to evade 
the Indian blockade and reach Malaysia before the surrender on December 16. From there it sailed to Karachi and 
continued to serve in the Pakistan navy. 

Blue on Blue: Tragedy near Khulna 

Indian Army Eastern Command had ordered Bangladesh Navy gunboats BNS Palash and BNS Padma, accompanied 
by INS Panvel under the overall command of Commander M.N Samant, to sail to Chalna port. These ships, carrying 
Bengali seamen and Indian command crew, had been operating against Pakistani shipping since November, and 

under the advise of Indian Eastern Air command, had painted their superstructure yellow to avoid misidentification, 

nil 
which had been reported back to Eastern air-command. This task force sailed on December 6, entered Mangla at 

7:30 Am on December 10 and took over the port facility. Commander Samant knew that Khulna was a IAF target 

but decided to push on anyway. Around 11:30 AM, when the 3 ships were closing in on Khulna dockyard, 3 

airplanes dived on them. Commander Samant recognized the IAF planes and ordered the ships to hold fire; all 3 

ships were strafed and sunk by the planes. 3 Bengali Naval commandos and 7 Bengali sailors were killed, 6 naval 

commandos, 1 BSF JCO, 3 Indian officers and 7 Bengali seamen were injured. Indian Navy gave 14 awards 

(including 3 Mahavir Chakras, and 6 Vir Chakras) to the Indian rank and file involved in this incident. Bengali 

Seaman Ruhul Amin, who tried to save MV Palash despite being wounded and ordered to abandon ship, and later 

had died under torture, was awarded 'Bir Shershtra" by Bangladesh government. 21 Indian and Bengali sailors 

became POWs. 

The IAF was to continue flying interdiction missions for the remainder of the war in, shooting up ammunition dumps 
and other fixed installations. Gnats and Sukhoi Su-7s flew many missions in support of army units as they moved 
swiftly towards Dhaka, delivering ordnance such as iron bombs to take out enemy bunkers which occasionally posed 
an obstacle to advancing infantry. Canberras repeatedly struck Jessore forcing the enemy to abandon this strategic 
city. The IAF also was prepared to hit any Chinese incursions into Indian territory in the eastern Himalayas. As it 
turned out, the Chinese did not stir. 



East Pakistan Air Operations, 1971 



192 



Notes 

[1] http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1965War/Appendix2.html 

[2] Islam, Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, p315 

[3] Salik, Siddiq, "Witness to Surrender" p87, p90 

[4] Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem A., The 1971 Indo-Pak War: A Soldiers Narrative p55, p58 

[5] Ali Khan, Maj. Gen. Rao Farman, When Pakistan Got Divided, p88 

[6] Salik, Siddiq, "Witness to Surrender" p82 

[7] Islam, Rafiqul, "A Tale of Millions", pl22, p213 

[8] Salik, Siddiq, "Witness to Surrender" pl32 

[9] Salik, Siddiq, "Witness to Surrender" pl23 



[10 
[11 
[12 
[13 
[14 
[15 
[16 
[17 

[18 

[19 
[20 
[21 

[22 
[23 
[24 
[25 
[26 
[27 
[28 
[29 
[30 
[31 



Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, pl32 

Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca, ppl88 

Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, "Surrender At Dacca: Birth of A Nation" p51 

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_326.shtml 

Uddin, Major Nasir, Juddhey Juddhey Swadhinata, ISBN 984-401-455-7, pp247 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender light aircraft- pl34 

Islam, Rafiqul, A Tale of Millions, pl22, p213 

The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare Edited by Chris Bishop (amber publishing 1997, republished 2004 pages 384-387 ISBN 
1-904687-26-1) 

Indian Air Force losses in the 1971 War" (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1971War/Appendix2.html). 
www.bharat-rakshak.com. . Retrieved 2006-08-23. 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, pl31 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, pl31 

"India — Pakistan War, 1971; Introduction" (http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_326.shtml). Tom Cooper & Shais Ali. 
www.acig.org. . Retrieved 2006-08-23. 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, pl32 

(http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Misc/Lossl971.html) IAF Losses in the East 

http ://www. bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/ 1 97 1 War/Appendix3 .html 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, p209 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender pl75-pl76 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness to Surrender, pl35 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, pl33 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, pl34 

Salik, Siddiq, Witness To Surrender, pl35 

Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR, Surrender at Dacca, p92 



References 

• Salik, Siddiq (1997). Witness to Surrender. ISBN 984-05-1374-5. 

• Jacob, Lt. Gen. JFR (2004). Surrender at Dacca: Birth of A Nation. The University Press Limited. 
ISBN 984-05-1532-2. 

• Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad (2003). The Indo Pak War of 1971: A Soldiers Narrative. Oxford University 
Press. ISBN 0-19-579778-7. 

• Islam, Major Rafiqul (2006). A Tale of Millions. Ananna. ISBN 984-412-033-0. 

• Ali Khan, Maj. Gen Rao Farman (1992). How Pakistan Got Divided. Jung Publishers (Bengali Translation: 
'Bangladesher Janmo' University Press Ltd. 2003). ISBN 9840501577. 



193 



Surrender 



Instrument of Surrender (1971) 



The Instrument of Surrender was signed at Ramna Race Course in Dhaka at one past five in the evening (1701 
hrs), local time, on December 16, 1971, by Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding in 
Chief of Eastern Command of the Indian Army and Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, Commander of 
Pakistani forces in Bangladesh, as the formal act of surrender of all Pakistani forces in erstwhile East Pakistan. Also 
present during the ceremony were Lieutenant General JFR Jacob, Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command and 
architect of the plan for the capture of Bangladesh, and, the commanders of Indian Naval and Air Forces in the 
Eastern Theatre. 

The signing of the document ended the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, and led to the formation of Bangladesh. The 
name of the new country, Bangla Desh (later reduced to a single word), was used in the instrument of surrender, 
which declared: "The Pakistan Eastern Command agree to surrender all Pakistan armed forces in Bangla desh to 
Lieutenant-General Jagjit Singh Aurora, General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and BANGLA DESH 
forces in the Eastern Theatre." 

Aurora accepted the surrender without a word, while the crowd on the race course started shouting anti-Niazi and 
anti-Pakistan slogans and abuses. Niazi along with a sizeable number of Pakistani soldiers were taken prisoner 
(upwards of 90,000). This was the largest number of POWs since World War II and included some government 
officials. 

Text of the Instrument 

"The PAKISTAN Eastern Command agree to surrender all PAKISTAN Armed Forces in BANGLA DESH to 
Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA, General Officer Commanding in Chief of the Indian and BANGLA 
DESH forces in the Eastern Theatre. This surrender includes all PAKISTAN land, air and naval forces as also all 
para-military forces and civil armed forces. These forces will lay down their arms and surrender at the places where 
they are currently located to the nearest regular troops under the command of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH 
AURORA. 

The PAKISTAN Eastern Command shall come under the orders of Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA 
as soon as the instrument has been signed. Disobedience of orders will be regarded as a breach of the surrender terms 
and will be dealt with in accordance with the accepted laws and usages of war. The decision of Lieutenant-General 
JAGJIT SINGH AURORA will be final, should any doubt arise as to the meaning or interpretation of the surrender 
terms. 

Lieutenant-General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA gives a solemn assurance that personnel who surrender shall be 
treated with dignity and respect that soldiers are entitled to in accordance with provisions of the GENEVA 
Convention and guarantees the safety and well-being of all PAKISTAN military and para-military forces who 
surrender. Protection will be provided to foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and personnel of WEST PAKISTAN 
origin by the forces under the command of Lieutenant- General JAGJIT SINGH AURORA." 

Signed by J.S. Aurora and A.A.K. Niazi on 16 December 1971. 

This document can be seen on display in the National Museum in Delhi (as of January 2012) 



Instrument of Surrender (1971) 194 

In Literature 

In Salman Rushdie's novel Midnight's Children, the encounter between the two generals is shown in the chapter Sam 
and the Tiger 

Sources 

INSTRUMENTS OF SURRENDER OF PAKISTANI FORCES IN DACCA [2] Hosted by Ministry of External 

T31 
Affairs, India Virtual Bangladesh 

References 

[1] Of betrayal and bungling by Kuldip Nayar (Google cache link) (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/ 

search?q=cache:YfijrFpnU_MJ: www. indianexpress.com/res/web/ple/ie/ daily/ 19980203/03450744. html+http://www.indianexpress. 
com/res/web/ple/ie/daily/19980203/03450744.html&cd=l&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us) - Indian Express 3 February 1998 



195 



Indo-Pakistani War of 1999 



Kargil War 



The Kargil War (Hindi: +K'il<?i ^f( kargil yuddh, Urdu: <Sss» J? jLS" kargil jang), also known as the Kargil 
conflict, e was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the 
Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LOC). The conflict is also referred to as 
Operation Vijay (Victory in Hindi) which was the name of the Indian operation to clear the Kargil sector. 

The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side 

T21 
of the LOC, which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the war, 

Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties 

and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani 



paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. The Indian Army, later on supported by the Indian Air 

Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LOC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and 
militants. With international diplomatic opposition, the Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining Indian 
positions along the LOC. 

The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which posed significant 
logistical problems for the combating sides. This was only the second direct ground war between any two countries 
after they had developed nuclear weapons; it is also the most recent. (India and Pakistan both test-detonated fission 
devices in May 1998, though the first Indian nuclear test was conducted in 1974.) 



Location 

Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region 
with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's 
highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (1947—48) concluded with the LOC bisecting the Baltistan district, with 

the town and district of Kargil lying on the Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and 

T71 
Kashmir. After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement 

promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary. 

The town of Kargil is located 205 km (unknown operator: 

u'strong' mi) from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the 
LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate 
climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long 
and chilly with temperatures often dropping to -48 °C (-54 °F) 



[81 



[10] 



An Indian national highway (NH ID) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts 
through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 
160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking this only road linking 

[21 

Srinagar and Leh. The military outposts on the ridges above the 

highway were generally around 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) high, with a 

few as high as 5,485 metres (18,000 ft). [11] Apart from the district 

capital, Kargil, the populated areas near the front line in the conflict 

included the Mushko Valley and the town of Drass, southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas 

northeast of Kargil. 




Location of the conflict 



Kargil War 



196 



One of the reasons why Kargil was targeted was that the terrain surrounding it, lent itself to pre-emptive seizure of 

ri2i 
unoccupied military positions. With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a 

defender of the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high 

ri3i 

ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, and the difficulties would be 

ri4i 

exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures. 

Kargil is just 173 km (unknown operator: u'strong 1 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was 
capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants. 




Background 

After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, there had been a long period 
with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces 
of the two neighbors - notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to 
control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the 
surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in 
the 1980s. During the 1990s, however, escalating tensions and 
conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir, some of which were 
supported by Pakistan, as well as the conducting of nuclear tests by 
both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. 
In an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore 
Declaration in February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and 
bilateral solution to the Kashmir conflict. 

During the winter of 1998 -1999, some elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces were covertly training and sending 
Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side 
of the LOC. The infiltration was code named "Operation Badr"; its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir 
and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a 
settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would 
internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost 
the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Some writers 

have speculated that the operation's objective may also have been as a retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 

ri7i 
1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier. 

According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik, and many other scholars, much of the background 

planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several occasions 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals 
for infiltration into the Kargil region, but the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out 

[20] [21] [22] 

war. 

Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief 
of army staff in October 1998. After the war, Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil 

conflict, claimed that he was unaware of the plans, and that he first learned about the situation when he received an 

[24] 

urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India. Sharif attributed the plan to Musharraf and 

[25] 

"just two or three of his cronies", a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four 
generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan. Musharraf, however, asserted that Sharif had been briefed on 



the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on February 20 



[27] 



Kargil War 



197 



War progress 

Further information: Kargil order of battle 

Conflict Events 



DATE 


HISTORICAL EVENT 


May 3, 
1999 


Pakistani intrusion in Kargil reported by local shepherds 


May 5 


Indian Army patrol sent up; Five Indian soldiers captured and tortured to death. 


May 9 


Heavy shelling by Pakistan Army damages ammunition dump in Kargil 


May 10 


Infiltrations first noticed in Dras, Kaksar and Mushkoh sectors 


Mid-May 


Indian Army moves in more troops from Kashmir Valley to Kargil Sector 


May 26 


IAF launches air strikes against infiltrators 


May 27 


IAF loses two fighters — MiG-21 and MiG-27;. Fit Lt Nachiketa taken POW 


May 28 


IAF MI- 17 shot down by Pakistan; four air crew dead 


June 1 


Pakistan steps up attacks; bombs NH 1A 


June 5 


Indian Army releases documents recovered from three Pakistani soldiers indicating Pakistan's involvement 


June 6 


Indian Army launches major offensive in Kargil 


June 9 


Indian Army re-captures two key positions in the Batalic sector 


June 11 


India releases intercepts of conversation between Pakistani Army Chief Gen Pervez Musharraf, while on a visit to China and Chief of 
General Staff Lt Gen Aziz Khan in Rawalpindi, as proof of Pakistani Army's involvement 


June 13 


Indian Army secures Tololing in Dras 


June 15 


US President Bill Clinton, in a telephonic conversation, asks Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to pull out from Kargil 


June 29 


Indian Army captures two vital posts — Point 5060 and Point 5100 near Tiger Hill 


July 2 


Indian Army launches three-pronged attack in Kargil 


July 4 


Indian Army recaptures Tiger Hill after an 11 -hour battle 


July 5 


Indian Army takes control of Dras. Sharif announces Pakistani army's withdrawal from Kargil following his meeting with Clinton 


July 7 


India recaptures Jubar Heights in Batalik 


July 1 1 


Pakistan begins pullout; India captures key peaks in Batalik 


July 14 


Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declares Operation Vijay a success. Government sets condition for talks with Pakistan 


July 26 


Kargil conflict officially comes to an end. Indian Army announces complete eviction of Pak intruders 



[28] [29] [30] 

There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section 
of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The next stage 
consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major 
battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing some territory held by Pakistani forces and the 
subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control after international pressure. 



Kargil War 



198 



Occupation by Pakistan 

During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped 
mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the 
Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their 
respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may 
be avenues of infiltration. When weather conditions became less 
severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed. 

During February 1999, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts 

it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also 

1311 
sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. 

Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven 

T32ir331 

battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary 

regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points 

of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri 




Infiltration and military build-up. 



guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries 



[34] 



Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in 
Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where 
the LOC turns North and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area. 



India discovers infiltration and mobilizes 

Initially, these incursions were not detected for a number of reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the 
areas infiltrated by the Pakistani forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for the 
infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team led by Capt Saurabh Kalia, 
who acted on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector, led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially, with 
little knowledge of the nature or extent of the infiltration, the Indian troops in the area assumed that the infiltrators 
were jihadis and claimed that they would evict them within a few days. Subsequent discovery of infiltration 
elsewhere along the LOC, and the difference in tactics employed by the infiltrators, caused the Indian army to realize 
that the plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. The total area seized by the ingress is generally accepted to 
between 130 km 2 - 200 km 2 ; [26][32][36] 

The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, 
because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; subsequent fighting was 

1371 

conducted mostly at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 
20,000, plus several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict 
zone. The total number of Indian soldiers that were involved in the military operation on the Kargil-Drass sector was 
thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has been put at 
approximately 5,000 at the height of the conflict. This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered 

Kashmir who provided additional artillery support. 

The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar in support of the mobilization of Indian land forces, but its 
effectiveness during the war was limited by the high altitude and weather conditions, which in turn limited bomb 
loads and the number of airstrips that could be used. 

T381 

The Indian Navy also prepared to blockade the Pakistani ports (primarily Karachi port) to cut off supply 

[39] 
routes. Later, the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days 

121 
of fuel to sustain itself if a full-fledged war had broken out. 



Kargil War 



199 



India attacks Pakistani positions 

The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway ID from 
Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which 
affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH ID (the actual stretch of the highway which was 
under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to 
lay down indirect artillery fire on NH ID, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. This was a serious problem 
for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial 
road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal 
Pradesh. 

The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, 

artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to having recovered 

1421 
more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report. Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through 

unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US. The initial Indian attacks were 

aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH ID, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near 

the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the 

recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The 

protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war. 

The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH ID. This resulted 
in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh 
route. This was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some 
of the peaks that were of vital strategic importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point 4590 and Point 5353. 

While 4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH ID, point 5353 was the highest feature in the Dras sector, 

T451 
allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH ID. The recapture of Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was 

significant, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle 

during the conflict. Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid- June, some parts 

of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war. 

Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH ID, the Indian 
Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of 
Control. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the 
combat in India's favor. The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by 
Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff 
resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the 

Z -""^**^^ war. Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at Tiger 

Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After a final assault on 
the peak in which 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indian soldiers were 
killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A few of the assaults occurred atop 
hitherto unheard of peaks — most of them unnamed with only Point 
numbers to differentiate them — which witnessed fierce hand to hand 
combat. 

As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts 
that were in the line-of-sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with Indian gunners making 
maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack 
of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun. 

It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used with limited effectiveness. French made Mirage 2000H of 

T21 
the IAF were tasked to drop laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces. 

However, The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter 




IAF MiG-21s were used extensively in the Kargil 
war. 



Kargil War 



200 



which was shot down by Pakistan; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory 
One Mi-8 helicopter was also lost, due to Stinger SAMs. 

On May 27, 1999, Fit. Lt. Nachiketa developed engine trouble in the 
Batalik sector and bailed out of his craft. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja went out 
of his way to locate his comrade but was shot down by a shoulder-fired 
Stinger missile. According to reports, he had bailed out of his stricken 
plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was 



[47] 



returned riddled with bullet wounds 



|2] 




During the Kargil conflict IAF Mirage 2000Hs 
carried out strike missions. 



In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the 
outposts manned by the Pakistani soldiers, who were out of visible 
range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults 
which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had 

to be made on peaks as high as 18000 feet (unknown operator: u'strong' m). Since any daylight attack would be 
suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for 
the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as -15 °C to -11 °C (12 °F to 5 °F) near the mountain tops. 
Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian 
Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move 
would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a 
manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international 
support for its cause. 

Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the 

[48] [49] 

infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 75%— 80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground 



was back under Indian control 



[16] 



Withdrawal and final battles 

Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, 
aide to then President Bill Clinton reported that the US intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear 
weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict between the two 
countries. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side 
of the Line of Control. Following the Washington accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani 
troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian 
side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for 
a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on. 

The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared 
of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil 
Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of 
Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement. 



World opinion 

Pakistan was criticised by other countries for instigating the war, as its paramilitary forces and insurgents crossed the 

[521 
Line of Control. Pakistan's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what 

[53] 

it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in the end not successful. Veteran analysts argued that 
the battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped "freedom fighters" 
would neither have the ability nor the wherewithal to seize land and defend it. Moreover, while the army had initially 
denied the involvement of its troops in the intrusion, two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan's 



KargilWar 201 

highest military honour). Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously, 

confirming Pakistan's role in the episode. India also released taped phone conversations between the Army Chief and 

T541 
a senior Pakistani general where the latter is recorded saying: "the scruff of [the militants] necks is in our hands,' 

although Pakistan dismissed it as a "total fabrication". Concurrently, Pakistan made several contradicting statements, 

confirming its role in Kargil, when it defended the incursions saying that the LOC itself was disputed. Pakistan 

also attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue, by linking the crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict but, 

such a diplomatic stance found few backers on the world stage. 

As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet U.S. 
President Bill Clinton on July 4 to obtain support from the United States. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and 
asked him to use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. Clinton 
would later reveal in his autobiography that "Sharif s moves were perplexing" since the Indian Prime Minister had 

travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of 

[571 
Control, Pakistan had wrecked the [bilateral] talks." On the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not 

crossing the LoC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war. 

G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European 

[59] 
Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC. China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of 

forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LoC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organizations like the 

ASEAN Regional Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC. 

Faced with growing international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from Indian territory. 
The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the Line of Control and resume 
bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes. 

Gallantry awards 

A number of Indian soldiers earned awards for gallantry during the campaign. 

• Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, 18 Grenadiers, Param Vir Chakra 

• Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, 1/1 1 Gorkha Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous 

• Captain Vikram Batra, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous 

• Captain Anuj Nayyar,17 JAT Regiment, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous 

• Major Saravanan, 1 Bihar, Vir Chakra, Posthumous 

• Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, Indian Air Force, Vir Chakra, Posthumous 

• Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra 

• Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari, 18 Grenadiers, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous 

Two Pakistani soldiers received the Nishan-e-Haider. 

• Captain Karnal Sher Khan, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous 

• Havaldaar Lalak Jan, Northern Light Infantry, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous 

Impact and influence of media 

The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media on public opinion in both nations. 
Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage 
were often telecast live on TV, and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. The conflict became the 
first "live" war in South Asia; it was given such detailed media coverage that one effect was the drumming up of 
jingoistic feelings. 

The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war, in which press briefings given by government officials of each 
nation produced conflicting claims and counterclaims. The Indian government placed a temporary news embargo on 
information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV and blocking access to 



Kargil War 202 

online editions of the Dawn newspaper. The Pakistani media criticized this apparent curbing of freedom of the 
press in India, while India media claimed it was in the interest of national security. The Indian government ran 
advertisements in foreign publications including The Times and The Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in 
supporting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner political support for its position. 

As the war progressed, media coverage of the conflict was more intense in India than in Pakistan. Many Indian 
channels showed images from the battle zone in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf War (one of the 
shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil while coverage continued). 
Reasons for India's increased coverage included the greater number of privately owned electronic media in India 
compared to Pakistan and relatively greater transparency in the Indian media. At a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani 
journalists agreed that while the Indian government had taken the press and the people into its confidence, Pakistan 
hadnot. [70] 

The print media in India and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based 
in the west and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was largely responsible for the conflict. Some analysts 

believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier 

r7ii 
for the Indian military operation in Kargil and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the 

Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic 

recognition for its position. 

WMDs and the nuclear factor 

Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were 
concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear 
capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test). Many pundits 
believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict 
started just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified. 

International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on May 31 

T72] 

warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. This was 
immediately interpreted as a threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the belief 

was reinforced when the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing weapons becomes 

T731 
meaningless if they are not used when they are needed." Many such ambiguous statements from officials of both 

countries were viewed as warnings of an impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider use of their 

limited nuclear arsenals in 'tactical' nuclear warfare in the belief that it would not have ended in mutual assured 

destruction, as could have occurred in a nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. Some experts 

believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, the Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent to 

markedly increase coercion against India. 

The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the U.S. received intelligence that Pakistani 
nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan prime minister 
Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White 
House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and responded that India 

was probably planning the same. In an article in May 2000 Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had 

T751 
readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, but could not back up this claim with any official proof. 

Sensing a deteriorating military scenario, diplomatic isolation, and the risks of a larger conventional and nuclear war, 
Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to vacate the Kargil heights. He later claimed in his official biography that General 
Pervez Musharraf had moved nuclear warheads without informing him. Recently however, Pervez Musharraf 

T321 

revealed in his memoirs that Pakistan's nuclear delivery system was not operational during the Kargil war; 
something that would have put Pakistan under serious disadvantage if the conflict went nuclear. 



Kargil War 203 

The threat of WMD included chemical and even biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemical 
weapons and incendiary weapons such as napalm against the Kashmiri fighters. India, on the other hand, showcased 
a cache of gas masks as proof that Pakistan may have been prepared to use non-conventional weapons. US official 

and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons determined that Pakistani allegations of India using 

ill] 
banned chemicals in its bombs were unfounded. 

Aftermath 
India 

From the end of the war until February 2000, the Indian stock market rose by over 30%. The next Indian national 
budget included major increases in military spending. 

T7S1 

There was a surge in patriotism, with many celebrities expressing their support for the Kargil cause. Indians were 
angered by media reports of the death of pilot Ajay Ahuja, especially after Indian authorities reported that Ahuja had 
been murdered and his body mutilated by Pakistani troops. The war had produced higher than expected fatalities for 
the Indian military, with a sizeable percentage of them including newly commissioned officers. One month after 
conclusion of the Kargil war, the Atlantique Incident - where a Pakistan Navy plane was shot down by India - briefly 
reignited fears of a conflict between the two countries. 

After the war, the Indian government severed ties with Pakistan and increased defence preparedness. India increased 

[79] 
its defence budget as it sought to acquire more state of the art equipment. Media reported about military 

procurement irregularities and criticism of intelligence agencies like Research and Analysis Wing, which failed to 

predict the intrusions or the identity/number of infiltrators during the war. An internal assessment report by the 

armed forces, published in an Indian magazine, showed several other failings, including "a sense of complacency" 

and being "unprepared for a conventional war" on the presumption that nuclearism would sustain peace. It also 

highlighted the lapses in command and control, the insufficient troop levels and the dearth of large-calibre guns like 

roil 

the Bofors. In 2006, retired Air Chief Marshal, A.Y. Tipnis, alleged that the Indian Army did not fully inform the 

government about the intrusions, adding that the army chief Ved Prakash Malik, was initially reluctant to use the full 

rs2i 
strike capability of the Indian Air Force, instead requesting only helicopter gunship support. Soon after the 

roil 

conflict, India also decided to complete the project - previously stalled by Pakistan - to fence the entire LOC. 

The end of the Kargil conflict was followed by the 13th Indian General Elections to the Lok Sabha, which gave a 
decisive mandate to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. It was re-elected to power in 
September— October 1999 with a majority of 303 seats out of 545 in the Lok Sabha. On the diplomatic front, 
Indo-U.S. relations improved, as the United States appreciated Indian attempts to restrict the conflict to a limited 
geographic area. Relations with Israel — which had discreetly aided India with ordnance supply and materiel such 

roc] 

as unmanned aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs, as well as satellite imagery — also were bolstered. 

Kargil Review Committee 

Soon after the war the Atal Behari Vajpayee government set up an inquiry into its causes and to analyze perceived 
Indian intelligence failures. The high-powered committee was chaired by eminent strategic affairs analyst K. 
Subrahmanyam and given powers to interview anyone with current or past associations with Indian security, 

including former Prime Ministers. The committee's final report (also referred to as the 'Subrahmanyam Report ) 

rs7i 
led to a large-scale restructuring of Indian Intelligence. It, however, came in for heavy criticism in the Indian 

media for its perceived avoidance of assigning specific responsibility for failures over detecting the Kargil 

rQQ] 

intrusions. The Committee was also embroiled in controversy for indicting Brigadier Surinder Singh of the Indian 
Army for his failure to report enemy intrusions in time, and for his subsequent conduct. Many press reports 
questioned or contradicted this finding and claimed that Singh had in fact issued early warnings that were ignored by 
senior Indian Army commanders and, ultimately, higher government functionaries. 



Kargil War 204 

[92] 
In a departure from the norm the final report was published and made publicly available. Some chapters and all 

annexures, however, were deemed to contain classified information by the government and not released. K. 

Subrahmanyam later wrote that the annexures contained information on the development of India's nuclear weapons 

[93] [94] 
program and the roles played by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi, P. V. Narasimha Rao and V P Singh. 

Pakistan 

Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the already fragile Pakistani economy was weakened 
further. The morale of Pakistani forces after the withdrawal declined as many units of the Northern Light 

rmr97i r98ir99i 

Infantry suffered heavy casualties. The government refused to accept the dead bodies of many officers, 

an issue that provoked outrage and protests in the Northern Areas. Pakistan initially did not acknowledge 

many of its casualties, but Sharif later said that over 4,000 Pakistani troops were killed in the operation. 
Responding to this, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf said, "It hurts me when an ex-premier undermines his own 

forces," and claimed that Indian casualties were more than that of Pakistan. 

[95] 
Many in Pakistan had expected a victory over the Indian military based on Pakistani official reports on the war, 

but were dismayed by the turn of events and questioned the eventual retreat. The military leadership is 

believed to have felt let down by the prime minister's decision to withdraw the remaining fighters. However, some 

authors, including ex-CENTCOM Commander Anthony Zinni, and ex-PM Nawaz Sharif, state that it was General 

Musharraf who requested Sharif to withdraw the Pakistani troops. With Sharif placing the onus of the Kargil 

attacks squarely on the army chief Pervez Musharraf, there was an atmosphere of uneasiness between the two. On 

October 12, 1999, General Musharraf staged a bloodless coup d'etat, ousting Nawaz Sharif. 

Benazir Bhutto, an opposition leader and former prime minister, called the Kargil War "Pakistan's greatest 
blunder". Many ex-officials of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan's principal intelligence 
agency) also believed that "Kargil was a waste of time" and "could not have resulted in any advantage" on the larger 
issue of Kashmir. A retired Pakistani Army General, Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, lambasted the war as "a 
disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy", adding that the plan was "flawed in terms of its conception, 
tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers." The Pakistani media criticized 

the whole plan and the eventual climbdown from the Kargil heights since there were no gains to show for the loss of 
lives and it only resulted in international condemnation. 

Despite calls by many, no public commission of inquiry was set up in Pakistan to investigate the people responsible 
for initiating the conflict. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML(N)) published a white paper in 2006, which stated 
that Nawaz Sharif constituted an inquiry committee that recommended a court martial for General Pervez Musharraf, 
but Musharraf "stole the report" after toppling the government, to save himself. The report also claims that India 
knew about the plan 1 1 months before its launch, enabling a complete victory for India on military, diplomatic and 
economic fronts. A statement in June, 2008 by a former Pakistan Army X Corps Core-commander and 

Director-General of Military Intelligence (M.I.) that time, Lieutenant-General (retired) Jamshed Gulzar Kiani said 
that As Prime minister, Nawaz Sharif "was never briefed by the army" on the Kargil attack, reignited the 
demand for a probe of the episode by legal and political groups. 

Though the Kargil conflict had brought the Kashmir dispute into international focus — which was one of the aims of 
Pakistan — it had done so in negative circumstances that eroded its credibility, since the infiltration came just after a 
peace process between the two countries was underway. The sanctity of the LOC too received international 
recognition. President Clinton's move to ask Islamabad to withdraw hundreds of armed militants from 
Indian-administered Kashmir was viewed by many in Pakistan as indicative of a clear shift in US policy against 
Pakistan. 



After the war, a few changes were made to the Pakistan army. In recognition of the Northern Light Infantry's 
performance in the war - which even drew praise from a retired Indian Lt. General - the regiment was 
incorporated into the regular army. The war showed that despite a tactically sound plan that had the element of 



Kargil War 



205 



surprise, little groundwork had been done to gauge the politico-diplomatic ramifications. And like previous 

unsuccessful infiltrations attempts, such as Operation Gibraltar, which sparked the 1965 war, there was little 
coordination or information sharing among the branches of the Pakistani Armed Forces. One U.S. Intelligence study 
is reported to have stated that Kargil was yet another example of Pakistan's (lack of) grand strategy, repeating the 
follies of the previous wars. 



Casualties 

Pakistan army losses have been difficult to determine. Pakistan 
confirmed that 453 soldiers were killed. The US Department of State 
had made an early, partial estimate of close to 700 fatalities. According 
to numbers stated by Nawaz Sharif there were over 4,000 fatalities. His 
PML (N) party in its "white paper" on the war mentioned that more 
than 3,000 Mujahideens, officers and soldiers were killed. Another 
major Pakistani political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, also says 

that "thousands" of soldiers and irregulars died. Indian estimates 

ri22i 
stand at 1,042 Pakistani soldiers killed. Musharraf, in his Hindi 

version of his memoirs, titled "Agnipath", differs from all the estimates 

stating that 357 troops were killed with a further 665 wounded. 

Apart from General Musharraf s figure on the number of Pakistanis 

wounded, the number of people injured in the Pakistan camp is not yet 

fully known although they are at least more than 400 according to 

Pakistan army's website. One Indian Pilot was officially captured 

during the fighting, while there were eight Pakistani soldiers who were 

captured during the fighting, and were repatriated on 13 August 1999; 

India gave its official casualty figures as 527 dead and 1,363 wounded. 





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Memorial of Operation Vijay. 



Kargil War in the arts 

The brief conflict provided considerable dramatic material for filmmakers and authors in India. Some documentaries 
which were shot on the subject were used by the ruling party coalition, led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in 
furthering its election campaign that immediately followed the war. The following is a list of the major films and 
dramas on the subject. 

• "Lord John Marbury (The West Wing)" (1999), 1 1th episode of the first season depicts a fictionalized 
representation of the Kargil conflict. 

• Pentagram's single, 'Price Of Bullets', released in 1999 dealt with the Kargil War. 

• LOC: Kargil (2003), a Hindi movie which depicts many incidents from the war was one of the longest in Indian 
movie history, running for more than four hours. 

• Lakshya (2004), another Hindi movie portraying a fictionalised account of the conflict. Movie critics have 

M271 

generally appreciated the realistic portrayal of characters. The film also received good reviews in Pakistan 

because it portrays both sides fairly. 

ri29i 

• Sainika (2002), the Kannada film directed by Mahesh Sukhdhare depicted the life of a soldier with Kargil war 

as one of the events. Starring C.P.Yogishwar and Sakshi Shivanand. 

• Dhoop (2003), ~ Hindi film, directed by national award winner Ashwini Chaudhary, which depicted the life of 
Anuj Nayyar's parents after his death. Anuj Nayyar was a captain in the Indian army and was awarded Maha Vir 
Chakra posthumously. Om Puri plays the role of S.K. Nayyar, Anuj's father. 



Kargil War 206 

• Mission Fateh - Real Stories of Kargil Heroes, a TV series telecast on Sahara channel chronicling the Indian 
Army's missions. 

• Fifty Day War - A theatrical production on the war, directed by Aamir Raza Husain, the title indicating the length 
of the Kargil conflict. This was claimed to be the biggest production of its kind in Asia, budget of Rs. 1.5 crore, 
involving real aircraft and explosions in an outdoor setting. 

• Kurukshetra{20Q%) - A Malayalam film directed by a former Indian Army Major - major Ravi (Retd) based on his 
actual experience of Kargil War. 

ri32i 

Many other movies like Tango Charlie drew heavily upon the Kargil episode, which still continues to be a plot 

ri 33i 

for mainstream movies with a Malayalam movie Keerthi Chakra. The impact of the war in the sporting arena 
was also visible during the India-Pakistan clash in the 1999 Cricket World Cup, which coincided with the Kargil 
timeline. The game witnessed heightened passions and was one of the most viewed matches in the tournament. 

Notes 

[I] It is also sometimes referred to as Operation Vijay Kargil so as to distinguish it from Operation Vijay (1961), the operation hy the Military 
of India that led to the capture of Goa, Daman and Diu and Anjidiv Islands. 

[2] "1999 Kargil Conflict" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm). GlobalSecurity.org. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[3] Tom Clancy, Gen. Tony Zinni (Retd) and Tony Koltz (2004). Battle Ready. Grosset & Dunlap. ISBN 0-399-15176-1. 
[4] "Pak commander blows the lid on Islamabad's Kargil plot" (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ 

as-spell-binding-as-the-guns-of-navarone/475330/). June 12, 2009. . Retrieved 2009-06-13. 
[5] "Sharif admits he let down Vajpayee on Kargil conflict" (http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/10/stories/2007091059781400.htm). The 

Hindu (Chennai, India). 2007-09-10. . Retrieved 2007-10-06. 
[6] Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, p. 420 (2007) 
[7] Hussain, Javed (2006-10-21). "Kargil: what might have happened" (http://www.dawn.eom/2006/10/21/ed.htm#4). Dawn. . Retrieved 

2009-05-20. 
[8] Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal (2003). The Armed Forces of Pakistan. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-86508-1 19- 1. Pg 4 
[9] Profile of Kargil District (http://kargil.nic.in/profile/profile.htm) Official website of Kargil District 
[10] "Climate & Soil conditions" (http://kargil.nic.in/profile/profile.htm). Official website of Kargil District. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 

[II] "War in Kargil - The CCC's summary on the war" (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/war_in_kargil.pdf) (PDF). . Retrieved 
2009-05-20. 

[12] Chandran, Suba (2004). "Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?" (http://acdis.illinois.edu/publications/207/ 

publication-LimitedWarwithPakistanWillItSecureIndiasInterests.html). ACDIS Occasional Paper. Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, 

and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[13] Against the accepted 3:1 ratio for attacking troops vs defending troops (http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR638/), the 

ratio over mountain terrain is estimated at 6:1. Men At War (http://www.india-today.com/itoday/19990726/cover3.html) India Today 
[14] Acosta, Marcus P., CPT, U.S. Army, High Altitude Warfare- The Kargil Conflict & the Future (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/ 

theses/Acosta03.pdf), June 2003. Alternate Link (http://www.nps.edu/academics/sigs/nsa/publicationsandresearch/studenttheses/ 

theses/Acosta03.pdf) 
[15] "The Coldest War" (http://outside.away.com/outside/features/200302/200302_siachen_7.html). Outside Magazine. . Retrieved 

2009-05-20. 
[16] Kargil: where defence met diplomacy (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_26-7-2002_pg4_12) - India's then Chief 

of Army Staff VP Malik, expressing his views on Operation Vijay. Hosted on Daily Times; The Fate of Kashmir By Vikas Kapur and Vipin 

Narang (http://www.stanford.edU/group/sjir/3.l.06_kapur-narang.html) Stanford Journal of International Relations; Book review of 

"The Indian Army: A Brief History by Maj Gen Ian Cardozo" (http://www.ipcs. org/ipcs/displayReview.jsp?kValue=102) - Hosted on 

IPCS 
[17] Robert G. Wirsing (2003). Kashmir in the Shadow of War: regional rivalries in a nuclear age. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1090-6. Pg 38 
[18] Ludra, Kuldip S. (2001). Operation Badr.Mussharefs contribution to Pakistan's thousand years war against India. Institute for Strategic 

Research and Analysis Chandigarh. 
[19] Low Intensity Conflicts in India By Vivek Chadha, United Service Institution of India Published by SAGE, 2005, ISBN 0-7619-3325-5 
[20] Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9. 
[21] Musharraf advised against Kargil, says Benazir (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_2-7-2003_pg7_19), 'Musharraf 

planned Kargil when I was PM' : Bhutto - Previous interview to Hindustan Times on November 30, 2001 
[22] Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within by Shuja Nawaz Oxford University Press 
[23] Kapur, S. Paul (2007). Dangerous Deterrent. Stanford University Press, p. 1 18. ISBN 0-8047-5550-7. 
[24] "Nawaz blames Musharraf for Kargil" (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1581473.cms). The Times of India. 2006-05-28. . 

Retrieved 2009-05-20. 



Kargil War 207 

[25] "I learnt about Kargil from Vajpayee, says Nawaz" (http://www.dawn.com/2006/05/29/natl.htm). Dawn. 2006-05-29. . Retrieved 

2006-05-29. 
[26] Qadir, Shaukat (April 2002). "An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999" (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/JA00199.pdf). 

RUSI Journal. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[27] "Kargil planned before Vajpayee's visit: Musharraf" (http://www. expressindia.com/fullstory. php?newsid=71008). Indian Express. 

2006-07-13. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[28] http://www.tribuneindia.com/201 1/201 10726/edit.htm#6 

[29] Kargil War: Need to learn strategic lessons General (Retd) V P Malik, India Tribune article 26/7/2011 
[30] BBC news Kargil conflict timeline (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/387702.stm) 

[31] "How I Started A War" (http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,991457,00.html). Time. 1999-07-12. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[32] Pervez Musharraf (2006). In the Line of Fire: A Memoir. Free Press. ISBN 0-7432-8344-9. 
[33] "The Northern Light Infantry in the Kargil Operations" (http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/pakistan/nli_kargill999.html). . 

Retrieved 2009-05-20. by Ravi Rikhye 1999 August 25, 2002 - ORBAT 
[34] It is estimated that around 2,000 "Mujahideen" might have been involved as Musharraf stated on July 6, 1999 to Pakistan's The News; online 

article (http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/AG08Df01.html) in the Asia Times quoting the General's estimate. An Indian Major 

General(retd) too puts the number of guerrillas at 2,000 (http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/jul/15ashok.htm) apart from the NLI Infantry 

Regiment. 
[35] Saurabh Kalia's parents waging a lone battle to highlight war crimes (http://www.hindu.com/2009/07/06/stories/2009070655650700. 

htm) 
[36] War in Kargil (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/war_in_kargil.pdf) (PDF) Islamabad Playing with Fire by Praful Bidwai 

(http://www.tni.org/archives/bidwai/danger.htm) - The Tribune, 7 June 1999 
[37] Gen VP Malik. "Lessons from Kargil" (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-6/malik.html). . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[38] Grare, Frederic. "The Resurgence of Baluch nationalism" (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CP65.Grare.FINAL.pdf) (PDF). 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[39] "Exercise Seaspark — 2001" (http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/apr/seaspark.htm). Defence Journal. April 2001. . Retrieved 

2009-05-20. 
[40] "Indian general praises Pakistani valour at Kargil" (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_5-5-2003_pg7_14). Daily 

Times, Pakistan. 2003-05-05. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[41] Kashmir in the Shadow of War By Robert Wirsing Published by M.E. Sharpe, 2003 ISBN 0-7656-1090-6 pp36 
[42] Landmine monitor - India (http://www.icbl.org/lm/2000/india) 
[43] Indian Army gets hostile weapon locating capability (http://indiaenews.com/2006-07/ 

151 12-indian-army-gets-hostile-weapon-locating-capability.htm) 
[44] Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century By Adekeye Adebajo, Chandra Lekha Sriram Published by Routledge ppl92,193 
[45] Swami, Praveen (2004-06-30). "Commander ordered capture of Point 5353 in Kargil war" (http://www.hindu.com/2004/06/30/stories/ 

2004063006391100.htm). The Hindu (Chennai, India). . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[46] The State at War in South Asia By Pradeep Barua Published by U of Nebraska Press Page 261 
[47] India loses two jets (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/354120.stm) 

[48] "Bitter Chill of Winter" (http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n08/ali_01_.html). TariqAli, London Review of Books. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[49] Colonel Ravi Nanda (1999). Kargil : A Wake Up Call. Vedams Books. ISBN 81-7095-074-0. Online summary of the Book (https://www. 

vedamsbooks.com/nol4953.htm) 
[50] Pakistan 'prepared nuclear strike' (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/1989886.stm) 
[51] "Pakistan and the Kashmir militants" (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/386537.stm). BBC News. 1999-07-05. . Retrieved 

2009-05-20. 
[52] Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9. 

Pg 173; Revisiting Kargil: Was it a Failure for Pakistan's Military?, IPCS (http://www.ipcs.org/whatsNewArticlell. 

j sp?action=sho wView&kValue= 1 647& status=article&mod=b) 
[53] "Lesson learnt?" (http://www.dawn.com/weekly/cowas/990711.htm). dawn. 2006-07-24. . Retrieved 2009-08-02. 
[54] "Transcripts of conversations between Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, Chief of General Staff and Musharraf" (http://web.archive.org/web/ 

20080701220255/http://www. india-today.com/kargil/ audio. html). India Today. Archived from the original (http://www.india-today. 

com/kargil/audio.html) on July 1, 2008. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[55] U.S. brokers Kargil peace but problems remain (http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/AG07Df01.html) 
[56] "ASEAN backs India's stand" (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/1999/99jul25/world.htm#6). The Tribune. 2006-07-24. . Retrieved 

2009-05-20. 
[57] Bill Clinton (2004). My Life. Random House. ISBN 0-375-41457-6., Pg 865 

[58] Dialogue call amid fresh fighting - (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/399897.stm) - BBC News 
[59] "India encircles rebels on Kashmir mountaintop" (http://web.archive.Org/web/20080614150423/http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/ 

asiapcf/9907/02/kashmir.pakistan/). CAW. Archived from the original (http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9907/02/kashmir. 

Pakistan/) on June 14, 2008. . Retrieved 2009-05-20.CNN 



Kargil War 208 

[60] "Text of joint Clinton-Sharif statement" (http://web.archive.Org/web/20080516134001/http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9907/ 

05/kashmir.02/). CNN. Archived from the original (http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9907/05/kashmir.02/) on May 16, 2008. . 

Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[61] "Disarmament Diplomacy - Complete texts of Indian and Pakistani statements following Pakistan's decision to withdraw its troops in 

Kargil" (http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd39/39kash.htm). . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[62] Indian Army Param Vir Chakra Winners (http://indianarmy.nic.in/PVC/pvc.html) 
[63] http ://www. shaheedfoundation. org/NishaneHaider. asp 

[64] India's Nuclear Bomb By George Perkovich University of California Press, 2002 ISBN 0-520-23210-0, Page 473 
[65] Sachdev, A.K.. "Media Related Lessons From Kargil - Strategic Analysis: January 2000 (Vol. XXIII No. 10)" (http://www.ciaonet.org/ 

olj/sa/sa_00saa01.html). . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[66] "Centre bans PTV" (http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/ple/ie/daily/19990603/ige03090.html). . Retrieved 2009-05-20.Indian 

Express June 3, 1999 
[67] Delhi lifts ban on Dawn website, PTV broadcasts (http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/1999/17jul99. 

html#delh) Dawn wire service 17 July 1999 
[68] A different view of Kargil by Rasheeda Bhagat (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fll619/16191300.htm) Volume 16 - Issue 19, Sep. 

11-24, 1999 The Frontline 
[69] Pak TV ban gets good response (http://www.indiantelevision.com/newsletter/070699/dd070699.htm) 
[70] Pak media lament lost opportunity (http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/jul/20media.htm) - Editorial statements and news headlines from 

Pakistan hosted on Rediff.com 
[71] The role of media in war - Sultan M Hali (http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/role-media-war.htm), Press Information Bureau, 

India (http://pib.nic.in/feature/feyr2000/fjul2000/f210720001.html) 
[72] Quoted in News Desk, "Pakistan May Use Any Weapon," The News, May 31, 1999. 
[73] Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program (http://www.nd.edu/~krocinst/ocpapers/op_18_2.pdf) (PDF) 
[74] Options Available to the United States to Counter a Nuclear Iran By George Perkovich (http://www.carnegieendowment.org/ 

publications/index. cfm?fa=view&id=17967) - Testimony by George Perkovich before the House Armed Services Committee, February 1, 

2006 
[75] India had deployed Agni during Kargil, Article from "Indian Express" 19/6/2000 
[76] "Musharraf moved nuclear weapons in Kargil war" (http://web.archive.Org/web/20071223045736/http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/ 

july-2006/6/indexl6.php). The Nation. Archived from the original (http://www. nation. com. pk/daily/july-2006/6/indexl6.php) on 

2007-12-23. . Retrieved 2009-05-27. 
[77] NTI: Country Overview (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Chemical/2324_2698.html) - Nuclear Threat Initiative 
[78] The Spoils of War (http://www.time.com/time/asia/magazine/2000/0410/india.kargil.html), India backs its 'boys' (http://news.bbc. 

co.uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/381006.stm) 
[79] Centre files second affidavit in Kargil scam (http://www.financialexpress.com/news/Centre-files-second-affidavit-in-Kargil-scam/ 

131793/) The Financial Express April 14, 2005 
[80] Kargil coffin scam (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/2001/20011212/edit.htm#2) 
[81] War Against Error, Cover story on Outlook, February 28, 2005 ( Online edition (http://www.outlookindia.com/full. 

asp?fodname=20050228&fname=Cover+Story+(F)&sid=l)) 
[82] Army was reluctant to tell govt about Kargil: Tipnis (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2115734.cms) 7 October 2006 - 

The Times of India 
[83] Fencing Duel (http://www.india-today.com/webexclusive/dispatch/20010421/vinayak.html) - India Today 

[84] India Changes Course By Paul R. Dettman Published by Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, ISBN 0-275-97308-5, Page 117-118 
[85] News reports from Daily Times (Pakistan) (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_30-7-2002_pg7_37) and BBC (http:/ 

/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3088780.stm) mentioning the Israeli military support to India during the conflict. 
[86] "Kargil : Subrahmanyam Committee's Report" (http://news.indiamart.com/news-analysis/kargil-subrahmanyam-6975.html). Indian 

News. . Retrieved 2009-10-20. 
[87] "Kargil report shows the way" (http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000320/ied20064.html). Indian Express. . Retrieved 

2009-10-20. 
[88] Pg 56-60 Dixit, JN, "India-Pakistan in War & Peace", Routledge, 2002 (http://books.google.co.in/books?id=XnzRttnqExUC) 
[89] "The sacking of a Brigadier" (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fll813/18130410.htm). Frontline. . Retrieved 2009-10-20. 
[90] "Scapegoat for the system" (http://www.hindu.com/2001/07/01/stories/0501 1344.htm). The Hindu (Chennai, India). 2001-07-01. . 

Retrieved 2009-10-20. 
[91] "Army's Kargil inquiry indicts Brig Surinder Singh" (http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/feb/16kargil.htm). Rediff. . Retrieved 

2009-10-20. 
[92] "THE KARGIL STORY" (http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fll722/17220240.htm). The Hindu. . Retrieved 2009-10-20. 
[93] "P.V. Narasimha Rao and the Bomb" (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/2004/20041229/edit.htm#6). The Tribune. . Retrieved 2009-10-20. 
[94] "Narasimha Rao and the Bomb" (http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a791915926~db=all). informaworld. . Retrieved 

2009-10-20. 



Kargil War 209 

[95] Samina Ahmed. "Diplomatic Fiasco: Pakistan's Failure on the Diplomatic Front Nullifies its Gains on the Battlefield" (http://belfercenter. 

ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1209/diplomatic_fiasco.html) (Belfer Center for International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government) 
[96] Multiple views and opinions on the state of Pakistan's economy, the Kashmir crisis and the military coup (http://www.salon.com/news/ 

feature/1999/10/13/reacts/print.html), The Promise of Contemporary Pakistan by Faisal Cheema (http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/ 

S&Ps/2003-04-Wi/S&P-Wi-2003/promise_pakistan.html) 
[97] Samina Ahmed. "A Friend for all Seasons." (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1002/friend_for_all_seasons.html) (Belfer 

Center for International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government) 
[98] "Pakistan refuses to take even officers' bodies" (http://www.rediff.eom/news/1999/jul/l lkargl.htm) 
[99] "press release issued in New Delhi regarding bodies of two Pakistan Army Officers" (http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/PR_1999/ 

July_1999/PR_July_15_1999.html) 
[100] Second-Class Citizens by M. Ilyas Khan, The Herald (Pakistan), July 2000. Online scanned version of the article (http://www.warbirds. 

in/downloads/HeraldKargil.pdf)(PDF) 
[101] Musharraf and the truth about Kargil (http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2006092505001100.htm& 

date=2006/09/25/&prd=th&) - The Hindu 25 September 2006 
[102] "Over soldier's killed in Kargil: Sharif" (http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2003/08/17/stories/2003081702900800.htm). The 

Hindu. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[103] President Musharraf reacts to Nawaz Sharif s Pakistan's casualty claims in Kargil (http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory. 

php?newsid=34665) 
[104] Pakistani opposition presses for Sharif s resignation By K. Ratnayake 7 August 1999 (http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/augl999/ 

pak-a07.shtml), Can Sharif deliver? (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/389884.stm), Michael Krepon. "The 

Stability-Instability Paradox in South Asia" (http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA20041217738) - Hosted on Henry L. Stimson 

Centre. 
[105] Tom Clancy, Gen. Tony Zinni (Retd) and Tony Koltz (2004). Battle Ready. Grosset & Dunlap. ISBN 0-399-15176-1. 
[106] Musharraf Vs. Sharif: Who's Lying? (http://www.weeklyvoice.com/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1443& 

Itemid=66) 
[107] Kargil Was Success Only For Pervez (http://farjinews.blogspot.com/2009/07/kargil-was-success-only-for-pervez-only.html) 
[108] Select Media Reports from Urdu Media in Pakistan (http://www.ipcs.org/PakMedia05-UAug04.pdf) (PDF) 
[109] Kargil was a bigger disaster than 1971 (http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1056536) - Interview of Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan 

Khattak. 
[110] Review of Musharraf s memoirs by S. A. Haleem (http://jang.com. pk/thenews/oct2006-weekly/books&people-19-10-2006/index. 

html) Jang, October 19, 2006 
[111] Victory in reverse: the great climbdown (http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/990709.htm), For this submission what gain? (http:// 

www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/990723.htm) by Ayaz Amir - Dawn (newspaper) 
[112] PML-N issues white paper on Kargil operation (http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=2382) - The News International 
[113] Ill-conceived planning by Musharraf led to second major military defeat in Kargil: PML-N (http://www.paktribune.com/news/index. 

shtml?15 1668) Pak Tribune, August 6, 2006 
[114] Call for Musharraf treason trial By M Ilyas Khan (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/7434427.stm) BBC Newsjune 3, 2008 
[115] Lawmakers demand probe into Kargil debacle (http://www.app. com. pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& 

id=40288&Itemid=2) Associated Press of Pakistan June 3, 2008 
[116] MNAs seek probe into Kargil debacle By Naveed Butt (http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/ 

Politics/04- Jun-2008/MNAs-seek-probe-into-Kargil-debacle) The Nation 
[117] Analysis: Shift in US Kashmir stance? (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/371945.stm), BBC 1999-06-17 
[118] Kargil: the morning after By Irfan Husain (http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/20000429.htm) 29 April 2000 Dawn 
[119] EDITORIAL: Kargil: a blessing in disguise? (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_19-7-2004_pg3_l) July 19, 2004 

Daily Times, Pakistan 
[120] Ill-conceived planning by Musharraf led to second major military defeat in Kargil: PML-N (http://www.paktribune.com/news/index. 

shtml?151668) August 6, 2006, PakTribune 
[121] "Indo-Pak summit 2001" (http://web.archive.Org/web/20071012153208/http://ppp.org.pk/articles/article30.htm). Pakistan Peoples 

Party. 2007-10-12. Archived from the original (http://ppp.org.pk/articles/article30.htm) on 2007-10-12. . Retrieved 2009-05-27. 
[122] Indian Army rubbishes Musharraf s Kargil claims (http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1805833, 0008. htm) 
[123] "President Musharaffs disclosure on Pakistani Casualties in his book" (http://www.indianexpress.com/story/14208.html). Indian 

Express. . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[124] Pakistan army publishes list of army regulars who died in various conflicts (http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/modules/shuhadascorner/ 

embed_shuhada_list.aspx), November 2010 
[125] "Tribune Report on Pakistani POWs" (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/1999/99augl5/nation.htm#9). . Retrieved 2009-05-20. 
[126] LOC: Kargil main page on (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0347416/) the website IMDb. 

[127] A collection of some reviews on the movie "Lakshya" at (http://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/lakshya/?show=all) Rotten Tomatoes 
[128] Bollywood's Kargil — Ihsan Aslam (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print.asp?page=2004\06\24\story_24-6-2004_pg3_3) Daily Times 
[129] (http://www.kannadaaudio.com/Songs/FilmStories/home/Sainika.php) 



KargilWar 210 

[130] Dhoop (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0387164/) at the Internet Movie Database 

[131] "The larger than life director" (http://www.financialexpress.com/old/fe/daily/20000219/flel3016.html). Financial Express. February 

19, 2000. . 
[132] Tango Charlie (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0444913/) at the Internet Movie Database 
[133] Keerthi Chakra (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0485922/) at the Internet Movie Database 

Footnotes 

• Note (I): Names for the conflict: There have been various names for the conflict. During the actual fighting in 
Kargil, the Indian Government was careful not to use the term "war", calling it a "war-like situation", even though 
both nations indicated that they were in a "state of war". Terms like Kargil "conflict", Kargil "incident" or the 
official military assault, "Operation Vijay", were thus preferred. After the end of the war however, the Indian 
Government increasingly called it the "Kargil War", even though there had been no official declaration of war. 
Other less popularly used names included "Third Kashmir War" and Pakistan's codename given to the infiltration: 
"Operation Badr". 

References 

• Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil (http:// 
www. Cambridge. org/aus/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521767217&ss=fro) the CCC Kargil Project. 

• Kargil Conflict (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm) (GlobalSecurity.org) 

• Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1450/) (RAND 
Corporation) 

• War in Kargil (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/war_in_kargil.pdf) (Center for Contemporary 
Conflict) PDF download 

• Essay on the outcomes of the Kargil War (http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives 1999/ 
99august05.html) 

• Stephen P. Cohen (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1502-1. 

• Kargil Review Committee (2000). From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report. SAGE 
Publications. ISBN 0-7619-9466-1. (Executive summary of the report, Online) (http://www.fas.org/news/ 
india/2000/25indi 1 .htm) 

• Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests? (http://acdis.illinois.edu/publications/207/ 
publication-LimitedWarwithPakistanWillItSecureIndiasInterests.html) ACDIS Occasional Paper by Suba 
Chandran, Published 2004 by Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), 
University of Illinois. 

• An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999, by [[Shaukat Qadir (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/kargil/ 
JA00199.pdf)], RUSI Journal, April 2002] (PDF) 

• V.P. Malik (2006). Kargil; From Surprise to Victory. Harper Collins, New Delhi, India.. 



KargilWar 211 

Further reading 

• M. K. Akbar (1999). Kargil Cross Border Terrorism. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-7099-734-8. 

• Amarinder Singh (2001). A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999. Motibagh Palace, Patiala. ASIN: 
B0006E8KKW. 

• Jasjit Singh (1999). Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-86019-22-7. 

• J. N. Dixit (2002). India-Pakistan in War & Peace. Books Today. ISBN 0-415-30472-5. 

• Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army From Independence to Kargil 
1947-1999). Rosedog Books, Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania, USA.. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3. 

Ranjan Kumar Singh. SarhadZero Mile. Parijat Prakashan.. ISBN 81-903561-0-0. 

External links 

• Indian Armed Forces site on Kargil (http://indianarmy.nic.in/arkargil/welcome.html) 

• Animated timeline and other Kargil stories (http://www.india-today.com/kargil/) - India Today 

• Impact of the conflict on civilians (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/401931.stm) - BBC 

• The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display. article ?id=4506) — YaleGlobal 
Online 

• Kargil Debacle: Musharrafs Time Bomb, Waiting to Explode (http://www.satribune.antisystemic.org/www. 
satribune.com/archives/august04/Pl_rauf.htm) 

• Brief analysis of the Kargil conflict (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/saml2.pdf) by Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (PDF) 

• Kargil— nine years on (http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=l 10941)The News International, 
Pakistan 

• POSTCARD USA: Kargil, Kargil everywhere (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default. 
asp?page=story_25-7-2004_pg3_4) - Pakistan's Daily Times 

• Pakistan's lessons from its Kargil War (http://web.archive.Org/web/20071012085214/http://www.saag.org/ 
papers 13/paperl231. html) 

• Video of Pakistani PoWs from the conflict (http://youtube. com/watch ?v=X3FJP4iOJM8&mode=related& 
search=) 

• Video - Tiger hill, Kargil hill's turning point (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-rZl-DWcyg) 

• Video of Indian army handling over bodies of Pakistani soldiers to Pak army (http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=E7HkMaGsSRQ) 



212 



War progress 



Kargil order of battle 



The following is the order of battle of both the Indian and Pakistani troops during the Kargil War. While the 
Indian orbat is based on publications by Indian authors, sourced from official sources and newspaper reports, the 
Pakistan orbat is based on Indian Intelligence reports. It must also be noted that Pakistani orbat does not include the 
separatist fighters who were also involved in fighting atop the peaks of Kargil. 



Indian Orbat 
Indian Army 

Northern Command 

• XV Corps 

• XV Corps Artillery Brigade 

• HQ 8 Mountain Division (ex Sharifabad, Valley) 

• 8 Mountain Artillery Brigade (division artillery) 

• 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade Group 

16 Grenadiers 

4Jat 

3 Punjab 

10 Garhwal 

BSFBn 

Det 17 Guards (ATGM) 

56 Mountain Brigade (Matayan) (part of division) 

16 Grenadiers 
18 Grenadiers 

8 Sikh 

1 Naga 

2 Raj Rif 
18 Garhwal 
BJAKRif 
1/3 GR 

9 Para Cdos 
Det 17 Guards (ATGM) 

50 (Independent) Parachute Brigade (ex Army HQ Reserves) 

• 6 Parachute 

• 7 Parachute 

• 1 Parachute Commandos 

• Det 19 Guards (ATGM) 

192 Mountain Brigade (part of division) 

• 18 Grenadiers 



Kargil order of battle 



213 



• 8 Sikh 

• 9 Para Cdos 

• Det 17 Guards (ATGM) 

79 Mountain Brigade (Dras) (part of division) 

17Jat 
28 RR 
12 Mahar 
BJAKRif 
2Naga 

9 Para Cdos 
Det 17 Guards (ATGM) 

3 Infantry Division (Leh) 

• 3 Artillery Brigade (divisional artillery) 

• 70 Infantry Brigade Group (ex Demchok, China border) (regularly assigned to division) 

1/11 GR 

12 JAK LI 

10 Para Cdos 
1 Bihar 

Ladakh Scouts 
17 Garhwal 
5 Para 

14 Sikh 
Det 19 Guards (ATGM) 

102 (Independent) Infantry Brigade Group (Shyok River Valley) (normally under command 3 Division) 

1 1 Rajputana Rifles 
9 Mahar 

13 Kumaon 
27 Rajput 

Det High Altitude Warfare School Permanent Cadre 
Det 19 Guards (ATGM) 

Kargil Theatre Artillery (these arty units took part in the War serving under various formations) 

Lt = Light; Fd = Field; Med = Medium; Hvy Mor = Heavy Mortar 

4 Fd Regt 

15 Fd Regt 
41 FdRegt 
108 Med Regt 
139 Med Regt 
141 Fd Regt 
153 Med Regt 
158 Med Regt 
197 Fd Regt 
212 Rocket Regt 
244 Hvy Mor Regt 
253 Med Regt 
255 Fd Regt 



Kargil order of battle 



214 



286 Med Regt 
305 Med Regt 
307 Med Regt 
315 Fd Regt 
1861 LtRegt 
1889 Lt Regt 

Other battalions 

5 Special Frontier Force (Vikas Force) 
663 Reconnaissance & Observation Squadron 
668 Reconnaissance & Observation Squadron 
Ladakh Scouts: Karakoram & India Wings 

13 Punjab 
12 Grenadiers 
22 Grenadiers 
7 Jat (may have been mistaken) 

14 Sikh LI (may have been mistaken) 
9 Rashtriya Rifles 
14 Rashtriya Rifles 
17 Rashtriya Rifles 
11 Sikh 
3 J&K Rifles 
16 Dogras 
Dogra Scouts 
5 Rajput 
9 Mahar 



Indian Air Force 

Apart from the involvement of the Indian Army, the Indian Air Force (IAF) also participated in the Kargil War as 
part of Operation Safed Sagar. 



Pakistan orbat 

5 NLI battalion 

6 NLI battalion 

12 NLI battalion 1 

13 NLI battalion 



[21 



24 SIND 
27 SIND 



[3] 
[2] 



Kargil order of battle 215 

References 

[1] This list is compiled from newspaper and casualty reports. 
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nishan_i_Haider 
[3] In the FCNA region from October 1998 onwards 

Source 

• Indian Army — Kargil War 1999 v. 2.0 8 March 2006 (http://www.ordersofbattle.darkscape.net/site/history/ 
index.html) Mandeep S. Bajwa & Ravi Rikhye 

• Kargil Committee Report Executive Summary (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCA.html) 



216 



Nuclear conflict 



Smiling Buddha 



Pokhran-I 
Operation Smiling Buddha 


Country 


India 


Test site 


Pokhran 


Period 


May 1974 


Number of tests 


1 


Test type 


Underground tests 


Device type 


Fission 


Max. yield 


8 kilotons of TNT (unknown operator: 


u'strong' TJ) 


Navigation 


Previous test 


None 


Next test 


Pokhran-II 



Smiling Buddha, formally designated as Pokhran-I, was the codename given to the Republic of India's first 

nuclear test explosion that took place at the long-constructed Indian Army base, Pokhran Test Range at Pokhran 

121 
municipality, Rajasthan state on 18 May 1974 at 8:05 a.m. (1ST). It was also the first confirmed nuclear test by a 

nation outside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The explosive yield of the bomb 

131 
was reported to be 8 kt. 

History 

The nuclear weapons efforts were remarkably established in 1944 by Homi J. Bhabha who founded the nuclear 

[41 

institute Institute of Fundamental Research in 1944. Nuclear physicist Piara Singh Gill also returned to the country 

from the United States after participating in the Manhattan Project in 1945. Physicists such as Chandrasekhara 

141 
Raman and Satyendra Bose later went on to play an integral role in the research of nuclear weapons technology. 

After Indian independence, Prime Minister Jawarharalal Nehru authorized the development of a nuclear programme 
headed by Homi J. Bhabha; the Atomic Energy Act of 1948 focuses on peaceful development. India was heavily 
involved in the development of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but ultimately opted not to sign. 

We must develop this atomic energy quite apart from war - indeed I think we must develop it for the purpose 
of using it for peaceful purposes. ... Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, 
possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way 

[41 

— Jawaharalal Nehru — 1st Premier of Republic of India, 

In 1954, Bhabha moved the nuclear programme in a direction towards weapons design and production. Bhabha 
established two important infrastructure projects - the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre at Mumbai and the 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) of which Bhabha was its first secretary. Between the period of 1954 to 1959, 
the nuclear programme grew swiftly and by 1958 the DAE had 1/3 of the defence budget for research purposes. In 
1954, the United States and Canada, as part of the Atoms for Peace policy, agreed to provide and established the 
small research reactor, CIRUS, also at Trombay. Acquisition of CIRUS was a watershed event in nuclear 



Smiling Buddha 217 

proliferation, with understanding between India and the United States that the reactor would be used for research 

purposes only. The CIRUS was an ideal facility to develop the plutonium bomb, therefore Nehru had refused to 

mi 
accept the nuclear fuel from Canada, and started the programme to develop the ingenious nuclear fuel cycle. 

In 1962, the nuclear programme continued to develop, but at slow rate. Nehru was distracted by the Sino-Indian 
War, but lost territory after China had successfully annexed the territory after launching a successful assault. 
Nehru turned to the Soviet Union for help but it was facing the missile crisis. The Soviet Politburo turned down 

Ml 

Nehru's request for weapon supply and continued backing the Chinese. The legacy of this war left an impression 

M] 

on India that the Soviet Union was an unreliable ally, therefore a nuclear deterrence was felt necessary at that time. 
Design work began in 1965 under Bhabha but later proceeded by Raja Ramanna who took over the programme after 
former's death. 

However, the nuclear programme came to a halt after Lai Bahadur Shastri became the prime minister after Nehru's 
death. Shastri faced a another war, this time with West Pakistan (now Pakistan). Shastri appointed Doctor Vikram 
Sarabhai as the head of nuclear programme, but because of his Gandhian beliefs, Sarabhai focused the programme to 
be developed into more peaceful purposes rather than the military applications. 

In 1967, after Indira Gandhi became the prime minister, the work on nuclear programme resumed with new a 

Mi 
attitude and goals. Homi Sethna, a chemical engineer, played a significant role in the development of 

weapon-grade plutonium while Ramanna designed and manufactured the whole nuclear device. Because of the 

sensitivity, the first nuclear bomb project did not employ more than 75 scientists. 

India continued to harbor ambivalent feelings about nuclear weapons and accord low priority to their production 
until the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. In the same month of December 1971, when Richard Nixon sent a carrier 
battle group led by the USS Enterprise (CVN-65) into the Bay of Bengal in an attempt to intimidate India, the Soviet 
Union responded by sending a submarine armed with nuclear missiles from Vladivostok to trail the US task force. 
The Soviet response demonstrated the deterrent value and significance of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
submarines to Indira Gandhi. 



On 7 September 1972, Indira Gandhi authorized the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) to manufacture a 
nuclear device and prepare it for a test. Throughout its development, ti 
Nuclear Explosive", but it was usually referred to as the Smiling Buddha. 



nuclear device and prepare it for a test. Throughout its development, the device was formally called the "Peaceful 



Development team 

The head of the development team was Raja Ramanna. Other key personnel included P. K. Iyengar, Rajagopala 
Chidambaram, Nagapattinam Sambasiva Venkatesan, and Waman Dattatreya Patwardhan under the supervision of 
Homi N. Sethna. Chidambaram, who would later coordinate work on the Pokhran-II tests, began work on the 
equation of state of plutonium in late 1967 or early 1968. To preserve secrecy, the project employed no more than 75 
scientists and engineers from 1967—1974. Dr. Abdul Kalam also arrived at the test site as the representative of 

the TBRL although he had no role whatsoever in the development of the nuclear bomb or even in the nuclear 
programme. 

Role of Indian Nuclear Research Institutes 

The device used a implosion system developed at the DRDO Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL) in 
Chandigarh based on the Fat Man design. The detonation system was developed at the High Energy Materials 
Research Laboratory (HEMRL) of DRDO at Pune. The 6 kg of plutonium came from the CIRUS reactor at BARC. 
The neutron initiator was of polonium-beryllium type and code-named Flower. The complete core was assembled in 
Trombay before transportation to the test site. 



Smiling Buddha 218 

Cross-section of the device 

The fully assembled device had a hexagonal cross section, 1.25 meter in diameter and weighed 1400 kg. The device 
was detonated at 8.05 a.m. in a shaft 107 m under the army Pokhran test range in the Thar Desert (or Great Indian 
Desert), Rajasthan. Coordinates of the crater are 27°05'42"N 71°45'11"E. 

Controversial yield 

The yield of this test has remained controversial with unclear data provided by Indian sources. Although occasional 
press reports have given ranges from 20 kt to as low as 2 kt, the official yield was initially reported at 12 kt (post 
Operation Shakti claims have raised it to 13 kt). Outside seismic data and analysis of the crater features indicates a 
lower figure. Analysts usually estimate the yield at 4 to 6 kt using conventional seismic magnitude-to-yield 
conversion formulas. In recent years, both Homi Sethna and P.K. Iyengar conceded the official yield to be an 
exaggeration. Iyengar has variously stated that the yield was actually 8—10 kt, that the device was designed to yield 
10 kt, and that the yield was 8 kt 'exactly as predicted'. Careful analysis of hard rock cratering effects establishes a 
tight bound around 8 kt for the yield. 

Code name 

The project's code name was Smiling Buddha and the detonation was scheduled to occur on 18 May 1974 (the 
official test date), Buddha Jayanti, a festival day in India marking the birth of Gautama Buddha. 

Aftermath 

In 1975, Homi Sethna (chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission), Raja Ramanna and Basanti Dulal 
Nagchaudhuri (Scientific Advisor of the DRDO) received the Padma Vibhushan - India's second highest civilian 
award. Five other project members received the Padma Shri - India's fourth highest civilian award. 

International reaction 

While India continued to state that the test was for peaceful purposes, it was shown opposition from many corners. 
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was formed in reaction to the Indian tests to check international nuclear 
proliferation. The NSG decided in 1992 to require full-scope IAEA safeguards for any new nuclear export 
deals, which effectively ruled out nuclear exports to India, but in 2008 waived this restriction on nuclear trade 
with India as part of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement. 

Pakistan 

Pakistan did not view the test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion", and canceled talks scheduled for June 10 on 
normalization of relations. Pakistan's Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto vowed in June 1974 that he would never 
succumb to "nuclear blackmail" or accept "Indian hegemony or domination over the subcontinent". The 

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Munir Ahmed Khan said that the test would force Pakistan to test its 

ri4i 
own nuclear bomb. Pakistan's leading nuclear physicist, Pervez Hoodbhoy, stated in 201 1 that he believes the test 

"pushed [Pakistan] further into the nuclear arena". 

United States and Canada 

The plutonium used in the test was created at the CIRUS reactor supplied by Canada and using heavy water supplied 
by the United States. Both countries reacted negatively, especially in light of then ongoing negotiations on the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the economic aid both countries provided to India. Canada concluded 

that the test violated a 1971 understanding between the two states, and froze nuclear energy assistance for the two 
heavy water reactors then under construction. The United States concluded that the test did not violate any 



Smiling Buddha 219 

agreement and proceeded with a June 1974 shipment of enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactor. 

Soviet Union 

ri7i 

The Soviet Union did not issue any statement, remaining silent in support of India. 

France 

ri7i 
France sent a congratulatory telegram to India but later on withdrew it. 

China 

China, itself a member of the nuclear club since 1964, issued no comment on the test. 

Effects 

The CIRUS reactor used to produce the plutonium was a research reactor based on the NRX design and donated by 
Canada in 1960, with heavy water supplied by the US; ("CIRUS" = Canada-India Research U.S.). The Smiling 
Buddha test caused a public outcry in Canada, and in May 1976 the Canadian government cut off exchange of 
nuclear materials and technology with India in the wake of the test. 

Pokhran-II 

After the test, India continued expanding its nuclear power capacity and developing its nuclear physics programme, 
but made no further nuclear tests until 1998. Operation Shakti was carried out two months after the 1998 elections at 
the Pokhran test site, and used devices designed and built over the preceding two decades. 

References 

[I] There are many code-names for this test. But it was officially known as Smiling Buddha by Indira Gandhi who witnessed this test. Civilian 
scientists called this test as "Operation Smiling Buddha" while Indian Army referred this test as Operation Happy Krishna. According to the 
United States Military Intelligence Corps, Operation Happy Krishna was codename for Indian Army to build the underground site in which 
the tests were taken. On other side, Indian Ministry of External Affairs designated this test as Pokhran-I. 

[2] 8:05 18 May 1974 (1ST) 

[3] "India's Nuclear Weapons Program - Smiling Buddha: 1974" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html). Nuclear Weapon 

Archive. . 
[4] Sublette, Carey. "Origins of Indian nuclear program" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaOrigin.html). Nuclear weapon Archive. 

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org. . Retrieved 13 November 2011. 
[5] Perkovich, George (2002). India 's nuclear bomb: the impact on global proliferation. University of California Press. 

ISBN 978-0-520-23210-5. 
[6] Kanavi, Shivanand. "How Indian PMs reacted to nuclear bombs" (http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/ 

slide-show-l-an-interview-with-k-subrahmanyam/20110210.htm). Shivanand Kanavi. . Retrieved 13 November 2011. 
[7] "Arihant: the annihilator" (http://www.indiandefencereview.com/2010/02/arihant-the-annihilator.html). Indian Defence Review. 

2010-10-25. . Retrieved 2012-01-08. 
[8] Richelson, Jefferey T. (March 1999). Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea. WW 

Norton, pp. 233. ISBN 978-0-393-05383-8. 
[9] "History of the NSG" (http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/01-history.htm). Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). . Retrieved 4 

December 2011. 
[10] "NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)" (http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdf). Nuclear Threat 

Initiative (NTI). . Retrieved 4 December 201 1. 

[II] Agencies (2 October 2008). "Nuclear Deal: A chronology of key developments" (http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ 
nuclear-deal-a-chronology-of-key-developmen/368607/). The Indian Express. . Retrieved 5 September 2011. 

[12] APP and Pakistan Television (PTV), Prime minister Secretariat Press Release (18 May, 1974). "India's so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion 
(PNE) is tested and designed to intimidate and establish "Indian hegemony in the subcontinent", most particularly Pakistan. ...Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, Prime minister of Pakistan, on May of 1974." (http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Nuclear/chronology_1974.html) 
(html). Statement published on Associated Press of Pakistan and the on-aired on Pakistan Television (PTV). . 

[13] video of Prime Minister Bhutto's address in response to the Smiling Buddha test (http://www.pakdef.info/multimedia/bhutto_address. 
wmv) 



Smiling Buddha 



220 



[14] Khan, Munir Ahmad (18 May, 1974). ""India's nuclear explosion: Challenge and Response"" (HTML). Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of 

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, and former director of the IAEA Reactor Division. International Atomic Energy Agency and Pakistan 

Atomic Energy Commission. 
[15] Hoodbhoy, PhD (Nuclear Physics), Pervez Amerali (Januar 23rd, 201 1). "Pakistan's nuclear bayonet" (http://www.dawn.com/201 1/02/ 

16/herald-exclusive-pakistans-nuclear-bayonet.html) (HTML). Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Doctor of Philosophy (Nuclear Physics), Professor of 

Nuclear and High-Energy Physics at the Quaid-e-Azam University and Senior academic research scientist at the National Center for Nuclear 

Physics. Dr. Prof. Pervez Amerali Hoodbhoy and the The Herald. . Retrieved September 9, 2011. 
[16] Press Report, Associated (22 May 1974). "Ripples in the nuclear pond" (http://news. google. com/newspapers ?id=x6ZSAAAAIBAJ& 

sjid=LX8DAAAAIBAJ&pg=7191,5606996). The Desert News. . Retrieved 5 September 2011. 
[17] ANDERSON, ROBERT (Volume 17 - Issue 13, June 24 - July 07, 2000). "Who is smiling now?" (http://www.frontlineonnet.com/ 

fll713/17130760.htm). Frontline, The Hindu. . Retrieved 12 March 2012. 
[18] Reed, Thomas C; Danny B. Stillman (2009). The nuclear express: a political history of the bomb and its proliferation. Zenith. 

ISBN 978-0-7603-3502-4. 



Kirana Hills 



The Kirana Hills is a small mountain range in Pakistan's Punjab province. It spans approximately 40 miles across 
the districts of Sargodha and Jhang. 



Topography 

The highest peak in the Kirana Hills is Koh-e-Kirana, 
which is about 980 feet high. The region is also known 
as "Black Mountains" by locals because of the dark 
brown colours of the range. The Kirana Hills and its 
environs are heavily infested with wild boar. 




Science in Kirana 



Kirana-I 




A rocky blackish mountain of Kirana Range in the outskirts of Rabwah. 



Country 



Information 

Pakistan 



Test site 



Kirana Weapon-testing laboratories 



Kirana Hills 



221 



Period 


1983-1990 


Number of tests 


24 


Test type 


Underground 
subcritical tests 


Device type 


Non-fission 


Max. yield 


N/A; Classified 


Navi 


Ration 


Previous test 


None 


Next test 


Chagai-I 



Kirana-I were the series of 24 cold-tests conducted by Pakistan from 1983 till 1990. The tests were primarily 
conducted by Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for the purposes of studying effects of nuclear detonation, with 
armed forces' playing a supporting role. The weapon-testing programme was kept in extreme secrecy with only few 
in the government knowing about it. The tests proved the capability of Pakistan to have successfully developed the 
atomic bomb project and to perform the tests without outside interference. 



Orgnizations 

The development, designing and construction of the weapon-testing laboratories at this region was initiated by 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's Munir Ahmad Khan, as its technical director, and Major-General Zahid Ali 
Akbar, as Military director of the Civil engineers Corps. Several meetings between civilian Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission officials and military officials of Corps of Engineers took place before starting the work. Finally 
having started in 1979, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the Corps of Engineers completed the 
construction of the weapon-testing laboratories in 1983, and it was named as Kirana Weapon-testing laboratories 
(Kirana-WTL). The tunnels and weapon-testing laboratories were reported as have been bored after the Chagai 
weapon-testing labs and as similar to Chagai, the underground tunnels and weapons-testing laboratories at Kirana 
Hills had been bored and then sealed and this task was also undertaken by SDW. 

The "Special Development Works", codename SDW, was a specially commissioned military unit of renowned 
Pakistan's military scientists and engineers founded by Brigadier Muhammad Sarfaraz in 1977. The SDW was 
responsible for the construction of the weapon-test sites and the military scientists of the SDW had closely their 
logistics support to PAEC in the developmental phases of the atomic bomb project. A joint task force was given 
commissioned with SDW and had Air Vice-Marshal (Major-General) Michale O'Brian, Major-General Zahid Ali 
Akbar, and Rear-Admiral Iftikhar Sirohey as its test commanders. The SDW had small number of engineer officers, 
but extremely capable of achieving tasks and put under joint-task force's command. The weapon-testing labs were 
established and constructed under the command of air marshal O'Brian in the region that is generally closed to public 
due to its high-rate of human disappearance and wild-life. 



Kirana Hills 



222 



Preparations 

The weapon-testing laboratories were carefully 
established and built by the military engineering 
formations. The military had long realized that United 
States' growing suspicion on secret military projects, 
therefore, the labs were constructed and built at night 
and quickly paced up the work before the sunrise. This 
was done to avoid the American Vela satellite to pick 
up the advancement and to avoid alerting the civil 
population inhabitant in the area. The weapon-testing 
labs were heavily guarded by the joint task forces and 
the tourism activities in the designated areas were 
closed for the public. 

The PAEC had been monitoring the establishment of the weapon-testing labs and dispatched a small team of 
scientists from the Radiation Physics Division (RPD), assisted by the joint task force teams. The teams were sent to 
de-seal, open and clean the tunnels and to make sure the tunnels were clear of the wild boars that are found in 
abundance in the Sargodha region. The damage which these wild boars could do to men and equipment, computer 
facilities, and laboratories. 




Tests predictions 

After the preparations were done and tunnels were cleared out, the RPD along with their Military units joined the 

PAEC's Diagnostic Team, under dr. Samar Mubarakmand who arrived on the scene with trailers fitted with 

T21 
supercomputers and diagnostic equipments installed in the vans. They were followed by Wah Group Scientists 

under dr. Zaman Shaikh and DTD under Hafeez Qureshi, with the nuclear device in sub assembly form. The device 

T21 
was placed in the weapon-testing laboratory-I (WTL-I). monitoring system was set up with around 20 cables 

T21 
linking various parts of the device with oscillators in diagnostic vans parked near the Kirana Hills. 

The device was tested using the push-button technique set in vintage style. The first test was to see whether the 
triggering mechanism created the necessary neutrons which would start a fission chain-reaction in the actual 

device. However, when the button was pushed, most of the wires connecting the device to the oscillators were 

T21 
severed due to errors committed in the preparation of the cables. At first, it was thought that the device had 

malfunctioned but closer scrutiny of two of the oscillators confirmed that the neutrons had indeed come out and a 



chain-reaction had taken place 



[2] 



Test teams and development 

The series of 24 different cold tests were conducted by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission chaired by Munir 

T21 
Ahmad Khan. This secret weapon-testings operation was coined Kirana-I by nuclear physicist dr. Ishfaq Ahmad 

who was the laboratories director and technical member at the PAEC. Other PAEC's test development personnel and 

teams included Hafeez Qureshi — director of the Directorate of Technical Development; Dr. Zaman Sheikh, director 

of the Wah Group Scientists (WGS); Dr. Naeem Ahmad Khan — director of Radiation and Isotope Applications 

Division (RIAD); Dr. Masud Ahmad — director of Theoretical Physics Group (TPG); and Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, 

director of the Diagnostic Group (Diag Grp). 

The tunnels at Kirana Hills, Sargodha, are reported to have been bored after the Chagai nuclear test sites, it is widely 
believed that the tunnels were constructed sometime between 1979 and 1983. As in Chagai, the tunnels at Kirana 
Hills had been bored and then sealed and this task was also undertaken by PAEC's DTD 



r-\ 



Kirana Hills 223 

As a result, between 1983 and 1990, the PAEC's Wah Group and DTD conducted more than 24 cold tests of the 
nuclear device at Kirana Hills with the help of mobile diagnostic equipment. These tests were carried out in 24 
tunnels measuring 100—150 feet in length which were bored inside the Kirana. 

The explosive HMX (His Majesty's Explosive), which was used to trigger the device. The HMX nuclear device was 
tested by DTD led by Hafeez Qureshi. The successful cold fission test was led and supervised by renowned physicist 
dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, and it was witnessed by PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali 
Akbar Khan, Air-Vice Marshal (Major-General) Michael John O'Brian, General Khalid Mahmud Arif, and 
then-Chairman of Senate of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan. 

Results and aftermath 

The need to improve and perfect the design of first nuclear device required constant testing. As a result, between 
1983 and 1990, the Wah Group Scientists conducted more than 24 cold tests of the nuclear device at Kirana Hills 
with the help of mobile diagnostic equipment. These tests were carried out in 24 horizontal-shaft designated 
weapon-testing laboratories measuring 100—150 feet in length which were bored inside the Kirana Hills. Later due to 
excessive US intelligence and satellite focus on the Kirana Hills regions, it was abandoned and the WTL-I was 
shifted to the Kala-Chitta Range. 

Development and the test teams 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 

Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan - Chairman, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 

Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad - Member (Technical) of PAEC. 

Dr. Samar Mubarakmand - Director-General of the Diagnostics Group of PAEC (DG) 

Mr. Hafeez Qureshi - Director-General of the Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) 

Dr. Zaman Sheikh -Directorate-General of the Wah Group of PAEC (WG). 

Dr. Naeem Ahmad Khan - Director-General of Radiation and Isotope Applications Division (RIAD). 

Dr. Hameed Ahmed Khan - Director-General of the Radiation Physics Division (RPD). 

Dr. Masud Ahmad - Director-General of Theoretical Physics Group (TPG). 

Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers 

• Lieutenant-General Zahid Ali Akbar, PA - Engineer-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Engineering Core. 

Special Works Development 

• Major-General Michael John O'Brian, PAF — Director-General of the Special Works Development 

• Brigadier-General Muhammad Sarfaraz, PA — Deputy Director of Special Works Development 

Government Observants 

• General Khalid Mahmud Arif PA — Vice Chief of Army Staff 

• Ghulam Ishaq Khan, SP — Chairman of Senate of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan 

• Vice-Admiral Iftihar Ahmad Sirohey, PN — Directorate-General Naval Weapon Engineering Branch (WEB). 



Kirana Hills 



224 



References 

[1] "Analysis: Custodians as proliferators" (http://observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail. 

html?cmaid=2237&mmacmaid=182). Observer Research Foundation. Observer Research Foundation. 13 August 2004. . Retrieved 201 1. 
[2] "Koh Kambaran (Ras Koh Hills)" (http://www.pakistanpaedia.com/landmarks/RasKoh/Youm-e-Takbeer.htm). Pakistan Encyclopedia. 

Pakistan Information and History Encyclopedia. . 
[3] name="The Nation 2009">"Pakistan Became a Nuclear State in 1983-Dr. Samar", The Nation, (Islamabad) May 2, 2003 accessed on August 

6, 2009 



Pokhran-II 



Pokhran-II 
Operation Shakti 


Image of Shaft-Ill named Shakti 


Information 


Country 


India 


Test site 


Indian Army Pokhran Test Range 


Period 


11 May 1998 


Number of tests 


5 


Test type 


Underground tests 


Device type 


Fission/fusion 


Max. yield 


Claimed 58Kt by BARC, Independent assessment put it at 45Kt. 


Navigation 


Previous test 


Operation Smiling Buddha 


Next test 


None 



Pokharan-II refers to test explosions of five nuclear devices, three on 11 May and two on 13 May 1998, conducted 
by India at the Pokhran test range. These nuclear tests resulted in a variety of sanctions against India by a number of 
major states. 

On 18 May 1974, India exploded its first nuclear device code named Operation Smiling Buddha. After about a 
quarter century, on 11 May 1998, Operation Shakti was carried out. Shakti was the codename of a thermonuclear 
device that was exploded in Pokhran as part of Pokhran-II. 



Birth of India's nuclear weapons program 

The Indian nuclear programme dated back to 1944 when Homi Bhabha established the Institute of Fundamental 
Research in 1945. Under the long premiership of Nehru, the nuclear programme's infrastructure was carefully 
established, and much of the weapon related facilities given commissioned in 1950s, most notably Bhabha Atomic 
Research Centre that operates the CIRUS which was commissioned in 1960. 

In 1962, India faced the bitter war with People's Republic of China and lost the territory it had controlled previously. 
Soon, the Chinese nuclear test, 596 in 1964 accelerated India's nuclear weapon efforts to counter the Chinese nuclear 
blackmailing. Preliminary studies were carried out at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and plans were developed 
to produce plutonium and other bomb components. Following the death of Nehru and Bhabha, the programme was 
revived and transferred into the hands of Vikram Sarabhai who also was the director of Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO). However, under the premiership of Lai Bahadur Shastri who faced the war with West-Pakistan 



Pokhran-II 225 

(now Pakistan) had the nuclear programme shelved and halted. This programme was again revived and re-started 
under the premiership of Indira Gandhi who gave the authorization soon after the Test No. 6 — China's successful 
detonation of thermonuclear device. The programme was delegated to Raja Ramanna who aggressively developed 
the nuclear weapons and the nuclear programme completed a milestone in 1972. In 1974, Indira Gandhi gave 
authorization of the nuclear test, codename Smiling Buddha. 

After the 1974 test, Prime Minister Morarji Desai shelved the programme and focused it to more academic research 

rather than military initiatives. By 1977, Ramanna was replaced by Homi Sethna as the director of BARC and 

T21 
unsuccessfully attempted to thwart Ramanna's efforts. In 1980, Indira Gandhi returned as the Prime Minister and 

re-evaluated the programme by bringing back Ramanna's role in the nuclear programme. Despite Gandhi's denial to 

conduct further tests, the nuclear programme continued to advance. It was the 1980s that the work on hydrogen 

bombs and the missile programme was initiated, and Dr. Abdul Kalam, an aerospace engineer who developed the 

SLV programme for ISRO, was made the director of the missile programme. 

Successive governments in India decided to observe this temporary moratorium for fear of inviting international 

[2] [31 

criticism. In 1995, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao decided to carry out further tests. But the plans were 

halted after American satellites picked up signs of preparations for testing at Pokhran. The Americans under 

T31 
President Bill Clinton exerted enormous pressure on Rao to stop the preparations. On February 28, the BJP came 

to power after the 1998 elections, and Atal Bihari Vajpayee became country's prime minister who had previously 

campaign on advocating for nuclear tests. On March 1998, Vajpayee administration asked the scientists to make 

preparations in a shortest time possible, and preparations were hastily made. Finally, on 11 and 13 May 1998, 

under prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India conducted its second group of nuclear tests. 

Preparations for the test 

After the detection of the test preparations by American satellites in 1995, it was decided that preparations for the 
May 1998 tests should be undertaken under a blanket of secrecy so that foreign countries will not be able to detect 
the preparations. Extensive planning was drawn out and executed in order to deceive intelligence agencies around 
the world. Even the senior most cabinet members of the Government of India did not have slightest hint of these 
elaborate preparations. The preparations were managed by a closed group of scientists, military officers and 
politicians. 

Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister, and Dr. R. Chidambaram, the head of the 
Department of Atomic Energy, were the chief coordinators for the operation. They were assisted by the 58th 
Regiment of the Army Engineering Corps in preparing the test site. Scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research 
Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) were involved in assembling the 
weapons, moving them to Pokhran, placing them into shafts in the ground and laying a network of sensors to gather 
data during the explosions. 

The Regiment 58 Engineers had learned much since the aborted 1995 test preparations about avoiding detection by 
American satellites. Much work was done at night, and heavy equipment was always returned to the same parking 
spot at dawn so that satellite image analysts would conclude that the equipment was never moved. Piles of dug-out 
sand were shaped to mimic the wind shaped dune forms in the desert area. The shafts were dug under camouflage 
netting. When cables for sensors were laid they were carefully covered with sand, and native vegetation was replaced 
to conceal the digging. 

The scientists involved in the operation took care to ensure that even their close friends and colleagues would not 
detect the work being undertaken at Pokhran. All scientists involved in the operation did not depart for Pokhran 
simultaneously, but left in groups of two or three. One group would use the pretext of attending a seminar or a 
conference, and would tell their wives that they could not be contacted while they were away. Tickets were bought 
for a destination other than Pokhran (or cities nearby) under pseudonyms, and after arriving at their destination, the 
group would secretly leave for the military base in Jaisalmer from where they would be taken by the army to 



Pokhran-II 226 

Pokhran. After finishing their work the group would return, retracing their path. Then another group would leave for 
the range employing similar means to do their work. In this way, information about the test was kept tightly under 
wraps. All technical staff at the range wore military fatigues, so that in satellite images they would appear to be 
military personnel maintaining the test range. 

On the diplomatic front, India adopted a policy of ambiguity about deciding to go nuclear. Statements by Indian 
politicians and diplomats gave an impression to the world that India was not yet decided about its nuclear status. 
Deliberate steps were taken to ensure that the world community would not take the BJP's campaign promises 
seriously. In separate meetings with American officials, then Foreign secretary K.Raghunath and Defence Minister 
George Fernandes stated that India had not yet decided about going nuclear and they also conveyed to the officials 
that the National Security Council would be meeting soon to discuss the matter and decide about the nuclear option. 
The council was to meet on the 26th of May. Both the Indian officials had categorically told the Americans that 
"there would be no surprise testings". All this led the Americans and the world community to believe that India was 
not going to pursue the nuclear option in the near future. They did not take the BJP's campaign promises seriously 
and hence did not expect an Indian nuclear test so soon. 

Name 

The word Shakti (Hindr.Wfi^J means Strength in Sanskrit. The Operation Shakti was the codename of a 
thermonuclear device that was exploded in Pokhran Test Range in May 11. 

Development and test teams 

The main technical personnel involved in the operation were: 

Project Chief Coordinators 

• Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam (later, President of India), Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister and Head of the 
DRDO. 

• Dr. R. Chidambaram, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Atomic energy. 

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) 

• Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Director of BARC. 

• Dr. Satinder Kumar Sikka, Director; Thermonuclear Weapon Development. 

• Dr. M.S. Ramkumar, Director of Nuclear Fuel and Automation Manufacturing Group; Director, Nuclear 
Component Manufacture. 

• Dr. D.D. Sood, Director of Radiochemistry and Isotope Group; Director, Nuclear Materials Acquisition. 

• Dr. S.K. Gupta, Solid State Physics and Spectroscopy Group; Director, Device Design & Assessment. 

• Dr. G Govindraj, Associate Director of Electronic and Instrumentation Group; Director, Field Instrumentation. 



Pokhran-II 227 

Defence Research & Development Organization (DRDO) 

• Dr. K. Santhanam; Director, Test Site Preparations. 

• Dr. M.Vasudev; Range Safety Officer. 

Devices 

A total of five nuclear weapons were detonated during Operation Shakti. They were: 

Shakti I 

A two stage thermonuclear device with a boosted fission primary, its yield was downgraded from 200 kt (theoretical) 
to 40 kt for test purposes. 

Shakti II 

A pure fission device using the Plutonium implosion design with a yield of 15 kt. The device tested was an actual 
nuclear warhead that can be delivered by bombers or fighters and also mounted on a missile. The warhead was an 
improved, lightweight and miniaturized version of the device tested in 1974. Scientists at BARC had been working 
to improve the 1974 design for many years. Data from the 1974 test was used to carry out computer simulations 
using the indigenous PARAM supercomputer to improve the design. The 1998 test was intended to prove the 
validity of the improved designs. 

Shakti III 

An experimental boosted fission device that used reactor grade Plutonium for its primary with a yield of 0.3 kt. This 
test device was used to test only the primary stage. It did not contain any tritium required to boost the fission. This 
test was designed to study the possibility of using reactor grade plutonium in warheads and also to prove India's 
expertise in controlling and damping a nuclear explosion in order to achieve a low (sub-kiloton) yield. 

Shakti IV 

A 0.5 kt experimental device. The test's only purpose was to collect data about the explosion process and to study the 
performance of various bomb components. 

Shakti V 

A 0.2 kt experimental device that used U-233, an isotope of uranium that is not found in nature but is produced in 
India's fast breeder reactors that consume Thorium. This device too was used to collect data. 

Production and preparation of devices 

Three laboratories of the DRDO were involved in designing, testing and producing components like advanced 
detonators, the implosion systems, high-voltage trigger systems. They were also responsible for weaponization, 
systems engineering, aerodynamics, safety interlocks and flight trials. The nuclear devices were moved from their 
vaults at the BARC complex in the early hours of 1 May, around 3 a.m., by four Indian Army trucks under the 
command of Col. Umang Kapur. They were transported to Mumbai airport and flown at dawn in an Indian Air Force 
AN-32 transport plane to the Jaisalmer military base. An Army convoy of four trucks transported the explosive 
devices to Pokhran. Three trips were required to complete the delivery of the devices and associated equipment. The 
devices were delivered directly to the device preparation building in the range which was designated as the 'Prayer 
Hall'. 

The tests were organized into two groups that were fired separately, with all devices in a group fired at the same 
time. The first group consisted of the thermonuclear device (Shakti I), the fission device (Shakti II), and a 



Pokhran-II 228 

sub-kiloton device (Shakti III). The remaining two sub-kiloton devices made up the second group (Shakti IV & V). It 
was decided that the first group consisting of three devices would be tested on 1 1 of May and the second group on 13 
May. The thermonuclear device was placed in a shaft code named 'White House' (over 200 m deep), while the 'Taj 
Mahal' shaft (over 150 m deep) was assigned to the fission bomb, and 'Kumbhkaran' to the first sub-kiloton shot. The 
other two shafts for the second test series were designated NT 1 & NT 2. The first three devices were placed in their 
respective shafts on 10 May, the day before the tests. The shafts were L-shaped, with a horizontal chamber for the 
test device. The first device to be placed was the sub-kiloton device in the 'Kumbhkaran' shaft. The Army engineers 
sealed the shaft at around 8:30 PM. Then the thermonuclear device was lowered into the 'White House' shaft and 
sealing this shaft took until 4 a.m. the next morning. By then the fission device was being placed in the 'Taj Mahal' 
shaft. It was sealed at 7:30 a.m., just 90 minutes from the planned test time. 

The actual timing of the tests depended on the local weather conditions. It was hot in the Pokhran desert in early 
May, it reached 43°C on the day of the test. But the critical factor was the wind. Although the tests were 
underground, they were shallow tests and the sealing of the shaft could not be guaranteed to be leak-proof (a number 
of shaft seal failures had occurred during tests by USA, USSR and UK despite the shafts being much deeper). Winds 
blowing toward inhabited areas, as occurred on the morning on 11 May were not acceptable. But by early afternoon 
the winds had died down and the scientists decided to go ahead with the tests. Dr. K. Santhanam of the DRDO, who 
was in charge of the test site preparations, gave the two keys that activated the test countdown to Dr. M. Vasudev, 
the range safety officer, who was responsible for verifying that all test indicators were normal. After checking the 
indicators, Vasudev handed one key each to a representative of BARC and the DRDO, who together unlocked the 
countdown system. At 3:45 p.m. the three devices were detonated. 

Detonations 

The three devices (Shakti I, II & III) were detonated simultaneously at 3:43:44.2 p.m. 1ST; 10:13:44.2 UTC +/-0.32 
sec; as measured by international seismic monitors. Seismic data collected by stations outside India have placed the 
total magnitude of the first event at 5.3 (+/- 0.4), making it one of the largest seismic events in the world during the 
24 hr period during which it occurred. The measured seismic center of the triple event was located at 27.0716 deg N 
latitude, and 71.7612 deg E longitude, which places it only 2.8 km from the 1974 test site (which was at 27.095 deg 
N, 71.752 deg E). The combined force of the three blasts lifted an area about the size of a cricket ground to a few 
metres above the earth kicking up dust and sand into the air. Three craters were sunk on the desert surface. 

Just two days later on 13 May, at 12.21 p.m.IST 6:51 UTC, the two sub-kiloton devices were detonated 
underground. This event was not detected by any seismic stations as they were of very low yield. 

With the five explosions, India declared the series of tests to be over. 

Reactions to the tests 
Reactions in India 

Shortly after the tests, a press meet was convened at the Prime Minister's residence in New Delhi. Prime Minister 
Vajpayee appeared before the press corps and made the following short statement: 

Today, at 1545 hours, India conducted three underground nuclear tests in the Pokhran range. The tests conducted today were with a fission 
device, a low yield device and a thermonuclear device. The measured yields are in line with expected values. Measurements have also 
confirmed that there was no release of radioactivity into the atmosphere. These were contained explosions like the experiment conducted in 
May 1974. 1 warmly congratulate the scientists and engineers who have carried out these successful tests. 

News of the tests were greeted with jubilation and large-scale approval by the society in India. The Bombay Stock 
Exchange registered significant gains. Newspapers and television channels praised the government for its bold 
decision; editorials were full of praise for the country's leadership and advocated the development of an operational 



Pokhran-II 229 

nuclear arsenal for the country's armed forces. The scientific establishment was thankful to the government for 
having been given the opportunity to prove their capabilities. More significantly, all doubts were erased from the 
minds of people who questioned India's nuclear capability after the testing in 1974. 

U.N. Sanctions 

The reactions from abroad started immediately after the tests were advertised. The United Nations issued a statement 
expressing its disappointment. On June 6, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1 172 condemning 
the test and that of Pakistan's. The United States issued a strong statement condemning India and promised that 
sanctions would follow. The American establishment was embarrassed as there had been a serious intelligence 
failure in detecting the preparations for the test. Canada, which had earlier supplied the CIRUS nuclear reactor to 
India which was the source of plutonium for the 1974 tests, reassured the world that the CIRUS reactor was not in 
any way connected to the 1998 tests. China issued a vociferous condemnation calling upon the international 
community to exert pressure on India to sign the NPT and eliminate its nuclear arsenal. With India joining the group 
of countries possessing nuclear weapons, a new strategic dimension had emerged in Asia, particularly South Asia. 

U.S. and Japanese reaction 

In keeping with its preferred approach to foreign policy in recent decades, and in compliance with a 1994 
anti-proliferation law, the United States imposed economic sanctions on India. The sanctions on India consisted of 
cutting off all assistance to India except humanitarian aid, banning the export of certain defense material and 
technologies, ending American credit and credit guarantees to India, and requiring the U.S. to oppose lending by 
international financial institutions to India. 

Japan also imposed economic sanctions on India. The sanctions consisted of freezing all new loans and grants except 

ro] 

for humanitarian aid to India. 

Some other nations also imposed sanctions on India, primarily in the form of suspension of foreign aid and 
government-to-government credit lines. However, the overall effect on India's economy and technological 
progress was marginal. Most nations did not sanction India, and India's exports and imports together constituted only 
4% of its GDP, with U.S. trade accounting for only 10% of this total. Far more significant were the restrictions on 
lending imposed by the United States and its representatives on international finance bodies. Most of the sanctions 
were lifted within five years. 

Support for India 

However, other nuclear powers, such as Israel, France and Russia, refrained from condemning India. 

Israel issued a statement 'praising' India's tests and declaring that India's reasons for carrying out nuclear tests were 
the same as Israel's. . 

China 

The tests "seriously" concerned China but ultimately refrained to gave criticism to India on May 12. The next 
day, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued the statement clearly stating that "it shocked and strongly condemned" the 

Indian nuclear tests and called for the international community to "adopt a unified stand and strongly demand that 

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India immediate stop development of nuclear weapons". China further rejected India's stated rationale "totally 

unreasonable", that it needs nuclear capabilities to counter a Chinese threat. In a meeting with Masayoshi 

Takemura of Democratic Party of Japan, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Qian Qichen quoted in 

television: "India's nuclear tests were a "serious matter," particularly because they were conducted in light of the fact 

that more than 140 countries have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is even more unacceptable that 

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India claims to have conducted the tests to counter what it called a "China threat". On 24 November 1998, the 

Chinese Embassy, New Delhi issued a formal statement: 



Pokhran-II 230 

(sic).... But regrettably, India conducted nuclear tests last May, which has run against the contemporary 
historical trend and seriously affected peace and stability in South Asia. Pakistan also conducted nuclear tests 
later on. India's nuclear tests have not only led to the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan and 
provocation of nuclear tests have not only led to the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan and 
provocation of nuclear arms races in South Asia, but also dealt a heavy blow to international nuclear 
disarmament and the global nonproliferation regime. It is only natural that India's nuclear tests have met with 
extensive condemnation and aroused serious concern from the international communit 

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— Chinese Embassy, New Delhi, source 

Pakistan 

The most vehement reaction to India's nuclear test was Pakistan's. Great ire was raised in Pakistan, which issued a 
severe statement blaming India for instigating a nuclear arms race in the region. Pakistan Prime Minister Navaz 
Sharif vowed that his country would give a suitable reply to the Indians. The day after the first tests, Pakistan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Captain (retired) Gohar Ayub Khan indicated that Pakistan was ready to conduct a 
nuclear test of its own. As he said: "[Pakistan] is prepared to match India, we have the capability ... We in Pakistan 
will maintain a balance with India in all fields", he said in an interview. "We are in a headlong arms race on the 
subcontinent." 

Prime Minister Navaz Sharif was much more subdued, refusing to say whether a test would be conducted in 
response: "We are watching the situation and we will take appropriate action with regard to our security" , he said. 
Sharif sought to mobilize the entire Islamic world in support of Pakistan and criticized India for nuclear 
proliferation. 

Given authorization by Prime minister Navaz Sharif, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) carried out 
nuclear testing under the codename Chagai-I on May 28, 1998 and Chagai-II on May 30, 1998. These six 
underground nuclear tests at the Chagai and Kharan test site were conducted just fifteen days after India's last test. 
The total yield of the tests were reported to be 40 kt (see codename: Chagai-I). 

Pakistan's subsequent tests invited similar condemnations from multiple nations ranging from Argentina to Russia, 

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the United Kingdom and the United States. American president Bill Clinton was quoted as saying "Two wrongs 

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don't make a right", criticizing Pakistan's tests as reactionary to India's Pokhran-II. The United States, Japan, and 
a number of other states reacted by imposing economic sanctions on Pakistan. 

Pakistan's leading nuclear physicist and one of the top scientists, Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, held India responsible for 
Pakistan's nuclear test experiments in Chagai. 

Test yields 

The yields from the three tests on 11 May 1998 were put at 58 kilotons by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 
based on seismic data obtained at the test site 3 kilometres from the test shafts. The tests were defined as a complete 
success, and it was determined that all the devices and their components had performed flawlessly. To remove all 
doubts, the senior scientists involved in the Pokhran operations addressed the press on the 17th of May. In this press 
meet the scientists claimed that the fission device produced a yield of 15 kt and .3 kt was obtained from the low yield 
device. They also claimed that the thermonuclear device gave a total yield of 45 kt, 15 kt from the fission trigger and 
30 kt from the fusion process and that the theoretical yield of the device (200 kt) was reduced to 45 kt in order to 
minimize seismic damage to villages near the test range. The village closest to the test range, Khetolai, was a mere 5 
kilometres away. Neutral assesement by western scholars show that Shakti-I was 32 Kt as claimed to 43Kt, however 
results of Shakti-2 was 13Kt according to western scholars as claimed by BARC. 

Recent allegations 

In 2009 it was widely reported that a retired atomic scientist, K. Santhanam who was closely associated with the 



Pokhran-II 23 1 

n 7in 8i 
tests, claims that the 1998 tests were not as successful as the then BJP government had claimed they were. 

These claims were widely dismissed in India, including a specific dismissal by A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, who cited 

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evidence and data to prove his point. 

Legacy 

May 1 1 has been officially declared as National Technology Day in India to commemorate the first of the five tests 
that were carried out on May 11, 1998. The day was officially signed by the then Prime Minister of India. The day is 
celebrated by giving awards to various individuals and industries in the field of science and industry. 

Images 



References 

[I] http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaRealYields.html 

[2] Sublette, Carey. "The Long Pause: 1974—1989" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaPause.html). nuclearweapon archive, http:// 

nuclearweaponarchive.org. . Retrieved 14 November 2011. 
[3] weapon archive. "The Momentum builds" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaMomentum.html). Nuclear weapon Archive. . 

Retrieved 14 November 2011. 
[4] (PTI), Press Trust of India. "Pokhran II row: Sethna slams Kalam, Iyengar says tests were done in haste" (http://www.dnaindia.com/india/ 

report_pokhran-ii-row-sethna-slams-kalam-iyengar-says-tests-were-done-in-haste_1286978). DNA News, dna news.. . Retrieved 15 November 

2011. 
[5] http://www.rediff.com/news/1998/may/16bombl2.htm Rediff News 'Operation Shakti' on Budh Purnima 

[6] Prime Minister's announcement of India's three underground nuclear tests (http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/vajpayeel 198.htm) 
[7] "U.S. imposes sanctions on India" (http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9805/13/india.us/). CAW. . 
[8] "U.S. lifts final sanctions on Pakistan" (http://articles.cnn.com/2001-10-26/world/japan. 

sanctions_l_pakistan-sanctions-pakistan-and-india-nuclear-testing?_s=PM:asiapcf). CAW. 29 October 2001. . 
[9] http://www.jstor.org/pss/44069222 
[10] Air vice-chief in Israel to clinch deal. Statesman (India) April 03, 2001 

[II] ""China is 'Seriously Concerned' But Restrained in Its Criticism,"". New York Times, 13 May 1998. 13 May 1998. 

[12] Resources on India and Pakistan (Copyright 1999, All Rights Reserved). "China's Reaction to India's Nuclear Tests" (http://cns.miis.edu/ 

archive/country _india/china/nsacris. htm). CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies. . Retrieved 

15 May 2012. 
[13] Active Correspondants (24 November 1998). "India-China Claim 'active approach". The Hindu, 24/xi-1998. 
[14] (http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/wreactpk.htm) 
[15] Hoodbhoy, PhD (Nuclear Physics), Pervez Amerali (Januar 23rd, 201 1). "Pakistan's nuclear bayonet" (http://www.dawn.com/201 1/02/ 

16/herald-exclusive-pakistans-nuclear-bayonet.html). Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Doctor of Philosophy (Nuclear Physics), Professor of Nuclear 

and High-Energy Physics at the Quaid-e-Azam University and Senior academic research scientist at the National Center for Nuclear Physics. 

Dr. Prof. Pervez Amerali Hoodbhoy and the The Herald. . Retrieved September 9, 201 1. 
[16] http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaRealYields.html 
[17] "Pokhran-II thermonuclear test, a failure" (http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article2131 l.ece). Chennai, India: thehindu.com. 

2009-09-17. . Retrieved 2010-10-27. 
[18] Majumder, Sanjoy (2009-08-27). "India nuclear test 'did not work'" (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/8225540.stm). bbc.co.uk. . Retrieved 

2010-05-04. 
[19] Pokhran II successful, insists Kalam (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/india/Pokhran-II-successful-insists-Kalam-/articleshow/ 

4941553.cms) 
[20] Press Inormation Bureau (May 11, 2008). "National technology day celebrated" (http://www.dst.gov.in/whats_new/press-release08/ 

tech-day. htm). Department of Science and Technology. . Retrieved January 9, 201 1. 



Pokhran-II 232 

External links 

• Nuclear Weapons Archive: Operation Shakti (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaShakti.html) 

• India aborted nuclear bomb plans in 1994' (http://news.in.msn.com/national/article. 
aspx?cp-documentid= 1 32052 1 ) 

• India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program (http:// 
w w w j stor. org/stable/25 39297 ?seq= 1 ) 

Books 

• How the CIA was Fooled written by Raj Chengappa (http://www.india-today.com/itoday/17051999/books. 
html) 



Chagai-I 



Chagai-I 


The mountain 


is seen raised above as the chain reaction builds up by the devices. 


Information 


Country 


Pakistan 


Test site 


Chagai Weapon-testing laboratories, Baluchistan Province 


Period 


May 1998 


Number of tests 


5 


Test type 


Underground tests 


Device type 


Fission/Fusion 


Max. yield 


Total yield -40 kilotons of TNT (unknown operator: 

u'strong' TJ) 

[1] 
See note 


Navigation 


Previous test 


Kirana-I 


Next test 


Chagai-11 



Chagai-I was the codename referring to the five underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan at 15:15hrs (3:15 
pm PST) on 28 May 1998. The tests were performed in a secret Chagai weapon-testing laboratories, located in the 
Chagai District of the Baluchistan Province of Pakistan. 

The Chagai-I — the first public nuclear tests operation of Pakistan — is considered a milestone in the history of 
Pakistan that was conducted in a direct response to India's second nuclear tests, Operation Shakti, on 11 and 13 May 
of 1998. Nuclear weapon testings of both states resulted in a variety of economic sanctions on each other by number 
of major powers, particularly the United States and Japan. With the performance of the simultaneous atomic testing 
of the five nuclear devices, Pakistan, thus became the seventh nuclear power in the world to successfully develop 
and publicly test nuclear weapons, despite the international fury. 



Chagai-I 233 

Birth of Pakistan's atomic weapons programme 

The country's uneasy relationship with India, Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union explains its policy to to 
become a nuclear power as part of its defence strategy. Since their independence from United Kingdom on August 
1947, India and Pakistan had fought two declared wars over the disputed Kashmir territory; first war being fought in 
1947-48 and second being fought in 1965. 

Economic embargo placed by the United States, alliance with the West endangering the national security of the 
country, and the offset the country s conventional inferiority against India and to counter the advancing Indian 
nuclear programme after 1965, the country put efforts to launch a classified and clandestine atomic bomb project. 
Shortly after the war, the country acquired its first research reactor, PARR-I, from the United States and a 
international research institute, Pinstesh, located in Nilore city in the Islamabad Capital Venue. In 1969, after 
successfully negotiating with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) to supply Pakistan with a 
nuclear fuel reprocessing site capable of extracting 360g of weapons-grade plutonium annually. The PAEC chose 
five top scientists to receive training to gain expertise in nuclear fuel cycle as well as weapon-grade and 

reactor-gradeplutonium. Agreements were made with Canada, France and the British consortium companies to 

T21 
expand the nuclear power infrastructure as part of the peaceful nuclear policy. 

The 1971 war and atomic bomb projects 

The main turning point in Pakistan's decision-making was the 1971 war with India which led the loss of provisional 
state, East-Pakistan, which was succeeded as Bangladesh. Lasting only less than two weeks, around 93,000 
personnel of Pakistan Armed Forces were taken as POWs by India as well as the 5,000 sq mi (13,000 km2) country's 
territory which held by India after the war. Although the territory and the POWs were returned to Pakistan, it left 
deep scars in Pakistan's civil society as well as leaving the political and military misery. The armed liberation 

war and the 1971 war was an unforgettable experience and lesson to political and military establishment. For 
Pakistan, it was a decisive defeat, a psychological setback that came from a defeat at the hands of intense rival 
India. Pakistan lost half its territory, a significant portion of its economy and its influential geo-political role in South 
Asia. At foreign fronts, Pakistan failed to gather any moral and foreign support even from her long-standing allies, 

particularly the United States, Turkey and the People's Republic of China. Since the Partition, the physical 

T71 
existence Pakistan seemed to be in great mortal danger and quite obviously could rely on no one but itself. 

The war played a crucial and groundbreaking role in the hearts of top scientists of the country who witnessed the war 

ro] 

and control of remaining parts of the country was given to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as country's elected Prime minister. 
Roughly two weeks after the disaster, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called for a secret meeting of top and senior scientists in 
Multan on 20 January 1972 which later elevated as "Multan meeting" . There, Zulfikar Bhutto authorised, initiated, 
and orchestrated the scientific research on atomic weapons bringing all the nuclear infrastructure under one chain of 
command. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was "obsessed" with Indian nuclear efforts, made extremely critical 

ri2i 

decisions and aggressively supervised the policy implementation of the atomic bomb project. In 1972, Bhutto 
appointed Abdus Salam as his science adviser and at same time, called nuclear engineer Munir Ahmad Khan from 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to lead the program administratively while Bhutto controlled the 
program as the political administrative figure. On November 1972, Bhutto assisted by Salam and Munir Khan, 

inaugurated the first commercial nuclear power, Kanupp-I in Karachi, Sindh Province. Along with Prof. Salam 

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and Munir Ahmad Khan, the diameter of scientific research was expanded throughout the country. In PAEC, 

Salam established research divisions and groups that took charge to carry out the physics and mathematical 

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calculations regarding to the development of the weapon. The atomic bomb project at an early stage was directed 

by Abdus Salam as he was the founding director of Theoretical Physics Group (denoted as TPG) and the and 

Mathematical Physics Group (denoted as MPG) at the PAEC to conduct mathematical and physics calculations 

regarding the fission devices. 



Chagai-I 



234 



On March 1974, the research on physical developments were initiated by Munir Khan and Abdus Salam after 

ri4i 

chairing a meeting in Pinstech Institute. At this meeting the word "bomb" was never used but the participants 
fully understood the nature of the work. This laid the foundation of "Wah Group Scientist" (denoted as WGS) with 
U.S. educated mechanical engineer Hafeez Qureshi as its director-general. During the same time, a new 
Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) was set up to coordinate work on the various specialised groups 
working in PAEC on the design, development, and testing of nuclear weapons under chemical engineer dr. Shaikh 

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Zaman. The far more complex assembly methods of implosion-bomb design was favoured over the relatively 
simple gun-type method, and the productions of reactor and weapon-grade and separation of weapon-grade 
plutonium isotopes were massive undertakings by the PAEC. 

The atomic bomb project was accelerated on May 1974 after India 

surprising Pakistan and the rest of the world after announcing the 

first explosion of nuclear device, Smiling Buddha in Pokhran Test 

Range of Indian Army. The goal to developed the atomic 

bombs became impetus after launching the uranium enrichment 

project, the Kahuta Project. In 1974, Abdul Qadeer Khan who 

was then working as a senior scientist at the URENCO Group 

directed a letter through the Embassy in Amsterdam, and officially 

joined the atomic bomb project in 1976. The Corps of 

Engineers under directorship of the General Zahid Ali Akbar, built 

the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) for that purpose and 

situated a Abdul Qadeer Khan and his team at ERL for 

commercial and weapon-grade uranium enrichment. Finally in 

1978, weapon designing and calculations were completed and a 

milestone in isotope separation was reached by the PAEC. In 

1981, the physical development of the atomic bomb project was 

completed and the ERL successfully enriched the uranium above 

5% and produces first batch of HEU fuel rods. On On 1 1 March 1983, a milestone was achieved when PAEC led 

by Munir Ahmad Khan carried out the first cold test of a working nuclear device, codename Kirana-1. This was 

followed by 24 more cold tests by PAEC in which different weapon designs were tested and improved. After 

decades of covertly building and developing the atomic weapons program and the related atomic, Pakistan under the 

ri7i 

leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, tested its five underground nuclear devices in Chagai Hills. 




All five atomic devices were the Implosion-type 
similar to one in the illustration. The government never 
released the details of the technical aspects of the tested 

weapons as a public domain due to its sensitivity. 



Tests planning and preparation 

Plans to conduct an atomic test started in 1976 when Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) research 
scientists frequently visiting the area to find a suitable location for an underground nuclear test, preferably a granite 
mountain. After a long survey, the PAEC scientists chose the granite mountain Koh Kambaran in the Ras Koh Hills 
range in the Chagai Division of Baluchistan in 1978. Its highest point rises to a height of 3,009 metres (sources 
vary). The then-martial law administrator of the province, General Rahimuddin Khan, spearheaded the construction 
of the potential test sites throughout the 1980s. 

In March 2005, the former Pakistan Prime minister Benazir Bhutto said Pakistan may have had an atomic weapon 
long before, and her father had told her from his prison cell that preparations for a nuclear test had been made in 
1977, and he expected to have an atomic test of a nuclear device in August 1977. However, the plan was moved on 
to December 1977 and later it was delayed indefinitely. In an interview with Geo TV, Samar Mubarakmand of the 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, has said that the team of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission developed the 
design of atomic bomb in 1978 and had successfully conducted a cold test after developing the first atomic bomb in 



1983 



[\i 



Chagai-I 235 

The exact origin of the name is unknown, but it is often attributed to the weapon-testing laboratory leader dr. Ishfaq 
Ahmad as a reference to the Chagai Hills, in spite of no nuclear experiments were performed at the vicinity of this 
site. It is generally believed that the codename was given in the honour of the Chagai Hills in an attempt that it 
would not attract international and national attention of the world at where the exact tests were actually performed. 
On April 2010, Nawaz Sharif, at a public function to celebrate nuclear blasts, said the then-U.S President Bill 
Clinton offered a package of US$5 billion for not carrying out nuclear blasts and warned about imposition of ban 

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otherwise. Nawaz said that he was in Kazakhstan in a visit to meet the President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, when 
India tested its nuclear device. The entire nation was united in favour of nuclear blasts and Mushahid Hussain was 

[21] [221 

the first person who advice that nuclear blasts should be carried out in reply of Indian nuclear explosions. In 

1999, in an interview given to Pakistani and Indian journalists in Islamabad, Sharif had said: If India had not 
exploded the bomb, Pakistan would not have done so. Once New Delhi did so, We [Sharif Government] had no 
choice because of public pressure. 

Test predictions and yields 

The PAEC carried out five underground nuclear tests at the Chagai test site at 3: 16 p.m. (PST) on the afternoon of 28 

[14] [24] 

May 1998. The observation post was established about 10km (about -6.21 miles) from the test vicinity, with 

members of Mathematics groups and Theoretical Physics Group remained charged with calculating the yields. 

Calculating an accurate and precise yields are very hard to calculate even in a control environmental system, with 

many different possible ways the yields can be determined. The questions of politics also further disputed the exact 

figures. The total maximum yield of the tests was reported to be -40 kilotons of TNT equivalent, with the largest 

[25] 
(boosted) device yielding 30—36 kilotons. However, Western seismologists remains unconvinced and estimated 

the yield of the largest device to be no greater than 12 kilotons, leading U.S. nuclear weapons expert David Albright 

also remains skeptical about Pakistan's claims. U.S. scholars, based on the data they received from their 

computers, claimed that the possible yield ranged from 12-20kt as opposed to ~40kt by the Pakistan Government. 

The PAEC's mathematics division made the scientific data to public domain and published seismic activities, 

T2R1 

mathematical graphs, and mathematical formulas used to calculate the yield. The equations obtained by Western 
observer, Terry Wallace (who applied on both India and Pakistan tests) follows: 

Mb = 4.10 + 0.7Uog 10 Y 

The scientific publications were continued to be appear as public domain, the explosion measured 5.54 degrees on 

T2R1 

the Richter Scale, supporting the Pakistan government's claim. After the tests, Prime minister Nawaz Sharif 
addressed the nation via Pakistan's government channel PTV and congratulated the entire nation and days of 

[29] [301 

celebration followed throughout Pakistan. 

From scientific data received by PAEC, it appears that Pakistan did not test a thermonuclear device, as opposed to 

[O] 

India. According to Ishfaq Ahmad, PAEC had no plan to developed a three-stage thermonuclear device because of 
economic reasons, even though back in 1974, Riazuddin did propose such a plan to Abdus Salam, Director of 

[O] 

Theoretical Physics Group that time. From the outset, PAEC concentrated on developing smaller but tactical 

[31] 
nuclear weapons easily installed in PAF's aircraft, naval combatant vessels, and missiles. 

Shortly after the tests, former chairman and technical director Munir Ahmad Khan famously quoted: "These boosted 
devices are like a half way stage towards a thermonuclear bomb. They use elements of the thermonuclear process, 

and are effectively stronger atom bombs Pakistan has had a nuclear capability since 1984 and all the first five 

T321 
devices were made with the HEU. On other hand, Abdul Qadeer Khan further provided technical details on 

235 

fission devices while addressing the local media as he puts it: "All boosted fission devices using U on 28 May. 

None of these explosions were thermonuclear.. Pakistan is currently doing research and can do a fusion test if only 

T321 
asked. But it depends on the economical circumstances, political situation and the decision of the government...". 

As opposed to India's thermonuclear approach, Dr. N.M. Butt, senior scientist, stated that "PAEC built a sufficient 

number of neutron bombs — a battlefield weapon that is essentially a low yield device". 



Chagai-I 236 

Development and test teams 

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 

Ishfaq Ahmad, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). 

Samar Mubarakmand, Member (Technical), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. 

Anwar Ali, Directorate of Technical Equipment (DTE). 

Hafeez Qureshi, Head of Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) 

NA. Javed, Director of Directorate of Quality Assurance (DQA). 

Man Burney, Director of Directorate of Technical Procurement (DTP). 

LA. Bhatty, Director of Directorate of Industrial Liaison (DIL) 

Tariq Salija, Director of the Radiation and Isotope Applications Division (RIAD). 

Muhammad Jameel, Director of Directorate of Science and Engineering Services (DSES) 

Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer (CSO). 

Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) 

Abdul Qadeer Khan, Director General of Khan Research Laboratories (KRL). 
M. Nasim Khan, Director of Material Science and Engineering Division (MSE). 
S. Mansoor Ahmed, Director of Uranium Enrichment Technology Division (UET). 
Fakhr Hashmi, Director of Molecular-Laser Enrichment Technology Division (MLET). 
Javed Ashraf Mirza, Director of Control and Guidance Division (CGD). 
Tasneem M. Shah, Director of Computational Fluid Dynamics Division (CFD). 

Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers (PACE) 

• LGen Zulfikar Ali Khan — Engineer-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Corps of Electrical and Mechanical 
Engineering and the System and Combat Engineering Division of the Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers 

Reaction in Pakistan 

The Directorate of Technical Development of PAEC which carried out the Chagai tests issued the following 

[331 
statement soon after the tests: 



The mission has, on the one hand, boosted the morale of the Pakistani nation by giving it an honorable position in the nuclear world, while on 
the other hand it validated scientific theory, design and previous results from cold tests. This has more than justified the creation and 
establishment of DTD more than 20 years back. 

Through these critical years of nuclear device development, the leadership contribution changed hands from Munir Ahmad Khan to Ishfaq 
Ahmad and finally to Mubarakmand. 

These gifted scientists and engineers along with a highly dedicated team worked logically and economically to design, produce and test an 

[34J 
extremely rugged device for the nation which enable the Islamic Republic of Pakistan from strength to strength. 



Effects on Science in Pakistan 

On this day, Pakistani scientists earned national renown in Pakistan, with Media of Pakistan projecting their 

1351 
biographies all over the country. Senior scientists and engineers were invited by a number of academic institutes 

F351 
and universities to deliver lectures on mathematical, theoretical, nuclear and particle physics. The institutes 

bestowed hundreds of silver and gold medallions and honorary doctorates to the scientists and engineers in 1998. 

Professor Abdus Salam (1926—1996) was also celebrated in Pakistan and Government of Pakistan released a 

commemorative stamp in the honour of Salam. In 1998, the theory of electroweak and its discovery two decade 

ago by Salam, was also celebrated nationwide for which Abdus Salam was awarded the Physics's Nobel Prize in 



Chagai-I 237 

T351 
1979. In 1999, Government established Abdus Salam's museum in National Center for Physics, where his 

T351 
contribution to scientific programs and efforts were publicly recorded and televised. The 28 May has been 

officially declared as Youm-e-Takbeer (Day of Greatness) to commemorate and remembrance of the first five tests 

that were carried out in 28 May, and as well as National Science Day in Pakistan to honour and remembrance the 

scientific efforts led by scientists to developed the devices. The day was officially signed by the then-Prime 

Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif. The day is celebrated by giving awards (such as Chagai-Medal) to various 

T371 
individuals and industries in the field of science and industries. The Nawaz Sharif Government also established 

rooi 

the Chagai-I Medal and it was first awarded to the scientists of Pakistan in 1998 who were witnessed the tests. 

no] 

The graphite mountains are visibly shown in the gold medallion and equal ribbon stripes of yellow, red and white. 

Global Reactions 

[39] 
Pakistan's tests were generally condemned by the Non-OIC international community. The United Nations 

Security Council adopted Resolution 1172 condemning the both Indian test and that of Pakistan's. Brazil declared 

[39] 
that it "deplores" Pakistan's decision to carry out the tests. In an official statement on 28 May 1998, the French 

Foreign Ministry denounced India's five nuclear tests. French President Jacques Chirac implored Pakistan to 

[39] 
abstain from further testing. Iran, Pakistan's strategic ally and neighbor also criticized the tests, with a formal 

statement by. Robin Cook, Britain's foreign secretary, expressed dismay at the tests. Kofi Annan, the secretary 

general of the United Nations, deplored the tests saying that "they exacerbate tension in an already difficult 

relationship". 

The United Nations Security Council condemned Pakistan's five nuclear tests. "The council strongly deplores the 

underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan despite international calls for restraint," said a statement from 

Kenya's Njugumu Moses Mahugu, president of the 15-member council. While France, Israel, and Russian 

[39] 
globally supported Indian's stand on testing nuclear devices. Pakistan founded difficult to gather support even 

from its long term allies. Pakistan's strategic allies Turkey, Germany, and People's Republic of China did not 

supported Pakistan while neither issued any statement. 

The tests brought Pakistan in an extensive Foreign policy deadlock, with no foreign support was found. Pakistan, 
since 1971 disaster, failed to gather any support and a Foreign policy turmoil continued until Navaz Sharif was 
deposed in 1999. 

At a news conference 28 May 1998, United States President Bill Clinton condemned Pakistan's nuclear tests saying, 
"I deplore the decision." He also promised to reprimand Islamabad with the same sanctions the United States has 
imposed on India." Clinton also signed off on economic sanctions against Pakistan that prohibited billions of dollars 

[39] 

in loans from multilateral institutions. NATO said that the tests were a "dangerous development" and also warned 
of sanctions. 

Economic effects 

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1172 condemning the Indian test and that of Pakistan's. 
United States, Japan, Australia, Sweden, Canada, and International Monetary Fund, imposed economical sanctions 
on Pakistan. The Japanese government had called its Ambassador from Pakistan, and suspend its foreign relations 
with Pakistan. During the time of nuclear testing, it was reported that Pakistan had only US$ 1 Billion in its 
national treasure, and India had reported by be $29Billion in its State Bank. By comparing to Pakistan's economy, 
the sanctions imposed by Resolution 1172, was exerted only with marginal effects on India's economy and 
technological progress. The IMF had suspend $3Billion aid to Pakistan, and the country's economy was near facing 
the serious economic default. Sartaj Aziz, an economist and Foreign Minister, and his economics team then briefed 
Nawaz Sharif that if the economy reaches to the financial default, the terms for the CTBT and NPT would be 
exercised more tougher on Pakistan, if Pakistan seeks a Bailout plan from the World Bank, the IMF, and the Asian 
Development Bank, or even the United States. 



Chagai-I 238 

The economy was already deteriorated, Aziz's team was quickly taking the steps to control the economy. Prime 
minister Sharif ordered his Finance minister, Sartaj Aziz, to freeze the low foreign exchange reserves. Aziz then 
asserted that such act would lead to an extreme financial default. Insead, Aziz offered the investors to sell their 
shares at rate of 46PKR, which was 2PKR was more that time, to the Government in order to avoid the financial 
default. This resulted in improving the control of the economy and Nawaz Sharif government then gained the 
control of the economy. Sharif then suspended his capitalist policies and made a move to introduced the socialist 
economics policies, previously introduced by former Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1970s. Sartaz Aziz was 
replaced by Sharif as he opposed Sharif s plans to divert an economic recession by taking such steps. Aziz was 
made Foreign minister and was succedeed by Dr. Ishaq Dar, a career professor of economist who took this daunting 
charge. 

In all, the United States had suspend the economical aid to the Pakistan, but continued the limited economical aid to 

Pakistan on humanitarian basis. Increasingly, the composition of assistance to Pakistan shifted away from grants 

T421 
toward loans repayable in foreign exchange. All new U.S. additional economic assistance to Pakistan was 

1421 
suspended in May 1998. The sanctions were lifted by President George W. Bush after Pakistan President General 

1421 
Musharraf allied Pakistan with the U.S. in its war on terror. Having improved its finances, the government 

T421 
refused further IMF assistance, and consequently the IMF program was ended. 

Historical Overview 

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime minister and colloquially known as the father of nuclear weapons programme. 

Navaz Sharif, Pakistan's Prime Minister at that time, 

Abdus Salam, embarked the nuclear weapons program and director of Theoretical Physics Division 

Riazuddin, designer of Pakistan's thermo-nuclear devices. 

Asghar Qadir, led mathematical calculations involved in the nuclear devices. 

Munir Ahmad Khan, technical director and developed Pakistan's nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear weapons and energy 

programs. 

Ishfaq Ahmad, nuclear weapon designer and the Chairman of PAEC at that time. 

Abdul Qadeer Khan, developed the Centrifuge technology used in enriching uranium hexafluoride gas for 

Pakistan. 

Samar Mubarakmand, Director of Fast-Neutron Physics Group and supervised the atomic tests at Chagai 

Operation Shakti — India's nuclear test on 1 1 May 1998 

Chagai-II- Pakistan's second nuclear test on 30 May 1998 

Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons 

List of countries with nuclear weapons 

External links 

T431 
• Video of Pakistan's first Nuclear Test 

References 

[1] Approximating and calculating the exact, accurate and precise yields are difficult to calculate. Even under very controlled conditions, precise 
yields can be very hard to determine, and for less controlled conditions the margins of error can be quite large. There are number of different 
ways that the yields can be determined, including calculations based on blast size, blast brightness, seismographic data, and the strength of the 
shock wave. The Pakistan Government authorities puts up the yield range from 35 — 40kt depending on the mathematical calculations they had 
performed. On other hand, independent and non-government sanctioned organizations puts the figure at the possible 15-20kt range. The 
explosion measured 5.54 degrees on the Richter Scale, the PAEC provided the data as public domain in the KNET sources. 

[2] Siddiqi, Muhammad Ali. "N-deterrent vital to security, says PM Bhutto" (http://www.lib.virginia.edu/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/ 
Dawn/1995/20 Ap95.html#ndet). Los Angeles Times (April 20th 1995). Muhammad Ali Siddiqi, Los Angeles. . Retrieved 18 November 
2011. 



Chagai-I 239 

[3] "Tale of a love affair that never was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations", (http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/june/loveaffair. 

htm) Hamid Hussain. The Defence Journal, June, 2002. 
[4] Volha Charnysh (3rd September 2009). "Pakistan's Nuclear Program" (http://www.findthatfile.com/search-33 13 1 12-hPDF/ 

download-documents-charnysh-pakistan-analysis-pdf.htm). Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. . 
[5] Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars. United States: Penguin Press. 
[6] Haqqani, his excellency and state [Pakistan] Ambassador to the United States of America (USA), Hussain (2005), "Chapter 3§The old and 

New Pakistan" (http://books. google.com/books 7id=nYppZ_dEjdIC&lpg=PPl&pg=PPl&hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false), Pakistan: 

Between Mosque and Military, 1 (1 ed.), Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: United Book Press., pp. 87-157, ISBN 0870032232143 , 

978-0-87003-214-1, 
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2010-09-26. 
[8] Rehman, Shahid-ur (1999), "Chapter 5§The Theoretical Physics Group: A Cue to Manhattan Project?", Long Road to Chagai:, 1 (1 ed.), 

Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Printwise Publications, pp. 55-101, ISBN 969-8500-00-6 
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[10] Stengel, Richard (Monday, 3 June 1985), "Who has the Bomb?" (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957761-7,00. 

html), Time magazine: 7/13, archived from on 3 June 1985, , retrieved 23 February 2011 
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html), Time magazine: 7/13, archived from on 3 June 1985, , retrieved 23 February 2011 
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whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2007/may-2007/bhutto-was-father-of-pakistani-bomb/?locale=en). International Institute for 

Strategic Studies. . Retrieved 201 1. "ZulfikarAli Bhutto was the father of Pakistan's atomic weapon programme, while Munir Ahmad Khan 

was referred as technical father of the program" 
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into History" (in English). The News International (Karachi, Sindh Province: Jang Group of Newspapers): pp. 1—2. 
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com/2000/june/chagai.htm). The Nation. The Nation and Pakistan Defence Journal. . Retrieved 2011. 
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Islamabad Capital Territory: PB, pp. 49-60, ISBN 969-8500-00-6 
[16] Mubarakmand, former Technical member and former director of Fast-Neutron Physics Group, Samar; Samar Mubarakmand (2004). 

"Pakistan became nuclear state in 1983" (in English). The News International (Karachi, Sindh Province: Jang Group of Newspapers): pp. 1—2. 
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30May98.html#poli). Dawn News 1998. . Retrieved 7 May 2012. 
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world/pakistan/nuke.htm). Global Security, globalsecurity.org. . Retrieved 2010. 
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Jang Group of Newspapers: 1, Friday, 28 May 2010, Jamadi-us-Sani 13, 1431 A.H., 
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[22] "GEO Headlines: America Offers $5Billion against atomic blasts" (http://geo.tv/urdu.htm) (in Urdu). GEO News. . 
[23] "Sweeping India off its feet" (http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/columnists/full_column.php?content_id=75533) (in English 

(British)). The Indian Express (Indian Express Group: Indian Express Group): p. 1. Wednesday, 3 August 2005. . Retrieved 201 1. 
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Sublette, nuclearweaponarchive.org 
[25] FAS.org (11 December 2002). "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons" (http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html). fas.org. . 
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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc.) 54 (4): 24-25. ISSN 0096-3402. . 
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[28] "Broadband recording of first blasts" (http://eqinfo.ucsd.edu/special_events/nuclear_tests/comparison.php). Broadband Seismic Data 

Collection Center. PAEC Mathematics Research Division. . Retrieved 10 May 2012. 
[29] http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html 
[30] BBC (28 May 1998). "BBC on This Day May 28, 1998" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/28/newsid_2495000/ 

2495045.stm). BBC. . Retrieved 28 April 2010. 
[31] Raja Zulfikar (28 May 1998). "Pakistan builds a neutron bomb" (http://nucnews.net/nucnews/1999nn/9908nn/990818nn.world2.htm). 

nuclnet. . Retrieved 17 June 2011. 
[32] Sublette, Carey. "1998: The Year of Testing" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html). Carey Sublette (10 September 

2001). . Retrieved 10 May 2012. 
[33] nuclear weapon archive (10 December 2001). "1998: The Year of Testing" (http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakTests.html). 

nuclearweaponarchive.org. . 
[34] M.A. Chaudhri, "Pakistan's Nuclear History: Separating Myth from Reality," Defence Journal (Karachi), May 2006. 



Chagai-I 240 

[35] "A Science Oddyssey: Pakistan's Nuclear Emergence" (http://www.khwarizmi.org/taxonomy/term/51). 19 October 1998. . Retrieved 6 

September 2011. 
[36] "13th Youm-e-Takbeer to be observed today" (http://www.dunyanews.tv/index.php ?key=Q2F0SUQ9MiNOaWQ9MjcwNTk=). 28 May 

2011. . Retrieved 28 July 2011. 
[37] "Youm-e-Takbeer being marked today" (http://www.geo.tv/5-28-2009/42960.htm). 28 May 2011. . Retrieved 28 July 201 1. 
[38] "Republic of Pakistan: Chagai-I Medal" (http://www.medals.org.uk/pakistan/pakistan048.htm). 26 April 2011. . Retrieved 28 July 

2011. 
[39] Directorate-Group of Press Release of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "World Reaction to Pakistan's nuclear tests" (http://cns. 

miis.edu/archive/country_india/wreactpk.htm). May 30, 1998. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998. . Retrieved 12 May 2012. 
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stm). BBC News. 28 May 1998. . 
[41] Rashid, Senator Pervez (Monday, 13 June of 201 1). "In response to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and Dr. Akram Sehgal" (http://www.jang. 

com.pk/jang/jun201 l-daily/14-06-201 l/col2.htm). Senator Pervez Rashid, Senator of Pakistan Muslim League (N) to the Senate 

Secretariat of Pakistan.. Senator Pervez Rashid, (note:Text only available in Urdu). . Retrieved 201 1. 
[42] Pakistan ends 15-year ties with IMF; Daily Times, 7 September 2004) (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/print. 

asp?page=story_7-9-2004_pg7_9) Pakistani Newspaper Article, 2004 



Kharan Desert 



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The Kharan Desert (Urdu: \j~, ,n qI^U. also known as the Sandy Desert) is a sand desert situated in the Balochistan 
province of Pakistan. Kharan desert is Pakistan's second nuclear test site, and the second nuclear test — Codename 
Chagai-IIChagai-II — was conducted and supervised by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in May 
30, 1998. The desert is characterized by extremes of altitude and extreme temperatures in the desert. The Kharan 
Desert consists of shifting sand dunes with an underlying pebble-conglomerate floor. The moving dunes reach 
heights of between 15 and 30 meters. Level areas between the dunes are a hard-topped pan when dry and a 
treacherous, sandy-clay mush when wet. The altitudes of deserts slope from about 1,000m in the north to about 250m 
on in the south-west. Average annual rainfall throughout these deserts is well under 100 mm. The desert includes 
areas of inland drainage and dry lakes (hamuns). The area is known particularly for its constant mirages and sudden 
severe sandstorms. Chagai-IIChagai-IISatellite image of Kharan Desert Information Country Pakistan Test site 
Kharan Desert Period May 1998 Number of tests 1-2 Test type Underground nuclear testingUnderground tests 
Device type Fission/Fusion Max. yield 40 TNT equivalentkilotons of TNT (unknown operator: u'strong' TJ) 
Navigation Previous test Chagai-I Next test NoneChagai-II was the codename of the second Atomic testsatomic test 
performed and conducted on 1310hrs (1:10 p.m.) (Pakistan Standard TimePST) on 30 May 1998 by Pakistan. It was 
the second tests performed two days after the first tests were conducted on 28 May and were conducted as part of the 
Tit for tattit-for-tat policy. Unlike the Ras Koh HillsChagai weapon-testing laboratories, the tests were performed in 
an open test site, the Kharan weapon-testing laboratories. The initial goals were to tests the new designs of the 
weapon rather than studying the effects and were differed from the first tests as the tests were primary conducted by 
Pakistan Pakistan Atomic Energy CommissionAtomic Energy Commission, with the Pakistan Armed Forcesarmed 
forces' engineering formations having only a supporting role. The single or two device was performed and was a 
boosted weapon-grade plutonium device as against the first tests that contained only uranium devices. With the 
performance of the tests made it sum total of six devices having been performed by Pakistan in 1998. Test 
preparations The weapon-testing laboratories selections and test sites were initiated by PAEC under Munir Ahmad 



Kharan Desert 24 1 

Khan. A mathematical and Three-dimensional spacethree-dimensional space Geological surveysurvey was 

commenced by nuclear physicist dr. Ishfaq Ahmad assisted by seismologist dr. Ahsan Mubarak.Azam, Rai 

Muhammad Saleh (June 2000). "When Mountains Move" (in English) (html). Dr Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam, 

professor of Political Science at Sargodha University. Karachi, Sindh Province of Pakistan: The Nation (1999) and 

Defence Journal of Pakistan (2000). p. 1. . Retrieved 8 May 2012. The PAEC officials met with Prime minister of 

PakistanPrime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to arrange the preparations and decided to bring the role of armed forces 

to provide supplies and logistical support. After the meeting, Bhutto sent a classified telegram to Brigadier 

Muhammad Sarfraz, Chief of Staff at the V Corps (Pakistan)V Corps stationed in Quetta, Balochistan Province of 

Pakistan. Brigadier Sarfraz was tasked with the arranging an army helicopter, Mil Mi-17, for civilian scientists from 

the PAEC; Brigadier Sarfraz was later posted as deputy Engineer-in-Chief (Pakistan Army)E-in-C at the General 

Headquarters (Pakistan Army)Army Combatant Headquarters in Rawalpindi. In 1977, Brigadier Sarfraz was 

summoned by Chief Martial Law AdministratorCMLA and Chief of Army Staff (Pakistan)Chief of Army Staff 

General Muhammad Zia-ul-HaqZia-ul-Haq and tasked him with creating the special military engineering formations 

in 1977. The PAEC officials readily agreed that the secondary tests would be scientific in nature with armed forces 

playing the engineering roles. The Pakistan Army Corps of Electrical and Mechanical EngineeringSpecial 

Development Works (SDW) was given an immediate commission, having the members from military engineering 

formations, it directly reported to Chief of Army Staff. Its first commander was Brigadier Sarfraz who entrusted with 

the task of preparing the weapon-testing laboratories and sites. The SDW later elevated as a nuclear variant of the 

Pakistan Army's famous Frontier Works Organisation (FWO), and commanded by Brigadier Sarfraz since its given 

commission. The weapon-testing laboratories at Kharan had consisted of 24 cold test sites, 46 short tunnels and 35 

underground accommodations for troops and command, control and monitoring facilities. The site was 300 by 200 

feet and was L-shaped horizontal shafts in the testing labs. The weapon-testing laboratories had an array of extensive 

cables, sensors and monitoring stations. THe SDW took 2-3 years to prepare and were completed in 1980, before 

Pakistan acquired the capability to physically develop a atomic bomb.. The weapon-testing labs were located at 

Kharan, in a desert valley between the Ras Koh Hills to the north and Siahan Range to the south. Carey Sublette (2 

January 2002). "Historical Background:§Preparing to Build the Bomb". Carey Sublette of the nuclear weapon 

archive. . Retrieved 2011. Subsequently, the Chagai Hills-Ras Koh-Kharan areas became restricted entry zones and 

were closed to the public. After the Brigadie Sarfraz was sent back the Army Headquarters, Lieutenant-General Zahid 

Ali Akbar Khan was appointed as Engineer-in-Chief (Pakistan Army)Engineer-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army Corps 

of Engineers (PACE) and the Military Engineering Service, as well as the test commander of the Special Works 

Development (SDW).Rehman, Shahidur, Long Road to Chagai: §The nuclear development under Army: General 

Zahid Ali, Printwise Publications, Islamabad (1999) The modernization of the tests labs were undertaken by Frontier 

Works OrganisationFrontier Works Organization (FWO); the FWO uncredited work in the construction of the 

weapon-testings labs in Kharan Desert, and had supervised the complete construction on the sites along with SDW. 

The construction was supervised by the Pakistan Army Engineering CorpsPakistan Army Corps of Engineers's 

combat engineer then-Lieutenant-Colonel Zulfikar Ali Khan and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the 

leadership of Chairman Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan who co-assigned this task to Member (Technical), Pakistan Atomic 

Energy CommissionPAEC, Ishfaq Ahmad. Tests experiments and predictionThe tests were conducted and performed 

on 30 May 30 1998 at 1310Hourhrs (1:10 p.m.) (Pakistan Standard TimePST). The device was a miniaturized 

Boosted fission weaponboosted-fission Weapons-grade#Weapons-grade plutoniumweapon-grade plutonium device 

Nuclear weapon yieldyielding 60% of the first tests performed two days earlier. The yield of a nuclear device was 

reported to be 18-20 kilotonnekt of TNT equivalent. On the other hand, the international observers estimated their 

calculation based on the results and data their received from their computer and approximating the figure at mere 

2Kt.http://books.google.co.in/books?id=vAsAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA24&dq=chagai+claimed+yield&hl=en&sa=X&ei=LMU4T4XB: 

crater now takes the place of what used to be a small hillock in the rolling desert, marking the ground zero of the 

nuclear test there.. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (or PAEC) had tested one or more plutonium nuclear 

devices, and the results and data of the devices were successful as it was expected by the Pakistan's mathematicians 



Kharan Desert 242 

and seismologists. "Nuclear Tests:§The Plutonium Device". Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and Pakistan 
Atomic Scientists Foundation (PASF). December 11, 2002. . Retrieved 2011. The devices were successfully tested 
and supervised by PAEC's Chief Technical Member (CTM) Dr. Samar Mubarakmand.. Cultural legacyMay 28 has 
been officially declared as Youm-e-Takbeer (Day of Greatness) and as well as National Science Day in Pakistan to 
commemorate and remembrance of the first five tests that were carried out in May 28, 1998. "13th Youm-e-Takbeer 
to be observed today". 28 May 2011. . Retrieved 2011. The day was officially signed by the then-Prime Minister of 
Pakistan Nawaz Sharif. The day is celebrated by giving awards (such as Chagai-Medal) to various individuals and 
industries in the field of science and industries. "Youm-e-Takbeer being marked today". 28 May 2011. . Retrieved 
2011. Government also established the Chagai-I Medal and it was first awarded to the scientists of Pakistan in 1998 
who were witnessed the tests. "Republic of Pakistan: Chagai-I Medal". 28 May 2011. . Retrieved 2011. The graphite 
mountains are visibly shown in the gold medallion and equal ribbon stripes of yellow, red and white. Preparations 
and Test TeamsPakistan Atomic Energy CommissionSamar Mubarakmand, Member (Technical), Pakistan Atomic 
Energy Commission. Muhammad Hafeez Qureshi, Head of Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) Man 
Burney, Director of Directorate of Technical Procurement (DTP). Tariq Salija, Director of the Radiation and Istope 
Applications Division (RIAD). Muhammad Jameel, Director of Directorate of Science and Engineering Services 
(DSES) Muhammad Arshad, the Chief Scientific Officer (CSO). Tasneem M. ShahTasneem Shah, Director of 
Computational Fluid Dynamics Division, A. Q. Khan Research LaboratoriesKRL, (CFDD) Pakistan Army Corps of 
EngineersLieutenant General Zulfikar Ali Khan Engineer-in-Chief (Pakistan Army)Engineer-in-Chief of the System 
EngineeringSystem and Combat Engineering Division of the Pakistan ArmyPakistan Army Corps of 
EngineersReferencesExternal links Chagai-II Test on YouTube "Comparison of India's and Pakinstan's nuclear tests 
and the 30 May, 1998 Afghanistan earthquake" (php). Broadband Seismic Data Collection Center. Broadband 
Seismic Data Collection Center, Pakistan Atomic Scientist Federation (PASF), Pakistan Nuclear Society, Pakistan 
Seismic Department (PAEC), and Pakistan Meteorological Department. 2010-11-23. Retrieved 2011. "KNET 
recording of second Pakistani nuclear test waveforms" (php). Broadband Seismic Data Collection Center. Broadband 
Seismic Data Collection Center, Pakistan Atomic Scientist Federation (PASF), Pakistan Nuclear Society, Pakistan 
Seismic Department (PAEC), and Pakistan Meteorological Department. 2010-11-23. Retrieved 2011. 



243 



Other armed engagements 

Indian integration of Junagadh 



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Junagadh was a princely state of India, located in what is now Gujarat, outside but under the suzerainty of British 
India. In the independence and partition of British India of 1947, the 562 princely states were given a choice of 
whether to join the new Dominion of India or the newly formed state of Pakistan or to remain independent. The 
Nawab of Junagadh, Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, a Muslim whose ancestors had ruled Junagadh and small 
principalities for some two hundred years, decided that Junagadh should become part of Pakistan, much to the 
displeasure of many of the people of the state, an overwhelming majority of whom were Hindus. The Nawab 
acceded to the Dominion of Pakistan on 15 September 1947, against the advice of Lord Mountbatten, arguing that 
Junagadh joined Pakistan by sea. History introduction at hellojunagadh.com: "On September 15, 1947, Nawab 
Mohammad Mahabat Khanji III of Junagadh, a princely state located on the south-western end of Gujarat and having 
no common border with Pakistan, chose to accede to Pakistan ignoring Mountbatten's views, arguing that Junagadh 
adjoined Pakistan by sea. The rulers of two states that were subject to the suzerainty of Junagadh Mangrol and 
Babariawad reacted by declaring their independence from Junagadh and acceding to India." The principality of 
Babariawad and Sheikh of Mangrol reacted by claiming independence from Junagadh and accession to India. When 
Pakistan accepted the Nawab's Instrument of Accession on 16 September, the Government of India was outraged that 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah could accept the accession of Junagadh despite his argument that Hindus and Muslims could 
not live as one nation, though this was a seen as a strategy to get a plebiscite held for the case of Kashmir which was 
a Muslim majority with a Hindu ruler. Raj mohan GandhiGandhi, Rajmohan (1991). Patel: A Life. India: Navajivan. 
p. 292. ASIN B0006EYQ0A. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel believed that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it 
would exacerbate the communal tension already simmering in Gujarat. The princely state was surrounded on all of 
its land borders by India, with an outlet onto the Arabian Sea. The unsettled conditions in Junagadh had led to a 
cessation of all trade with India and the food position became precarious. With the region in crisis, the Nawab, 
fearing for his life, felt forced to flee to Karachi with his family and his followers, and there he established a 
provisional government. Vallabhbhai Patel offered Pakistan time to reverse its acceptance of the accession and to 
hold a plebiscite in Junagadh. Samaldas Gandhi formed a government-in-exile, the Aarzi Hukumat (in Urdu:Aarzi: 
Temporary, Hukumat: Government) of the people of Junagadh. Eventually, Patel ordered the forcible annexation of 
Junagadh's three principalities. Junagadh's state government, facing financial collapse and lacking forces with which 
to resist Indian force, invited the Government of India to take control. A plebiscite was conducted in December, in 
which approximately 99% of the people chose India over Pakistan. Rajmohan GandhiGandhi, Rajmohan (1991). 
Patel: A Life. India: Navajivan. p. 438. ASIN B0006EYQ0A.Background After the announcement by the last 
Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, on 3 June 1947, of the intention to partition British India, the British parliament 
passed the Indian Independence Act 1947 on 11 July 1947. as a result, the native states were left with these choices: 
to remain independent or to accede to either of the two new British Dominionsdominions, the Union of India or the 
Dominion of Pakistan. The Indian Government made efforts to persuade Nawab Sahab of Junagadh to accede to 



Indian integration of Junagadh 244 

India, but he remained firm. The Indian minister V. P. Menon came to request an accession to India, threatening 
consequences in case of denial. The Nawab however decided to accede to Pakistan, and an announcement to this 
effect was made in the gazette of Junagadh (Dastrural Amal Sarkar Junagadh) on 15 August 1947. Instrument of 
accession Immediately after making the announcement in Dastrural Amal Sarkar Junagadh, the Jungadh government 
communicated to Pakistan its wish to accede, and a delegation headed by Ismail was sent to Karachi with the 
Instrument of Accession signed by the Nawab. The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan considered the proposal in 
detail and approved it. The Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as Governor General of Pakistan, counter-signed 
the Instrument of Accession on 15 September 1947. This was notified in the Gazette of Pakistan and Dasturul Amal, 
the Gazette of Junagadh, on that date. The Instrument of Accession provided for the right of the Pakistan legislature 
to legislate in the areas of Defence and Communication, as well as others. Although the territory of Junagadh was 
geographically not adjoining the existing Pakistan, it had a link by sea through the Veraval Port of Junagadh. 
Menon's reaction V. P. Menon, the Secretary of the States department of the Government of India, travelled to 
Junagadh on 17 September 1947 and met Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the dewan (or Chief Minister) of Junagadh. 
Menon said he had brought a message from the Indian Government and wished to deliver it to the Nawab in person. 
Bhutto said he could not arrange a meeting with the Nawab as he was not feeling well. Menon expressed displeasure, 
but conveyed the message of the Indian Government to Bhutto, insisting that Junagadh should withdraw its accession 
to Pakistan. Bhutto told Menon that the accession was now complete and that according to international law only the 
Government of Pakistan was responsible. Menon went to Bombay and met Samaldas Gandhi, a journalist of Rajkot 
who was related to Mohandas Karamchand GandhiMohandas Gandhi, and others, and unfolded the scheme of 
"Arziee Hukumat" (Provisional Government). On 24 September 1947, Mohandas K. Gandhi condemned the action 
of the Junagadh government in a prayer meeting held at Delhi. Provisional government (Aarzee Hukumat)In the 
meanwhile, there were exchanges between the governments of India and Pakistan. Pakistan told the Indian 
Government that the accession was in accordance with the Scheme of Independence announced by the outgoing 
British and that Junagadh was now part of Pakistan. While this exchange of correspondence was going on, India 
closed all its borders to Junagadh and stopped the movement of goods, transport and postal articles. In view of 
worsening situation, the Nawab and his family left Junagadh and arrived in Karachi on 25 October 1947. On 27 
October 1947, Bhutto, as Chief Minister of Junagadh, wrote a letter to Jinnah explaining the critical situation of 
which the State government. As the situation worsened, he wrote again on 28 October 1947 to Ikramullah, Secretary 
of the Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, seeking help and directions. When all hopes for assistance from Pakistan 
were lost, Bhutto wrote by telegram on 1 November 1947 to Nawab Saheb at Karachi, explaining the situation and 
the danger to life and property, considering an armed attack was imminent. In a return telegram, the Nawab 
authorised Bhutto to act in the best interests of the Muslim population of Junagadh. A meeting of the Junagadh State 
Council was called on 5 November to discuss the critical situation. The Council authorised Bhutto to take 
appropriate action. He sent Captain Harvey Johnson, a senior member of the Council of Ministers, to Rajkot to meet 
Indian officials. Another meeting of the Junagadh State Council was convened on 7 November, and some prominent 
citizens of Junagadh state were also invited. The meeting continued till 3 o'clock in the morning and decided that 
instead of surrendering to the "Provisional Government", the Indian Government should be requested to take over 
the administration of Junagadh to protect the lives of its citizens, which were being threatened by Provisional 
Government forces. On 8 November, Bhutto sent a letter to Nilam Butch, Provincial Head of the Indian Government 
in Rajkot, requesting him to help to restore law and order in Junagadh to prevent bloodshed. Harvey Johnson took 
the message to Rajkot. The head of the Indian administration telephoned V. P. Menon in Delhi and read out the 
letter. Menon immediately rushed to see Jawaharlal Nehru and explained the situation. After consultation with other 
ministers and V. B. Patel, the home minister, a formal order was drafted and a notification issued announcing the 
take-over of Junagadh at the request of its Chief Minister. The notification promised a referendum in due course. 
Bhutto left Junagadh for Karachi on the night of 8 November 1947. On 9 November, the Indian Air Force flew 
several sorties at low level over Junagadh. Entry of Indian forces Soon columns of Indian tanks and other vehicles 
carrying Indian soldiers entered Junagadh state. At 6 p.m. on 9 November, Captain Harvey Johnson and Chief 



Indian integration of Junagadh 245 

Secretary Gheewala, a civil servant of Junagadh state, formally handed over the charge of the State to the Indian 
Government. On the same day, Nehru sent a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan about the Indian take-over of Junagadh. 
Khan sent a return telegram to Nehru stating that Junagadh was Pakistani territory, and nobody except the Pakistan 
government was authorised to invite anybody to Junagadh. He also accused the Indian Government of naked 
aggression on Pakistan's territory and of violating international law. The Government of Pakistan strongly opposed 
the Indian occupation. Nehru wrote In view of special circumstances pointed out by Junagadh Dewan that is the 
Prime Minister of Junagadh - our Regional Commissioner at Rajkot has taken temporarily charge of Junagadh 
administration. This has been done to avoid disorder and resulting chaos. We have, however, no desire to continue 
this arrangement and wish to find a speedy solution in accordance with the wishes of the people of Junagadh. We 
have pointed out to you previously that final decision should be made by means of referendum or plebiscite. We 
would be glad to discuss this question and allied matters affecting Junagadh with representatives of your 
Government at the earliest possible moment convenient to you. We propose to invite Nawab of Junagadh to send his 
representatives to this conference. The Government of Pakistan protested, saying that the accession of the state to 
Pakistan was already accepted. In reply to the above telegram, the Prime Minister of Pakistan sent the following: 
Your telegram informing that your Government had taken charge of Junagadh was received by me on November 10, 
1947. Your action in taking over State Administration and sending Indian troops to state without any authority from 
Pakistan Government and indeed without our knowledge, is a clear violation of Pakistan territory and breach of 
International law. Indian Government's activities on accession of Junagadh to Pakistan have all been directed to 
force the State to renounce accession and all kinds of weapons have been used by you to achieve this end. We 
consider your action in taking charge of Junagadh Administration and sending Indian troops to occupy Junagadh to 
be a direct act of hostility against Pakistan Dominion. We demand that you should immediately withdraw your 
forces, and relinquish charge of administration to the rightful ruler and stop people of Union of India from invading 
Junagadh and committing acts of violence. This was the followed by a Press Statement made by the Prime Minister 
of Pakistan. It was communicated to Prime Minister of India on November 16, 1947 and read as follows: In spite of 
the gravest provocation, we have refrained from any action which should result in armed conflict. We could with full 
justification and legal right could have sent our forces to Junagadh but at no time since the accession of state, was a 
single soldier sent by us to Junagadh and our advice throughout to the State Authorities was to exercise the greatest 
restraint. Manavadar, another State which had acceded to Pakistan and Mangrol and Babariawad have also been 
occupied by Indian troops. Immediately after the take-over of the state, all rebel Muslim officials of the state were 
put behind the bars. They included Ismail Abrehani, a senior minister in the Junagadh government, who had taken 
the instrument of Accession to the Quaid-e-Azam for his signature. Abrehani refused to leave Junagadh, even when 
he was offered in jail the option of going to Pakistan, saying that despite its occupation Junagadh was part of 
Pakistan according to international law and he preferred to remain. He stayed and later died in Junagadh. Plebiscite 
A plebiscite was held on 20 February 1948, in which all but 91 out of 190,870 who voted (from an electorate of 
201,457) voted to join India, ie. 99% of the population voted to join India. A.G NOORANI. "Of Jinnah and 
Junagadh". . Retrieved May 27, 2011. Later arrangements Junagadh became part of the Indian Saurashtra State until 
November 1, 1956, when Saurashtra became part of Bombay State. Bombay State was split into the linguistic states 
of Gujarat and Maharashtra in 1960, and Junagadh is now one of the modern districts of Saurasthra in Gujarat. 
References 



Siachen conflict 246 



Siachen conflict 



The Siachen Conflict, sometimes referred to as the Siachen War, is a military conflict between India and Pakistan 
over the disputed Siachen Glacier region in Kashmir. A cease-fire went into effect in 2003. The conflict began in 
1984 with India's successful Operation Meghdoot during which it wrested control of the Siachen Glacier from 
Pakistan and forced the Pakistanis to retreat west of the Saltoro Ridge. India has established control over all of the 70 
kilometres (unknown operator: u'strong 1 mi) long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as well as the 
three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier — Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. 
Pakistan controls the glacial valleys immediately west of the Saltoro Ridge. According to TIME magazine, India 

2 

gained more than 1000 square miles (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km ) of territory because of its military 
operations in Siachen. 

Conflict 

The Siachen glacier is the highest battleground on earth, where India and Pakistan have fought intermittently 

since April 13, 1984. Both countries maintain permanent military presence in the region at a height of over 6000 
metres (unknown operator: u'strong' ft). More than 2000 people have died in this inhospitable terrain, mostly due 
to weather extremes and the natural hazards of mountain warfare. 

The conflict in Siachen stems from the incompletely demarcated territory on the map beyond the map coordinate 
known as NJ9842. The 1972 Simla Agreement did not clearly mention who controlled the glacier, merely stating that 
from the NJ9842 location the boundary would proceed "thence north to the glaciers." UN officials presumed there 
would be no dispute between India and Pakistan over such a cold and barren region. 

Oropolitics 

In 1949, a Cease-Fire Line Agreement(CFL) was signed and ratified by India, Pakistan and the UN Military 
Observer Group that delineated entire CFL. In 1956-58, a scientific team led by the Geological Survey of India 
recorded its findings publicly including information about the Siachen and other glaciers. 

After Pakistan ceded Shaksgam Valley to China in a boundary agreement in 1963, Pakistan started giving approval 
to western expedition to the east of mountain K2. In 1957 Pakistan permitted a British expedition under Eric 

ro] 

Shipton to approach the Siachen through the Bilafond La, and recce Saltoro Kangri. Five years later a 
Japanese-Pakistani expedition put two Japanese and a Pakistani Army climber on top of Saltoro Kangri. These 
were early moves in this particular game of oropolitics. 

Maps from Pakistan, the United Nations and other global atlases depicted the CFL correctly till around 1967-72. 
The United States Defense Mapping Agency (now National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) began in about 1967 to 
show international boundary on their Tactical Pilotage Charts as proceeding from NJ9842 east-northeast to the 
Karakoram Pass at 5,534 m (18,136 ft) on the China border without justification or documentation Numerous 
governmental and private cartographers and atlas producers followed suit. This resulted in the US cartographically 
giving the entire unknown operator: u',' square kilometers (unknown operator: u'strong'unknown operator: 
u','sq mi) of the Siachen-Saltoro area to Pakistan. 

In the 1970s and early 1980s several mountaineering expeditions applied to Pakistan to climb high peaks in the 
Siachen area due in part to U.S Defense Mapping Agency and most other maps and atlases showing it on the 
Pakistani side of the line. Pakistan granted a number of permits. This in turn reinforced the Pakistani claim on the 
area, as these expeditions arrived on the glacier with a permit obtained from the Government of Pakistan. Teram 
Kangri I (7465 m/unknown operator: u'strong' ft) and Teram Kangri II (7406 m/unknown operator: u'strong' ft) 
were climbed in 1975 by a Japanese expedition led by H. Katayama, which approached through Pakistan via the 
Bilafond La. [12] 



Siachen conflict 



247 



The Indian government and military took notice, and protested the cartography. Prior to 1984 neither India nor 
Pakistan had any permanent presence in the area. Having become aware of the errant US military maps and the 
permit incidents, Colonel Narendra "Bull" Kumar, then commanding officer of the Indian Army's High Altitude 
Warfare School, mounted an Army expedition to the Siachen area as a counter-exercise. In 1978 this expedition 
climbed Teram Kangri II, claiming it as a first ascent in a typical 'oropolitical' riposte. Unusually for the normally 
secretive Indian Army, the news and photographs of this expedition were published in 'The Illustrated Weekly of 
India', a widely-circulated popular magazine. 

The first public acknowledgment of the maneuvers and the developing conflict situation in the Siachen was an 
abbreviated article titled "High Politics in the Karakoram" by Joydeep Sircar in The Telegraph newspaper of 
Calcutta in 1982. The full text was re-printed as "Oropolitics" in the Alpine Journal, London, in 1984. 



Skirmish 

At army headquarters in Rawalpindi, Pakistani generals decided they had better stake a claim to Siachen before India 
did. Islamabad then committed an intelligence blunder, according to a now retired Pakistani army colonel. "They 
ordered Arctic-weather gear from a London outfitters who also supplied the Indians," says the colonel. "Once the 
Indians got wind of it, they ordered 300 outfits — twice as many as we had — and rushed their men up to Siachen." 

Reportedly with specific intelligence of a possible Pakistani operation, 
India launched Operation Meghdoot (named after the divine cloud 
messenger in a Sanskrit play by Kalidasa) on 13 April 1984 when the 
Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force went 
into the glacier region. India was soon in control of the area, beating 
Pakistan to the Saltoro Ridge high ground by about a week. The two 
northern passes — Sia La and Bilafond La — were quickly secured by 
India. When the Pakistanis arrived at the region in 1984, they found a 
300-man Indian battalion dug into the highest mountaintops. ' The 

contentious area is about 900 square miles (unknown operator: 

2 ri7i 
u'strong' km ) to nearly 1000 square miles (unknown operator: 

2 n ri 

u'strong' km ) of territory. After 1984, Pakistan launched several 

attempts to displace the Indian forces, but with little success. The most 

well known was in 1987, when an attempt was made by Pakistan to 

dislodge India from the area. The attack was masterminded by Pervez 

Musharraf (later President of Pakistan) heading a newly raised elite 

SSG commando unit raised with United States Special Operations 

ri9i 

Forces help in the area. A special garrison with eight thousand 

troops was built at Khapalu. The immediate aim was to capture 

Bilafond La but after bitter fighting that included hand to hand combat, the Pakistanis were thrown back and the 

positions remained the same. The only Param Vir Chakra — India's highest gallantry award — to be awarded for 

combat in the Siachen area went to Naib Subedar Bana Singh (retired as Subedar Major/Honorary Captain), who in a 

daring daylight raid assaulted and captured a Pakistani post atop a 22,000 foot (6,700 m) peak, now named Bana 

Post, after climbing a 457 m (1500 feet) ice cliff face. [20][21] 




A memorial at the headquarters of the Dogra 

Regiment of the Indian Army in remembrance of 

members of the regiment who died or served in 

the Siachen Conflict 



Siachen conflict 



248 



Ground situation 

In his memoirs, former Pakistani president General Pervez Musharraf 

states that Pakistan lost almost 900 square miles (unknown operator: 

2 ri7i 

u'strong' km ) of territory that it claimed. TIME states that the 

Indian advance captured nearly 1000 square miles (unknown 

2 n si 

operator: u'strong' km ) of territory claimed by Pakistan. 

Further attempts to reclaim positions were launched by Pakistan in 
1990, 1995, 1996 and even in early 1999, just prior to the Lahore 
Summit. The 1995 attack by Pakistan SSG was significant as it 
resulted in 40 casualties for Pakistan troops without any changes in the 
positions. An Indian IAF MI- 17 helicopter was shot down in 1996. 

The Indian army controls all of the 70 kilometres (unknown operator: 

u'strong' mi) long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as 
well as the three main passes of the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of 
the glacier — Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La — thus holding onto 
the tactical advantage of high ground 



[22] [23] [24] [25] 



Siachen glacier 




Red dotted line is AGPL, right of which is 
Siachen Glacier controlled by Indian army. 




*1 *- 



ptPIP 



fc_ 



The Pakistanis control the glacial valley just five kilometers southwest 
of Gyong La. The Pakistanis have been unable get up to the crest of the 
Saltoro Ridge, while the Indians cannot come down and abandon their 
strategic high posts. 

The line between where Indian and Pakistani troops are presently holding onto their respective posts is being 
increasingly referred to as the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) 



Pakistani Soldiers in Siachen Sector (2012) 



[26] [27] 



Severe conditions 

A cease-fire went into effect in 2003. Even before then, every year more soldiers were killed because of severe 
weather than enemy firing. The two sides by 2003 had lost an estimated 2,000 personnel primarily due to frostbite, 
avalanches and other complications. Together, the nations have about 150 manned outposts along the glacier, with 
some 3,000 troops each. Official figures for maintaining these outposts are put at ~$300 and ~$200 million for India 
and Pakistan respectively. India built the world's highest helipad on the glacier at Point Sonam, 21,000 feet 
(6,400 m) above the sea level, to supply its troops. The problems of reinforcing or evacuating the high-altitude 
ridgeline have led to India's development of the Dhruv Mk III helicopter, powered by the Shakti engine, which was 
flight-tested to lift and land personnel and stores from the Sonam post, the highest permanently manned post in the 

no] T2Q1 

world. India also installed the world's highest telephone booth on the glacier. 



Kargil War 

One of the factors behind the Kargil War in 1999 when Pakistan sent infiltrators to occupy vacated Indian posts 
across the Line of Control was their belief that India would be forced to withdraw from Siachen in exchange of a 
Pakistani withdrawal from Kargil. Both sides had previously desired to disengage from the costly military outposts 
but after the Kargil War, India decided to maintain its military outposts on the glacier, wary of further Pakistani 
incursions into Kashmir if they vacate from the Siachen Glacier posts without an official recognition from Pakistan 
of the current positions. 



Siachen conflict 249 

Visits 

During her tenure as Prime Minister of Pakistan, Ms Benazir Bhutto, visited the area west of Gyong La, making her 
the first premier from either side to get to the Siachen region. On June 12, 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit the area, calling for a peaceful resolution of the problem. In 2007, the 
President of India, Abdul Kalam became the first head of state to visit the area. 

The Chief of Staff of the US Army, General George Casey on October 17, 2008 visited the Siachen Glacier along 
with Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor. The US General visited for the purpose of "developing concepts 
and medical aspects of fighting in severe cold conditions and high altitude". 

Since September 2007, India has welcomed mountaineering and trekking expeditions to the forbidding glacial 
heights. The expeditions have been meant to show the international audience that Indian troops hold "almost all 
dominating heights" on the important Saltoro Ridge west of Siachen Glacier, and to show that Pakistani troops are 
not within 15 miles (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km) of the 43.5-mile (unknown operator: u'strong 1 km) 
Siachen Glacier. An October 2008 trek was "being undertaken to send a message that every civilian with the help 
of military can visit this part of the country," a senior Indian army officer explained. The civilian treks to Siachen 
started despite vehement protests from Pakistan which termed it India's "tourism" in "disputed territory". Pakistan 
conducts similar expeditions in nearby areas under its control with no requirement of a military liaison officer to 
accompany trekkers; their permit formalities are simpler, often taking just two weeks. Pakistan in 2008 did not lodge 
a formal protest against the treks and India too has also kept it a low key affair, with Indian Defence Minister A.K. 
Antony skipping the flagging off ceremony. 

2012 avalanche 

In the early morning of 7 April 2012, an avalanche hit a Pakistani military headquarters in the area, burying over 120 
Pakistani soldiers and civilian contractors. 

Operations 

• Operation Meghdoot ( 1 984) 

Notes 

[I] Wirsing, Robert. Pakistan's security underZia, 1977—1988: the policy imperatives of a peripheral Asian state. Palgrave Macmillan, 1991. 
ISBN 0-312-06067-X, 9780312060671. 

[2] Child, Greg. Thin air: encounters in the Himalayas. The Mountaineers Books, 1998. ISBN 0-89886-588-3, 9780898865882. 

[3] "The Himalayas War at the Top Of the World" (http://www.time.eom/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 958254-2, 00. html). Time. July 31, 

1989. . 
[4] VAUSE, Mikel. Peering Over the Edge: The Philosophy of Mountaineering, p. 194. 
[5] CHILD, Greg. Mixed Emotions: Mountaineering Writings, p. 147. 

[6] Modern world history- Chapter-The Indian subcontinent achieves independence/The Coldest War. 
[7] Facts vs bluff on Siachen, Kayani's suggestion worth pursuing (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2012/20120421/edit.htm), B.G. Verghese, 

Saturday, April 21, 2012, Chandigarh, India 
[8] Himalayan Journal Vol. 21 
[9] Himalayan Journal Vol. 25 
[10] "2003 article about Siachen in Outside magazine" (http://outsideonline.com/outside/features/200302/200302_siachen_7.html). 

Outsideonline.com. . Retrieved 2011-04-15. 

[II] Trivedi, Ramesh (2008). India's Relations with Her Neighbours (http://books. google. co.in/books?id=-VUgSG8bcP0C&dq=Siachen+ 
cartographic+aggression+USA&source=gbs_navlinks_s). Gyan Publishing House, pp. 220. ISBN 9788182054387 8182054389. . 

[12] SANGAKU71 

[13] "Outside magazine article about Siachen battleground" (http://outsideonline.com/outside/features/200302/200302_siachen_l.html). 

Outsideonline.com. . Retrieved 2011-04-15. 
[14] Dutta, Sujan (2006-05-15). "The Telegraph - Calcutta : Nation" (http://www.telegraphindia.com/1060515/asp/nation/story_6221947. 

asp). Calcutta, India: Telegraphindia.com. . Retrieved 2011-04-15. 



Siachen conflict 250 

[15] Alpine Journal, 1984 

[16] "War at the Top of the World" (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1079528-l,00.html). Time. November 7, 2005. . 

[17] Pervez Musharraf (2006). In the Line of Fire: A Memoir. Free Press. ISBN 0-7432-8344-9.(pp. 68-69) 

[18] The Himalayas War at the Top Of the World (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,958254-2,00.html) July 31, 1989 - 

TIME 
[19] J. N. Dixit. India-Pakistan in war & peace. Routledge. ISBN 0-415-30472-5. (pp. 39) 

[20] "The Siachen Conflict: 1984 Onwards" (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/History/1984.html). . 
[21] Siachen: Frozen disengagement (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/2011/20110606/edit.htm#6), Maj Gen Raj Mehta (Retd), Monday, June 

6, 2011, tribuneindia.com 
[22] See http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-l/Siachen.html for perhaps the most detailed treatment of the geography of 

the conflict, including its early days, and under section "3." the current status of control of Gyong La, contrary to the oft-copied misstatement 

in the old error-plagued summary at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/siachen.htm 
[23] NOORANI, A.G. (Mar. 10, 2006). "For the first time, the leaders of India and Pakistan seem close to finding a solution to the Kashmir 

problem." (http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2304/stories/200603 10001704400.htm). A working paper on Kashmir. . Retrieved April 29, 

2012. 
[24] "Indians have been able to hold on to the tactical advantage of the high ground Most of India's many outposts are west of the Siachen 

Glacier along the Saltoro Range. Bearak, Barry (May 23, 1999). "THE COLDEST WAR; Frozen in Fury on the Roof of the World" (http:// 

query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9807EFDA1431F930A15756C0A96F958260&sec=&spon=&&scp=l&sq="May23, 1999" 

"Roof of the World"&st=cse). The New York Times. . Retrieved 2009-02-20. 
[25] In an academic study with detailed maps and satellite images, co-authored by brigadiers from both the Pakistani and Indian military, pages 

16 and 27: "Since 1984, the Indian army has been in physical possession of most of the heights on the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen 

Glacier, while the Pakistan army has held posts at lower elevations of western slopes of the spurs emanating from the Saltoro ridgeline. The 

Indian army has secured its position on the ridgeline." Hakeem, Asad; Gurmeet Kanwal , Michael Vannoni, Gaurav Rajen (2007-09-01). 

"Demilitarization of the Siachen Conflict Zone" (http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/cmc-papers/sand20075670.pdf). Sandia Report. Sandia 

National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, USA. . Retrieved 2009-02-20. 
[26] Confirm ground position line on Siachen: BJP (http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/29/stories/2006042906591200.htm) - April 29, 2006, 

The Hindu 
[27] Guns to fall silent on Indo-Pak borders (http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_26-l l-2003_pgl_l) November 26, 2003 

— Daily Times 
[28] Shukla, Ajai. In Siachen, Dhruv proves a world-heater (http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ 

in-siachen-dhruv-provesworld-beater/427533/), (March 7, 2011). Business Standard. New Delhi. 
[29] India Installs World's Highest Phone Booth Soldiers Fighting Along Kashmir Glacier Can Now Call Families, Army Says — Denver Rocky 

Mountain News — Highbeam Research (http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lPl-54801 1 l.html) 
[30] India opens Siachen to trekkers (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India_opens_Siachen_to_trekkers/articleshow/2363583.cms) Times 

of India 13 Sep 2007 
[31] "Pakistan resumes search for 135 buried by avalanche" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17643625). BBC News. 8 April 2012. . 

Retrieved 28 April 2012. 
[32] "Huge search for trapped Pakistani soldiers" (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2012/04/20124755454785414.html). Al Jazeera 

English. 7 April 2012. . Retrieved 7 April 2012. 

References 

• Myra MacDonald (2008) Heights of Madness: One Woman's Journey in Pursuit of a Secret War, Rupa, New 
Delhi ISBN 81-291-1292-2. The first full account of the Siachen war to be told from the Indian and Pakistani 
sides. 

• Siachen: Conflict Without End by V.R. Raghavan 

External links 

• The Coldest War (http://outsideonline.com/outside/features/200302/200302_siachen_l.html) 

• Time report (http://www. time. com/time/magazine/article/0,9171, 1079528,00. html) 

• Siachen: The stalemate continues (http://www.kashmirsentinel.eom/aprl999/3.9.html) 



Operation Brasstacks 25 1 



Operation Brasstacks 



The Operation Brasstacks was a codename of a large military exercise undertaken by the Indian Army in Rajasthan 
region of India during November 1986 and March 1987. It was one of the largest mobilizations of Indian Armed 
Forces in the Indian subcontinent. Many regard this as one of the most critical points in the relationships between 
India and Pakistan with regard to nuclear war. The exercise's magnitude and closeness to the border caused a 
situation where a war between India and Pakistan looked imminent. There is still a considerable debate regarding the 
purpose of the exercise as many believe that India was preparing for a war against Pakistan, even though the stated 
objective of Operation Brasstacks was to test new concepts of mechanization, mobility, and air support devised by 
General Sundarji. 

Indian army rationale and moves 

The Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, General Krishnaswamy Sundarrajan (popularly known as Sundarji), at that 
time, advocated for modern methods of land-based warfare and professionalism in the Indian Army. According to 
General Sundarji, Operation Brasstacks was carried out to test new concepts of mechanization, mobility, and air 
support. 

The scale of the operation was bigger than any NATO exercise and the biggest land exercise since World War II. 
According to retired Lieutenant-General PN Hoon, commander of the Western Military Command of the Indian 
Army, Operation Brasstacks was a mobilization of the entire army of India. The exercise took place in the deserts of 
Rajasthan instead of the sensitive regions of Kashmir and the then restive Punjab. At one point of time nearly 
400,000 Indian army troops were deployed directly across the Sindh Province of Pakistan. The magnitude and large 
scale direction of the exercise led to Pakistan fears that India was displaying an overwhelming conventional 
superiority and was planning to invade Pakistan, and dismember it by surgical strikes, as it did with East Pakistan 
during the Indo-Pak 1971 Winter war. 

Pakistan's response 

Pakistan's response was to mobilize its entire V Corps and Southern Air Command, near the Indian state of Punjab. 
Then-President and Chief of Army Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Zia-ul-Haq viewed the exercise as a direct 
threat and challenge to Pakistan's existence, and issued commands Armoured Corps and entire V Corps to move to 
the front lines. Meanwhile, Pakistan Air Force proceeded with Pakistan Army, and the Southern Air Command was 
put on high-alert directly reporting to Chief of Air Staff of Pakistan Air Force Air Chief Marshal Jamal Ahmad 
Khan. 

In order to remind the Indian Armed Forces of the possible repercussions of war with Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq 
famously said: "If your [Indian Armed] Forces cross our [Pakistan] borders by even an inch, we are going to 
annihilate your cities", indicating that if necessary, Pakistanis will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons, as first strike 
policy, in order to defend their motherland. Many defence analysts saw this statement as the first real, although 
subtle, confirmation of Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons and discouraged an Indian invasion of Pakistan's 
territory. 

By mid January, both the Indian army and the Pakistan army were facing each other on the frontiers. The situation 
could have potentially lead to a war between a de facto nuclear weapon state (India — who had already conducted a 
nuclear test in 1974 codename Smiling Buddha) and a state that was believed to be developing nuclear weapons at 
that time (Pakistan). 



Operation Brasstacks 252 

End of Operation Brasstacks 

According to events that played out and stance taken by the Indian army, Operation Brasstacks was only an exercise 
and not supposed to be a provocative one. The media, particularly the western media, was involved after this and 
intense diplomatic maneuvers followed preventing any further escalation in hostilities. 

Indian Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and self-appointed President General Zia-ul-Haq involved in Cricket diplomacy 
to resolve this issue towards a peaceful end. It is also widely quoted that General Zia-ul-Haq, using his military 

confidence to his advantage, threatened and intimidated the Indian prime minister in the same cricket diplomacy 

T31 
during a match by warning him of Pakistani fighter jets loaded with nuclear weapons awaiting orders back home. 

[4] 

Further reading 

• Sunil Dasgupta, 'Operation Brasstacks,' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1996 (book review; notes 
previous coverage of the operation) 

External links 

• http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2010/02/24/indias_futile_talks_with_pakistan/3333/ 

• http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/143245 

• http://www.webcitation.org/query?url=http://www.geocities.com/siafdu/sundarji.html& 
date=2009-10-26+02:34:27 

• http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/aug/05hoon.htm Rediff interview by PN Hoon 

• http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/brass-tacks.htm 

• http://www-personal.umich.edu/~rtanter/S96PS472_Papers/KHAN.ARIFA.PAKISTAN 

• http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-F0RCES/Army/Army-Chiefs/Chiefs-Armyl6.html 

• http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fll902/19021240.htm V.P Singh's statement on the operation 

[1] "pakistanlinkurl=http://pakistanlink.org/Commentary/2006/March06/03/02.HTM". 

[2] "pakistanlinkurl=http://pakistanlink.org/Commentary/2006/March06/03/02.HTM". 

[3] "pakistanlinkurl=http://pakistanlink.org/Commentary/2006/March06/03/02.HTM". 

[4] "israelnationalnews url=http://www. israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/143245". 



Sir Creek 



253 



Sir Creek 



Sir Creek listen is a 96 km (60 mi) strip of water that is disputed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch 
marshlands. The creek, which opens up into the Arabian Sea, divides the Kutch region of the Indian state of Gujarat 
with the Sindh province of Pakistan. It is located at approximately 23°58'N 68°48'E. Originally and locally it is 
called 'Baan Ganga'. Sir Creek is named after the British representative. 

The long-standing dispute hinges in the actual demarcation "from the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek, and 
from the top of Sir Creek eastward to a point on the line designated on the Western Terminus". From this point 
onwards, the boundary is unambiguously fixed as defined by the Tribunal Award of 1968. 

The creek itself is located in the uninhabited marshlands. During the monsoon season between June and September, 
the creek floods its banks and envelops the low-lying salty mudflats around it. During the winter season, the area is 
home to flamingoes and other migratory birds. 



Dispute 

The dispute lies in the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. Before India's 
independence, the provincial region was a part of Bombay Presidency of British India. After India's independence in 
1947, Sindh became a part of Pakistan while Kutch remained a part of India. 

121 
Pakistan lays claim to the entire creek as per paras 9 and 10 of the Bombay Government Resolution of 1914 signed 

i3i 
between the then Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj, the ruler of the princely state of Kutch. 



The resolution, which demarcated the boundaries between the two 
territories, included the creek as part of Sindh, thus setting the 
boundary as the eastern flank of the creek. The boundary line, known 
as the "Green Line", is disputed by India which maintains that it is an 
"indicative line", known as a "ribbon line" in technical jargon. India 
sticks to its position that the boundary lies mid-channel as depicted in 
another map drawn in 1925, and implemented by the installation of 
mid-channel pillars back in 1924 



PAKISTAN 



[4] 




ARABIAN SEA 



The Green Line is the boundary as claimed by 
Pakistan, the red line is the boundary as claimed 
by India. The black line is the undisputed section. 



India supports its stance by citing the Thalweg Doctrine in 

International Law. The law states that river boundaries between two 

states may be, if the two states agree, divided by the mid-channel. 

Though Pakistan does not dispute the 1925 map, it maintains that the 

Doctrine is not applicable in this case as it only applies to bodies of 

water that are navigable, which the Sir Creek is not. India rejects the 

Pakistani stance by maintaining the fact that the creek is navigable in high tide, and that fishing trawlers use it to go 

out to sea. Another point of concern for Pakistan is that Sir Creek has changed its course considerably over the years. 

If the boundary line is demarcated according to the Thalweg principle, Pakistan stands to lose a considerable portion 

of the territory that was historically part of the province of Sindh. Acceding to India's stance would also result in the 

shifting of the land/sea terminus point several kilometres to the detriment of Pakistan, leading in turn to a loss of 

several thousand square kilometres of its Exclusive Economic Zone under the United Nations Convention on Law of 

the Sea. 

In April 1965, a dispute there contributed to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, when fighting broke out between India 
and Pakistan. Later the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to 
end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. A verdict was reached in 1968 which saw Pakistan getting 
10% of its claim of 9,000 km 2 (3,500 sq. miles). 



Sir Creek 254 

The disputed region was at the center of international attention in 1999 after Mig-21 fighter planes of the Indian Air 
Force shot down a Pakistani Navy Breguet Atlantique surveillance aircraft over the Sir Creek on August 10, 1999, 
killing all 16 on board. India claimed that the plane had strayed into its airspace, which was disputed by the Pakistani 
navy. (See the Atlantique Incident). 

Economic reasons 

Though the creek has little military value, it holds immense economic gain. Much of the region is rich in oil and gas 
below the sea bed, and control over the creek would have a huge bearing on the energy potential of each nation. Also 
once the boundaries are defined, it would help in the determination of the maritime boundaries which are drawn as 
an extension of onshore reference points. Maritime boundaries also help in determining the limits of Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves. EEZs extend to 200 nautical miles (370 km) and can be subjected 
to commercial exploitation. 

The demarcation would also prevent the inadvertent crossing over of fishermen of both nations into each others' 
territories. 

Dispute resolution 

Since 1969, there have been eight rounds of talks between the two nations, without a breakthrough. Steps to resolve 
the dispute include: 

1 . Allocation 

2. Delimitation 

3. Demarcation 

4. Administration 

Since neither side has conceded ground, India has proposed that the maritime boundary could be demarcated first, as 

T31 
per the provisions of Technical Aspects of Law of Sea (TALOS). However, Pakistan has staunchly refused the 

proposal on the grounds that the dispute should be resolved first. Pakistan has also proposed that the two sides go in 

for international arbitration, which India has flatly refused. India maintains that all bilateral disputes should be 

resolved without the intervention of third-parties. 

References 

[1] "Kargilisation of Sir Creek" (http://www.tribuneindia.eom/2000/20000307/edit.htm#l). The Tribune, Chandigarh. . Retrieved May 21, 

2006. 
[2] "India-Pakistan talks: Sir Creek" (http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/indpak(sircreek).htm). Embassy of India. . 

Retrieved May 21, 2006. 
[3] "Dialogue on Sir Creek begins" (http://www.hinduonnet.com/2005/05/29/stories/2005052902300900.htm). The Hindu. . Retrieved May 

21, 2006. 
[4] "Sir Creek" (http://ipripak.org/factfiles/ffl8.shtml). Islamabad Policy Research Institute. . Retrieved May 21, 2006. 
[5] "The disputed Sir Creek" (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/south_asia/416806.stm). BBC News. August 10, 1999. . Retrieved May 21, 

2006. 



Sir Creek 255 

Further reading 

• Bharat Bhushan, Tulbul, Sir Creek and Slacken: Competitive Methodologies, South Asian Journal, No. 7 Jan-Mar 
2005 accessed at (http://www.southasianmedia.net/Magazine/journal/7_competitive_methodologies.htm) 

July 26, 2006 

• Indo-Pak composite dialogue: No movement on Sir Creek talks, By Zahid Gishkori, Express Tribune, Published: 
May 22, 2011 (http://tribune.com.pk/story/173672/ 
indo-pak-composite-dialogue-no-movement-on-sir-creek-talks/) 

External links 

• India, Pakistan in border talks (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/6202399.stm) BBC December 22, 
2006 

Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 

The insurgency in Kashmir has existed in various forms. Thousands of lives have been lost since 1989 due to the 
intensification of both the insurgency and the fight against it. 

A widespread armed insurgency started in Kashmir with the disputed 1987 election with some elements from the 
State's assembly forming militant wings which acted as a catalyst for the emergence of armed insurgency in the 

[1][2] 

region. 

The Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan has been accused by India of supporting and training mujahideen. to 
fight in Jammu and Kashmir. According to official figures released in Jammu and Kashmir assembly, there were 
3,400 disappearance cases and the conflict has left more than 47,000 people dead as of July 2009. However, the 
number of insurgency-related deaths in the state have fallen sharply since the start of a slow-moving peace process 
between India and Pakistan. 

History of the insurgency 
1947-1987 

After independence from colonial rule India and Pakistan fought a war over the princely state of Kashmir. At the end 

ro] 

of the war India controlled the most valuable parts of Kashmir. While there were sporadic periods of violence 
there was no organized insurgency movement. 

During this period legislative elections in Jammu and Kashmir were first held in 1951 and Sheikh Abdullah's party 
stood unopposed. However Sheikh Abdullah would fall in and out of favour with the central government and would 
often be dismissed only to be re-appointed later on. This was a time of political instability in Jammu and Kashmir 
and it went through several periods of President's rule by the Federal Government. 



Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 256 

1987-2004 

After Sheikh Abdullah's death, his son Farooq Abdullah took over as Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Farooq 
Abdullah eventually fell out of favour with the Central Government and the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi 
had him dismissed. A year later Farooq Abdullah announced an alliance with the ruling Congress party for the 
elections of 1987. The elections were allegedly rigged in favour of Farooq Abdullah. 

ri2i 
This led to the rise of an armed insurgency movement composed, in part, of those who unfairly lost elections. 

Pakistan supplied these groups with logistical support, arms, recuits and training. 

2004-present 

Beginning in 2004 Pakistan began to end its support for insurgents in Kashmir. This happened because terrorist 

ri4i 

groups linked to Kashmir twice tried to assassinate Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf. His successor, 
Asif Ali Zardari has continued the policy, calling insurgents in Kashmir "terrorists". Although it is unclear if 
Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, thought to be the agency aiding and controlling the 
insurgency is following Pakistan's commitment to end support for the insurgency in Kashmir. 

Despite the change in the nature of the insurgency from a phenomenon supported by external forces to a primarily 
domestic driven movement the Indian government has continued to send large numbers of troops to 

the Indian border and to crack down on civil liberties. 

n si 
There have been widespread protests against Indian rule. 

Once the most formidable face of Kashmir militancy, Hizbul Mujahideen is slowly fading away as its remaining 

T221 
commanders and cadres are being taken out on a regular interval by security forces. 

Reasons for the insurgency 
Humanitarian abuses 

Some analysts have suggested that the number of Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir is close to 600,000 although 

[231 
estimates vary and the Indian government refuses to release official figures. These troops have engaged in 

widespread humanitarian abuses and have engaged in extrajudicial killings. This has led to support for the 

insurgency. However in October 2010, Army Chief Gen VK Singh stated in an interview that over 95% of the 

allegations of human rights violations proved to be false and had apparently been levelled with the "ulterior motive 

of maligning the armed forces". Giving details, he said 988 allegations against the Army personnel in Jammu and 

Kashmir were received since 1994. Out of these 965 cases were investigated and 940 were found false, accounting 

for 95.2 percent. 

Military forces in Jammu and Kashmir operate under emergency powers granted to them by the central government. 
These powers allow the military to curtail civil liberties, creating further support for the insurgency. 

The insurgents have also abused human rights, engaging in what some have called an ethnic cleansing. The 
government's inability to protect the people from both its own troops and the insurgency has further eroded support 
for the government. 



Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 257 

ISI's role 

The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence has allegedly encouraged and aided the Kashmir independence movement 
through an insurgency due to its dispute on the legitimacy of Indian rule in Kashmir, with the 

ro] 

insurgency as an easy way to keep Indian troops distracted and cause international condemnation of India. 

Political rights 

The insurgency was sparked by the rigging of state elections in 1987. This has contributed to anti-government 

sentiment. 

A government report found that almost half of all Kashmiri Panchayat Raj positions were vacant and suggested that 

the reason for this was the destabilizing effect of the conflict. The Panchayat Raj is a system of elected village level 

governance created by the 73rd amendment to the Indian constitution. The report also noted that their ability to 

[291 
effectively govern was "crippled." 

There have been some signs in recent times that the Indian government has begun to take Kashmiri political views 
more seriously, especially those expressed through elections. During the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly 
elections, 2008 the national ruling party chose to form a coalition with the party that won the most votes in order to 
"honour the mandate" of the election even though it was contrary to their immediate interests. 

Mujahideen influence 

After the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, Mujahideen fighters, with the aid of Pakistan, slowly 
infiltrated Kashmir with the goal of spreading a radical Islamist ideology. 

Religion 

Jammu and Kashmir is the only Muslim majority state in Hindu-majority India. Indian-American journalist Asra 
Nomani states that while India itself is a secular state, Muslims are politically, culturally and economically 
marginalized when compared to Hindus in India as a whole. The Government's decision to transfer 99 acres of 
forest land to a Hindu organization solidified this feeling and led to one of the largest protest rallies in Jammu and 
Kashmir. 

Other reasons 

The Indian National Census shows that Kashmir lags behind other states in most socio-development indicators such 

T331 
as literacy rates and has unusually high levels of unemployment. This contributes to anti-government sentiment. 

Kunanposhspora mass rape 

[34] 

Kunan Poshpora Rape incident The Kunan Poshpora mass rape occurred on February 23, 1991, when units of the 
Indian army launched a search and interrogation operation in the village of Kunan Poshpora, located in Kashmir's 
remote Kupwara District. At least 53 women were allegedly gang raped by soldiers that night . However, Human 
Rights organizations including Human Rights Watch have reported that the number of raped women could be as high 
as 100 .February 23, 1991, at least 23 and perhaps as many as 100 women were reported to have been 

raped in the village of Kunan Poshpora by soldiers of the Fourth Raj Rifles, who were posted in Kupwara. Although 
the Indian government's investigations into the incident rejected the allegations as "baseless," international human 
rights organizations have expressed serious doubts about the integrity of these investigations and the manner in 
which they were conducted, stating that the Indian government launched a "campaign to acquit the army of charges 
of human rights violations and discredit those who brought the charges 



Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 258 

According to reports, on February 23, 1991 at approximately 11:00PM soldiers from the 4th Rajputana Rifles 
cordoned off the village of Kunan Poshpora to conduct a search operation. The men were taken from their homes 
and assembled in an open field for interrogation overnight. Once the men had been taken away, soldiers allegedly 
gang raped a large number of village women overnight till 9:00 AM the next day. Local villagers alleged that up to 
100 women "were gang-raped without any consideration of their age, married, unmarried, pregnancy etc., The 
victims ranged in age from 13 to 80. [9] The village headman and other leaders have claimed that they reported the 
rapes to army officials on February 27, but the officials denied the charges and refused to take any further action. 
However, army officials claim that no report was ever made. On March 5, villagers complained to Kupwara district 
magistrate S.M. Yasin, who visited the village on March 7 to investigate. In his final report, he stated that the 
soldiers "behaved like wild beasts" [8] and described the attack as follows: 

A large number of armed personnel entered into the houses of villagers and at gunpoint they gang-raped 
23 ladies, without any consideration of their age, married, unmarried, pregnancy etc... there was a hue 
and cry in the whole village. 

He went on to state: I found the villagers were harassed to the extreme possible extent. In the morning after 9 a.m. 
when the Army left, the village men folk were released and when they entered their houses, they were shocked to see 
that the Army forces have gang raped their daughters, wives, sisters, etc. The armed forces have forcibly taken No 
Objection Certificate from the locals as well as from the local police after doing the illegal action... I feel ashamed 
to put in black and white what kind of atrocities and their magnitude was brought to my notice on the spot. 

On March 18, divisional commissioner Wajahat Habibullah visited the village, and filed a confidential report, parts 
of which were later released to the public. He concluded: "While the veracity of the complaint is highly doubtful, it 
still needs to be determined why such complaint was made at all. The people of the village are simple folk and by the 
Army's own admission have been generally helpful and even careful of security of the Army's officers... Unlike 

Brig. Sharma I found many of the village women genuinely angry ... It is recommended that the level of 

T421 
investigation be upgraded to that of a gazetted police officer. 

In response to criticism of the government's handling of the investigation, the army requested the Press Council of 
India to investigate the incident. The investigative team visited Kunan Poshpora in June, more than three months 
after the alleged attacks. Upon interviewing a number of the alleged victims, the team claimed that contradictions in 
their testimony rendered their allegations of rape "baseless. The Press Council's dismissal of all the Kunan Poshpora 
allegation, and the manner in which it carried out its investigation were widely criticized. Human Rights Watch 
wrote: 

While the results of the examinations by themselves could not prove the charges of rape, they raised serious 
questions about the army's actions in Kunan Poshpora. Under the circumstances, the committee's eagerness to 
dismiss any evidence that might contradict the government's version of events is deeply disturbing. In the end, the 

committee has revealed itself to be far more concerned about countering domestic and international criticism than 

T431 
about uncovering the truth 

The United States Department of State, in its 1992 report on international human rights, rejected the Indian 

government's conclusion, and determined that there was "was credible evidence to support charges that an elite army 

T441 
unit engaged in mass rape in the Kashmiri village of Kunan Poshpora. 

Following the release of the Press Council's report, Indian authorities dismissed all of the allegations of mass rape as 
groundless. No further investigations were conducted. 

In 1994, a Women's Initiative report featured the testimony of several of the alleged victims. Many complained of 
social ostracism from their families and communities because of the "shame" of having been raped. Some of the 
alleged victims reportedly committed suicide after the incident. According to the report, not a single marriage 
proposal had been received for any women, raped or not, in the village for three years after the incident. 



Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 259 

Tactics 
India 

Over time the Indian government has increasingly relied on military presence and a curtailment of civil liberties to 
achieve its aims in Kashmir. The military has committed massive human rights violations. 

For most of the history of the insurgency the government paid little attention to the political views of the Kashmiri 
people. The government would often dissolve assemblies, arrest elected politicians and impose President's rule. The 
government also rigged elections in 1987. In recent times there have been signs that the government is taking 
local elections more seriously. 

The government has also funnelled development aid to Kashmir and Kashmir has now become the biggest per capita 
receiver of Federal aid. 

Pakistan 

The Pakistani central government originally supported, trained and armed the insurgency in Kashmir, however after 
groups linked to the Kashmiri insurgency twice attempted to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf, Musharraf 

ri4i 

decided to end support for such groups. His successor, Asif Ali Zardari has continued the policy, calling 
insurgents in Kashmir "terrorists". 

But the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence hasn't followed the lead of the government and has continued its support 
for insurgent groups in Kashmir although Pakistani support for the insurgency has certainly waned. 

Insurgents 

Since around 2000 the 'insurgency' has become far less violent and has instead taken on the form of protests and 

T321 
marches. Certain groups have also chosen to lay down their arms and look for a peaceful resolution to the 

conflict. 

Groups 

The different insurgent groups have different aims in Kashmir. Some want complete independence from both India 
and Pakistan, others want unification with Pakistan and still others just want greater autonomy from the Indian 
government. 

A 2010 survey found that 43% in J&K would favour independence, with support for the independence movement 

[49] 
unevenly distributed across the region. 

Identity 

Over the last two years, the militant group, Lashkar-e-Toiba has split into two factions: Al Mansurin and Al Nasirin. 
Another new group reported to have emerged is the Save Kashmir Movement. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (formerly 
known as Harkat-ul-Ansar) and Lashkar-e-Toiba are believed to be operating from Muzaffarabad, Azad Kashmir and 
Muridke, Pakistan respectively. 

Other less well known groups are the Freedom Force and Farzandan-e-Milat. A smaller group, Al-Badr, has been 
active in Kashmir for many years and is still believed to be functioning. All Parties Hurriyat Conference, an 
organization that uses moderate means to press for the rights of the Kashmiris, is often considered as the mediator 
between New Delhi and insurgent groups. 



Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir 260 

Al-Qaeda 



It is unclear if Al Qaeda has a presence in Jammu and Kashmir. Donald Rumsfield suggested that they were 

active [50] and in 2002 the SAS hunted for Os 

1521 
established a base in Jammu and Kashmir 



active and in 2002 the SAS hunted for Osama bin Laden in Jammu and Kashmir. Al Qaeda claims that it has 



However there has been no evidence for any of these assertions. The Indian army also claims that there is 

[531 
no evidence of Al Qaeda presence in Jammu and Kashmir. 

Al Qaeda has established bases in Pakistani administered Kashmir and some, including Robert Gates have suggested 
that they have helped to plan attacks in India. 

References 

[I] "Kashmir insurgency" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1989.stm). BBC 
(London: BBC). . Retrieved November 1, 2010. 

[2] Hussain, Altaf (14 September 2002). "Kashmir's flawed elections" (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/2223364.stm). BBC (London: 

BBC). . Retrieved November 1, 2010. 
[3] Pakistan's shadowy secret service - BBC News (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/6033383.stm) 
[4] Nato's top brass accuse Pakistan over Taliban aid - Telegraph (http://www. telegraph. co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/ 10/06/ 

wafghan06.xml) 
[5] At Border, Signs of Pakistani Role in Taliban Surge - New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/21/world/asia/21quetta. 

html) 
[6] A NATION CHALLENGED: THE SUSPECTS; Death of Reporter Puts Focus On Pakistan Intelligence Unit - New York Times (http:// 

query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE7D81F3EF936A15751C0A9649C8B63) 
[7] Indian officials say 3,400 missing in held Kashmir (August 18, 2009; AFP) (http://archives.dawn.com/archives/100977) 
[8] Bose, Sumantm.Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace. Harvard, 2005. 
[9] Swami, Praveen./nt/ia, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad. 2006. 
[10] Altaf, Hussein. (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/2223364.stm) "Kashmir's Flawed Elections" 

[II] BBC News, (http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1989.stm) "Kashmir 
Insurgency" 

[12] Jamar, Ani.The untold story of Jihad in Kashmir. 2009. 

[13] Hasan, Syed Shoaib. (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/4416771.stm) "Why Pakistan is boosting Kashmir militants" 

[14] Khan, Aamer Ahmed. (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/4415823.stm) "Pakistan: Where have the militants gone?" 

[15] Stephens, Bret. (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122307507392703831.html) "The most difficult job in the world" 

[16] Cole, Juan, (http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/feature/2008/12/12/pakistan/index.html) "Does Obama understand his biggest 

foreign-policy challenge?" 
[17] Rediff. (http://www.rediff.eom/news/2002/jun/l lwar4.htm) "Links between ISI, militant groups: Straw" 
[18] The Economist. Stony Ground. July 2010. 
[19] The Economist. Your Place or Mine?. February 2004. 
[20] The Economist. Grim Up North. June 2009. 

[21] BBC News. (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/6367917.stm) "Kashmir's extra-judicial killings" 
[22] "Hizbul Mujahideen almost wiped out in Kashmir" (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ 

Hizbul-Mujahideen-Kashmir-militancys-dominant-face-on-death-bed/articleshow/10408682.cms). The Times Of India. 19 October 2011. . 
[23] Nathan, Joanna, (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article392432.ece) "India's leader makes peace overtures in Kashmir" 
[24] "95% HR violation cases against Army in J&K false" (http://www.zeenews.com/news663426.html). zeenews. . 
[25] Jim Yardley. India Reopens Kashmir's Schools, but Many Stay Away . The New York Times, 27th September 2010. 
[26] Pallone, Frank, (http://www.house.gov/list/press/nj06_pallone/pr_febl5_kashmir.html) "Resolution condemning Human Rights 

Violations against Kashmiri Pandits" 
[27] Human Rights Watch. Rights Abuses Behind Kashmir Fighting July 1999. 

[28] GlobalSecurity.org. (http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/pakistan/isi.htm) "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI]" 
[29] Planning Commission of India Jammu & Kashmir Development Report 2003. 
[30] Ramaseshan, Radhika. (http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081230/jsp/nation/story_10319531.jsp) "Cong dilemma: young Omar or 

PDP" The Telegraph 
[31] Nomani, Asra Q. (http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-nomanil-2008dec01, 0,4752. story) "Muslims -- India's 

new 'untouchables'" Los Angeles Times 
[32] Thottam, Jyoti (http://www.time.eom/time/magazine/article/0, 9171, 1838586, OO.html) "Valley of Tears" Time Magazine, September 

2008 
[33] Government of India Indian National Census 2001 2001. 



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[34] Greater, Kashmir. "Kunanposhspora mass rape echoes in LA" (http://greaterkashmir.com/news/2012/Mar/15/ 

kunanposhspora-mass-rape-echoes-in-la-81.asp) (in Independent MLA Engineer Abdul Rasheed and National Conference MLA, Mir 

Saifullah on Wednesday exchanged heated words in the Legislative Assembly (LA) during Question Hour. As the proceedings of Question 

Hour began Er Rasheed tried to draw the attention of the house towards State Human Right Commission (SHRC) report regarding 

Kunanposhpora mass rape episode.). Jammu, J&K. . Retrieved 15 March 2012. 
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Penguin Books.. (1999).. . 
[36] Mattu, Abdul Majid (2002). Kashmir issue: a historical perspective (http://books.google.co. in/books ?id=AjxuAAAAMAAJ&q=& 

redir_esc=y). srinagar: Ali Mohammad & Sons. pp. 169. . 
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Organisation. 1992. pp. 311. . 
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lpg=PA88&dq=&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false). Asia Watch Committee (U.S.), Patricia Gossman, Human Rights Watch 

(Organization). . 
[39] Abdication of responsibility: the Commonwealth and human rights (http://books. google. co.in/books?hl=en&id=_QTz5PCDvjEC& 

dq=ABDICATION+OF+RESPONSIBILITY&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=NdSFn3CHgd& 

sig=jtwpmYG0dxWzr-M6uARUgh99aJY&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=ABDICATIONOF 

RESPONSIBILITY&f=false). google books: By Human Rights Watch (Organization). . 
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india-moves-against-kashmir-rebels.html). The New York Times. . 
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dq=ABDICATION+OF+RESPONSIBILITY&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=NdSFn3CHgd& 

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RESPONSIBILITY&f=false). By Human Rights Watch (Organization). . 
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nytimes.com/1992/02/01/world/state-department-cites-china-and-other-nations-for-human-rights-abuses.html). http://www.nytimes. 

com. . 
[45] Human Rights Watch, Patricia Gossman. "India's secret army in Kashmir : new patterns of abuse emerge in the conflict ", 1996 
[46] Sanghvi, Vir (http://www.hindustantimes.com/Think-the-Unthinkable/Articlel-331689.aspx) "Think the unthinkable" Hindustan Times, 

August 2008 
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srcid=ADGEEShAKwH9pVW16YC2-dyX6RP_KYtdoG3X7iDlGKwTxaO0O114JdLMf_wKYEJVQ_LinyIgx2I0TWSQAxl2oc8OSyUWAIBHSyTHuVs8XTVl 

sig=AHIEtbQWdbVbaShVvuAURLFsmBS-IR4gog) "Kashmir: Recent Developments and US Concerns", June 2002 
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[49] Bradnock, Robert "Kashmir: Paths to Peace" Chatham House, London, 2008 
[50] Abbas, Zaffar. (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/2043800.stm) "Analysis: Is al-Qaeda in Kashmir?" 
[51] Smith, Michael. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/1385795/SAS-joins-Kashmir-hunt-for-bin-Laden.html) 

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'The template .Iuiiiiiui and Kutlwiir fn'i:dom tiicrc/iic/tt is being eonsitletetl lot deletion.' 



20012002 IndiaPakistan standoff 262 

2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoff 

The 2001—2002 India— Pakistan standoff was a military standoff between India and Pakistan that resulted in the 
massing of troops on either side of the International Border (IB) and along the Line of Control (LoC) in the region of 
Kashmir. This was the second major military standoff between India and Pakistan following the successful 
detonation of nuclear devices by both countries in 1998 and the most recent standoff between the nuclear rivals. The 
other had been the Kargil War. 

The military build up was initiated by India responding to a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 
13, 2001 during which twelve people, including the five men who attacked the building, were killed. India claimed 
that the attacks were carried out by two Pakistan based Terrorist groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), both of whom India has said are backed by Pakistan's Inter 
Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, a charge Pakistan denied. In the Western media, coverage of the standoff 

focused on the possibility of a nuclear war between the two countries and the implications of the potential conflict on 
the United States-led War on Terrorism. Tensions de-escalated following international diplomatic mediation which 
resulted in the October 2002 withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops from the International Border. 

Parliament attack 

On the morning of December 13, 2001, a group of five armed men attacked the Indian Parliament by breaching the 
security cordon at Gate 12. The five men killed seven people before being shot dead by the Parliament security. 

World leaders and leaders in India's immediate neighbourhood condemned the attack on the Parliament, including 
Pakistan. On December 14, the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) blamed Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba 
and Jaish-e-Mohammed for the attack. Home Minister LK Advani claimed, "we have received some clues about 
yesterday's incident, which shows that a neighbouring country, and some terrorist organisations active there behind 

r*7] 

it, in an indirect reference to Pakistan and Pakistan-based militant groups. The same day, in a demarche to 
Pakistani High Commissioner to India Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, India demanded that Pakistan stop the activities of LeT 
and JeM, that Pakistan apprehend the organisation's leaders and that Pakistan curb the financial assets and the 

ro] 

group's access to these assets. In response to the Indian government's statements, Pakistani forces were put on high 
alert the same day. Pakistan military spokesman Major-General Rashid Qureshi claimed that the Parliament attack 
was a "drama staged by Indian intelligence agencies to defame the freedom struggle in 'occupied Kashmir'" and 
further warned that India would pay "heavily if they engage in any misadventure". On December 20, amid calls 
from the United States and the United Nations (UN) to exercise restraint, India mobilised and deployed its troops to 
Kashmir and the Indian part of the Punjab in what was India's largest military mobilization since the 1971 
Indo-Pakistani War. The mobilization was known as Operation Parakram (Sanskrit: Valor). 



20012002 IndiaPakistan standoff 263 

Confrontations 
December- January 

In late December, both countries moved ballistic missiles closer to each other's border, and mortar and artillery fire 
was reported in Kashmir. By January 2002, India had mobilized around 500,000 troops and three armored 

divisions on the Pakistani border concentrated along the Line of Control in Kashmir. Pakistan responded similarly, 

ri7i 
deploying around 300,000 troops to that region. This was the largest buildup on the subcontinent since the 1971 

war. 

On January 12, 2002, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf gave a speech intended to reduce tensions with India. He 

ri2i 
declared that Pakistan would combat extremism on its own soil, but said that Pakistan had a right to Kashmir. 

Indian leaders reacted with skepticism. Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah, a Kashmiri himself 

ri3i 
said that the speech was nothing new, and others said that it would 'not make any change in the Indian stand'. 

ri4i 

Still, tensions eased somewhat. The Indian President told his generals that there would be no attack "for now." 

May-June 

However, tensions escalated dramatically in May. On May 14, three gunmen killed 34 people in an army camp near 
Jammu, most of them the wives and children of Hindu and Sikh soldiers serving in Kashmir. The Army was angered 
by the attack and pressed Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and his cabinet for permission to attack Pakistani military 
targets. On May 18, India expelled Pakistan s ambassador. That same day, thousands of villagers fled Pakistani 
artillery fire in Jammu. On May 2, clashes killed 6 Pakistani soldiers and 1 Indian soldier, as well as civilians 
from both sides. On May 22, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee warned his troops to prepare for a "decisive battle." 

Beginning on May 24 and lasting for several days, Pakistan carried out a series of missile tests. On June 7, an Indian 

ri7i 
UAV was shot down inside Pakistan near the city of Lahore. 

At the same time, attempts to defuse the situation continued. Alarmed at the possibility of nuclear war, the US 

ri Q] 

ordered all non-essential citizens to leave India on May 31. Both Vajpayee and Musharraf blamed each other for 
the standoff, and a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin could not mediate a solution. But by mid-June, the 
Indian government accepted Musharraf s pledge to end militant infiltration into India, and on June 10, air restrictions 

j ri9i 

over India were ended and Indian warships removed from Pakistan s coast. 

While tensions remained high throughout the next few months, both governments began easing the situation in 
Kashmir. By October 2002, India and Pakistan had begun to demobilize their troops along their border, and in 2003 
a cease-fire between the two nations was signed. No threat of conflict on such a grand scale has occurred again since 
2002. 

Cost of standoff 

The Indian cost for the buildup was ^ 21600 crore (US$4.31 billion), while the Pakistani cost was estimated to be 
$1.4 billion. Also it took India months to mobilize and lost 789 men in the process. Around 100 soldiers were killed 
in the initial phase of laying mines, another 250 were injured. The remaining casualties were a result of artillery 
duels with Pakistan and vehicle accidents. 

Threat of nuclear war 

As both India and Pakistan are armed with nuclear weapons, the possibility a conventional war could escalate into a 
nuclear one were raised several times during the standoff. Various statements on this subject were made by Indian 
and Pakistani officials during the conflict, mainly concerning a no first use policy. Indian Foreign Affairs Minister 

Jaswant Singh said on June 5 that India would not use nuclear weapons first, while Musharraf said on June 5 he 

T221 
would not renounce Pakistan's right to use nuclear weapons first. The possession of nuclear weapons by both 



20012002 IndiaPakistan standoff 264 

[231 
parties proved a decisive factor in preventing all out war. A Defense Intelligence Agency report in May 2002 

estimated that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could, in a worst-case scenario, lead to 8—12 million deaths 

n si 
initially and millions more later from radiation poisoning. 

There was also concern that a June 6, 2002 asteroid explosion over Earth, known as the Eastern Mediterranean 

T241 
Event, could have caused a nuclear conflict had it exploded over India or Pakistan. 

References 

[I] "Who will strike first" (http://www. economist.com/printedition/displayStory. cfm?Story_ID=917228), The Economist, December 20, 
2001. 

[2] Jamal Afridi (July 9, 2009). "Kashmir Militant Extremists" (http://www.cfr.org/kashmir/kashmir-militant-extremists/p9135). Council 

Foreign Relations. . Retrieved 4 February 2012. "Pakistan denies any ongoing collaboration between the ISI and militants, stressing a change 

of course after September 11, 2001." 
[3] Perlez, Jane (2008-11-29). "Pakistan Denies Any Role in Mumbai Attacks" (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ll/30/world/asia/30pstan. 

html). Mumbai (India);Pakistan: NYTimes.com. . Retrieved 2012-01-31. 
[4] "Attack on Indian parliament heightens danger of Indo-Pakistan war" (http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/dec2001/ind-d20.shtml). 

Wsws.org. 2001-12-20. . Retrieved 2012-01-31. 
[5] "India to withdraw troops from Pak border" (http://wwwl.timesofindia.indiatimes. com/cms. dll/articleshow?artid=25384627), Times of 

India, October 16, 2002. 
[6] "Pakistan to withdraw front-line troops" (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/world/south_asia/2335599.stm), BBC, October 17, 2002. 
[7] "Parliament attack: Advani points towards neighbouring country" (http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/14parl21.htm), Rediff, 

December 14, 2001. 
[8] "Govt blames LeT for Parliament attack, asks Pak to restrain terrorist outfits" (http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/dec/14parll2.htm), 

Rediff, December 14, 2001. 
[9] "Pakistan forces put on high alert: Storming of parliament" (http://www.dawn.com/2001/12/15/topl.htm), Dawn (newspaper), 

December 15, 2001. 
[10] "Gen. Padmanabhan mulls over lessons of Operation Parakram" (http://www.hindu.com/2004/02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm). 

The Hindu (Chennai, India). February 6, 2004. Archived (http://web.archive.Org/web/20081203233122/http://www.hindu.com/2004/ 

02/06/stories/2004020604461200.htm) from the original on 3 December 2008. . Retrieved 4 December 2008. 

[II] Pakistan, India 'move missiles' to border (http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/12/25/india.pakistan.kashmir. 
missiles) CNN, December 26, 2001. 

[12] Musharraf declares war on extremism (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/1756965.stm), BBC, January 12, 2002. 

[13] "Musharraf s speech greeted with skepticism in India" (http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/may/27war2.htm), Rediff, May 27, 2002. 

[14] "The Stand-off" (http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/02/13/060213fa_fact_coll), The New Yorker, February 13, 2006. 

[15] "India expels Pakistan's ambassador" (http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2002/05/18/india_pak020518.html), CBC.ca, May 18, 2002. 

[16] "Six more Pak soldiers killed" (http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020522/mainl.htm), The Tribune, May 21, 2002. 

[17] "IAF's Searcher-II Loss on June 07, 2002" (http://vayu-sena-aux.tripod.com/other-Parakram-IAF-UAV-Wreckage.html). 

Vayu-sena-aux.tripod.com. . Retrieved 2012-03-01. 
[18] "Disarmament Diplomacy: News Review — India and Pakistan Camped on Brink of War over Kashmir" (http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/ 

dd65/65nr01.htm). Acronym.org.uk. . Retrieved 2012-03-01. 
[19] India-Pakistan Conflict (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak.htm), globalsecurity.org 
[20] Aditi Phadnis (January 16, 2003). "Parakram cost put at Rs 6,500 crore" (http://www.rediff.com/money/2003/jan/16defence.htm). 

Redijf.com India Limited. Archived (http://web.archive.Org/web/20030203133106/http://www.rediff.com/money/2003/jan/ 

16defence.htm) from the original on 2003-02-03. . Retrieved 2012-03-20. 
[21] "India will not use nuclear weapons first: Singh" (http://web.archive.org/web/2008120519421 l/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ 

mi_m0WDQ/is_2002_June_3/ai_86623659). BNET. June 3, 2002. Archived from the original (http://www.findarticles.eom/p/articles/ 

mi_m0WDQ/is_2002_June_3/ai_86623659) on 2008-12-05. . Retrieved 2012-03-20. 
[22] Irish Examiner — 2002/06/05: "Musharraf refuses to renounce first use of nuclear weapons" (http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2002/ 

06/05/story 29703. asp), Irish Examiner, June 5, 2002 
[23] "IPRI :: Islamabad Policy Research Institute" (http://ipripak.org/papers/india-pakistan.shtml). Ipripak.org. . Retrieved 2012-01-13. 
[24] "Near-Earth Objects Pose Threat, General Says" (http://www.spacedaily.com/news/deepimpac